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Abstract
Introduction Escherichia coli 0157 is a major cause of serious infectious
gastrointestinal illness in the developed world, exacting a high toll in terms of both
morbidity and economic costs, with the cost of a single case as high as £3 million.
Some of the highest rates of cases, approximately 20% of which are part of
outbreaks, have been reported in Scotland, Canada, and the United States. Despite
the efforts put into surveillance, it is estimated that up to 95% of cases go undetected.
Additionally, there has been little published research on temporal trends in outbreaks
or cases, the nature of primary and secondary outbreak cases or the true prevalence
of cases in Scotland. Improved knowledge about long term trends, the epidemiology
of outbreaks and actual case prevalence could help focus and improve surveillance
efforts and reduce the number and impact of cases.
Aims and Methods The aim of this thesis is firstly to provide an introduction to the
current knowledge on E. coli 0157 and the statistical techniques to be used in the
thesis, including a background E. coli 0157 epidemiology and transmission.
Next, using data sets provided by Health Protection Scotland (Scotland), Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (United States) and the Public Health Agency of
Canada (Canada), temporal trends in outbreaks and cases in each country will be
analysed used linear and generalised linear models to determine whether these trends
can be modelled using simple linear models, and if so, whether or not the trends are
statistically significant. Where possible, trends in the three countries will then be
compared using analysis of covariance to see if there are any statistically significant
differences between countries. The correlation between ill and ill and positive cases
will be compared across countries. The results will be discussed in relation to the
issues and limitations involved in analysing date within countries and between
countries with differing populations and surveillance systems.
Data on laboratory confirmed primary and secondary cases from outbreaks in
Scotland, England, Wales, Japan, Canada, United States, Scandinavia and Ireland
will be obtained from published papers, and the outbreaks will be described in terms
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ofmode of transmission (food, milk, water, animal contact/environmental or
nursery), country, case numbers and median age of cases (<6, 6-16, 17-59, >60).
Statistical procedures will be used to check for statistically significant differences in
the log-transformed number of ill, confirmed, primary and (untransformed)
secondary cases and compare secondary case rates between countries, modes of
transmission and median age categories.
The final section will present a framework, based on the truncated negative binomial
distribution, for estimating the true prevalence ofE. coli in Scotland. The framework
can demonstrate which distributions of outbreak sizes and actual event detection
probabilities (sporadic cases + outbreaks) best explain the observed distribution of
event sizes.
Results It was found that most outbreak and case trends between 1996 and 2004 in
Scotland, 1996 and 2003 in Canada, and 1998 and 2004 in the United States could be
described using simple linear models. In each of the three countries, the inability to
fit simple linear models to particular trends could generally be ascribed to the effect
of one or two disproportionately large outbreaks which acted as outliers and to low
number of data points. In Scotland there were statistically significant decreases over
time in the number of sporadic cases, the number of foodborne cases and the number
of ill cases per outbreak, while in United States, the trend in the number of ill cases
from outbreaks decreased statistically significantly. Lastly, in Canada, a statistically
significant increase exists in the trends in the number of outbreaks, both overall and
in those spread person to person and by water.
When the trends in the number of outbreaks, ill cases and outbreak size were
compared between countries, there were few statistically significant differences.
These differences were likely due to the substantial amount of data missing from the
Canadian data set. The results from this comparison of temporal trends and the
analyses of the trends in each country provide the first statistical analysis of temporal
trends in outbreaks within and between countries.
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Statistical analyses of the primary and secondary cases in outbreaks indicated that
approximately 19% of outbreak cases are secondary. In addition there were very few
statistically significant differences in secondary or primary case characteristics
between countries, with the results suggesting that median age and mode of
secondary transmission are more important in determining the rate of secondary
cases in an outbreak.
The framework for estimation of true event and cases prevalence ofE. coli 0157 was
explored using data from Scotland between 1996 and 2004. Several potentially
appropriate models were presented, all suggesting that the level of under-reporting in
Scotland is greater than 99%. The exploration raised a number of issues with the
framework, most importantly that of differences in the definition of a sporadic cases
in Scotland and in the framework. These issues were discussed, with suggestions for
changes and adjustments to the framework so that it might be more appropriate for
prevalence estimation.
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In 1972, Danish researchers identified two new Escherichia coli (E. coli) antigens,
0159 and 0157, in porcine samples (Furowicz & Orskov 1972). A decade later, a
strain ofE. coli with one of those antigens - 0157 — emerged through a series of
haemorrhagic uraemic syndrome (HUS) cases and outbreaks in the United States,
Canada and the United Kingdom (CDC 1983; Day et al. 1983; Johnson et al. 1983;
Lior 1983; O'Brien et al. 1983; Riley et al. 1983; Wells et al. 1983) as a major
contributor to severe infectious gastrointestinal illness. In 2007, twenty five years
after the first reported outbreak of E. coli 0157, infections remain a significant
public health issue, especially in terms ofmorbidity and mortality in children (Beutin
2006; Welinder-Olsson 2005) and financial cost (Frenzen et al. 2005; Roberts &
Upton 2000).
The number of cases - estimated to be as high as 73,400 per year in the United States
(Mead et al. 1999), 21,600 to 103,000 in Canada (Thomas et al. 2006) and 1600 in
England and Wales (Adak et al. 2002) - is high, but it is the associatedmortality and
morbidity that make E. coli 0157 infections a particularly significant public health
issue. In the United States and England & Wales, between 20% and 50% of persons
with E. coli 0157 are hospitalised and 0.8 to 1.2% of infected persons die (Adak et
al. 2002; Chalker & Blaser 1988; van de Giessen et al. 2006; Voetsch et al. 2004b).
These rates are much higher than in Campylobacter and non-typhoidal Salmonella
where only up to 24% of infected persons are hospitalised and 0.015 to 0.2% die
(Adak et al. 2002; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2006c; Chalker &
Blaser 1988; Mead et al. 1999; Voetsch et al. 2004b).
There are a number of reasons that these high rates of illness and death are a
particular public health concern: the considerable financial costs associated, the
number of severe illnesses and deaths in young children, and the increasing evidence
of long term effects from infections. A study in the United States estimated that the
cost ofE. coli 0157 infections in the United States for 2003 was $405 million, with
the costs for single cases with complications as high as $6.2 million (Frenzen et al.
2005). An earlier study of a 1994 outbreak in Scotland suggested that cost per case
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that developed HUS was approximately £62,400, with the long term costs of the
outbreak over 30 years exceeding £168, 032 per case or £11.9 million total (Roberts
et al. 2000). The outbreak resulted in £600,000 of hospital costs despite being
controlled within 36 hours of the time it was recognised (Roberts 2000). Much of
the illness and death in outbreaks is related to HUS in children (see 1.5.2), as will be
discussed below and in section 1.6.5. As approximately 15% of children under the
age of 10 who are infected with E. coli 0157 progress to HUS (Tarr et al. 2005), 3-
5% of those with HUS die and a further 12-30% have severe sequelae (Nataro &
Kaper 1998), a high rate ofE. coli infection is a serious public health issue.
Furthermore, a number of recent studies suggest that even infections with non-severe
milder symptoms may have long term detrimental health effects (Garg et al. 2005).
For instance, less than five years after the Walkerton Outbreak in Canada, the
increase in risk of hypertension and reduced kidney function was significantly
associated with the severity of symptoms during the outbreak (Garg et al. 2005).
Increased rates of irritable bowel disease were also seen in infected persons from the
Walkerton Outbreak (Marshall et al. 2006). These long term sequelae add to the
financial burden of the disease in terms of medical cost and lost productivity, and
thus each case prevented reduces personal and economic cost.
The continued public health significance ofE. coli 0157 infections, in particular the
potential for high levels ofmorbidity, has been demonstrated by a series ofwell-
publicised, large outbreaks of 50 or more cases which took place in many countries
in the last three years. In 2005, cross contamination between raw and cooked meat
products in a Welsh butcher shop resulted in the largest ever reported in outbreak in
Wales. The outbreak involved 118 persons with confirmed infections, one ofwhom
- a young boy - died (Outbreak Control Team - NHS Wales 2007). The following
year two major multi-state outbreaks, each involving more than 70 cases, occurred in
the United States. In the first outbreak, contaminated bagged spinach sickened 205
people, 103 (50%) ofwhom were hospitalised; at least three deaths were linked the
outbreak (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2006h). A subsequent
outbreak with probable links to food items at Taco Bell restaurants resulted in at least
71 cases and 75% of ill persons had to be hospitalised (Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention 2006d). That same year, Scotland experienced its first outbreak of
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sorbitol fermenting E. coli 0157, an event of concern because this type of E. coli
0157 is much more difficult to detect using standard laboratory methods (Incident
Control Team NHS Fife 2007), and a young child died in an unrelated infection
(BBC 2006). E. coli 0157 continues to be of concern in 2007, with at least two
outbreaks in Scotland in the last two months (Health Protection Scotland 2007c;
Health Protection Scotland 2007d) and, at the time of this writing, an ongoing recall
ofmore than 21 million pounds ofminced beef in the United States (United States
Department ofAgriculture 2007b) associated with at least 40 cases ofE. coli 0157
infection (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2007d). That such widespread
contamination could occur despite the prevention efforts by the government and the
meat industry (Wachsmuth et al. 1997), suggests that minced-beef associated
infections remain a risk and thus a public health issue of note. The occurrence of the
two above mentioned outbreaks related to lettuces and spinach reinforces the
significance of infections as a public health issue, particular as salad greens cannot
be cooked or pasteurised like milk products or meat.
With E. coli 0157 infections still a major issue, a great deal of research has been, and
is being conducted. Particular foci have been the control of the bacteria in cattle
(Duffy 2003; Matthews et al. 2006a; Naylor et al. 2005; Shaw et al. 2004; Sheng et
al. 2006), risk factors for infection (Bryant et al. 1989; Coia et al. 1998; Locking et
al. 2001; Mead et al. 1997; Parry et al. 1998; Voetsch et al. 2006; Werber et al. 2007)
and mechanisms of infection (Caprioli et al. 2005; Sussman 1997; Vallance et al.
2002).
1.1.2 Overall aims
However, there are a number of important epidemiological issues that have not been
addressed in the published literature. These issues - comparison of temporal trends
between countries, estimating the rate of secondary cases in outbreaks and estimating
true infection prevalence in Scotland - involve the analysis of outbreaks as a whole,
rather than outbreak by outbreak. The overall aim of this thesis was first to model
temporal trends in E. coli 0157 cases and outbreaks, where appropriate, using simple
linear models, and to compare the modelled trends between countries to gain
knowledge about the possible epidemiological factors involved in E. coli 0157
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infection. Emerging from this study is the aim of creating and testing a framework to
provide a more accurate estimation of true infection prevalence in Scotland. Finally,
using data from published outbreak reports, the last aim is to estimate the overall
proportion of outbreak cases which are the result of secondary transmission and to
determine whether median age, country, modes of primary transmission or mode of
secondary transmission have a statistically significant effect on the rate of secondary
cases in outbreaks.
1.1.3 Chapters 2-6: Comparison of temporal trends
In the first section of this thesis, the aim is to compare temporal trends in E. coli
0157 between countries in order to better understand the epidemiology of the
bacterium with the apriori hypothesis that it is possible to fit simple linear models to
such trends.
There has been very little statistical analysis of long term temporal trends in
individual countries, including those which have had high national or regional rates
of infection such as Scotland, Canada and the United States. Instead, most published
analyses have been descriptive in nature and/or focused on outbreak investigations
(see Chapter 7, Table 7.2 for an extensive listing of published outbreak reports). This
emphasis on descriptive and outbreak reports likely results from the need of
infectious disease agencies such as Health Protection Scotland to place a primary
emphasis on acute issues such as the investigation and control of outbreaks, and the
lack of consistent long term surveillance data sets. Yet, analyses and between-
country comparisons of temporal trends are important because they have the
potential to reveal possible long term trends, suggest as to whether prevention
programs are having an effect on case and outbreak trends, and suggest as to whether
epidemiological factors affecting E. coli 0157 infection trends are linked to within-
country factors.
With a national level outbreak data set available for Canada for the first time, and
more than eight years of data now available in existing surveillance data sets from
Scotland and the United States, temporal trend comparison between these countries
is now possible. Inclusion of other countries, such as England & Wales and Japan in
the comparison would be of interest, but data is not available.
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Thus, the aim in the next four chapters is to compare temporal trends in both cases
and outbreaks between Scotland, the United States and Canada, where possible, in
particular relating to modes of transmission to see which trends are statistically
significant. In order that the comparisons are both statistically feasible given the
relatively low number of data points and potentially explainable in terms of
biological mechanisms, analytic methods are limited to simple linear models.
However, before comparisons can be made, the data set from each country will have
to be considered and the trends modelled statistically. For instance, studies have
suggested that in Scotland there has been in a shift in predominant modes of
transmission from food to modes such as water and animal exposure (Strachan et al.
2006). Statistical models might be able to indicate whether this trend is statistically
significant.
Chapter 2 will provide an introduction to the comparison, including a presentation of
the issues involved in comparing data between countries, and an introduction to the
statistical methods using in modelling of temporal trends. The subsequent three
chapters will present the results from the modelling of the trends within each country
(in order): Scotland, I Tnited States and Canada. The sixth chapter of the thesis will
present the comparison of temporal trends between Scotland, the United States and
Canada with a discussion of the trends that can be compared, particularly whether or
not there are any statistically significant differences between countries. Additionally,
there will be a further exploration of any issues that were anticipated or arise with
regards to the comparability of data. These include factors such as large outbreaks or
shifts in surveillance methods which significantly affect temporal trends, as well as
the differing time periods for which data was available and the comparability of
mode of transmission categories between countries.
1.1.4 Chapter 7: Secondary cases in outbreaks
The aim of the analyses in Chapter 7 is to estimate the rate of secondary spread in E.
coli 0157 and determine whether the mode of primary or secondary transmission,
country and age of cases have a statistically significant effect on the rate. The
research for this thesis on secondary cases developed out of an initial exploration of
factors that might affect parameters in the distribution of outbreak sizes (Chapter 8).
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Outbreak reports and observations in some literature reviews suggest that secondary
cases, cases in which infection is not acquired from the original source of the
infection, but from direct or indirect (e.g. though water) contact with another infected
person, may account for as many as 40% of cases (Armstrong et al. 1996; Locking et
al. 2003a; Locking et al. 2004; Locking et al. 2006a; Parry & Palmer 2005).
Secondary cases are often noted in outbreaks which occur in locations such as
nurseries, nursing/care homes or private households. Such locations frequently have
a high proportion ofpersons - the young, ill and elderly - who are at a higher risk for
severe outcomes. Additionally, the severity of outcomes in secondary cases may be
equivalent to that for primary cases (Locking et al. 2006a). However while Scotland
has published annual data on the proportion of secondary cases overall (outbreak and
sporadic cases) (Locking et al. 2003a; Locking et al. 2004; Locking et al. 2006a),
there has been little systematic quantification or characterisation of secondary
outbreak cases in the published literature.
The study in Chapter 7 aims to fill this gap in the published literature by using data
from published outbreak reports to estimate the rate of secondary cases in outbreaks
and to analyse the relationships between primary and secondary cases by mode of
transmission, country and age of cases. The results of the analyses will provide
insight on whether factors such as age, country and mode of transmission affect the
rate of secondary cases in outbreaks. Information on which, if any, factors are
associated with higher rates of secondary cases could potentially be helpful in
targeting programs aimed at reducing secondary transmission in outbreaks.
1.1.5 Chapter 8: New framework for the estimation of case prevalence
In Chapter 8, the aim is to develop a framework to estimate the true E. coli 0157
infection prevalence. The need for a tool to estimate of infection prevalence that had
less uncertainty than the reporting triangle-based estimations emerged out of the
work on modelling of temporal trends which involved incomplete data sets. A priori,
the hypothesis was that the actual prevalence ofE. coli 0157 infections in Scotland
could be modelled based on the known distribution of detected event size and a
hypothesised function of the probability of case detection.
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A series of studies from the United States, Canada and England & Wales have
indicated that E. coli 0157 infections are significantly under-reported - with high
estimates suggesting that as many as 98% of infections may not be reported to
national surveillance agencies (Adak et al. 2002; Bender et al. 2004; Michel et al.
2000; Thomas et al. 2006). However, the current studies have relied on data from
surveys which calculated the number of cases lost to surveillance at each stage
between infection and reporting to the surveillance agency (see Chapter 1.9 for more
detail on these stages) or on estimates of hospitalisation rates. Such stepwise
estimation methods are known to have inaccuracies and provide wide ranges of
estimates (Adak et al. 2002; Bender et al. 2004; Michel et al. 2000; Thomas et al.
2006). This is because the calculations may, for instance, be based only on data from
one specific region within a country resulting in bias due to differences in underlying
rate or physician/lab practices. Also, any error is compounded from step to step. No
study estimating true prevalence has ever been published for Scotland, despite
Scotland having had some of the highest rates of reported infection in the world.
Yet, an accurate estimation of infection prevalence is of importance because it would
allow the need for prevention and treatment resources to be more accurately
calculated, and thus ensure that enough funding is allocated for treatment, prevention
and research. In particular, given the historically high rates of infection in Scotland
as compared to other developed countries, it would be of interest to determine
whether the high rates reflect a true high prevalence or rather a higher rate of case
detection.
Given these issues, the eighth chapter of this thesis proposes and explores the use of
a framework for estimating E. coli 0157 infection prevalence using the Scottish data.
The framework is based on the assumption that every infection/case is part of an
event, whether the event is a sporadic case or an outbreak, and while an event is
either detected or not, not all of the cases in an event are necessarily detected. The
use of survey data is avoided by calculating the true number of cases based on the
distribution of the proportions of detected event sizes, which is constructed from a
matrix based on the distribution of actual event occurrence and function of case
detection. If a model can be constructed in which the distribution of the proportions
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of detected event size occurrence matches that observed in Scotland, it can be used to
estimate the true prevalence of infection.
Not only does it have the potential to provide a more accurate estimate of infection
prevalence, this new approach can demonstrate what sized outbreaks are being
missed by surveillance. This information, partnered with data from estimates based
on surveys, might be able to provide a more detailed and accurate estimate of gaps in
current surveillance systems and suggest foci for improving surveillance systems. In
this thesis, the framework will be presented with a discussion of how the appropriate
distributions/functions and parameters were selected. Models of the distribution of
detected event sizes will also be constructed using the framework, and presented in
order to determine whether the approach can be used to accurately estimate model
prevalence.
1.1.6 Conclusion
The aim of the studies presented in these eight chapters involves first the comparison
of temporal trends in Scotland, the United States and Canada (Chapters 2 -6) using
simple linear models. From this research emerges need for a better estimate of
infection prevalence, addressed by the development of a different framework for
estimating E. coli 0157 infection prevalence with application to the Scottish data
(Chapter 8). Lastly, to look at factors which may affect the size of outbreaks,
secondary case rates in outbreaks will be estimated and the significance of country,
mode of primary and secondary transmission and age in secondary case rate will be
analysed (Chapter 7).
1.2 Introduction to the literature review
First however, a background to E. coli 0157 will be provided, with a particular focus
on topics pertinent to the analyses in this thesis, including verotoxins, modes of
transmission, methods of detection and case and outbreak epidemiology. Whilst a
general background to E. coli 0157 will be provided, the particular focus is on topics
that are of relevance to and provide a background to the studies in Chapters 2-8.
These include verotoxins, modes of transmission, methods of E. coli 0157 case
detection, case types (outbreak and sporadic), outbreak detection, outbreak and
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sporadic case surveillance and methods of analysing temporal trends. Information
was obtained both from books and from searches of databases including Web of
Science and Medline using one or more of the terms "VTEC", "STEC", "0157",
"verotoxins", "outbreaks", "infectious intestinal illness" and "infectious
gastrointestinal illness". Search terms for data on methods of assessing under¬
reporting and estimating prevalence also included "underreporting", "burden of
illness", "estimation of prevalence", "prevalence", "reporting triangle" and "burden".
Additional data was obtained from posters presented at the VTEC 2006 conference
in Melbourne, Australia, the websites of Health Protection Scotland (HPS), the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Public Health Agency of
Canada (PHAC) as well as from conversations and correspondence with
epidemiologists at HPS, the CDC and the PHAC.
1.3 Molecular and microbiological background
1.3.1 E. coli
E. coli, a common species of gram-negative bacteria (e.g. not stained by gram stain)
is an important part of the normal human and mammalian intestinal flora (Kaper et
al. 2004), however not all strains are innocuous to human hosts (Nataro & Kaper
1998).
Figure 1.1: Structure of an Escherichia coli
The structure of an Escherichia coli, showing the locations of the O, K and H antigens.
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The bacterium is short and rod shaped with flagella that contain H antigens.
Lipopolysaccharides, which contain the O antigens, are found at the border of the
outer cell membrane and the capsule (Fig. 1.1) (Murray et al. 2002; Sussman 1997).
Strains are classified both by their O (lipopolysaccharide or somatic), K (capsular)
and H (flagellar) surface antigens, with serogroups defined by the O antigen and
serotypes by both O and H antigens, and by the nature of their pathogenicity in
humans (i.e. "pathotypes") (Naylor et al. 2005). At least 170 O antigens, 56 H
antigens and 80 K antigens have been identified (Orskov & Orskov 1992). There are
six classes ofE. coli which are known to cause gastrointestinal illness in humans -
enterohaemorrhagic E. coli (EHEC), enteroinvasive E. coli (EIEC), enteropathogenic
E. coli (EPEC), enteroaggregative E. coli (EAEC), diffusely adherent E. coli
(DAEC) and enterotoxigenic E. coli (Kaper et al. 2004). This review will focus on
EHEC.
1.3.2 Enterohaemorrhagic E. coli
EHEC strains are defined by the production of the virulence factor Shiga toxin (Stx,
also known as verocytotoxin (Vt)) (see 1.3.3) and the ability to adhere to and interact
with intestinal cells via the presence of the locus of enterocyte effacement (LEE).
This is a 35kb gene segment which encodes the ability of the bacteria to attach and
interact with intestinal epithelial cells (Kaper et al. 2004). Infection by EHEC in
humans is characterised by haemorrhagic colitis - bloody diarrhoea and HUS. Of
the EHEC serogroups, including 026, Olll and 0103, the most important and high
profile in North America, the United Kingdom and Japan is E. coli 0157 (Caprioli et
al. 2005; Kaper et al. 2004).
1.4 E. coli 0157
1.4.1 History
The 0157 serogroup of E. coli was first identified in pigs in 1972 (Furowicz &
Orskov 1972), but not recognized as a human pathogen for another decade (Riley et
al. 1983). At that time the serotype E. coli 0157:H7 was linked to two outbreaks of
bloody diarrhoea and HUS in Oregon and Michigan attributed to consumption of
undercooked minced beef (Riley et al. 1983), as well as being linked to cases or
outbreaks in Canada (CDC 1983; Lior 1983) and the United Kingdom (Day et al.
1983). Simultaneously, Karmali and colleagues made the connection between HUS
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and a cytotoxin produced by strains ofE. coli (Karmali et al. 1983), and the
cytotoxin, verotoxin, was thereafter identified in the serotype isolated in the initial
HUS outbreaks (O'Brien et al. 1983). However, evidence from retrospectively tested
specimens and serum samples has implicated E. coli 0157 in cases ofHUS as far
back as 1974 in the United States (Riley et al. 1983), the United Kingdom (Day et al.
1983), Canada (Johnson et al. 1983) and the Netherlands (Chart et al. 1991). It is
thought that the 0157:H7 serotype evolved from E. coli 055:H7 strains which
acquired new virulence factors - attributes that allow the bacteria to successfully
invade hosts - via lateral transfer (Whittam 1998). Lateral transfer includes
transduction, in which genetic material is transferred from cell to cell via phages
(short for bacteriophage), viruses containing either RNA or DNA which infect
bacteria (Griffiths et al. 1996). The verotoxin genes, which are the key virulence
factors in E. coli 0157, are thought to have been acquired via transduction (Whittam
1998).
1.4.2 Structure
E. coli 0157 (Figures 1.1 and 1.2) is an anaerobic bacteria (Coia 1998a) with O
antigen type 157 (Griffin and Tauxe, 1991).
Figure 1.2: Transmission electron micrograph of Escherichia coli 0157:H7
A transmission electron micrograph ofE. coli Oi57:H7 showing the flagella. The image is taken
from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention's Public Health Image Library, provided by
Peggy S. Hayes and credited to Elizabeth H. White.
Within the Ol 57 serogroup, the most important serotype is 0157:H7, though the non
motile (NM or H-) serotype is also included in sections of this thesis. The
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chromosome for E. coli 0157 is approximately 5.5 Mb in length (Hayashi et al.
2001), which is in the middle of the genome size spectrum for bacteria, and the
bacterium normally contains p0157, a 60MDa plasmid involved in virulence and
found in most 0157 strains and in other EHEC strains (Nataro & Kaper 1998), and
produces one or both of two verocytotoxins (Vtxs) (Mead & Griffin 1998).
1.4.3 Verotoxins
The vast majority of 0157 E. coli, including 0157:H7, are verocytotoxin/shiga-
toxin-producing E. coli (VTEC or STEC), meaning that they produce verotoxins
(Sussman, 1997). (All EHEC are VTEC, however there are VTEC which are not
EHEC). These verotoxins, verotoxin 1 (Vtl) and verotoxin 2 (Vt2), so named
because of their toxicity to cultured Vero cells (a lineage ofAfrican green monkey
kidney epithelial cells frequently used in cell culture) (Konowalchuk et al., 1977),
are often called Shiga-like toxins (SLTs, stxs) because of their similarity to the Shiga
toxin ofShigella dysenteriae (Noel & Boedeker 1997). Vtl differs from Shiga toxin
by only a single amino acid (Feng, 1995; Coia et al., 1998), with two variants Vtlc
and Vtld (Karch et al. 2005) having been identified in recent years. Vtlc is
generally associated with mild clinical symptoms, whilst there as ofyet no data
linking Vtld to specific clinical outcomes (Kuczius et al. 2004). Vt2, which is 55-
60% homologous with Vtl (Coia 1998a; Kaper et al. 2004) has four variants: 2c, 2d,
2e and 2f (Ochoa and Cleary, 2003). These variants differ mostly in their b subunit,
the amino acid sequences ofwhich have from 84% to 98% homology with Vt2
(Melton-Celsa and O'Brien, 1998). Strains ofE. coli 0157:H7 may contain one or
both of these toxins - those with neither are not considered to be VTEC.
Of the two Vt types, Vt2 is much more common in human infections, occurring in
more than 85% of isolates in Scotland from 2002-2004 (Locking et al. 2003b;
Locking et al. 2003a; Locking et al. 2004; Locking et al. 2006a), England & Wales
from 1992-2003 the EU in 2000 (Fisher 2002), Washington State in 1987 (Ostroff et
al. 1989), and Canada from 1994 - 2000 (Woodward et al. 2002). However, the
proportions of strains that also produce Vtl vary widely between countries, though
the variation within countries is much less pronounced over time. In England and
Wales, the percentage of isolates between 1992 and 2003 that were positive for both
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Vtl and Vt2 ranged from 19% to 28% (Table 1.1) and in Scotland fewer than 16% of
isolates were Vtl+Vt2+ (Thomson-Carter et al., 1996; Locking et al., 2003).
Table 1.1: Verocytotoxin gene types oiE. coli 0157 isolates in England & Wales: 1989 - 2003
The percentage of isolates or outbreaks from England and Wales for each three-year or single year
period which produced only Vt2, Vtl and Vt2 or only Vtl. Data from (Frost et al., 1993; Thomas et
al., 1996) (Willshaw et al., 2001a; Health Protection Agency, 2004). Blanks indicate where no
information was provided in the source.
Vt 2 only Vt 1 and Vt 2 Vt 1 only
1989-91 82% of outbreaks
1992-94 75.4% 24.1% 0.5%
1995 80.2% 19.2% 0.6%
1996 76.1% 23.3% 0.6%
1997 72.8% 26.1% 1.1%
1998 74.7% 24.6% 0.7%
1999 78% 21% <1%
2000 72% 27% <1%
2001 76% 23% <1%
2002 76% 23%
2003 71% 28% <1%
Contrastingly in North America & Japan, nearly three quarters of isolates have both
Vtl and Vt2 (Mead and Griffin, 1998). For instance, 80% of 444 isolates tested in
Canada in 1995 were positive for both VT types, and both types were found in
samples from 16 of 22 (73%) outbreaks in the United States from 1982 to 1993
(Strockbine et al., 1998). Over time, as illustrated by Table 1.1, the percentages of
isolates that were Vtl+Vt2+ only varied between 19% and 28% over 11 years (Frost
et al., 1993; Thomas et al., 1996) (Willshaw et al., 2001a; Health Protection Agency,
2004). The presence ofVtl alone is very rare, comprising less than 2% of cases in
Canada and England & Wales (Table 1.1) and not found in recent years in Scotland
(Locking et al. 2003b; Locking et al. 2003a; Locking et al. 2004; Locking et al.
2006a; Woodward et al. 2002).
Vt2 is 100 times more toxic to rabbits than Vtl (Noel & Boedeker 1997), and the
presence of Vt2 has been associated with a greater severity of disease in humans
(Friedrich et al. 2002). Vt2-only strains have the highest risk ofHUS, whilst those
with just Vtl, the lowest (Friedrich et al. 2002; Melton-Celsa & O'Brien 1998;
Ostroff et al. 1989). For instance, in England & Wales, between 1983 and 1994, 90%
of isolates from E. coli 0157 infected persons with HUS contained just Vt2, while
overall only 70% of isolates were Vt2+Vtl-. In 1995-2001, the percentage of Vt2+
only rose to 96% for isolates from HUS patients and 76% for all isolates (Smith et
al., 2003).
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However, whilst it is clear from the studies discussed above that verotoxin type has
an important role in determining pathogenicity, the data sets provided by the three
health organisations Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Public
Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) and Health Protection Scotland (HPS) and used in
thesis do not include data on Vt type. Thus no analysis or comparison ofVt type
trends could be performed. Additionally, analysis ofVt type as a potential factor in
secondary case rate was precluded by the lack of data on Vt type provided in
published reports.
Vt production alone does not make an E. coli 0157 strain capable of causing disease.
It has been suggested that the 60 MDa virulence plasmid and the LEE are also vital
for pathogenicity. The plasmid contains the gene for a haemolysin, which may help
the bacteria to obtain iron from blood and the LEE codes for factors that play a vital
role in allowing the bacteria to attach to the intestinal epithelial cells (Mead and
Griffin, 1998). Other virulence factors include colonization factors such as Intimin
(genes for which are in the LEE), ToxB, Saa and Efa-l/LifA, effectors such as EspP,
EspF, EspH, and toxins including StcE and Ehx (Kaper et al. 2004).
1.4.4 Phage type
Phage typing was one of the earliest methods that emerged for categorizing E. coli
0157:H7 strains and is still widely used (Strockbine et al. 1998) in countries like
Scotland (Locking et al. 2006a). It most often used for preliminary linking of
individual cases to identify potential outbreaks because the procedure is not time
intensive. However, the availability of phage typing is limited as few labs are able to
accommodate the upkeep of phage stocks. The procedure involves exposing a isolate
sample to a battery of selected lytic phages and noting the lysis pattern that results
(Strockbine et al., 1998). Each phage type (PT) has a unique series of lytic patterns.
The current phage-typing scheme for E. coli 0157, used in many countries including
Canada and Scotland, was set up in 1987 (Ahmed et al. 1987) and expanded in 1990
to recognize 62 distinct phage types (Khakhria et al. 1990). It has since been further
expanded to approximately 82 phage types (PTs) (Strockbine et al. 1998), though the
phage types ofE. coli 0157 referred to as PT 28 in Scotland and PT 21 in England &
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Wales were shown to be (nearly) identical, and thus in 1998, it was agreed that the
phage type should be redesignated PT 21/28 (Anonymous, 1998). This scheme is
used in countries worldwide, including the U.S., Canada, Japan, Great Britain,
Australia and parts of Europe (Strockbine et al., 1998), though isolates are not
routinely typed in the United States where pulse field gel electrophoresis is used as
the standard. Since isolates generally are not typed, phage type information is not
included in the United States data set.
In the two decades since the phage-typing scheme was first introduced, there have
been distinct temporal and between-country variations in phage types. Changes in
phage distribution over time have been seen in countries where isolates are routinely
phage-typed. For instance, typing of Canadian samples in 1990 revealed 35 distinct
phage types, with PT 1, PT 4, PT 8, PT 31 and PT 14 the most common (Table 1.2)
(Khakhria et al., 1990).
Table 1.2: Phage types ofE. coli 0157 in Canada
Phage types in Canada in 1982-1989 and 1995. Data is taken from (Khakhria et al., 1990) (Khakhria
et al., 1997). Blank spaces are left where phage types are not mentioned.
PT 1 PT 2 PT 4 PT 8 PT 14 PT 31
1982-89 30.5% 4.8% 21% 13.5% 8% 8.9%
1995 5.9% 11.3% 4.2% 52% 9.8%
Five years later, the most common phage types were PT 14 (52%), PT 2 (11.3%), PT
31 (9.8%), PT 1 (5.9%) and PT 4 (4.2%) (Khakhria et al., 1997). However, because
phage type information on the majority of Canadian outbreaks was not available for
this thesis, temporal trends in phage types will not be examined in Chapter 5.
Changes in phage types can also be seen in England & Wales and Scotland (Table
1.3).
Table 1.3: Phage types of E. coli 0157 in England and Wales
Common phage types ofE. coli 0157 isolates in England and Wales from 1983 to 2003. Data is
taken from (Thomas et al., 1996; Cheasty et al., 2000; Smith et al., 2003; Health Protection Agency,









1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
PT1 7% 7%
PT2 49% 46% 32% 32% 31% 26% 19% 21% 16% 16%
PT4 6% 7% 8% 8% 6% 3% 8% 4%
PT8 8% 17% 16% 18% 16% 21% 17% 21% 26%
PT14 4% 4% 4% 3% 3%
PT21/28 2.4% 19% 20% 16% 29% 30% 36% 33% 35%
PT32 3.6% 8% 8% 7% 10% 5% 6% 5%
PT49 22% 17%
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Between 1983 and 1994, PT 2 was the predominant phage type in England & Wales,
followed by PT 49 and PT 1 (Smith et al., 2003). By 1997-99, PT 2 had decreased to
32% of the total, while PT21/28, PT 8 and PT32 were the next most common
(Cheasty et al., 2000). Between 1995 and 2001, PT2 was most common.
In Scotland, the most common phage types in 1992 were PT49 and PT2, but a decade
later PT 21/28, PT 8 and PT 2 were most frequently seen, with PT 2 a distant third
(Table 1.4)(Locking et al., 2003). PT 49 went from being the most common phage
type in 1992, to the fourth most common, behind PT 2, PT 28 and other phage types
in 1994, and by 2002, was not amongst the top 8 most common phage types (Reilly,
1997; Locking et al., 2003). Temporal trends in the two most common phage types -
21/28 and 2 - will be examined in detail in Chapter 3.
Table 1.4: E. coli 0157 phage types in Scotland
The most common phage types in Scotland from 1984 to 2003. Stars (*) indicate phage types of
which mention is made, but no specific value is provided. Blank spaces are left where phage types
are not mentioned. Data is taken from (Coia et al. 1996; Locking et al. 2003a; Locking et al. 2004;
Locking et al. 2006a; Sharp et al. 1994a; Smith et al. 2002)
1984-93 1994 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
PT1 *
PT2 33% 14% 9% 7% 9% 5.2% 9% 17%
PT4 * 6% * 6%
PT8 * 7% 11% 7% 11% 13% 6% 12%
PT14 * 0.7% 3%
PT21/28 * 59% 57% 67% 63% 64.5% 65.8% 58%
PT32 * 6% 8% 5% 3% 2.1% 4%
PT49 36% 8% *
Differences in phage types are also evident between countries (Cheasty et al., 2000).
For instance, when human samples from six countries were typed, PT 47 was found
only in Japan and PTs 49, 50, 51 and 52 only in the United Kingdom (Khakhria et
al., 1990). In another instance, while PT 21/28 was very common in England &
Wales and Scotland between January of 1997 and June 1999, it was not among the
three most common phage types in Northern Ireland, Ireland, Denmark, Belgium,
Finland, Germany or Sweden (Cheasty et al., 2000). Differences can also be seen in
phage types of outbreaks: in 1997, the leading phage types in outbreaks in Canada
were PT 14 (80% of 19 outbreaks), and PT 4, 31, 32, 34 (5% each), yet in Scotland,
the only overlap was PT 4 (9% of 11 outbreaks), while PT 21/28, 2 and 8 were the
types for the remaining 81%. As, however, data on phage types was only available
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from Scotland, these differences will not be analysed in Chapters 4 (United States)
and 5 (Canada) or as a part of the comparisons in Chapter 6.
Phage and Vt types are strongly linked, and though the mix of phage types may
change over time, the VT profiles of particular phage types usually do not (Willshaw
et al., 2001b). Data on Scottish cases indicates that in 1995, all PT49 isolates were
Vtl-Vt2+ and those from PT54 were Vtl+Vt2+(Thomson-Carter et al., 1996).
Seven years later in 2002, PT21/28 and PT14 isolates were all Vt2+ only, PT2
isolates were predominantly Vtl-Vt2+ and PT8 isolates were predominantly
Vtl+Vt2+ (Locking et al., 2003), and 2004 all PT 21/28 isolates were also Vt2+
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only, whilst almost all PT8 isolates were Vtl+Vt2+. Similar patterns are seen in
England & Wales, where during the periods of both 1992-1994 and 1995-2001, PT 8
isolates were predominantly Vtl+/Vt2+, while PT2, PT21/28 and PT49 isolates were
predominantly Vtl-/Vt2+ (Smith et al., 2003). The association between phage type
and verotoxin profde presumably is linked to inability or ability of specific typing
phages to lyse bacteria containing specific verotoxin types.
1.4.5 Testing and screening procedures
1.4.5.1 Testing — Soibitol fermentation test
E. coli 0157 can be distinguished from other bacteria in lab specimens by several
methods, ofwhich the sorbitol fermentation test is the most widely used (Strockbine
et al. 1998). The sorbitol fermentation test is based on the fact that the majority of E.
coli 0157 strains cannot ferment D-sorbitol overnight, and thus can be distinguished
from other E. coli and bacterial strains by testing for this trait (Mead and Griffin,
1998). Samples are incubated in Sorbitol-MacConkey Agar (SMAC), and clear
plaques indicate the likely presence ofE. coli 0157. The test is straightforward and
inexpensive, but due to the fact that sorbitol fermenting VTEC strains have been
found in Europe and Scotland (Gunzer et al., 1992; SCIEH, 2002), and a study has
shown that E. coli 0157:H7 may mutate into the sorbitol-fermenting phenotype in
sorbitol producing foods,(Feng, 1995) the plain SMAC test is no longer considered
to be the gold standard.
To combat this problem, modifications have been made to increase the quality the
original SMAC test. Samples can be refined prior to SMAC incubation by
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immunomagnetic separation with polystyrene beads coated in 0157 antibodies
(Strockbine et al., 1998). Also, the SMAC media can be made more specific by the
addition of other components. CR-SMAC contains cefixime rhamnose (Chapman et
al., 1991) and CT-SMAC contains cefixime and potassium tellurite (Zadik et al.,
1993). CT-SMAC is commonly used for screening isolates in the United Kingdom,
and is one method used in Italy (Smith et al., 2002). However, some strains, like the
sorbitol-fermenting strain that was isolated in Scotland in 2002, are also tellurite
sensitive, so even CT-SMAC agar may not be sufficient to detect the presence of
some E. coli 0157 strains (SCIEH 2002a). This may hamper the detection of cases
or outbreaks of sorbitol-fermenting outbreaks, in particular where the symptoms of
many patients may be relatively minor. In addition, the diagnostic techniques differ
between countries (Smith et al. 2002), with potentially lower rates of infection
reported in countries or regions that use less specific or sensitive isolation methods.
The identity of colonies that come up positive via the SMAC test can then be further
confirmed by testing for 0157 antigen with 0157 antiserum or latex reagent kits
(Mead and Griffin, 1998).
1.4.5.2 Testing - other detection methods
E. coli 0157 cases can also be identified by a number of techniques which test for
the presence ofVtxs or nucleic acids (i.e. genes) associated with E. coli Ol 57
(Strockbine et al. 1998). Biologic methods involve assays which can detect free
verocytotoxin in faecal samples, though there may be false negative results when the
tests are done in the first few days of an infection (Strockbine et al. 1998).
Immunologic methods such as immunoblots or enzyme immunoassays (EIAs) detect
E. coli 0157 by using antibodies specific to vtx to identify the presence of the toxins.
Finally, the presence ofVT genes, 0157 plasmid or eae gene nucleic acids in isolates
can be detected using DNA probes or Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)(Strockbine
et al., 1998). A number of assays, including western blots, cell culture assays and
EIAs can also be used to detect antibodies to vtxs or E. coli 0157 cell components in
serum. These methods may improve the recognition of cases, especially in situations
where testing is delayed and thus shedding of the bacteria has ceased. Serum
sampling has in some outbreaks picked up cases that were not identified through
faecal testing (Marsh et al. 1992). For instance, 165 cases in the Wishaw Outbreak
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where either stool samples were negative or were not taken tested positive via
serology (Cowden et al. 2001). Thus, the use of serological testing could potentially
improve the recognition of secondary cases, the rate ofwhich are analysed in
Chapter 7.
1.4.5.3 Subtyping
Further identification of an E. coli strain can be made via phenotypic or genotypic
methods. Among the phenotypic properties that can be used to divide E. coli Ol 57
into further subtypes are phage type (see 1.4.4), verotoxin type, antibiotic resistance
and the presence or absence ofE. coli attaching and effacing (aea) genes (Karch et
al., 1999). The major genotypic method is Pulse Field Gel Electrophoresis (PFGE).
Since the number ofE coli 0157:H7 subtypes continues to increase (Willshaw et al.
1997) and exact determination of subtype is often required to link and trace both
animal and human cases in outbreaks, it is now considered good practice to
determine phage type, VT type and also run a PFGE to examine subtype (Willshaw
et al., 1997).
PFGE, which reveals the unique DNA restriction fragment length polymorphisms of
each subtype, is also frequently used in typing 0157 strains because it is effective at
identifying identical or closely related 0157 strains (Willshaw et al., 1997). While
closely related strains can vary by up to two bands, meaning that for instance,
isolates within a single outbreak may not have a completely identical pattern of
bands, PFGE typing has been of great utility in proving links between cases
otherwise not known to be related (Bender et al. 1997; Strockbine et al. 1998).
Currently, PFGE typing is widely used in countries such as Canada, the United States
and Scotland, though between-country comparisons may be limited by the use of
different restriction enzymes for PFGE. Verotoxin types, discussed in more detail in
Section 1.4.3, can be determined by immunologic methods, the most common being
the use ofPCR with probes for specific VT types with or without restriction analysis
(Karch et al. 1999; Kuczius et al. 2004).
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1.5 Pathogenesis and clinical symptoms
1.5.1 Symptoms and treatment
The pathogenicity ofE. coli 0157 in humans results from the ability of the
verotoxins, which inhibit protein synthesis, to damage the endothelial cells of the
intestinal lining (U.S. Food & Drug Administration, 2003). The damage to the
intestinal endothelial cells causes acute gastrointestinal disease, known as
haemorrhagic colitis. Most cases are relatively mild, and as many as 15% of
infections may be asymptomatic (Todd & Dundas 2001). Typical symptoms, which
include watery and/or bloody diarrhoea, severe abdominal cramping and nausea, but
rarely any fever, usually begin after an incubation period of up to two weeks - with
an average of about 3 days - and last about a week (Coia et al., 1998; U.S. Food &
Drug Administration, 2003). In as many as 90% of laboratory confirmed cases,
diarrhoea becomes bloody after a few days (Karch et al. 2005). Treatment for
infection is generally focused on ameliorating symptoms, monitoring for signs of
HUS or other complications and maintaining hydration (Mead & Griffin 1998; Tarr
1995; Todd & Dundas 2001). The use of antibiotics is contraindicated because of the
risk of killing normal intestinal flora which might help to prevent toxin absorption by
the gut, and because certain antibiotics may in fact promote the expression and
release of verotoxins (Zimmerhackl 2000). Studies suggest that antibiotic treatment
increases the risk of poor clinical outcome and HUS (Pavia et al. 1990; Wong et al.
2000). The use of anti-motility agents is also discouraged because slowing down
normal gut peristalsis slows down clearance of the bacteria from the intestine and
thus increases the exposure of the endothelial cells to the verotoxins (Tarr 1995).
The majority of cases (up to 85-95%) resolve, with or without professional medical
care, within a week of symptom onset (Mead & Griffin 1998; Todd & Dundas 2001).
1.5.2 Complications - HUS
However, in anywhere from 3% to 25% of the cases, usually in the very young or
old, the acute illness leads to HUS (Mead and Griffin, 1998; Todd and Dundas, 2001;
Ochoa and Cleary, 2003) (Naylor et al. 2005). HUS, a syndrome marked by acute
renal failure, thrombocytopenia and microangiopathic hemolytic anemia (O'Brien
and Kaper, 1998) occurs when the verotoxins enter the bloodstream from the large
intestine, where they are brought via leukocytes to endothelial cells in other
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locations, most vitally the glomeruli in the kidneys. Once the verotoxins enter the
endothelial cells, they trigger pathological changes which cause the characteristic
symptoms ofHUS (see above) by interfering with normal protein synthesis (Karmali
2004). HUS is a major cause of acute renal failure in children and the mortality rate
can be as high as 20% (Griffin and Tauxe, 1991). Those who do survive may have
long-term sequelae such as kidney failure, neurological damage, colonic stricture and
glucose intolerance (Mead and Griffin, 1998). Infections that do not progress to
HUS have not been thought to have such long term effects, but recent studies of
persons infected during the Walkerton Outbreak in Canada suggest that E. coli 0157
infection may indeed be linked to increase risks of pathologies such as high blood
pressure, irritable bowel syndrome and decreased renal function (Garg et al. 2005;
Marshall et al. 2006).
Among the suggested risk factors for developing HUS are being female, very young
or advanced age (<5 years or >65 years) and mental retardation (Griffin and Tauxe,
1991) (Todd & Dundas 2001). It is suggested that young children are at a higher risk
for HUS because larger amounts of verotoxin are released into their systems during
an infection (Monnens et al. 1998), though the reasons behind this are not fully
understood. In addition the risk may be linked to the non-fully developed immune
status of young children (Cimolai et al. 1990). However, the most indicative factor
in determining HUS risk seems to be the Vt composition of the implicated E. coli
0157 strain. Strains expressing only VT2 have the highest risk of causing HUS
(Ochoa and Cleary, 2003), while those with both verotoxins having a lower risk and
those expressing just Vtl the least risk.
1.6 Epidemiology
1.6.1 Infectious dose
Investigations of outbreaks and sporadic infections suggest that the infectious dose
for E. coli 0157:H7 is less than 100 organisms (Caprioli et al. 2005), and could be as
little as 10 organisms. Tuttle and colleagues, in studies of hamburger meat
implicated in a 1992-93 outbreak, deduced an infectious dose of~700 organisms, but
suggested that the actual dose was likely to be far less, as the meat was cooked
before being eaten, thus killing many organisms (Tuttle et al., 1999). Other
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indications of low infectious dose include the occurrence ofwaterborne transmission,
where infection occurs despite the bacteria counted being diluted via the water. Data
from an outbreak caused by contaminated dry fermented salami (Tilden et al., 1996)
suggested an infectious does of less than 50 organisms. The low infectious dose is of
importance because it may account for the large size of some outbreaks, and the high
rates of person to person transmission within household. For instance, in large
waterborne outbreaks like the Walkerton Outbreak (O'Connor 2002) (Chapter 5, see
2.4.1.3) and the Washington County Fair (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention 1999a) (Chapter 4, see 4.2.3.1), which are a significant factor in temporal
trends, the low infectious dose may have made it possible for many people to be
infected, despite the bacteria being transmitted through large water systems. In the
Wishaw Outbreak (Cowden et al. 2001) (Chapter 3, see 2.4.1.1), another large
outbreak, the fact that only a small quantity of bacteria had to pass between raw and
cooked meats, and then survive reheating, may have contributed to the over 270
confirmed cases.
1.6.2 Reservoirs
Though it is a zoonotic bacterium, E. coli 0157:H7 has not been shown to be
strongly pathogenic in any species but humans. It is, however, posited that some
VTEC serotypes may cause diarrhoea in young calves (Naylor et al. 2005) and a
disease in greyhounds, cutaneous and renal glomerular vasculopathy, appears to be
connected with E. coli 0157:H7 (Moxley & Francis 1998).
E. coli 0157:H7 is most commonly found in ruminants, particularly cattle (Renter
and Sargeant, 2002) and sheep (Chapman et al., 1997). Though studies in farms and
slaughterhouses have provided a wide range of estimates for the prevalence of the
serotype in cattle, with a range of 0% to 36% (Naylor et al. 2005; Renter & Sargeant
2002), cattle are now thought to be the predominant source ofE. coli 0157
implicated in human disease (Naylor et al. 2005). In sheep, prevalence has been
estimated at 31% (Kudva et al. 1996), and contact with ovine faecal material has
been implicated in an outbreak involving at least 20 people (Howie et al. 2003). The
bacteria can remain viable in bovine faeces for nearly two months and in water for up
to a month, though counts decrease much more rapidly in slurry (Maule 1999), thus
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contaminated faeces can present a considerable risk via direct or indirect contact (i.e.
via water or food). A number of factors have been suggested to affect the shedding of
the bacteria by cattle, including feed type, age, season and housing (Renter &
Sargeant 2002). Additionally, it has been posited that a small minority of cattle -
super shedders - may be responsible for most of the bacteria shed (Matthews et al.
2006b). Though the prevalence of the bacteria in sheep has thus far not been shown
to be as high as in cattle (Naylor et al. 2005), one outbreak in Scotland was caused by
direct handling of sheep faeces (Howie et al. 2003).
In addition to ruminants, E. coli 0157 has also been isolated from deer (Sargeant et
al., 1999), birds (Hancock et al., 1998), dogs (Trevena et al., 1996; Hancock et al.,
1998), horses (Hancock et al., 1998), flies (Shere et al., 1998), pigeons (Shere et al.,
1998), raccoons (Shere et al., 1998), opossums (Renter et al., 2003), goats
(Bielaszewska et al., 1997; Milne et al., 1999), rats (Cizek et al., 1999), cats (Trevena
et al., 1996), turkeys (Heuvelink et al., 2002) and pigs (Chapman et al., 1997; Mead
and Griffin, 1998). Though the bacteria has been found in such a wide range of
animals, evidence of animal to human transmission, direct or indirect, has been found
only for cows (Synge et al., 1993; Shukla et al., 1995), deer (Rabatsky-Ehr et al.,
2002), goats (Shukla et al., 1995), sheep (Licence et al., 2001; Howie et al., 2003),
horses and dogs (Trevena et al., 1996). Such transmission is of great importance in
human infection because of the extent of contact between humans and these animals
in settings like zoos, farms and through handling and consumption of animal
products such as cheese, milk, minced beef and lamb. These methods of
transmission will be discussed in the next section.
1.6.3 Transmission
Research has shown that E. coli 0157 infection can be transmitted via direct or
indirect contact with infected animal or humans, faecal matter and/or by-products
(Caprioli et al. 2005; Karch et al. 2005). This transmission may be foodbome,
waterborne, person-to-person, environmental, via animal contact or any combination
of the above. Temporal trends in mode of transmission will be explored in Chapters
2-5, compared across countries in Chapter 6 and mode of transmission will be
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explored as a potential factor in the rate of secondary cases in Chapter 7. The next
sections will provide an introduction to each mode of transmission category.
1.6.3.1 Foodborne transmission
Most outbreaks in the developed world have been linked to foodborne transmission
ofE. coli 0157. Beef products, in particular, have been very frequently identified as
a vehicle of transmission (Mead and Griffin, 1998), especially in the United States
and Canada, where the vast majority of outbreaks, including the largest outbreaks,
have involved minced (ground) beef (Riley et al., 1983; Wells et al., 1983; Bell et ah,
1994; Feng, 1995; Todd, 2000). Beef has also been a factor in outbreaks in Scotland
and England & Wales (Feng, 1995; Wall et ah, 1996; Wachsmuth et ah, 1997),
though in recent years other modes of transmission have become increasingly
important (SCIEH, 2000b; 2001; 2002; Locking et ah, 2003; SCIEH, 2003).
Other bovine and meat products have also been implicated in E. coli 0157 outbreaks,
including venison (Wachsmuth et ah, 1997), raw and pasteurized milk (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention 1999b; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
2000; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2001a; Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention 2002a; Chapman et ah 1993; Coia 1998a; Cowden 1997b;
Keene et ah 1997; Upton & Coia 1994), yogurt (Coia, 1998), cheese (Cowden, 1997;
Coia, 1998) and cheese curds (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1999).
Many infections have also been caused by cooked meats, which may be served in
foods like meat pies, sandwiches, stews and salads (Griffin and Tauxe, 1991;
Cowden et ah, 2001).
Increasingly, however, E. coli 0157 outbreaks are being caused by a much wider
variety of food products (Coia, 1999). These include lettuce (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, 1999; 2000), spinach (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention 2006h), alfalfa sprouts (Breuer et ah 2001), salads, coleslaw, fruit salad,
grapes (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2001) and fruit juices (Willshaw
et ah, 1997). The probable or confirmed source of infection for most of these foods
is cross-contamination by faeces from cows or other animals that are introduced onto
the fields via irrigation, wild animals and/or runoff (California Food Emergency
Response Team 2007), or contamination during packaging (Myers et ah 2002;
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Palumbo et al. 2004) and/or meal preparation (Proctor 2000a; Proctor 2000b).
However, it is not always possible to determine the exact source of an infection; for
instance in 2006 spinach outbreak, samples from local rivers, wild pigs known to
have been in the spinach fields and cows from local farms all tested positive for the
outbreak strain (California Food Emergency Response Team 2007), suggesting a
number of pathways for contamination of the spinach including direct faecal
contamination from the wild pigs and contamination of irrigation water by the cows
or pigs.
The considerable potential for cross-contamination via faecal matter in crop fields
was illustrated in a series of experiments in which E. coli 0157 was shown to survive
up to 22 days in sieved soil. Further experiments showing that the bacteria could
survive up to 60 days on stainless steel, 5-7 days on anti-microbial impregnated
plastic cutting boards at 22° C and at least two weeks at 4°C demonstrate the
possibility for cross-contamination during food preparation. In addition, E. coli
0157 is able survive in highly acidic conditions (Feng, 1995), the knowledge of
which has emerged through discoveries of outbreaks spread by mayonnaise, apple
cider (Besser et al., 1993; Mead and Griffin, 1998) and salami (Tilden et al., 1996;
MacDonald et al., 2004).
1.6.3.2 Waterborne transmission
More incidences ofE. coli 0157 spread through drinking or recreational water
supplies have been noted in recent years, in part an indication of the bacteria's
hypothesised relatively low infective dose, as mentioned above (Feng, 1995; Mead
and Griffin, 1998).
Contaminated drinking water, either from wells ormunicipal water supplies, has
been the source of a number of outbreaks in the U.S. (Swerdlow et al., 1992; Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, 1999), Scotland (Licence et al., 2001), Canada
(Health Canada, 2000), and England & Wales. Also implicated in the transmission
ofE. coli 0157 infections are swimming in faecally contaminated water in paddling
pools (Brewster et al. 1994; Cowden 1997b; Hildebrand et al. 1996), lakes/beaches
(Ackman et al. 1997; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2001a; Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention 2002c; Harrison & Kinra 2004; Paunio et al. 1999;
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Samadpour et al. 2002b) and swimming pools (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention 1999b; Friedman et al. 1999; Verma et al. 2007). Contamination of
natural water sources may be from animals (e.g. direct contact or runoff containing
faecal material) or humans (faecal accidents or sewage), and pool contamination
from the latter. The potential for waterborne transmission, even weeks after the
initial contamination of the water is suggested by the finding that viable numbers of
E. coli 0157:H7 have been shown to survive in 18°C river water for up to 26 days
(Maule, 1999).
1.6.3.3 Person to person transmission
Person to person/animal to person and environmental transmission have become
increasingly important in recent years (Locking et al., 2003) (Steinmuller et al. 2006;
Strachan et al. 2006). For instance, in Scotland, the percentage of outbreaks where
the primary mode of transmission was to person-to-person contact went from 0% to
50% between 1998 and 2002. Trends in other countries as well as Scotland will be
analyses in Chapters 2 to 5.
Person to person transmission may be the primary mode of transmission or spread an
infection initially acquired from direct animal (David et al. 2004; Payne et al. 2003)
or foodborne contact (Bell et al. 1994). It is more frequent in places of close contact,
especially where there is potential for less than ideal sanitary conditions, in particular
nursery schools/day-care centres (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2002b; Health Canada, 2003) (Al-Jader et al. 1999; Allaby & Mayon-White 1995;
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2002a; Galanis et al. 2003; Public Health
Laboratory Service 2000a; Reida et al. 1994; Sugiyama et al. 2005) and residential
institutions/nursing homes (Afza et al. 2006; Bisset et al. 1992; Coia 1998b; Coia
1999; Levine et al. 1991; Lior 1983) . Secondary transmission within households has
also been noted and quantified, with estimates for the sporadic household
transmission rate in Wales of 4 to 15%, and the presence of a person in the same
household with diarrhoea very strongly associated with sporadic infection in the
United States (Slutsker et al. 1998). Within households, younger children are the
mostly likely both to transmit and to be infected by E. coli 0157 (Parry & Salmon
1998), and it has been postulated that person to person transmission rates in settings
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where young children are present may be elevated because young children have been
shown to shed bacteria in their faeces for extended periods of time (Belongia et al.
1993; Karch et al. 1995; Shah et al. 1996; Swerdlow & Griffin 1997). Incidents in
hospitals and institutions demonstrate the possibility of nosocomial transmission -
transmission in a hospital setting due to direct or indirect contact between patients
and items (dressings, surgical instruments etc.) used in their care (Coia et al., 1995),
but may also caused by contaminated food (Health Canada, 1997; 2004).
1.6.3.4 Animal contact
Infection due to direct animal contact is a significant mode of transmission
(Steinmuller et al. 2006; Trevena et al. 1999) in terms of infections in young
children. The potential for direct animal to human transmission ofE. coli 0157 was
first recognized in a case where the infected child had contact with animals on the
family farm (Synge et al., 1993), and subsequent cases, both symptomatic and non-
symptomatic, have been noted in farming families & workers (Health Canada, 1998;
Trevena et al., 1999). However, the majority of cases, at least the symptomatic ones
detailed in the published literature or included in the data sets provided for the
studies in Chapters 2-6, have been at petting zoos or open farms. It has been
suggested that this may occur because people who have frequent contact with
animals build up immunity to the bacteria, leaving infrequent visitors the most likely
to have severe enough symptoms to be end up being reported to a surveillance
agency (Wilson et al. 1996).
The first known petting farm outbreak in Canada was in 1999 and involved contact
with sheep & goats (Middlesex-London Health Unit, 1999), while the first reported
outbreaks in the United States took place a year later in two different states and
involved calves and young cattle (Gage et al., 2001). Petting farm linked outbreaks
have also occurred in countries such as England (Shukla et al., 1995; Milne et al.,
1999; Trevena et al., 1999), Denmark (Anonymous 2004) and Scotland (Strachan et
al. 2006). Such outbreaks are clearly of particular concern because they frequently




Environmental transmission, often via contact with animal faeces on the ground has
been postulated to account for an increasing frequency of cases (Strachan et al.
2006). Recent environmentally related outbreaks in Scotland have included an
outbreak at a scout camp, where scouts camped on field recently occupied by
infected sheep (SCIEH, 2000a; Howie et al., 2003) and an outbreak where persons
had exposure to a potentially faecally contaminated stream on a campsite (Strachan
et al. 2006). Other outbreaks with environmental links have occurred in Austria
(Grif et al. 2005), the United States (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
2006e; Varma et al. 2003) and England and Wales (Chapman 2000). Recent studies
suggest that environmental transmission may be a significant factor in E. coli 0157
outbreaks in Scotland (Strachan et al. 2006) and the United States (Steinmuller et al.
2006), and contact or likely contact with animal excreta has been shown as a
statistically significant risk factor for sporadic infection (Locking et al. 2001). A
strongly significant association between sporadic infection (see 1.6.6.1) and contact
with farming environments has also been demonstrated in England (O'Brien et al.
2001a).
1.6.4 Seasonality
E coli 0157:H7 infections also show seasonality (Bach et al. 2002), with the highest
rates of infection during the summer months of July-September in the northern
hemisphere (Mead and Griffin, 1998). This pattern has been noted in Canada
(Michel et al., 1999), Wales (Chalmers et al., 1999), England & Wales (Wall et al.,
1996; Willshaw et al., 2001) and Scotland (Douglas and Kurien, 1997), and it is
postulated to result from better growing conditions for bacteria in the warmer months
of the year as well as higher number of people participating in activities that put them
at risk for contact with E. coli 0157 in the summer, such as barbeques, visits to farms
and parks. The existence of a seasonal pattern is of importance because it affects the
choice of statistical techniques and data format (yearly data points rather than
monthly or daily data points) for the analysis of temporal trends (see Section 1.8) -
in Chapters 3 to 6.
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1.6.5 Age and sex specific rates
The highest rates of infection are in young children (Parry & Palmer 2005), with
peak infection rates in most countries for children under the age of five (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention 1995b; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
1996a; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 1997; Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention 1998; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2001b;
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2002b; Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention 2003b; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2005e; Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention 2007g; Public Health Agency of Canada 2006). The
differences in infection rates between age groups are likely linked to
pathophysiological factors (see 1.5.2), the higher risk for children to acquire
infections in the home (see 1.6.3.3) and the association of children with locations
such as petting zoos and swimming pools (see 1.6.3.4). The links between age and
infection rates will be examined in more detail in Chapter 7, when the median age of
cases in outbreaks is analysed as a potential factor in the rate of secondary cases.
There is also male-female pattern in infections, with women accounting for more
than half of infections in Wales (Chalmers et al., 1999), Europe (Fisher, 2002),
Canada (Waters et ah, 1994; Michel et ah, 1998), United States (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, 2002; Locking et ah, 2003) and Scotland. However, though
more women are infected overall, in children rates of infection tend to be higher for
boys: outside of Canada (Waters et ah, 1994; Michel et ah, 1998) and England &
Wales (Thomas et ah, 1996), where girls catch up around the age of .15, boys tend to
make up the majority of infected cases until about the age of five. The higher rates
of infection in post-pubertal women is postulated to result from the fact that women
are more likely to be involved in activities that put them at risk for infection such as
taking care of young children and preparing food. However, for reasons of
maintaining patient confidentiality, sex data was not available for most of the studies
in this thesis, so differences in infection rates between men and women will not be
considered in any of the analyses.
1.6.6 Outbreaks vs. sporadic cases
E. coli 0157 cases are generally defined as being either a sporadic case or part of an
outbreak (Locking et ah 2003a). The definition of an outbreak varies between
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countries, with some countries including Scotland and England & Wales reporting as
"general outbreaks" those clusters of cases which involve "members ofmore than
one household or institution" (Locking et al. 2004), and other countries using
different definitions for outbreaks, the definition sometimes varying by surveillance
system or region (Tinga et al. 2006). For instance, a recent publication on the
epidemiology ofE. coli 0157 cases in Japan defines an outbreak as having more than
11 cases in a certain area and time frame (Sakuma et al. 2006) and in the United
States an outbreak has been defined a cluster of at least two infections with a
"common epidemiologic exposure" (Rangel et al. 2005). The implications of these
differences in definitions will be discussed in Chapter 6 when some of the temporal
trends are compared between countries.
1.6.6.1 Sporadic Cases
Sporadic cases make up the majority of reported E. coli 0157 infections, comprising
from 73% to 83% of annual reported confirmed cases between 2002 and 2004 in
Scotland, and accounting for as many as 90% of reported annual confirmed cases in
the United States (official CDC data set, Elizabeth Blanton) and 96% of reported
cases in Ontario between 1990 and 1994. However, the definition of a sporadic case
does vary between countries (Locking et al. 2003a)(personal communication, Thai
An Nguyen, CDC). This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6 and in Chapter 8,
with regards to between-country comparison of data and defining an E. coli 0157
event. Briefly, cases within single household clusters in Scotland are considered to
be sporadic, whilst in countries like Canada and the United States these clusters are
considered to be outbreaks (and thus the cases are outbreak cases). Thus the counts
of sporadic cases in Scotland include cases which have epidemiological links to other
cases and thus would not be defined as sporadic cases in Canada or the United States.
1.6.6.2 Outbreaks
The first reported outbreaks were in 1982, when clusters of cases in Oregon and
Michigan in the United States were linked to consumption ofminced beef. In the
twenty five years since, there have been outbreaks across the world, including the
United States (Rangel et al. 2005), Canada (Woodward et al. 2002), Scotland
(Cowden 1997b), Japan (Michino et al. 1999), Denmark (Jensen et al. 2006), Sweden
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(Sartz et al. 2007), Finland (Paunio et al. 1999), France (Espie et al. 2006), Germany
(Conedera et al. 2007), Ireland (Anonymous 2005), Australia (McCall et al. 1996),
England & Wales (Willshaw et al. 1997) and the Canary Islands (Pebody et al.
1999). The majority of reported outbreaks have been small, with the geometric mean
number of ill cases in Scotland, Canada and the United States since 1996 (1998 for
the U. S.) all under 9 cases (see Chapter 6 for more details). However, a number of
large outbreaks - some ofwhich are influential in the analyses conducted in Chapters
2-6 - have occurred.
With more than 6000 cases and as many as 1682 confirmed cases (National Institute
of Infectious Diseases 1996), the 1996 Sakai City outbreak in Japan remains the
largest reported outbreak. The cases were linked to contaminated radish sprouts
served as part of school meals across the city (Michino et al. 1999). Other large
outbreaks include the 2000 Walkerton Outbreak in Canada (1346 ill cases, see
2.4.1.3), caused by contamination of a public water supply (O'Connor 2002), the
1996 Wishaw Outbreak in Scotland, in which cross-contamination between cooked
and uncooked meats in a butchers shop sickened over 500 people (279 laboratory
confirmed, see 2.4.1.1) (Cowden et al. 2001). An outbreak caused by contaminated
drinking water at the 1999 Washington County Fair, New York, United States
resulted in more than 700 illnesses (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
1999a)(see 4.2.3.1), and the 1993 multi-state outbreak in the western United States
involved 501 confirmed cases (Bell et al. 1994). Outbreaks will be examined in
detail in further chapters of this thesis, with Chapters 2-5 examining trends in
single countries, Chapter 6 comparing across countries and Chapter 7 examining
cases within outbreaks.
1.6.7 Primary cases vs. secondary cases
E. coli 0157 cases can be primary or secondary. Primary cases are cases which
result from direct contact or exposure to the initial or point source of an outbreak,
whilst secondary cases are generally acquired through direct or indirect spread (e.g.
through water or a contaminated surface) from another infected person (Locking et
al. 2003a). Normally, the terms primary and secondary are only used in the context
of outbreaks. However, in countries such as Scotland and England & Wales where
cases in single household clusters are considered to be sporadic, some sporadic cases
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may also be considered to be secondary (e.g. household contacts) (Locking et al.
2003a; Parry & Salmon 1998).
Definitions of secondary cases vary between countries (Locking et al. 2003a; Parry
& Salmon 1998), and even between outbreaks as the number of cases defined as
secondary may depend on the exact definition established in an outbreak
investigation. For instance in the 1993 minced-beef outbreak in Washington, people
were defined as having secondary infection if they "became ill within 10 days of a
household or other close contact with another patient and had not eaten at chain A
during that time" (Bell et al. 1994), whereas in a 1986 outbreak also related to
minced beef the definition was more restrictive because, "a secondary case was
defined as culture-confirmed E. coli 0157:147 illness in a household contact of a
primary case which began at least 48hrs after the onset of illness in the primary case"
(Ostroff et al. 1990).
This lack of a common definition may be one factor in the lack of comprehensive
estimates of the magnitude of secondary spread. Papers suggest that secondary
spread is common (Armstrong et al. 1996; Coia 1998a), with data from single
outbreaks suggesting that secondary cases may account for up to 40% of cases and
most outbreaks having a secondary rate no higher than 10% (Armstrong et al. 1996;
Coia et al. 1996). Secondary spread has also been documented in households, with
children the most likely to infect or be infected (Parry & Salmon 1998), and has been
shown to occur via asymptomatic cases (Marsh et al. 1992). Such cases are of
concern because, in particular, as discussed above, children are at a higher risk for
severe complications. Yet, no comprehensive multi-country study of secondary cases
rates has been published. The study of secondary case rates and characteristics in
outbreaks in Chapter 7 of this thesis is intended to fill this gap in the literature.
1.6.8 Asymptomatic cases
Asymptomatic infection has been shown to occur in outbreaks, as well as in close
contacts of infected persons (Armstrong et al. 1996). Detection of asymptomatic
cases usually occurs in an outbreak investigation when either contacts of
symptomatic cases or persons with possible exposure to the source of contamination
are screened (Akashi et al. 1994). The rate of asymptomatic cases reported for single
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outbreaks and in single-country population-based studies would suggest that
asymptomatic cases may not be the exception. For instance, some examples of the
rate of asymptomatic cases include 17% of confirmed cases in a 1990 Japanese
outbreak at a nursery school (Akashi et al. 1994), up to 12.5% of confirmed cases in
the Wishaw Outbreak (Cowden et al. 2001) and 16% of cases in a Minnesota (USA)
nursery school outbreak (Belongia et al. 1993). However, investigational techniques
may affect the number of asymptomatic cases that are reported - e.g. broad based
screening like that done in some Japanese outbreaks (Akashi et al. 1994) may pick up
a higher percentage of asymptomatic cases.
Few estimates of the overall prevalence of asymptomatic cases in any one country
exist, but between 2002 and 2004 from 6.5% to 10% of reported and laboratory
confirmed cases in Scotland were asymptomatic. More than half of these cases were
not linked to a reported outbreak, but rather to sporadic cases within the same
household (Locking et al. 2003a; Locking et al. 2004; Locking et al. 2006a).
Approximately 10% of serotype 0157 cases reported by EnterNet countries (EU
countries, Australia and Canada) in 2005 were asymptomatic (European Commission
2007). These reported rates of asymptomatic infection of up to 17% and the high
rates of under-reporting of infections estimated in countries such as England &
Wales, United States and Canada (Adak et al. 2002; Hedberg et al. 1997; Michel et
al. 2000) suggest at a much higher prevalence of infection than is reported. The issue
of true prevalence will be explored in Chapter 8 where a framework for estimation of
prevalence will be presented.
1.6.9 Geographic distribution
E. coli 0157 infection has been primarily reported in the developed world, with the
highest rates of reported annual infection during the last two decades having been
seen in Scotland, Canada and the United States (Mead & Griffin 1998; Sakuma et al.
2006), the three countries which are covered in depth in this thesis, as well as Japan.
Since 1982, infections have been reported in more than 30 countries in every
continent other than Antarctica, with confirmed infections in the countries indicated
in pink on Figure 1.3. However, infections may have occurred in other countries
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since it has been postulated that infections are more likely to go undetected in
countries without developed E. coli 0157 surveillance systems (Ackers et al. 1998).
Figure 1.3: Countries where E. coli 0157 infection has been reported
The countries where E. coli 0157 infection has been reported, adapted from a figure courtesy of
Prof. Bill Reilly. As not all cases are detected and reported in the published literature, infections
may have occurred in countries not highlighted on this map. The figure has been updated to reflect
postulated that infections are more likely to go undetected in countries without
developed E. coli 0157 surveillance systems (Ackers et al. 1998). Additionally,
studies have indicated that non-0157 VTEC/EHEC infectious are more common in
places including Australia (Goldwater & Bettelheim 1995), South America and parts
of continental Europe (Bach et al. 2002; Karch et al. 2005).
In 2005, eight continental European countries contributing to the Enter-Net database
(which will be discussed below) reported more than 50% of infections dues to non-
0157 serotypes: Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, Norway, Slovenia, Italy, Austria
and Switzerland (European Commission 2007). As a result, these countries and
regions are less likely to be included in the analyses in this thesis.
1.7 Surveillance
1.7.1 Methods of surveillance
Organized surveillance systems for E. coli 0157 have been established in many of
the countries where E. coli 0157 cases have occurred, with some of the most
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comprehensive programs in the three countries covered in this thesis: Scotland
(Locking et al. 2003a), the United States (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
2003a) and Canada (Public Health Agency of Canada 2007). Surveillance systems
can be either active or passive, or involve components of both types (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention 2006f). In active surveillance, data - usually on
cases - is actively sought from health or laboratory professionals, while passive
surveillance systems rely on data being reported by laboratories, physicians or other
public health personnel.
The reporting systems for the three above mentioned countries will be detailed in the
corresponding chapters (2 - 5), but a general summary of surveillance will be
provided below. In countries such as Scotland, the United States and Canada,
reporting of all cases to the national infectious disease agency (e.g. HPS, CDC,
PHAC etc.) is mandatory, though the regulations within political sub regions (e.g.
states or provinces) may vary. For instance, reporting was mandatory at the state
level (e.g. to the state public health agency) in only 48 U.S. states by 2000 (Rangel et
al. 2005). In Scotland, cases are reported to HPS (Locking et al. 2003c), while in the
United States all laboratory confirmed and probable cases are reported through the
National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System (NNDSS) (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention 2007g) and in Canada cases are reported to the National
Notifiable Diseases program (NND) (Public Health Agency of Canada 2006). This
passive surveillance may also be supplemented by active surveillance programs such
as FoodNet in the United States. Established in 1995, FoodNet has expanded to
cover 10 surveillance areas each ofwhich ranges from a few counties to an entire
state, and overall comprise about 15% of the US population (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention 2007f). The program involves active surveillance conducted
via regular contact with laboratories to gather data on confirmed cases of infectious
foodborne illnesses as well as population, physician and laboratory surveys to
increase the knowledge of disease prevalence. In Scotland, the enhanced
surveillance program, started in 1999, includes active components including an
attempted case by case follow-up of all reported cases (Locking et al. 2003a).
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Surveillance for outbreaks differs between countries and is usually done a passive
basis. Outbreak cases are reported via paper or internet based systems from
local/regional public health offices and laboratories to the national surveillance
organizations (Health Protection Scotland 2007f), with PFGE types of isolates
reported to national laboratories compared via PulseNet in Canada and the United
States. In Scotland there is a single reporting form used to capture reporting
information, but in other countries the form and thus the type and quality of the
outbreak data captured, can differ by state/province/health board (personal
communication, Carole Tinga, PHAC and Thai An Nguyen, CDC). The issues of
data comparability will be discussed in each country specific chapter (Chapters 2-5)
and in detail when the trends between countries are compared (Chapter 6).
Within Scotland, outbreaks are reported to Health Protection Scotland (Health
Protection Scotland 2007f), while in Canada the Foodbome, Waterborne and
Zoonotic Infections Division at the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC)
maintains a database of outbreaks (Tinga et al. 2006) and the National Microbiology
Laboratory issues yearly reports on all outbreaks for which samples are submitted to
the laboratory (National Laboratory for Enteric Pathogens 2006). In the United
States, outbreaks are reported to the CDC via electronic or paper records (personal
communication, Thai An Nguyen, CDC). Until 2006, foodborne and non-foodbome
outbreaks were reported via separate forms and records maintained in separate
databases (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2003a; Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention 2004a). The fact that the forms have been updated at least
five times since 1989 raises the issue of data comparability over time. Changing
forms and reporting methods can affect the quality and quantity of data, and for the
United States in particular, such effects are a significant issue and will be addressed
in detail in Chapter 4.
As E. coli 0157 infections have been reported in more than 20 countries (see 1.6.9),
and a number of outbreaks have crossed international borders (Pebody et al. 1999),
multi-national surveillance networks have been created. In terms of the countries
covered in this thesis, the major network has been EnterNet, which covers 36
countries, primarily from Europe, but also from North America, Africa, Australia and
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Asia (European Commission 2007). As of the 2005 report, data on E. coli 0157 had
been received from 26 countries for all or part of the period of 2000 to 2005, though
some countries provide only case counts, while others provide more detailed
information such as outbreak information and a breakdown of cases by factors such
as serotype and phage type. The network provides an important opportunity for
future comparison of national case and outbreak trends, as well as ability to
coordinate approaches towards multi-country outbreaks. However, the data provided
in the reports has thus far been descriptive, with no statistical analysis of trends
within or between countries (European Commission 2007). EnterNet has been
discontinued as of 2007, but data collection and analysis will be continued under the
auspices of the new European Centers for Disease Control (ECDC). Multi-country
collaboration also exists via the PulseNet groups which allow comparison of PFGE
types from isolates, linking cases together within and between countries (CDC 2007).
For all passive surveillance — outbreak or sporadic - incomplete reporting is an
important issue, in terms of the number of cases or outbreaks that may not be
reported to national surveillance agencies. The causes of, and research on, under¬
reporting prior to the level of surveillance will be discussed in Section 1.9, but even
when cases are identified and laboratory confirmed, the data provided to the national
surveillance agency may not be complete. In the United States, not all states
reported case counts to the CDC until 2002 (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention 2004b), and in Canada, not all provinces or territories have provided data
each year to the NND and/or the outbreak database (Public Health Agency of Canada
2006; Sockett et al. 2006). Thus, any analysis of data from surveillance must be
interpreted based on knowledge regarding omissions in the data sets.
1.7.2 Surveillance data - publication
Routine surveillance data in most countries, including the three analysed in Chapters
2-6, are published in reports or publications issued by the national surveillance
agencies. The depth of detail in the reports varies by country, with all countries
releasing at least a yearly listing of total laboratory isolates or case numbers. In
Scotland, quarterly and yearly listings of outbreaks as well as an in depth summary
of findings from enhanced surveillance are published in HPS Weekly(currently
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available for years 2002 to 2004) (Locking et al. 2003a; Locking et al. 2004; Locking
et al. 2006a; SCIEH 1997b; SCIEH 2000a; SCIEH 2003b; SCIEH 2003d; Smith-
Palmer et al. 2005). Outbreak listings include health board region, suspected mode
of transmission and case number (ill and confirmed), while the enhanced surveillance
reports include statistics with graphs or charts on the breakdown of cases by such
factors as serotype, asymptomatic/symptomatic, outbreak/sporadic, and
secondary/primary.
For the United States, counts of reported cases are issued weekly in the Morbidity &
Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) and summarized in more detail in yearly
MMWR reports on notifiable diseases (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
2007g). Information on outbreaks, other than MMWR reports on specific outbreaks,
does not appear to be routinely released, but listings of all foodborne outbreaks and
E. coli 0157 outbreaks between 1998 and 2002, have been posted on the CDC
website (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2007e). In Canada, data on
case numbers and rates, by sex, age, province and year can be accessed in graphical
and table format via Notifiable Disease On-Line (Public Health Agency of Canada
2006). The National Microbiology Laboratory also issues yearly reports covering
isolates (sporadic and outbreak) reported to the National Enteric Surveillance
Program (National Laboratory for Enteric Pathogens 2002). Monthly data on
reported cases is also released in the Notifiable Disease Monthly Report (Public
Health Agency of Canada 2005). Temporal data is generally presented in the form of
graphs, with examples given in Figure 1.4 a-c. These tables show trends in total
cases or rates. Figure 1.4a shows the total number ofVTEC cases, which includes
non-0157 E. coli, in Canada, while Figure 1.4b includes plot lines for is. coli 0157
rates per 100,000 of laboratory confirmed E. coli 0157 in the countries that make up
the United Kingdom.
Figure 1.4c shows the number of cases reported to the two reporting systems in the
United States (PHLIS and NNDSS) - NNDSS numbers are higher because they
include both confirmed and probable cases (see Chapter 2 for details on these
reporting systems). These figures are all purely descriptive, with no statistical
analysis of trends included in the accompanying reports.
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Figure 1.4 a-c: Examples of plots illustrating temporal trends in overall E. coli case numbers
from surveillance reports in (a) Canada, (b) Scotland and (c) United States.
Examples of plots showing temporal trends in case numbers. Plot a is constructed using the
Notifiable Diseases On-Line (Public Health Agency of Canada 2006), and shows the total number
of VTEC cases in Canada each year. Plot B is from the 2004 enhanced surveillance report issued
by HPS (Locking et al. 2006a). Plot C is from a 2002 report on Shiga-toxin producing E. coli in
the United States (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2003a), with the PHLIS data
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1.8 Methods of analysing temporal trends
Analyses of temporal trends in E. coli 0157 have been limited to descriptive studies
and analyses of seasonal trends. However, statistical analyses of trends in a wide
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range of chronic and infectious conditions have been conducted. These include
cancer (Agha et al. 2006; Conway et al. 2006; Maule et al. 2006) injury rates
(Agnusdei et al. 1993; Brenner et al. 1999), Campylobacter (Miller et al. 2004b;
Sandberg et al. 2006; van de Giessen et al. 2006), Salmonella (Guerin et al. 2005a;
Guerin et al. 2005b; Khakhria et al. 1997; Marcus et al. 2004b; Menzies et al. 1994;
Olsen et al. 2001; Smith-Palmer et al. 2003) and Acinetobacter (McDonald et al.
1999).
Temporal trends or time trend data (Maule et al. 2006) can be analysed using multi-
year (Tleyjeh et al. 2005), yearly (Sandberg et al. 2006), monthly (Miller et al.
2004b; van de Giessen et al. 2006), weekly or even daily data points. Since
surveillance data is commonly recorded in weekly or monthly intervals (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention 1995b; Public Health Agency of Canada 2005),
these data points are often used for analyses infectious disease trends. However,
while sub-yearly data permit the analysis of seasonal trends (Douglas & Kurien
1997; McDonald et al. 1999; Miller et al. 2004b), the effects of seasonality must be
identified and adjusted for in order for overall trends to be analysed. One method for
analysing both seasonal and yearly trends is to include terms for both year and month
(or day) in a model (Guerin et al. 2005b).
The most common method for analysing temporal trends is Poisson regression (Agha
et al. 2006; EURODIAB ACE Study Group 2000; Kamper-Jorgensen et al. 2006;
Sandberg et al. 2006; Tleyjeh et al. 2005), with the time (year, month etc) as a
continuous, categorical or offset variable. However, simple linear regression (Van
der Heyden et al. 2000), Bayesian methods (Maule et al. 2006), time series analysis
(Kuhn et al. 1994), Chi-square tests of trend (Joe & Kaplan 2002; Marcus et al.
2004b) and least squares regression (Agnusdei et al. 1993; Olsen et al. 2001) have
also been used in some studies. Trends have been compared using analysis of
covariance (Joe & Kaplan 2002) or by the inclusion of an interaction term in a
regression (EURODIAB ACE Study Group 2000). Poisson regression appears to be
appropriate for short time periods, with analyses done on data sets with as few as six
data points. Such applicability is important when considering the data sets for
Chapters 2-6, which contain only 8 or 9 data points.
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These methods, in particular those shown to be applicable for other infectious
diseases and for shorter time periods, will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 2
(section 2.3) when the process for selecting the appropriate statistical method(s) for
analysing E. coli 0157 trends in Chapters 3-6 are presented.
1.9 Methods of assessing under-reporting
In this section, an introduction to the techniques used to analyse under-reporting of
diseases and conditions, and the under-reporting of infectious diseases is provided.
A brief introduction to the under-reporting ofE. coli 0157 will be given, with a more
in depth analysis provided in the introduction to Chapter 8. Existing methods of
estimating of prevalence will also be mentioned as background for the framework
presented in Chapter 8.
1.9.1 Under-reporting in infectious diseases
Underreporting of counts or cases occurs in a wide range of circumstances in
infectious diseases. For instance, the rate of human Schistomiasis mansoni infections
is underestimated by more than 50% by single faecal egg counts (de Vlas & Gryseels
1992). As many as 25% of Legionellosis cases in Italy were not reported to the
national register (Rota et al. 2007). In Canada, the United States and United
Kingdom, a number of studies have suggested that a large percentage of foodborne
illnesses are never reported (Angulo et al. 1998; Cumberland et al. 2003; Handysides
1999; Imhoff et al. 2004; MacDougall et al. 2007; Voetsch et al. 2004b; Wheeler et
al. 1999). One study in the United States indicated that only 21% of persons with
acute diarrhoeal illnesses sought medical care, and of those persons just 16% were
asked for a stool sample (Imhoff et al. 2004). The rates ofmedical care uptake were
approximately 10% in England & Wales (Cumberland et al. 2003) and British
Columbia, Canada (MacDougall et al. 2007).
In Canada the National Studies of Acute Gastrointestinal Illness (NSAGI), which
involved population, laboratory and reporting practice studies (MacDougall et al.
2007), have provided a great deal of data to assist in estimation of illness prevalence.
Based on this data and other information, it has been estimated that Campylobacter,
which has the lowest rate of cases with bloody diarrhoea, has the lowest rate of
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reporting at 2% to 4%, followed by Salmonella (3 to 8%) and E. coli 0157 (2 to
10%) (Thomas et al. 2006). The Infectious Intestinal Disease (IID) study in England
and Wales was conducted to determine foodborne illness incidence rates in the
community and in persons who report to general practice with symptoms of
infectious intestinal illnesses (Wheeler et al. 1999). It included both community and
general practice level surveys (Cumberland et al. 2003). Data from this study,
together with additional information on hospital stays and deaths, was used to
estimate the burden of foodbome diseases in 1992, 1995 and 2000. Again, the
reporting rate of Campylobacter (-10%) and Salmonella (-26%) was estimated to be
much lower than that ofE. coli 0157 (-50%) (Adak et al. 2002). The lowest rates of
reporting were found for viruses and bacteria such as Aeromonas spp. Similar results
were seen in CDC study based on data from a number of passive and active
surveillance systems in the United States (Mead et al. 1999). Where data was not
available, the major factor taken into consideration in estimating under-reporting was
the general severity of symptoms. Salmonella and Campylobacter were assumed to
have a higher rate of under-reporting because infected persons were less likely to
have bloody diarrhoea than those infected with E. coli 0157. This factor was hinted
at in the correlation between rate of bloody diarrhoea and reporting rate found in the
Canadian study mentioned above, and is likely to have influenced the results of the
IID study in England & Wales. Though E. coli 0157 does not have the highest rate
of under-reporting or case numbers, it has higher rate of hospitalisation and case
fatality that most other infectious intestinal organisms. Thus, despite the lower case
counts, it remains an important public health issue.
1.9.2 Using reporting triangles to illustrate under-reporting
Cases of infectious intestinal illness are only picked up by surveillance programs if
the infected persons seek medical care, samples are taken, tested and confirmed by a
laboratory, and the positive results are reported to the appropriate surveillance
agency. This incremental process is often captured in 'reporting triangles', also
referred to commonly as "prevalence of illness pyramids" (Angulo et al. 1998;
Griffin 1998) or "under-reporting pyramids" (MacDougall et al. 2007), which are
used to illustrate the steps required for a case to be reported. By providing a clear
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depiction of the process, reporting triangles can suggest where cases might be 'lost'
to the reporting system. They also provide a basis for more accurately estimating
both under-ascertainment and true prevalence of infections. In Figure 1.5 a, b and c,
examples of reporting triangles for the surveillance of all infectious intestinal
diseases in England and Wales (Handysides 1999) and in the United States (FoodNet
Working Group 1997) are presented, demonstrating the attrition of cases between
infection and reporting to the national surveillance body.
Figure 1.5 a-c: Examples of reporting triangles
Examples of reporting trials from (a) England and Wales, (b) United States and (c) Canada
a b
Figure 2 Notified cases represent only a proport ion of llie
morbidity caused by food poisoning
Wall et al (1996) Angulo et al (1998)
c
Fig. 1. Under-reporting pyramid for gastrointestinal illness
in British Columbia. Overall under-reporting was charac¬
terized by estimating the proportion of cases thatmoved up
through each of eight sequential tiers of reporting, con¬
ditional on reaching the previous tier.
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In the first triangle, the sections represent the proportions of the population for which
the case does not make it to the next level - i.e. the bottom section are those persons
who have mild or no symptoms, and so thus would not ever be seen by a doctor. In
Figure 1.5b, the sections of the triangle indicate the steps between illness and
reporting, as well as indicating which type of surveys would measure the percentage
of cases that progressed to each step. The final triangle is the most detailed,
indicating the actual ratios of cases (as compared to every one reported case) that
progress to each step.
Reporting triangles for E. coli 0157 have been constructed, and will be discussed in
Chapter 8. These triangles, however, present only one method of looking at
prevalence.
1.9.3 Estimating prevalence
In addition to the studies detailed in Sections 1.9.1 and 1.9.2, which have estimated
true prevalence of infections using data primary from surveys and records, there have
been other studies which have used a variety ofmethods to estimate prevalence. A
recent study estimated the prevalence ofHuman Papillomavirus in the United States
based on data from studies of specific population groups (Weller & Stanberry 2007).
Community studies with additional modelling for uncertainty were used in the
estimation of prevalence for a wide range of conditions in South Africa (Bradshaw et
al. 2007; Groenewald et al. 2007; Joubert et al. 2007; Norman et al. 2007; Schneider
et al. 2007a; Schneider et al. 2007b). Italian researchers estimated Legionellosis
prevalence using capture-recapture methods, which are based on counts of data from
two different points (Rota et al. 2007) in times. Black and Craig used a Bayesian
approach to estimate prevalence ofStrongyloses infection based on results from two
diagnostic tests (Black & Craig 2002). For calculating Schistosoma mansoni egg
counts in faecal samples, de Vlas and Gryseels employed a stochastic model which
incorporated such factors as worm distribution and variability of egg counts (de Vlas
& Gryseels 1992). However, ofmost interest, given the framework proposed in
Chapter 8, is the model presented for the estimation of bovine spongiform
encephalopathy in cattle herds (Prattley et al. 2007). The model is based on
surveillance and demographic data, but one main assumption is that the number of
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cattle which are infected are binomial distributed. The framework in Chapter 8 also
involves binomial distribution. However, whilst these studies all estimate prevalence
for single cases, no study could be found which estimated prevalence based on
counts of events (cases or outbreaks). Thus the study in Chapter 8 provides a
potentially unique and different framework for estimating prevalence.
1.10 Conclusion
In this chapter, an introduction to E. coli and E. coli 0157 has been presented,
focusing on the history, microbiology, epidemiology and surveillance of the E. coli
0157. This information is intended to provide a background to the studies in the
next 7 chapters of this thesis. Temporal trends in E. coli 0157 cases and outbreaks
will be compared between Scotland, the United States and Canada, but before a
comparison can be done, the trends in each country must be modelled individually.
The first country for which trends will be modelled is Scotland.
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As discussed in the prospectus, the central aim of this thesis is to compare temporal
trends in E. coli 0157 outbreaks and cases between countries. Linear trends over
time in such diseases such as cancer (Venzon & Moolgavkar 1984), gonorrhoea
(Van der Heyden et al. 2000) and childhood diabetes (EURODIAB ACE Study
Group 2000) have been compared, but to-date, there has been little direct
comparison, descriptive or statistical, of trends in E. coli 0157 between countries. In
1994, as the result of an exchange between Scotland and the Canadian province of
Alberta, Waters and colleagues published a broad descriptive overview ofE. coli
0157 in Scotland and Alberta from 1987 to 1991 (Waters et al. 1994). Cases were
described in terms of variables such as rate of infection by year, month and age, and
suspected source of infection, but comparisons were made on a purely descriptive
basis with the authors highlighting a number of similarities between the two
countries. Since then there has been little published work on comparisons, though
the establishment of the EnterNet Salmonella and E. coli 0157 surveillance network,
primarily involving European Union nations, has allowed for the creation of an
international database of cases. Though no statistical comparisons have yet been
published based on data from the database, the yearly reports (European Commission
2006; European Commission 2007) have included tables of case numbers and
incidence rates from the contributing countries.
The dearth of detailed comparative trend analyses between countries in trends may
be due, in part, to the great caution over comparing data collected via different
surveillance systems, an issue addressed by Waters and colleagues (Waters et al.
1994). With the onset of improved and/or enhanced surveillance programs across
Scotland, Canada and United States in the last decade, and the potential for a
comparative analysis to provide insight into E. coli 0157 epidemiology, it seems
appropriate for a comparison to now be attempted.
However, prior to a comparison of temporal trends between Scotland, Canada and
the United States being attempted, background on the countries and data sets must be
provided, the issues involving such a comparison be addressed, and the trends in
each country be individually modelled. In this chapter, a background to the
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comparison of temporal trends in E. coli 0157 between countries will be presented.
Comparative information on the three countries included in the analyses will be
included in order to provide context to the comparisons. Next, methods for statistical
analysis of trends will be introduced, followed by a description of the specific
methods to be used in this thesis. The issues regarding the choice ofmethod(s) will
also be discussed. The final section will offer an introduction to the data sets which
will be used in the temporal trend analyses, the results ofwhich are to be presented in
Chapters 3 (Scotland), 4 (United States), 5 (Canada) and 6 (Comparison).
2.2 Comparing trends between countries
2.2.1 Selection of countries
As discussed above, the first focus of the thesis is on comparing temporal trends
between countries. In order for the trend analyses and comparisons to be statistically
feasible, the data sets to be analysed must come from countries with an established
surveillance program. Also, the data available from the surveillance must involve
enough cases/outbreaks and a long enough time period to provide sufficient
statistical power. A number of countries potentially fit this profile including
Scotland, the United States, Canada, England & Wales and Japan. However, for this
thesis, it was only possible to obtain official data sets from Scotland, the United
States and Canada, so the individual and comparison analyses will be limited to these
three countries.
2.2.2 Comparing Scotland, the United States and Canada
In order to provide context for the comparison, a number of issues will be examined,
including the spatial distribution of cases within each country, the definitions used
within each country and the control measures used.
2.2.2.1 Spatial distribution of cases
As illustrated by the statistics in Table 2.1, the three countries being compared in this
chapter - Scotland, the United States and Canada - vary widely in size, population,
population density and land usage. These are factors which could potentially affect
the spatial distribution in each country. Figure 2.1 would suggest that at least for
population density, the patterns between the countries vary. There is more of an
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east-west variation in the United States and more of a north-south variation in
Canada and Scotland.
Table 2.1: Comparison of demographic statistics between countries
The table provides a comparison of demographic statistics between Scotland, the United States and
Canada. A rough estimate of cattle density per hectare (p/ha) was calculated by dividing the
Comparison Between Countries
Scotland United States Canada
Population (2003) 5,057,400 290, 796, 023 31, 985,000
Land size (km sq) 78, 722 9,826,630 9, 984,670
Population density 65 person per knrf 29.4 3.1
Land farmed
(hectares) 6,100,000 379,708, 062 67,500,000
Land in crops
(hectares) 650,000 175,700,320 36,395,150
Cattle population 1,914,000 95,438,000 16,250,000
Cattle density (p/ha) 0.35 0.47 0.52
Data sources: (Scottish Executive 2007a; Statistics Canada 2006; U.S.Census Bureau 2006; United
States Department ofAgriculture 2007a)
Within Scotland, the rate of sporadic cases increases from west to east and south to
north, with the highest rates in the north east and the lowest in the central-west
(Innocent et al. 2006) (Fig. 2.1a). Closely linked is the rural/urban divide, with
higher rates in the rural areas, as demonstrated by Figure 2.1a which shows that the
health board districts that have had some of the highest rates of infection tend to have
low population densities.
Overall case rates also closely align with these findings, the highest rates most often
in the north-east health board ofGrampian (GR), and in the Borders (BR), Fife (FF)
and Dumfries & Galloway (DG) (Coia et al. 1993; Coia et al. 1995; Coia et al. 1996;
Cowden 1997b; Douglas & Kurien 1997; Sharp et al. 1994a; Thomson-Carter et al.
1996). Differences between rural and urban rates were also noticed in Ontario,
Canada where regions associated with higher case rates were frequently of mixed-
agricultural use (Michel et al. 1999). Case rates in the United States have historically
been highest in the states bordering Canada, with the highest numbers of outbreaks
between 1982 and 2002 in Minnesota, Washington, New York, California and
Oregon (Rangel et al. 2005) (Figure 2.1b). However, as shown in Figure 2.1b, states
with high rates of infection do not always have low population densities. Overall,
consistently higher rates of infection have been seen in the central provinces of
Alberta, Manitoba and Saskatchewan (Prince Edward Island has very high rates, but
68
these are likely to be influenced, as with the island health board regions in Scotland,
by the very low population) (Fig. 2.1c), with infection rate and population density
not appearing to be connected on the provincial level (Sockett et al. 2006).
Figure 2.1 a-c: Population density of regions in (a) Scotland, (b) United States and (c) Canada
The population densities by region in the three countries being compared. For Scotland (a) the
measure of density is persons per square kilometre, for the United States and the approximate
locations of the health board regions with the highest rates ofE. coli 0157 infection are indicated.
For the United States (b), the map shows population density in square miles, with darker colours
indicating higher density and red dots indicating the states with the highest outbreak rates. For
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2.2.2.2 Definitions
Case and outbreak definitions for each country will be discussed in the relevant
chapters; however it is important to highlight the general similarities and differences
between countries in these definitions (see Table 6.1).
When examining the overall number of reported (total confirmed) cases - both
sporadic and outbreak-related - the definitions for the cases which are recorded in
the data sets vary between countries. In Scotland, the total case count includes only
cases which are confirmed by faecal isolate. The Canadian data set also is limited to
laboratory confirmed cases (though not explicitly limited to confirmation by faecal
isolate), but includes both 0157 and non-0157 VTEC cases. Contrastingly, whilst in
the United States data set only includes 0157 cases, probable cases are also counted
in the total. Probable cases may be laboratory confirmed, but can also be clinically
compatible cases that are epidemiologically linked to other probable or confirmed
cases. These clinically compatible cases are mostly non-laboratory confirmed
outbreak cases; cases that in Scotland would be included in the count of the number
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of ill cases in an outbreak, but not in the count of the number of ill and positive cases
in an outbreak.
For outbreaks, the definitions used to compile the national data sets in Canada and
the United States prescribe that outbreaks must involve at least two linked cases. In
addition, for a cluster to be an outbreak in the United States, the illness must result
from a common source, whilst in Canada the standard is that the cluster must involve
two or more clinically or laboratory confirmed cases. Two linked cases are also
required in Scotland, however to be defined as an outbreak, the cases must involve
persons who are not in the same household. These 'household outbreaks', based on
the information provided, are considered as outbreaks on a national level in Canada
and the United States. It should be noted though, that in at least one Canadian
province, the provincial database may not explicitly identify household outbreaks
(Pearl et al. 2006). However, it is not known whether the outbreak data provided by
the PHAC was obtained from this data set.
Both Canada (federally) and Scotland have very similar definitions for ill (also
referred to as clinical, but can include asymptomatic cases) outbreak cases and ill &
positive (also referred to as confirmed) outbreak cases. The latter must be laboratory
confirmed whilst the former must only have compatible symptoms (excepting
asymptomatic cases) and be linked to the outbreak. It should be noted, though, that
the definitions used to collect data within each Canadian province or territory vary,
so whilst there is a single definition for the federal data set, the numbers may not
directly reflect this definition.
In the United States, the definitions have evolved along with system used to collect
outbreak data. The system was at first paper-based and separated between foodborne
and non-foodborne outbreaks, then computerised in 1998. However, the foodborne
and non-foodborne aspects were not combined until after the time period covered in
the analyses. The definition for a confirmed case is essentially as for the other two
countries, in that the case must be lab confirmed. Ill cases also include those that are
probable, as defined for total cases, which is again, roughly compatible with the
definitions in Canada and Scotland. However, it is not clear whether secondary cases
were consistently included with the count of either laboratory confirmed cases or ill
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cases, as such cases were reported separately on a completed outbreak form provided
for this thesis. Additionally, two data sets were merged for the analysis of temporal
trends in the United States, only one ofwhich had been edited and updated to comply
with current definitions.
2.2.2.3 Control Measures
Across the three countries, a wide range ofmeasures for the prevention and control
ofE. coli 0157 infection have been taken. Consideration of these measures is of
importance because of their potential influence on temporal trends.
Many of the control measures which have been undertaken in Scotland were directly
or indirectly in response to the Wishaw Outbreak. As discussed in section 3.2.3.3, an
enhanced surveillance program, which involves long term follow-up of confirmed
cases, was initiated in Scotland in mid-1999. The program has the potential to
causes changes in the number and type (outbreak or sporadic) of cases reported via
surveillance. Recommendations for public control measures since the Wishaw
Outbreak have come from reports produced by groups such as the Pennington Group
(Pennington 1998) and a task force convened by the Food Standards Agency and the
Scottish Executive Health Department with a remit that included a considerations of
"what future measures would help protect public health" (O'Brien et al. 2001b). The
recommendations which have been put into practice focus not only on the meat
industry, but also increasingly on reducing environmental contact. Food safety
measures, including the implementation of HACCP (Health Analysis and Critical
Control Point), have been introduced for restaurants and other businesses that handle
food items. More recently, there has been an effort to educate people about the need
for proper hygiene measures at places such as open farms, petting zoos and when
camping (Scottish Executive 2007b). It will be of interest to see if the
implementation of these measures has had any affect on the trends in foodborne
cases/outbreaks.
Additional measures targeting environmental transmission in Scotland include
guidelines suggesting a minimum time period between use of a field for livestock
and for camping (O'Brien & Adak 2002). A program of increased education about
ways to reduce the risk of animal to human transmission has also been implemented
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in the United States (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2007b). Given the
large number of cases in the United States associated with minced beef, control
measures in the U. S. have also focused on the beef industry. These measures have
included a monitoring program and HACCP (Wachsmuth et al. 1997). On the
consumer level, programs have encouraged safe food preparation techniques with a
particular emphasis on ensuring thorough cooking of minced beef (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention 2005b). The creation of the FoodNet and PulseNet
networks have provided improved surveillance and linkage of cases, while research
in both Canada and the United States has proceeded on methods, such as cattle
vaccines, to decrease the carriage of the bacteria in cattle (Tauxe 1998). Since such
programs are aimed at decreasing the number of cases and outbreaks, one of focus of
the analysis of temporal trends will be to determine whether there has been a
decrease in case/outbreak numbers.
Control measures in Canada have also included education - via brochures and
websites - of the public about food safety measures including proper food
preparation and cooking techniques (Canadian Food Inspection Agency 2007). Day
care centre policies have been assessed, and campaigns have been launched to inform
consumers about outbreaks and general prevention methods. In addition, there have
been changes to commercial food processing practices (Sockett et al. 2006). Since
the Walkerton Outbreak, there has also been a focus on ensuring safety of the water
supply (Todd 2000). Collaborative research such as the IPRAVE study, which
looked at links between infection in cattle and humans, have been part of control
measures in all three countries. Many of these measures have been enacted too
recently for effects to be linked to statistically significant temporal trends. However,
the effects will be considered in the interpretation of temporal trend models, as
differing control measures could play a greater role in any differences in trends
between countries than dissimilar underlying epidemiological factors.
2.2.3 Temporal trends by country
Prior to comparing temporal trends between Scotland, the United States and Canada,
the trends in each of these countries must be analysed separately. The trends which
can be appropriate and adequately modelled within each of the individually countries
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can then be compared. The next section of this chapter will introduce and discuss the
statistical methods used in the analyses of temporal trends.
2.3 Descriptive and statistical analysis of temporal trends
In the next four chapters, temporal trends in E. coli 0157 outbreaks and cases will be
analysed in three separate countries and then compared. This section will begin with
a brief introduction to the statistical analysis of temporal trends, followed by a
description and discussion of the methods selected for the analyses in Chapters 3 to
6. Finally the issues ofmultiple testing, power and uncertainty, in the context of the
trend analysis, will be discussed.
2.3.1 Selection of variables
The variables from each country will be discussed in detail in the relevant chapter,
but this section is intended to provide a brief overview as to the trend selected to be
modelled and compared.
The selection of variables is driven both by an interest in determining the statistical
significance of trends suggested in the literature, as well as by the data made
available (see Section 2.4.2 on issues of data availability). Trends in overall cases,
sporadic case, outbreaks and outbreak cases are of interest in order to provide a
complete picture of any changes that have been occurring in terms of the
epidemiology ofE. coli 0157. For instance, is there a general decrease in cases, or
only in either outbreak cases or sporadic cases? The other main focus is on outbreak
size and mode of transmission in outbreaks, since it has been suggested, at least in
Scotland, that there has been a shift in the dominant mode(s) of transmission.
2.3.2 Methods for analysing temporal trends - non-selected methods
As introduced in Section 1.8, there a number ofmethods for analysing temporal
trends (time trends, time series trends). These include Poisson regression (Agha et
al. 2006; EURODIAB ACE Study Group 2000; Kamper-Jorgensen et al. 2006;
Sandberg et al. 2006; Tleyjeh et al. 2005), with the time (year, month etc) as a
continuous, categorical or offset variable, simple linear regression (Van der Heyden
et al. 2000), Bayesian methods (Maule et al. 2006), time series analysis (Kuhn et al.
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1994), Chi-square tests of trend (Joe & Kaplan 2002; Marcus et al. 2004b) and non¬
linear regression methods (Anthony et al. 2006).
• Non-linear methods
A number of non-linear methods can be applied, such as regression analysis with a
quadratic or cubic term (Anthony et al. 2006) and the Bayesian Generalised Linear
Mixed Models (GLMM) methods (Maule et al. 2006).
Polynomial functions, which include the independent variable (x) raised to various
powers, can be used to model non-linear curves (Crawley 2002). A model with a
2 3
quadratic term (x ) can be used to model humped curves, whilst a cubic term (x ) can
be added to model curves that have double changes in curve shape. A quadratic
model has been used to model the temporal trend in the (contribution of the) familial
component of high systolic pressure (Province et al. 1989). Trends in seabird
populations have also been modelled using Poisson regressions with polynomial
terms (Fewster et al. 2000).
Other non-linear shapes can be described by functions such as the Rickert curve (y =
a-x-e"bx), which is used in fisheries research (Crawley 2002). Generalised Additive
Models (GAMs), which are related to GLMs, provide smoothed curves, and can
accommodate a wide range of non-linear curve shapes, have also been using in
temporal trend modelling (Fewster et al. 2000; Rodriguez et al. 2007).
Bayesian modelling methods include Bayesian non-parametric GLMMs (Maule et
al. 2006). Bayesian analyses are differentiated from other regression analyses by the
fact that the parameter estimates are obtained from the distribution of the model
parameters (Brown & Prescott 1999). The advantages of the Bayesian approach of
relevance to temporal trend analyses include the ability to handle overdispersion and
correlated data points (Maule et al. 2006). Additionally, non-linear models can
account for changes in the direction of a trend (Maule et al. 2006).
However, non-linear methods were not considered appropriate for the analyses of
temporal trends in E. coli 0157 for several reasons. Firstly and most importantly, the
apriori hypothesis for the analyses of temporal trends is that temporal trends in E.
coli 0157 could be modelled using simple linear techniques. This hypothesis has
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been established because one of the aims of the study is to create models which can
be explained via biological mechanisms, rather than simply fitting a trend with as
many parameters as needed to find the closest fit to the data points. The concern
with using highly parameterised models, such a polynomial and other non-linear
models is that with data from such a short time period which has low counts and a
great deal ofvariation, it may not be possible to determine true non-linear trends.
Starting with linear models also is in line with the principle of Occam's razor, which
in modelling means that "models should have as few parameters as possible..." and
"linear models should be preferred to non-linear models..." (Crawley 2002).
• Time series analysis
Time series analysis, as discussed by Kuhn and colleagues, is a form of regression
analysis in which the relationship between data collected at regular time periods is
examined (Kuhn et al. 1994). In contrast to regular analysis, the points on the
regression line (dependent variables) are predicted from "values of the outcome at
previous points in time..." (Kuhn et al. 1994). Time series analyses are
autoregressive, in that they account for correlation between time points. However,
because of the different prediction method and the fact that they are used to look for
long term patterns, time-series regressions are generally used where there are least 30
time points (Dan Haydon, personal communication). Thus, since the data sets for the
temporal trend analyses only include 7 to 9 data points, time series analyses are not
appropriate.
• Chi-squared tests for trend
Chi-square tests for trend use the Chi-test to look for trends in the proportion of
population with a specific trait (Kirkwood & Sterne 2003). Such tests are not used
frequently for temporal trend analyses, in particular for infectious diseases, because
data from surveillance only provides information on the numbers of persons with a
disease, not on the number of people without the infection. For this reason, chi-
squared test for trend is not an appropriate method for the analyses in Chapters 3-6.
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2.3.3 Methods for analysing temporal trends - selected methods
• Poisson regression (GLMs) and linear regression - introduction
Regression using GLMs with Poisson error structure will be detailed in Section
2.3.4.2, but briefly, the aim of such regression is to "fit to observed data a regression
equation that accurately models the expected value of the dependent variable Y,
E(Y), as a function X, of a set ofX independent variables... and P regression
parameters" (Kuhn et al. 1994). In terms ofmodelling temporal trends in E. coli
0157, GLM regression with Poisson error structure models the expected number of
cases or outbreaks as function of year and the parameters in the regression model.
Linear regression has a similar aim, but is used when the dependent variable is
continuous or when the count data are log-transformed and are thus no longer in the
form of integer counts.
• Poisson regression - reasons for selection
GLMs using Poisson and binomial error structures, and linear regression have been
selected for the analyses for a number of specific reasons. Firstly and most
importantly, as mentioned above, the a priori hypothesis for the analyses of temporal
trends is that temporal trends in E. coli 0157 can be modelled using simple linear
techniques. The reason for this hypothesis is that a major focus of the trend analyses
is to create models which can be explained via biological mechanisms, rather than
simply fitting a trend with as many parameters as needed to find the closest fit to the
data points. Limiting the number of parameters also follows the principle of
Occam's razor, which in modelling means that "models should have as few
parameters as possible..." and "linear models should be preferred to non-linear
models..." (Crawley 2002).
Secondly, Poisson regression is widely to model trends in count data (Crawley 2007)
of relatively rare events (Kuhn et al. 1994) and most of the E. coli 0157 data is in
terms of counts, and infection is relatively rare. Other error structures e.g. Weibull
and Gamma distributions and transformations such as the inverse will not be used
because of the need to avoid over-parameterisation (Weibull and Gamma
distributions have two parameters, as compared to the single parameter of Poisson
model). Also, both Weibull and Gamma distributions are generally applicable when
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the data is the form of continuous measurements (Crawley 2007), whilst the
measurements in this thesis - numbers of outbreaks and cases - are counts.
The negative binomial error structure has also been considered because one of the
tenets ofmodelling biological processes, such as E. coli 0157 infections, is that
"individuals of any one kind (or species) are seldom, if ever, randomly dispersed in
space" (Cassie 1962; Miller et al. 2004a), but instead they are clustered or
aggregated. In terms ofE. coli 0157, infections are aggregated into events (i.e.
outbreaks) and the size distribution of these events, which underlies all E. coli 0157
surveillance, is in itself aggregated, as there are a few large events and many small
events or single sporadic cases (Locking et al. 2006a; O'Brien & Adak 2002;
Willshaw et al. 2001).
The negative binomial error structure, in which one of the two parameters, k, is an
inverse measure of aggregation (Fisher 1941), is used to describe populations that
are aggregated or overdispersed (Bliss & Fisher 1953) such as macroparasites in
wildlife host populations (Shaw et al. 1998). Thus it would seem appropriate to use
models with negative binomial error structures to describe the E. coli 0157 trends in
this thesis. However, because many of the trends analysed had non-zero minimums -
for instance, there must be at least two ill cases in an outbreak - the use of truncated
negative binomial models would be required. Such models are considered to be
outside the scope of the analyses in this chapter, in which the intent is to use simple
linear models. The use of truncated negative binomials will, however, be addressed
in Chapter 8 when prevalence is modelled.
In addition, Poisson regressions have been frequently used to model short term
temporal trends with as few as six time points (e.g. (EURODIAB ACE Study Group
2000; Tleyjeh et al. 2005; Van der Heyden et al. 2000)). This is of particular
relevance because the data sets being used contain only from seven to nine time
points. Since, as mentioned above, time series analyses usually require a large
number of data points in order that long term patterns might be recognized, they are
not appropriate. The non-linear analyses mentioned above, in particular the GAM
analyses, also tend to include longer data sets.
78
Finally, linear Poisson regressions are used because of the need to create models with
as much statistical power to detect trend as possible, despite the low number of data
points. With only 7 to 9 data points, the inclusion ofmore than a slope and an
intercept in the model would result in very few degrees of freedom in the regression
and thus low power to detect any significant changes in trend. Using non-linear
methods would increase the number of parameters, and with only seven time points
in some analyses, having three or more parameters would result in fewer than four
degrees of freedom. Such a model would only be able to demonstrate statistical
significance for very large changes in value over time.
Where the data is the form of proportions, a binomial error structure can be used with
a GLM, and where logarithmic transformation is needed to normalise data, linear
models can be used. Such log transformation can linearise data so that Poisson
regression can be used in line with the aims of this thesis.
There are however, some implications of the choice to use linear regression methods.
Firstly, such methods (with the exception of using a log transformation to linearise a
curve), cannot detect a non-linear trend, so such trends may not be recognised
(Maule et al. 2006). Additionally, However, GLM regression with Poisson error
structure is not always appropriate for temporal trend data because the key
assumption for regression is independence of observations (Zeger et al. 2006) and
data points in a time series may be correlated. (Here the observations are not
considered to be correlated). When interpreting a model fit, the possibility must be
considered that even if a linear model can be fitted to the data, that the trend may not
be truly linear. Thus a linear model may over-simply the nature of a trend. As a
result, it is important that all data be plotted and examined prior to modelling so that
clearly non-linear trends are excluded from linear analysis.
The next section will detail the specific methods used for the analyses in Chapters 3
to 6.
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2.3.4 Statistical methods for analysing temporal trends in Chapters 3 to 6
For this thesis, temporal trends in both count and continuous data were analysed
using GLMs and linear models as specified below. Methods specific to a particular
country will be presented in the relevant chapter.
2.3.4.1 Generalised linear models
While the assumption in a linear regression is that the residual error structure is
normal, the ability ofGLMs to be adapted for other error structures permits them to
be used for analysing non-normal data with categorical, count or continuous outcome
variable(s) (Crawley 2007). There are two main components to a GLM model, the
error structure and the link function. The error structure, for instance Poisson or
binomial, specifies the error structure of the data being analysed. The link function
is based on the error structure (though it can be varied in certain circumstances), and
is essentially a transformation of the outcome variable prior to modelling. When the
model is fitted, the predicted value is thus obtained from the linear predictor by back-
transformation.
The transformation by the link function allows non-linear equations to be linearised
so they can be analysed by GLM models. For example Crawley (Crawley 2002)
gives the example of the equation y=exp(a+bx) which is not linear. It can however
be linearised by log transforming both sides of the equation so it is now In y = a+bx.
This transformation can be accomplished with GLMs using the log link function.
In GLMs the values for the parameters, indicated as a, b,... are obtained by
maximizing the log likelihood via an "iterative, weighted least squares" method
(Brown & Prescott 1999). Using least squares to determine the best fit parameters is
based upon fitting a line for which the sum of the squares for the difference between
the y value of each data point and the corresponding y value on the line are
minimized. These differences, the residuals are weighted by 1/variance matrix
(Brown & Prescott 1999).
The outcome variable data for this study is either count, continuous or binomial and
the type of models used for each type will be discussed below.
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2.3.4.2 Count data
For count data, the initial model used is a GLM with Poisson error structure. The
Poisson error structure is a discrete distribution, and is thus used in instances where
the data is integers, such as counts. It is particularly appropriate for count data which
by definition includes only non-negative integer values - one cannot have -3 E. coli
0157 outbreaks, for example - where the link function is log, and thus restricts
outcome predictions/Poisson parameter estimates to values greater than zero. The
equation for the Poisson GLM model is given below:
L°g(y) = a + bx + error from Poisson or y = exp(a + bx) + error from Poisson
In R (R Development Core Team 2007) this is coded as below where y indicates the
y variable
Model <- glm(y~x, family = Poisson)
GLM with Poisson error structure is a test for trend which assumes that the increase
in log y is the same for each unit increase in x, which in the data set used in this
chapter is one year.
Each model is checked for appropriateness by inspection of residual plots and for
dispersion by calculating the ratio of residual deviance to residual degrees of
freedom. Where the ratio of residual deviance to residual degrees of freedom is
markedly greater or less than 1, meaning that the variance is not equal to the mean as
assumed in Poisson regression, there is over- or under-dispersion (Crawley 2007). In
these instances a quasipoisson model is used. The quasipoisson model is identical to
the Poisson model except that the over or under-dispersion is accounted for by not
setting the dispersion parameter, which is measure of the dispersion, at one, but at a
value that is the ratio of the residual deviance to residual degrees of freedom. The
standard errors of the parameters in the quasipoisson models are then adjusted by a
factor of the square root of the dispersion parameter. This adjustment provides a
more conservative estimation of statistical significance in overdispersion and a more
liberal estimation in underdispersion, correcting for the fact that the distribution is
not strictly Poisson. The greater the over- or under-dispersion, the greater the
adjustment.
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Two residual plots are examined for each quasipoisson or Poisson model. The first,
the Residuals vs. Fitted plot shows the residuals from the model plotted against the
predicted values. There should be no pattern in these residuals for linear models and
an expanding pattern (variance proportional to the mean) for Poisson models. If
there is a pattern indicating heteroscedasticity (variance increasing out of proportion
with the mean), transformation or a different error structure is used normalize the
pattern. The Normal Quantile-Quantile (Q-Q) plot in which the theoretical quantiles
were plotted against the Studentised deviance residuals is used to check for normality
of errors. If the data points deviate too much from the x=y line, transformation (after
consideration of the Residuals vs. Fitted Plot) is attempted to normalize the data.
Transformations and error structures are limited to those with associations to
plausible biological mechanisms. When no transformation or error structure results
in acceptable residual plots, the nature of the deviation from normal error plots is
described and a plain plot of the variable against time was provided. Since most
regressions only involve 9 or 10 data points, deviation of the points from the normal
line is accepted and in cases where the deviation was border-line, discussion of the
possible influence on the regression results is included. If the residuals indicate that
a transformation is needed, log 10 transformations are used as appropriate. Once the
data is transformed, a linear model is used, as described below for continuous data.
For the modelling of variables in which the data is transformed, for example 111 and
Positive Cases per Outbreak, linear models are used, with the equation:
Y = a+bx (R code: Model<-lm(y~x ...)
Model appropriateness is determined as described above.
2.3.4.3 Binomial/Proportion data
Variables that involve proportions, for instance the proportion of outbreaks that are
foodborne, are modelled using GLMs with binomial error structure. In binomial
GLMs, the logit link is used, the logit transformation of p being ln(p/q) where p is
the proportion of successes or occurrences and q the proportion of failures or non¬
occurrences. Thus the equation is:
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y (i.e. p) = e(a+bx)/1 + e(a+bx)
The models are run in R, using the cbind function which allows separate variables for
the number of occurrences (a) and number of failures (b) to be combined to create p
and q.
Model<- glm(cbind(a, b) ~ x, family=binomial...)
The values for a and b - for instance the number of foodborne outbreaks and the
number of outbreaks that are not foodborne - are entered into cbind as the number of
successes (foodborne outbreaks) and failures (total outbreaks - foodborne outbreaks)
and these two values are used to calculate p and q, and subsequently the linear
predictor (logit), ln(p/q).
In the proportion variables, the denominators (a+b) in the proportion (a/a+b) differ
between years, and thus the amount of data (counts) represented by each proportion
varies. For instance 0.4 could be 4/10, 2/5 or 6/15 and where more data (counts) are
used in calculating a proportion - i.e. a larger denominator (a+b) - there is more
statistical information and thus should be more influence in the regression. In order
to distribute influence appropriately, the regressions must be weighted by the
denominator (a+b). Since both a and b are entered, rather than just a proportion, the
program (R, v 2.5.1) can automatically calculate the denominator and weight the
regression.
A quasibinomial model is used when there is evidence of overdispersion as described
above and the outcome variable could be expressed in terms of successes (a) and
failures (b).
2.3.4.4 Comparison between modes of transmission - ANCOVA
It is important to avoid performing too many statistical tests because over-testing can
result in false-positives in tests of significance (Kirkwood & Sterne 2003). Thus
where variables are compared between modes of transmission, analysis of covariance
(ANCOVA) - which combines regression and analysis of variance (Crawley 2005) -
is used to determine whether there is an overall statistically significant difference in
trends over time between modes of transmission. A statistically significant
difference in temporal trends between modes of transmission in the temporal trend is
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considered to exist when there is a significant interaction between the time and mode
of transmission explanatory variables in the ANCOVA analysis. (The variables for
which ANCOVA is used are number of outbreaks, proportion of total outbreaks,
number of ill/ill and positive cases in outbreaks and proportion of ill/ill and positive
cases.)
In ANCOVA there is at least one continuous and one categorical explanatory
variable, in this study, year and mode of transmission respectively. A regression
model is fitted for each level of the categorical variable with slopes and intercepts
estimated for each level. A separate data set was used for the ANCOVA models,
which was constructed with a separate entry for the number or proportion of
outbreaks or ill cases for each mode of transmission for each year between 1998 and
2004. Both year and mode of transmission were entered as explanatory variables
along with the interaction between the two variables, using the following log-linear
model (the variable number of ill cases is used as an example below ):
Number of 111 Cases = exp(aj+bj x Year) where ai and bj are separate parameters for each
mode of transmission
R code: Model glm(y~ Year*Transmission, quasipoisson, data=....), where * indicates a
test with interaction
If the p value for the F-test for interaction was less than 0.05, contrasts were used to
look for statistically significant differences in temporal trends between outbreaks and
models were constructed for each mode of transmission as described above.
2.3.4.5 Procedure for modelling
Checking the appropriateness of the data
Prior to formal modelling, the data for each potential variable is plotted against year
to check for obvious non-linearity (for example, as in Fig. 2.2a) or data that is too
varied to be appropriate for formal modelling over a short time period (Figure 2.2b).
Additionally, epidemiological factors that may make preclude statistical modelling
are considered. For instance, if a specific mode of transmission was not considered
in investigations prior to a certain year, then modelling of the trend in that mode
would not be attempted. Potential outliers are also considered. However, as the time
periods involved are relatively short, the presence of a single potential outlier does
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not necessarily exclude data from being modelled. There is a potential for outliers,
such as very large outbreaks (see section 2.4.1 for discussion of large outbreaks such
as Wishaw and Walkerton). In the case of such potential outliers, data may be
modelled with and without the outbreaks to assess the influence of the data point.
Thus, only where it would be appear that the data is of sufficient quality for
modelling, in terms of linearity, variance and the effect of surveillance changes, is
the trend modelled.
Figure 2.2 a-b: Examples of data that are not appropriate for modelling
Two examples of data plots for data that are most likely not appropriate for modelling as per the
methods for Chapters 3-6. In (a) the trend is clearly not linear, and in (b) there are very low
counts and a very large variation in the counts between years.
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Year
~i 1 1 1 1 1 1 r
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Year
Checking for the appropriateness of the model
If the data is appropriate for modelling in terms of linearity, variation and
epidemiological/surveillance factors, modelling is attempted using GLM regression
on raw data or linear regression on log transformed data. Statistical appropriateness
of the models is determined based on residual plots. An example of residual plots
showing data that is appropriate to model is given in Fig. 2.3. In the residual vs.
fitted plot, no clear pattern in the data points should be seen, while in the Normal Q-
Q plot, the line of points should be close to the dotted (normal line). However, given
the low of number of data points, some non-normality in the residual plots is
considered to be acceptable.
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Figure 2.3 a-b: Example of residual plots for count data
A plot (a) of sample count data and (b) the Residuals vs. Fitted Values and Normal Q-Q plots for
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2.3.4.6 Analyses carried out in the chapters
If no statistically appropriate model can be constructed using biologically plausible
limits and/or transformations, the untransformed data is plotted and no further
analyses are performed. It is important to note that the determination of whether a
model is appropriate is based on the residual plots and visual inspection of the data,
and does not imply that models have clinical significance. Clinical significance can
only be assessed ifmore information on clinical goals is available. Thus a model
that meets the statistical requirements may not be clinically relevant.
When a statistically appropriate model can be found, the data is plotted with the
variable on the y axis and years on the x-axis. In the plots, the best fit line is
indicated by a solid line and the 95% confidence intervals for this line are indicated
by dashed lines. The predicted best fit line, based upon the model for the known data
points, is indicated by a broken line, the predicted 95% CI lines are indicated by
dotted lines.
Ifmore than one model appears to be statistically appropriate based on residual plots,
models are selected to allow best comparison between data sets with and without
large outbreak cases (see section 2.4.1 for details). F-tests are used for all models,
except models with Poisson errors for which z values are considered. The level of
significance is considered to be 0.05 for all tests.
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2.3.5 Issues with the analyses
2.3.5.1 Multiple testing
Since there are a large number of different variables being modelled for each country
and then compared, one of the potential issues that must be anticipated is over-testing
(multiple testing). The concern with conducting too many tests of significance is that
with a significance level of 0.05, 5 out of every 100 (or 5%) of associations will be
statistically significant by chance (Kirkwood & Sterne 2003). In terms of the
analyses performed, where for instance, approximately 46 trends were analysed for
Scotland, this would mean that two or three statistically significant associations
between time and a variable would be expected even if none of the trends were
statistically significant.
In order to minimise and account the effects of over-testing, a number of steps will
be taken. To reduce the number of tests being performed, data will be plotted and
visually examined to avoid modelling of data with extreme variation or non-linear
characteristics (see Section 2.3.4.5). Also, as mentioned in Section 2.3.4.4,
modelling of trends in individual modes of transmission will only be done where
there is a statistically significant overall difference between the modes or where there
is an a priori hypothesis about a particular mode (i.e. foodborne). Several additional
steps are taken post-modelling, the first of which is that the F-test for significance is
used in order to provide a more conservative estimate of significance. It is possible
to use post-hoc adjustments (e.g. Bonferroni) to account for multiple testing (Petrie
& Sabin 2000), however this approach will not be used because of the risk, with
potentially lower power to detect statistically significant trends, of not recognizing
trends that are actually statistically significant. Furthermore, plots are presented with
95% confidence intervals and exact (or the highest) p-value is given so that the
validity of any statistical significance can be assessed. For instance, where 95%
confidence intervals are very wide and there is a p-value of 0.045, the result may be
called in to question. Finally, the issue of statistically spurious results will be
addressed when discussing relevant results.
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2.3.5.2 Power
The second statistical issue that must be considered is that of statistical power. Since
the time periods being analysed are relatively short (seven to nine years), there is
concern that even if trends (or differences in trends) are present, there may not be
enough power to detect them. In the context of the trend analyses, there are four
main factors that affect power: the number of data points, the variability between
these data points, the size of the change in trend that one wants to detect and the
significance level. The latter is fixed at the standard level of 5% significance for all
analyses in this thesis. The first two factors are determined by the characteristics of
the data, and the power to detect statistically significant trends declines as the
number of total data points decreases and/or the variability of the data points (around
the regression line) increases. The size of the changes (i.e. the percent increase or
decrease from year to year, which is also the change in the slope of the regression
line) that the analyses need to have the power to detect, in terms ofE. coli 0157,
relate to what changes are considered clinically and/or epidemiologically significant.
Data on clinical significance (vs. statistical significance) do not appear to be
presented in the published literature, with the exception of the target set in 2000 for
the overall infection rate in the United States in 2010 (Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention 2007a) which is a rate of one case per 100,000 persons.
Thus, in order to estimate the power of the analyses performed in the next few
chapters to detect clinically significant trends, a number of power calculations will be
presented. The power calculations, run using the TRENDS software package
(Gerrodette 1993a), will be done for year to year changes of 10%, 20% and 30% for
data involving large numbers of counts (total cases) and 25% and 50% for small
counts (number of person to person outbreaks), using data from each country.
TRENDS can calculate the power of an linear trend analysis given four factors: the
number of data points, the rate of change from year to year (regression line) slope,
the coefficient of variation of the data and the significance level (Gerrodette 1993b).
The software is designed for linear trends, but since linear trend analysis of log-
transformed data is similar to Poisson linear regression (where a log link is used), the
software is considered sufficient to provide an estimate of power for Poisson
regression. In addition, the package provides an exponential option, which in
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assuming lognormal distribution and providing the option for variance to be
proportional to 1/Vmean (Gerrodette 1987), which is appropriate for a Poisson
regression. The inclusion of a value for the coefficient of variation in the calculation
also makes it possible to adjust for overdispersion, an important factor since some
overdispersion is a potential issue in the analyses (adjusted for by using the quasi
function).
The assumptions in such analyses are that the counts are not related, a basic
assumption also of Poisson regression. This may not always be true for E. coli
0157, but the deviation from independence of counts is not considered to be large
and thus not likely to have a significant impact. Additionally, for linear power
analysis, the change in counts must be additive, whilst for exponential, it must be
exponential. As the trends being analysed in the following chapters may not be
strictly linear (or strictly exponential), there may be a small amount of additional
uncertainty in the estimates of power. Another assumption of the power analyses is
that none of the assumptions of the regression analyses are being violated (see
Section 2.3.4). Therefore if one or more of these assumptions is violated, for instance
if there is overdispersion, the regression may not be as powerful as estimated.
However, as mentioned above, overdispersion is adjusted for by the inclusion of the
co-efficient of variation as a variable in the power analysis. Thus, the power as
indicated by TRENDS should be considered as the maximum possible power, but
actual power may be less.
Power calculations indicate that for all three countries, for the total number of
confirmed cases (all outbreak and sporadic cases), whether or not the large outbreak
cases are included, there is >99% power to detect decreases of 10%, 20% or 30% per
year. For example, in Scotland there is >99% power to detect trends where there is a
decrease in the number of total confirmed cases of as little as 3%. This would
suggest that in the analyses with large numbers of counts, there is enough power to
detect trends that might be of clinical significance. While, as stated before, the
definition of clinical significance is not known, the goal set in the United States has
been for a 50% drop in case rates over ten years, approximately 7% (of the original
value) per year. Thus detecting a decrease of 3% would appear to be sufficient.
However, when the data for number of foodborne outbreaks is used as an example of
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a model with low counts and higher variability, the power to detect trends decreasing
(or increasing) at a rate of 50% per year ranges from 92% to >99% in all three
countries. In Canada and the United States, there is only approximately 50% power
to detect trends that change (increase or decrease) from year to year at a rate of 25%.
As a result, results from analyses where there are low counts, such as the number of
outbreaks, number of outbreaks for each mode of transmission, number of cases for
modes of transmission such as animal/environmental, and (in Scotland) the number
of outbreaks and cases associated with outbreaks that are of PT 2 or PT 21/28, should
be considered with caution, as there may not be enough power to detect trends with
statistical significance. In these instances, the results may in many instances suggest
a non-statistically significant trend even where a clinically or statistically trend is
actually present.
2.3.5.3 Sources ofUncertainty
In any statistical analysis, there will be uncertainty based on factors in the data and in
the analysis. When analysing temporal trends, both within and between countries,
there are a number of sources of uncertainty which affect the interpretation of the
modelling. These sources and their effect will be presented here, with more detailed
discussions in the relevant chapters.
The main sources ofuncertainty in the modelling of temporal trends are missing data
and 'artefacts' in the data such as very large outbreaks and changes in surveillance
system. Whilst it is unlikely that the Scottish data sets include every case or
outbreak in the country (see Chapter 8 for a discussion of under-reporting), missing
data is primarily an issue for the analysis of trends in the United States and Canada.
As increasing the number of data points generally enhances the precision of a model,
missing data would generally be assumed to decrease the precision ofmodelling, as
reflected by larger 95% confidence intervals around the best fit line. However, if
inclusion ofmissing data would in fact increase the variance of points around the
mean, the result ofmissing data could in fact be overly narrow 95% confidence
intervals. As will be discussed in Chapter 2.4.1.2, potential causes of missing data in
the United States data could be the parallel reporting systems for foodborne and non-
foodborne outbreaks, in particular waterborne outbreaks, as well as non-reporting by
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some states to the NNDSS in the early years of the data set. In Canada, the issue of
missing data is much more acute because it is known that outbreak data is missing
from a many provinces/territories for part or all of the time period being analysed.
As will be discussed in Chapter 5.5.1, missing data would appear to be much more
an influence in the first half of the data set. Thus, trend models may not reflect true
trends, and so both trend lines and confidence intervals could potentially be
inaccurate. The methods used to assess the possible affect of such uncertainty are
addressed in section 5.5 and discussed in terms of the results of the analyses in
section 5.5.1
Another factor which introduces uncertainty into the analyses is changes in
surveillance. The onset of enhanced surveillance in Scotland (see Section 2.4.1.1) in
1999 has the potential to cause changes in trends, for instance due to an increase in
cases picked up surveillance. If there is a change in trend caused by an artefact such
as reporting or definition changes, modelling the trend over the complete time period
using linear analysis is not appropriate. Two separate trends with low variability
around two regression lines, for instance, might be incorrectly interpreted as one
longer trend with much more variability (and thus wider 95% confidence intervals).
Thus, for the Scottish data, these two trends were analysed separately to determine
whether they were statistically significant (see Section 3.2.5.1). For the United
States, where the time period must be truncated (see section 4.2.1.2) because of
significant changes in surveillance methods, there is an increase in the size of
confidence intervals due to the decrease in the number of data points being analysed.
A final source of uncertainty is mis-categorisation of outbreaks with regards to mode
of transmission. Determination ofmode of transmission is made based only on
information provided in the data sets or from direct correspondence with
epidemiologists at the relevant agency. However, since mode of transmission
categories have differed between and within countries as well as over time, there are
likely to be some mis-categorisations. For instance, many outbreaks in the Scotland
which are listed as other than environmental may have environmental factors
(Strachan et al. 2006). The effect of such uncertainty depends on variability of the
data points, if they reflected the true modes of transmission, around the regression
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line. If the true variability was higher than that suggested by the available data, mis-
categorisation might result in a better fitting model. On the other hand, if the true
variability was lower than that of the data set, mis-categorisation would result in a
poorer fitting model.
2.4 Data sets
The individual country data sets, including the definitions and country-specific issues
will be discussed in detail within the relevant country analysis chapters. In this
section, an introduction to the surveillance measures in each country will presented,
followed by a discussion of some of the general aspects regarding the obtaining data
will be presented in this section.
2.4.1 Surveillance
2.4.1.1 E. coli 0157 surveillance in Scotland
General overview
In Scotland, national level E. coli 0157 surveillance programs are coordinated by
HPS (formerly SCIEH). Incidents of infection have been voluntarily reported to
HPS and its predecessors on a weekly basis since 1989 by physicians, hospitals and
laboratories. Data on confirmed cases is collected from the Scottish E. coli 0157
Reference Laboratory (SERL), which confirms the presence and serotype ofE. coli
in samples sent from diagnostic laboratories; other diagnostic laboratories and NHS
public health teams. In Scotland, all isolates submitted to SERL are also phage-
typed (NHS Lothians 2005). Overall totals for outbreak and sporadic cases are
ascertained by the number of confirmed isolates reported to HPS. Outbreak data is
usually recorded and reported via E. coli 0157 specific outbreak report forms, filled
out by the appropriate public health team(s), with information updated as appropriate
by public health consultants and epidemiologists involved with the outbreak
investigation. HPS may become directly involved in an outbreak investigation if an
outbreak involves more than one health board region and/or the outbreak
investigation team requests assistance.
Wishaw Outbreak
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The largest outbreak to-date in Scotland took place in Lanarkshire between
November 1996 and January 1997, with confirmed cases in two other health board
regions. The outbreak, which resulted in at least 17 deaths, is termed the Wishaw
Outbreak for the purposes of this study, though it also referred to as the Central
Scotland Outbreak (Cowden et al. 2001). Over the course of the outbreak there were
512 ill cases and 279 ill and positive cases reported, more than seven times the
number of ill cases and nearly 14 times the number of ill and positive cases in any
other outbreak in Scotland between 1996 and 2004. The potential effect of the
outbreak on temporal trends and how the outbreak will be handled in the analyses
will be discussed in Section 3.2.3.2.
Major changes
Major changes to the E. coli 0157 surveillance system have occurred in 1996 and in
1999. A new surveillance system was enacted in 1996, with major changes
implemented in order to create a more active outbreak surveillance system that
would provide information on all general outbreaks. The major change involved a
switch from the World Health Organization reporting form, which included many
open ended questions and was returned only for foodborne outbreaks, to a new
Scotland-unique form. The Scottish form is specific to E. coli 0157, has more
focused questions and is completed for all outbreaks involving members ofmore
than one household, regardless ofmode of transmission. There was also a shift from
passive surveillance, where Consultants in Public Health Medicine (CsPHM) were
responsible for reporting outbreaks and returning forms, to a more active surveillance
where Health Protection Scotland (then Scottish Centre for Infection and
Environmental Health) tracks, logs and send out forms for all possible outbreaks.
This ensures that all parties are equally informed about potential incidents (Cowden
1997a; SC1EH 1997b).
It would be expected that the changes created in 1996 have resulted in a greater
number of outbreaks being reported because outbreaks are much less likely to be
missed by both the CsPHMs and the HPS. In addition, more non-foodborne
outbreaks are likely to be reported since the forms have to be returned for all
outbreaks. Finally, with forms tailored to Scotland, and with fewer opened ended
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questions, the information collected is likely to be more uniform in terminology and
definition, and thus more comparable.
The enhanced surveillance program, which began in April 1,1999, is a
comprehensive and integrated active surveillance program in which HPS receives,
collates and cross-validates data from public health teams, the Scottish E. coli
Reference Lab (SERL), Obsurv (the HPS infectious intestinal disease surveillance
program), ENSHURE (the HPS HUS surveillance program) and other diagnostic
laboratories. The information is kept in an integrated database, and questionnaires
are sent out to case patients and involved medical practitioners. These questionnaires
are used both to get more detailed information on cases in the short term and for long
term case follow-up (Locking et al. 2003a)(HPS, unpublished data).
It is possible that changes to data collection forms and protocols as a result of the
onset of the enhanced surveillance could potentially have affected long term trends.
Most importantly, more in-depth investigation of cases may have resulted in more
accurate assessments of outbreak mode of transmission, especially in terms of
highlighting less obvious causes which would have gone under-reported before.
Additionally, data from questionnaires and other surveillance sources (see above)
may have helped to identify cases that were not picked up in the initial investigation
and/or to link together prior to un-related cases. All of these changes could impact
both the slope and magnitude of trends and/or create the false pretence of trends
where none actually exists. Analyses will be conducted to determine whether the
enhanced surveillance program has had a statistically significant effect on temporal
trends. These analyses, which involve regressions of the data points before and after
the onset of enhanced surveillance, are discussed in Section 3.2.5.1.
2.4.1.2 E. coli 0157 surveillance in the United States
Case numbers — NNDSS and PHLIS reporting systems
Beginning in 1994, E. coli 0157 cases in the United States were reported to the CDC
through the Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS) and the Public Health
Laboratory Information System (PHLIS). Totals for both systems were reported in
the yearly notifiable disease summaries printed in the CDC's Mortality and
Morbidity Weekly Report (MMWR) between 1995 and 2001, but starting in 2002,
94
totals from the PHLIS system were no longer published. Beginning in 2003, selected
states began the transition to the current National Electronic Disease Surveillance
System (NEDSS).
Data from the NNDSS includes both probable and confirmed cases of infection; a
confirmed case is considered to be a laboratory confirmed case, which is a case
where either E. coli 0157:H7 is isolated from a specimen or Shiga toxin producing
E. coli 0157:NM is isolated from a clinical specimen (Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention 2006a). Between 1996 and 1999 inclusive, a probable case was
defined a case "with isolation ofE. coli 0157 from a clinical specimen, pending
confirmation ofH7 or Shiga toxin OR a clinically compatible case that is
epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or probable case" (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention 2006b). After 2000 the probable case definition was
amended to include cases where there was "identification of Shiga toxin in a
specimen from a clinically compatible case OR definitive evidence of an elevated
antibody titre to a known EHEC serotype [for this study, 0157:H7 or :NM] from a
clinically compatible case. This amendment to the definition may have caused an
increase in the number of cases defined as "ill cases".
Outbreak data - CDC data sets
Outbreak data are captured by different systems, the exact structures ofwhich have
changed since 1996 as procedures and forms have been updated on the local, state
and federal level. Outbreaks are reported to the CDC from state and local health
departments either directly by phone or fax or when appropriate, through the routine
foodborne disease outbreak surveillance system. Starting in 1998, an enhanced
surveillance program was put in place for foodborne outbreaks, encompassing both
enhanced communication between various levels of health departments and an
updated form (see section 4.2.3.2 ) (Lynch et al. 2006). In 2001, the reporting
system became web based. (Lynch et al. 2006) The reporting form most commonly
used for reports ofE. coli 0157 outbreaks, Form 52.13 (Investigation of a Foodborne
Outbreak), was updated in 1996, 1999, 2000 and 2004, with major changes in 1999
as a part of the new enhanced surveillance system. The potential effect of these
changes on the analyses, which include significant shifts in the total numbers of
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outbreaks, and shifts in the types of modes of transmission reported, will be
discussed in Section 4.2.3.2.
2.4.1.3 E. coli 0157 surveillance in Canada
PHAC outbreak data set
For a number of years, the Health Products and Food Branch of Health Canada
released annual summaries of enteric disease outbreaks; the 1994-1995 report being
the last to list individual outbreaks (Todd et al. 2000). The National Microbiology
Laboratory has also released annual summaries ofmajor outbreaks and clusters based
on isolates tested and data assembled by the laboratory (National Laboratory for
Enteric Pathogens 2002). The current pan-Canadian enteric outbreak data set was
assembled between 2003 and 2005 by the Foodborne, Waterborne and Zoonotic
Infections Division of the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC), based on
written, oral and electronic reports obtained from the individual provinces and
territories and then compiled and cleaned, for the production of the
"Provincial/Territorial Enteric Outbreaks in Canada, 1996 - 2003" report. For the
data set, an outbreak was defined as "involving two or more clinically or laboratory
confirmed cases".
Outbreak mode of transmission, stated as being "within the context of the geographic
area or setting experiencing the outbreak" was classified as either foodborne,
waterborne, agriculture, person-to-person, other or unknown, or no value was
provided. No details were available in terms of the original collection of data by
local, regional or provincial public health officials. In addition, it is of importance
that the data on mode of transmission was not confirmed, with virtually no
information on the strength of evidence connecting the outbreak to the reported mode
of transmission. Further, the data set is known to be incomplete as data was not
received from all provinces/territories for each year: of 12 provinces and territories
(13 with the addition of the territory ofNunavut in 1999), only four provided data for
the entire eight-year period, and complete data was available for no more than 8
provinces/territories in any one year. The specific data variables collected by each
reporting province or territory differed, the consequences of which will be discussed
in Section 5.5.
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Total confirmed cases data set
Notification of all VTEC cases, including E. coli 0157 cases, initially classified as
"haemorrhagic colitis", has been mandatory since 1990, with the province of Alberta
requiring reporting six year earlier (Waters et al. 1994; Wilson et al. 1997). Only
reports on the total number of confirmed VTEC cases for each province/territory are
released by the Nationally Notifiable Diseases program of the PHAC. For national
surveillance purposes a confirmed case of VTEC infection is considered to be an
infection with "laboratory confirmation of infection with/without symptoms" where
laboratory confirmation consists of "isolation of verotoxin producing Escherichia
coli or other toxigenic strains from an appropriate clinical specimen." (Health
Canada 2000a). As such, this number includes VTEC cases in which the serotype
was not 0157. These non-0157 cases represented a small percentage of the total,
accounting for less than 5% ofVTEC cases reported between 1983 and 2000
(Woodward et al. 2002), so should not have a statistically significant effect on trends.
For 2000, data from Ontario also includes non laboratory confirmed
"epidemiologically linked cases as part of their VTEC reporting protocol reflecting
the Walkerton outbreak" (Sockett et al. 2006). See Section 5.2.1.2 for details on how
these cases are handled in the analyses.
Walkerton Outbreak
The largest reported E. coli 0157 outbreak in Canadian history took place in
Walkerton, Ontario during May and June of 2000. Termed the "Walkerton
Outbreak" for the purposes of this thesis, the outbreak occurred when heavy rains
washed run-off from nearby cattle farms into wells which provided the municipal
water supply. Due to the fact that proper procedures for chlorination had not been
followed by the managers of the water supply (O'Connor 2002), chlorine levels were
insufficient to kill the contaminating bacteria. The result was an extensive
waterborne outbreak in which 1346 persons were infected by E. coli 0157 and/or
Campylobacter, 1304 directly from the water. Of these persons, 174 were confirmed
with E. coli 0157 infection, 27 progressed to HUS and seven died. A smaller





Official outbreak data sets for each country have been obtained from the respective
public health or infectious disease surveillance agencies (Health Protection Scotland,
Centers for Disease Control and Surveillance, Public Health Agency ofCanada).
Details on the sources and data are provided in the relevant country specific chapter
(3, 4 or 5).
Data on non-outbreak cases is taken from publicly released in reports or on the
websites of the above agencies because single case data sets were not available due
to concerns of preserving the anonymity of patients. In order for such data to be
released, it must be anonymised which requires extra time on the part of the
providing agency. Since there has been considerable delay in obtaining outbreak
data sets (A final outbreak data set from the CDC was not received until late 2006,
the data set from PHAC in mid 2006), a decision has been taken not to request
sporadic case data.
2.4.2.2 Time variable selection and issues
Outbreak and sporadic case data from all three countries has been provided by year,
with the additional information on date or month for some outbreaks in the Canadian
and United States data sets. Weekly or monthly data points are the most frequently
used in analyses of infectious diseases, primarily due to the fact that surveillance data
is commonly recorded in such intervals. Additionally, increased numbers of data
points allow for a higher level of detail in trend analyses, and with weekly or
monthly data, seasonal trends can be analysed as in McDonald et al (McDonald et al.
1999). It would be ideal to have an exact starting date - the date of first infection or
date of first infection reported - for each outbreak or case.
However, for several reasons, data cannot be analysed on a monthly, weekly or daily
level. The first issue is in regards to the issue of patient confidentiality. In order for
data on the month or data of sporadic cases to be released, the data set would have to
be further processed prior to release by the specific agency in order to strip patient-
identifier material from the existing data set. This additional processing was not
possible because of time constraints on HPS/CDC/PHAC staff and in getting data for
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the analyses in this thesis (as a note, a request to HPS for more detailed information
on sporadic data for analyses in Chapter 7 was not carried out). Similarly, monthly
data on outbreaks from Scotland has not been obtained because with as few as three
outbreaks per year and significant publicity around many outbreaks, there are
concerns that identifying the month of an outbreak might lead to identification of the
individuals involved.
Also, while in the United States data sets, outbreaks were recorded by month of first
illness onset, and in the Canadian data sets, date of report and/or recognition and/or
first onset were provided, the lack of standard definition for first onset between and
within the two countries made it impossible to determine whether the definitions
were equivalent. Additionally, since no monthly data is available for Scotland,
modelling ofyearly trends from each country is the most practical in terms of
facilitating comparison between countries.
Finally, the use of annual data points avoids the issue of dealing with seasonal trends
within each year, the study ofwhich require different analytical methods in order for
seasonal effects to be identified and separated from yearly trends. However even if
seasonal trend analyses are performed, temporal trends can still be separately
analysed with the data summarised by year (McDonald et al. 1999) or with separate
independent variables for yearly and monthly data points (Guerin et al. 2005b).
Again, however, this would require monthly or daily data from all three countries as
well as consistent definitions for time variables. Even ifmonthly data were available
from Scotland (in particular when analysing outbreak trends), the ability of analyses
to detect a significant trend might be significantly affected by the very low counts for
many months.
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Chapter 3 — E. coli 0157 in Scotland: 1996 - 2004
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3.1 Introduction
Though E. coli 0157 was first identified as a human pathogen in the course of
investigating two HUS outbreaks in the United States in 1982 (Riley et al. 1983), the
first Scottish isolates were not reported until 1984 (Coia et al. 1995). The first
reported outbreak, a cluster of four cases in Dalkeith, took place five years later.
Since 1989, there have been approximately 104 general outbreaks reported in
Scotland, with the definition of a general outbreak being an incident "in which two or
more linked cases experience the same illness, or when the observed number of cases
unaccountably exceeds the expected number" and which affects "members ofmore
than one household or residents of an institution" (Smith-Palmer & Cowden 2004).
The largest outbreak to-date, involving 512 illnesses, 279 ofwhich were confirmed,
was the 1996 Wishaw Outbreak. Overall there were approximately 3487 laboratory
isolates of E. coli 0157 reported between 1984 and 2003.
There has been discussion about the trends in the numbers of these outbreaks and
isolates, (Locking et al. 2003a; SCIEH 2000c; Sharp et al. 1994a; Tarr et al. 1990),
as well as about shifts over time in the dominant phage types (Reilly 1997) and the
general epidemiology of reported cases (Locking et al. 2003c). The studies of these
trends have, however, so far been primarily descriptive in nature (Douglas & Kurien
1997; Locking et al. 2006b; MacDonald et al. 1996; Sharp et al. 1994a), with graphs
ofmonthly/yearly case numbers provided in periodic Health Protection Scotland
(HPS) reports, and trends most frequently mentioned in the context of shifts from
year to year (Douglas & Kurien 1997; SCIEH 2002b; SCIEH 2002c). Statistical
models in trend analyses have only been applied for the study of seasonality
(Douglas & Kurien 1997) and in the comparison of isolate numbers or proportions
between two years (Locking et al. 2006a; SCIEH 2003a).
The lack of statistical analysis in relation to temporal trends is unfortunate because
this type of analysis appears to have the potential to contribute a great deal towards
the knowledge of the E. coli 0157 in Scotland, and allow the trends to be compared
with those in other countries. This study aims to fill this gap in the literature by
describing and modelling, where epidemiologically appropriate and using simple
linear models, the temporal trends in Scottish E. coli 0157 outbreaks and case
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numbers. Where the trends can be appropriately modelled, the statistical significance
of trend will be assessed. If a trend cannot be modelled, the possible reasons will be
discussed. Ofparticular interest are trends in the predominant modes of
transmission and phage types, the role and/or effect, if any, of the Wishaw Outbreak
in E. coli 0157 trends (see Sections 2.4.1.1, 3.2.3.2), and the effect of the onset of
the enhanced surveillance program (see Sections 2.4.1.1, 3.2.3.3) on the trends.
3.2 Materials and methods
3.2.1 Data sets
3.2.1.1 Time period
Outbreaks from the years prior to 1996 are not included in the analyses because there
were major changes in the surveillance system, as mentioned in Section 2.4.1.1,
which took effect on January 1, 1996 (Anonymous 1997). The potential effects of
these changes on the data make it inappropriate to compare data from 1996 to the
present with earlier data.
3.2.1.2 Outbreaks
The data set for Scottish E. coli 0157 outbreaks in 1996 - 2003 has been obtained
courtesy of HPS. Data for 2004 was obtained from the 2004 Enhanced Surveillance
Report (Locking et al. 2006a) and the 2004 Annual Report of General Outbreaks of
Infectious Intestinal Diseases in Scotland (Smith-Palmer et al. 2005), and data for
2005 as publicly released by HPS and HPA (Health Protection Agency 2006b).
3.2.1.3 Total confirmed cases
Data on total isolates was obtained from the HPS website (www.hps.scot.nhs.uk ).
With the exception of the alterations made regarding the Wishaw Outbreak cases
(see 3.2.3.2), no changes were made to the data or definitions in the above data sets.
As such, the definitions mentioned below are applicable to both the HPS data sets
and this thesis unless specified otherwise. The definitions vary from those in other




In Scotland, the term case is generally used to define all epidemiological^ plausible
instances ofE. coli 0157 infection that have been reported to HPS, whether or not
the infection has been confirmed by a laboratory. In the laboratory, confirmation of
E. coli 0157 is made either by isolation of the bacteria from faecal sample or by
detection of antibodies in blood serum (see Section 1.4.5). 'Laboratory isolates'
refers only to confirmations made from faecal samples (see Figure 3.1), and thus this
number does not include those confirmed through blood serum samples. However,
the number of cases laboratory confirmed only via serum antibodies is very small,
accounting for no more than 3.3% of cases between 2002 and 2004 (Locking et al.
2003a; Locking et al. 2004; Locking et al. 2006a).
Figure 3.1: Diagram oiE. coli 0157 variables
Diagram of the E. coli 0157 variables used in the study. Red lines indicate variables that involve
outbreaks, blue lines indicate variables that involve sporadic cases and red & blue striped lines
indicate variables that involve both outbreaks and sporadic cases. Variables for which trends are
analysed in this chapter are indicated in bold.
Thus, the total number of confirmed E. coli 0157 cases is the sum of the cases
confirmed by the two different methods - faecal isolates and serum antibodies (see
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Figure 3.1). This number can then be broken down into the number of sporadic
cases - cases not epidemiological^ linked to any cases other than those within the
same household - and ill and positive cases from outbreaks, which are confirmed
outbreak cases. The number of ill cases from outbreaks is the number of confirmed
cases added to the number of cases in which the person was ill and epidemiologically
linked to the outbreak, but the presence of E. coli 0157 was not confirmed (see
Figure 3.1).
This includes all cases that have been laboratory confirmed as having E. coli 0157,
including those in which the person did not display any symptoms. It is important,
however, to note that just because a case is not defined as ill and positive does not
mean that the person did not have E. coli 0157. It is not always possible to obtain
faecal samples from all 'ill' persons, and if there is delay before a sample is taken,
the person may no longer be excreting the bacteria; Tarr et al reported that the
percent of stools from which E. coli 0157 was recovered declined from 90+% to
under 33% after six days of illness (Tarr et al. 1990).
Events are defined as single incidents of infection, whether that be an outbreak or a
single sporadic case. This number is calculated by adding together the number of
outbreaks and the number of sporadic cases (see Figure 3.1). The count for the
number of events, though, is not precise because the exact number of sporadic cases
has not been released by FIPS for this study. As a result, the number of sporadic
cases must be approximated by subtracting the number of ill and positive outbreak
cases from the total number ofE. coli 0157 isolates. However, the number of total
isolates does not include those infections confirmed by serum antibodies, so this
method of approximation underestimates the number of sporadic cases, and thus the
number of events. On the other hand, because HPS defines an outbreak as an
incident that involves members ofmore than one household, cases within one
household that are related to each other, and according to the definition used in this
chapter should be considered as one event, are actually counted as multiple events.
Thus, calculating the number of events as the sum of the number of sporadic cases
and the number of outbreaks is likely to provide an overestimate of the true value. As
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such the number of events, as calculated for this chapter, may not be completely
accurate.
In this thesis, putative outbreak mode of transmission is classified as either:
• foodborne
• waterborne
• person to person
• environmental
• animal contact
• multiple including foodborne
• multiple excluding foodborne, or
• unknown
As specified in the HPS 'General outbreaks of infectious intestinal disease' Form
(Health Protection Scotland 2004), outbreaks are classified as foodbome,
waterborne, person-to-person, environmental or animal contact if the infection was
"mainly" spread though the listed mode of transmission. Outbreaks for which food
was involved, but not the main factor, are classified as multiple modes including
foodborne, and where transmission was the result ofmultiple non-foodbome factors
with none as the over-riding cause, the outbreak was defined as multiple modes
excluding foodborne. It should be noted, however, that the selection of the mode of
transmission category was made by the CsPHM or other investigator who was filling
out the form. Thus, the strength of evidence for the selected mode of transmission is
not always known.
For the purposes of this study, to encompass all outbreaks where food played a role,
the multiple including foodborne and foodborne classifications are also combined
into a final category, which includes all outbreaks with a foodbome element.
Environmental and animal contact outbreaks were combined to create
'animal/environmental'. In addition, the outbreak listed as 'environmental or
unknown' is classified as unknown because no further information about the
circumstances of the outbreak was known. The classifications used for the Scottish
data will be used as basis for establishing classifications that are comparable across
countries. This issue of mode of transmission classification will be addressed again
in Chapter 6, when the Scottish data is compared to that from Canada and the United
States.
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3.2.3 Variables - selection and issues
3.2.3.1 Variables
Table 3.1: Variables used in the analyses of Scottish data, 1996 - 2004
The variables analysed in the analyses of the Scottish data between 1996 and 2004
Variable Definition
Total isolates Number of E. coli 0157 cases confirmed via faecal isolate
Sporadic cases
Number of confirmed cases not linked to other cases outside
the same home
Total events
Number of infection incidents = number of outbreaks +
number of sporadics
Number of outbreaks
Number of general outbreaks (not within the same
household)
Number of ill and positive cases from outbreaks Number of microbiologically confirmed cases from outbreaks
Number of ill cases from outbreaks
Total number of cases from outbreaks, including those ill,
but not confirmed
Number of ill cases per outbreak Total number of cases per outbreak
Number of ill and positive cases per outbreak Total number of confirmed cases per outbreak
Number of outbreaks spread via:
a) Food
b) Multiple including food (MIF)
c) Foodborne Element ( Food + MIF)
d) Water
e) Environmental or Animal Contact/Exposure
f) Person to person
Number of Outbreaks, Phage Type (PT):
a) PT 2
b) PT 21/28
Number of outbreaks in which the mode of transmission was
a) Food
b) Multiple including food (MIF)
c) Foodborne Element ( Food + MIF)
d) Water
e) Environmental or Animal Contact/Exposure
f) Person to person
Number of outbreaks in which the isolates were Phage Type
a) PT 2
b) PT 21/28
Number of ill and positive cases from
outbreaks
Number of confirmed cases from outbreaks where mode of
transmission/PT was a - f/ a- b
Proportion of outbreaks spread via mode of
transmission a - f or phage type a or b
Proportion of outbreaks with known mode/phage type, in
which mode of transmission was a - f or the PT was a or b
Proportion of ill and positive cases from
outbreaks in which the mode of transmission
was a - f or phage type was a or b
Proportion of confirmed cases from outbreaks with known
mode/phage type in which the mode of transmission was a
- f or the PT was a or b
Number of ill and positive cases per outbreak
Number of confirmed cases per outbreak from outbreaks




With the cases (ill or ill & positive) from the Wishaw
Outbreak excluded
With the Wishaw Outbreak split into five outbreaks as per
Methods & Materials
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When investigating temporal tends in E. coli 0157 cases and outbreaks in Scotland,
there are many variables which can be modelled. For this study, variables have been
chosen both to provide a coherent analysis ofE. coli 0157 trends over the time
period, and to address epidemiological aspects ofE. coli 0157 that have been of
interest in recent years (Table 2.1). Consideration is also given to selecting variables
that would be appropriate for comparison between countries (see Chapter 6).
Though the primary focus of the chapter is on outbreaks, it is important to place
outbreaks into the wider context ofE. coli 0157 infection in Scotland. Thus the first
two variables to be analysed describe the overall numbers of infection: the number of
total laboratory isolates and the number oftotal events (see above for definition and
discussion of these variables). The number ofsporadic cases, calculated by
subtracting the number of ill and positive cases in outbreaks from the number of total
laboratory isolates, is also included as a way to compare trends involving outbreak
cases to trends involving non-outbreak cases.
The first outbreak related variable is the number ofoutbreaks, which provides an
overview of trends in outbreak numbers. When looking at overall trends, it is then
important to look at the total number ofcases from outbreaks (ill and ill and positive)
as these numbers illustrate the real extent of outbreaks, as for instance a year with
three outbreaks each with 70 ill cases is clearly different from a year in which there
were three outbreaks, but each with less than five ill cases. The final step is to look
at the number ofill andpositive cases per outbreak in order to see if there have been
any trends in the size of outbreaks.
Far from being a homogenous group, outbreaks are comprised of incidents spread by
a wide range ofmodes including food, water arid person to person contact (Mead &
Griffin 1998). It follows then, that any trends observed overall may be a composite
ofmany different trends in outbreaks spread by various modes. The trends in each
mode of transmission will thus be examined. The individual modes of transmission
to be investigated are foodborne, foodbome element, multiple modes including
foodborne, waterborne, person to person and environmental.
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It is equally as important to consider the trends in the modes in the context of their
relationship to each other because analyses of the numerical trends do not reveal the
relative dominance of transmission modes. Thus the next section in the analyses will
examine trends in the proportion of the outbreaks in which cases were spread by each
mode of transmission in order to determine whether there was a statistically
significant shift in the dominance of one or a few modes of transmission. These
results may help to explain whether any increases or decreases in the number of
outbreaks represent a change in the dominance (or not) of a particular mode of
transmission.
In addition to examining the trends in the number and proportion of outbreaks spread
by each mode of transmission, the trends in the number ofill andpositive cases from
each mode of transmission will also be statistically modelled. The number of ill and
positive is important because it indicates not just the number of outbreaks, but how
many people are being affected by each mode of transmission. It is possible that
very different models may be fitted for the number of people in outbreaks than for
the number outbreaks. For instance, a mode of transmission that was implicated in
just a few large outbreaks may affect more people than a mode implicated in many
small outbreaks.
When examining the different trends in the modes of transmission and their
relationship to the overall trend, the last major step is to look at the number of ill
cases in outbreaks by mode of transmission. For this variable, the focus is on
foodborne outbreaks because of the noted shift away from foodborne transmission
over the course of the time period covered in this chapter.
In the last section, the trends in the two dominant phage types - PT2 and PT 21/28 -
will be modelled. Reports have indicated that there have been increasing trends in
the number of PT 21/28 cases and decreasing trends in the number of PT 2 case
(Locking et al. 2003c). To determine whether there has been a statistically
significant change in the numbers or relative importance of PT 2 and PT 21/28, the
phage types will be examined in terms of the number of outbreaks, number of ill and
positive cases from outbreaks, proportion of total ill and positive cases from
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outbreaks that are PT 2 or PT 21/28, proportion of total outbreaks and number of ill
and positive cases per outbreak.
3.2.3.2 Issues -Wishaw Outbreak
For the purposes of this chapter, the Wishaw Outbreak raises concerns for two
reasons. Firstly, it involves an extremely large number of cases in comparison with
any other outbreak in the data set. In addition, the outbreak took place in the first
year of the data set, a position from which it could potentially have statistically
significant influence on trends in outbreak size. Due to these concerns, in this
chapter the data will be analysed with and without the Wishaw Outbreak for
variables other than outbreak counts. Outbreak counts will not be analysed with the
Wishaw Outbreak omitted, because the Wishaw Outbreak is still one outbreak,
regardless of the number of cases involved.
Additionally, in some other countries, clusters or cohorts of infections in different
locations caused by a single source are sometimes considered to be separate
outbreaks (Banatvala et al. 1996; Ferguson et al. 2005; Michino et al. 1999). In
Scotland, this is not true and all 279 confirmed cases in the large Wishaw Outbreak
are considered to be part of one outbreak. However, within the outbreak there are a
number of clearly defined cohorts (Cowden et al. 2001).
Thus, a possible hypothesis is that Wishaw is not one extremely large outbreak, but a
combination of several smaller outbreaks with one initial source. This hypothesis is
of interest because subsequent analyses of the Scottish data (in this chapter) have
suggested that the Wishaw Outbreak is clearly different from the other outbreaks as
case trends often cannot be appropriately modelled when Wishaw is included. In
order to determine whether considering Wishaw as a group of outbreaks would have
a statistically significant effect on trend modelling, for three variables (the number of
outbreaks, the number of ill and positive cases per outbreak and the number of ill and
positive cases per foodborne outbreak) the data will also be analysed with the
Wishaw Outbreak split into five separate outbreaks as suggested by the information
provided in Figure 2 (see below) from Cowden et al (Cowden et al. 2001). Seven
sporadic cases with no link to suspect premises and 15 secondary cases could not be
ascribed to a particular cohort and thus were omitted from this analysis.
109
A. Sporadic case with no documented link to suspect premises
B. Sporadic case who consumed food subject premises
C. Sporadic case in a member of the suspect premises' staff
D. CoJiort case who attended the church lunch
E. Cohort case from pub party
F. Secondary case
G. Sporadic case who consumed food from premises
supplied by suspect premises
H. Cohort case in resident of nursing home
I. Cohort case in staff of nursing home
279 confirmed cases.
The five outbreaks used for the analyses in this study are as follows
A - 23 cases - patients and staff at nursing home
B - 11 cases - persons at pub party
C - 29 cases - persons at church lunch
D - 76 cases - persons who consumed food bought at premises supplied by suspect
premises
E - 118 cases - persons who consumed food bought at the suspect premises
For most variables, the Wishaw Outbreak cases are all considered to have taken
place in 1996. A few cases did take place in early January 1997, and for the number
of total isolates, these cases are counted as part of the total for 1997. However, since
the epidemic curve of symptomatic cases presented by Cowden et al (Cowden et al.
2001) indicates that there was only one case in 1997, this difference is not considered
to be an issue in terms of the trend analyses.
3.2.3.3 Issues - enhanced surveillance
Another important factor that must be considered in the analysis of any trends in E.
coli 0157 cases and outbreaks in the 1996-2004 time period is the onset of enhanced
surveillance. To assess whether enhanced surveillance may have influenced the
trends - or lack thereof- between 1996 and 2004, all variables will be assessed for
changes in trend slope and magnitude before and after the onset of enhanced
surveillance (see Section 3.2.3.3). Since enhanced surveillance became active in
April 1999 (Locking et al. 2003b), and so not all data for 1999 was collected under
the new system, for the purposes of this chapter, data from 1996 to 1999 will be
Fie. 3. Exposure
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considered to be pre-enhanced surveillance. However, if there is any indication of a
gradual effect between from 1999 and 2001, when the enhanced surveillance system
was coming into effect, this will be presented and discussed as appropriate.
3.2.4 Descriptive statistics
The data from 1996 to 2004 was described in terms of the variables mentioned in
Table 2.1. Specifically, the total number of ill and ill and positive cases and the
geometric mean number of ill and ill and positive cases per outbreak were calculated,
and the data broken down by the number of outbreaks in terms of year, mode of
transmission and phage type.
3.2.5 Statistical Analyses - methods particular to Scotland
3.2.5.1 Models to assess the role of enhanced surveillance
For the Scottish data, enhanced surveillance was started in April of 1999. Since the
system was not in place for all of 1999, data from 1996 - 1999 is considered to be
prior to enhanced surveillance. In order to determine whether this change in
outbreak handling affected the data, plots of the variable values over time are
visually assessed for noticeable differences in value or slope between 1996-1999 and
2000- 2004).
For the variables in which an apparent difference was noted, regression with a
binomial and linear explanatory variable and interaction between the two is used to
determine whether there were statistically significant differences in outcome variable
means and slopes between the pre and post enhanced surveillance time periods:
Y = a + b i x i + b2x2 + b3x3 where x3= Year
x2= Year.b
0 if pre surveillance (1996-9)
1 if post surveillance (2000-4)
x3= xi*x2 (interaction)
RCode: Model<-lm(y~Year.b * Year ...) or
Model<- glm(y~Year.b * Year, family = ...)
Ill
The model and error structure used for the regression depend on the type and
structure of the appropriate model, as already determined. Statistical significance of
the binomial variable indicates a significant difference in the mean values, and
statistical significance in the interaction term indicates significant difference in the
slopes before and after the onset of enhanced surveillance. Where the pre and post
surveillance model is of interest, the trend is plotted with separate best fit lines for
1996 - 1999 and 2000 - 2004.
3.2.5.2 Analysis of phage type data
The binomial model (see section 2.3.4.3) is used with a simple binomial response
variable instead of the cbind function in order to model the occurrence of PT 21/28
outbreaks versus PT 2 outbreaks over time. The response variable values are "1"
when the outbreak is PT21/28, "0" when the outbreak is PT 2 and NA when the
outbreak is any other PT. For this variable, the outbreak in which there are three
phage types - 4, 8 and 21/28, is considered to be PT 21/28.
3.2.5.3 Modelling procedure
All variables derived from data regarding the number of cases are also modelled with
and without the cases from the Wishaw Outbreak, as detailed in Section 3.2.3.2.
In the plots, the best fit line is indicated by a solid line and the 95% confidence
intervals for this line are indicated by dashed lines. For the variables where the 2005
value was known - total laboratory isolates and total outbreaks - a value for the data
point for 2005 is predicted based on the model for the data from 1996 to 2004 in
order to determine whether the models have potential use in predicting future data
points. The predicted best fit line, based upon the model for the known data points,
is indicated by a broken line, the predicted 95% CI lines from 2004 to 2005 are
indicated by dotted lines and the 2005 data point by a bright green dot. For the plots,
darker blue dots indicate complete years prior to the onset of enhanced surveillance.
112
3.3 Results - Descriptive
Between 1996 and 2004 there were 2458 E. coli 0157 laboratory isolates from
outbreaks and sporadic cases reported to Health Protection Scotland by laboratories
in Scotland. These isolates represent 1923 E. coli 0157 events, including 71
outbreaks reported to Health Protection Scotland for which completed forms were
returned. The number of outbreaks per year ranged from 3 to 14 (Figure 3.2a).
During the period of 1996 - 2004, there were 1048 ill cases from outbreaks (range 22
to 517 per year) and 606 ill and positive cases from outbreaks (range 14 to 284 per
year; Figure 3.2b). Outbreaks have a geometric mean of 5.23 ill cases (95% CI =
4.14, 6.61) and 3.95 ill and positive cases (95% CI = 3.26, 4.77).
Figure 3.2 a-b: (a) Number of outbreaks per year and (b) Number of laboratory isolates, ill
cases from outbreaks and ill & positive cases from outbreaks, 1996 - 2004
Plots showing (a) the number of outbreaks and (b) the number of laboratory isolates, ill cases from
outbreaks, and ill & positive cases from outbreaks per year, 1996 - 2004. In (b), the number of
laboratory isolates is indicated by a solid line, the number of ill cases from outbreaks as a blue-
dotted line and the number of ill and positive cases from outbreaks as a red-dashed line.
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Figure 3.3: Number of outbreaks by mode of transmission (1996 - 2004)
The number of outbreaks by mode of transmission, as defined by HPS.
FTP- person to person
MIF - multiple including FB
ENV - environmental
UNK - unknow n
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A putative mode of transmission is listed for sixty-six outbreaks, the putative mode
of transmission for four outbreaks is unknown and one outbreak is listed as
'environmental or unknown'. The highest numbers of outbreaks - 16 - were
transmitted mainly by food (FB), while 14 were transmitted mainly person to person
and 13 by multiple modes including food (Figure 3.3).
Between 1996 and 2004, seven phage types were associated with outbreaks: PT 2, 4,
8, 14, 21/28, 32 and 49. In addition, isolates from one outbreak were classified as
RDNC, meaning that they reacted to the phages used in the typing procedure, but the
resulting pattern of reactions to the different phages did not conform to the pattern
from any known phage type. Phage types 21/28 and 2 were the most common in
outbreaks (Figure 3.4), accounting for 62.0% and 19.7% of outbreaks and 38.3% and
53.1% of ill and positive cases, respectively.
Figure 3.4: Number of outbreaks by phage type (1996 - 2004)
The number of outbreaks in Scotland, by phage type. The outbreak with multiple phage types had
cases that were phage types 4, 8 and 21/28. In one outbreak, the isolates were not phage typed
(unknown) and in another outbreak the patterns of the isolate reactions to the phages did not match
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3.4 Results - Statistical analyses
3.4.1 Overall variables
3.4.1.1 Total lab isolates from sporadic and outbreak E. coli 0157 cases in
Scotland, by year
To examine temporal trends in the number of total yearly E. coli 0157 laboratory
isolates, a linear model with a log transformation of the outcome variable is used.
There is a statistically significant decreasing trend in the log 10 transformed number
of total E. coli 0157 isolates between 1996 - and 2004 (Fig. 3.5a; Fi,7=T2.8,
p=0.009). This trend is not statistically significant between 1996 and 2004 when the
Wishaw Outbreak isolates are omitted (Fi;7=3.4, p=0.108; Fig. 3.5b), but is just
statistically significant between 1996 and 2005 (Fijg= 5.4, p=0.0495).
Figure 3.5 a-b: Number of total laboratory isolates, by year (1996 - 2004)
The number of total laboratory isolates per year between 1996 and 2004 (a) with the Wishaw
Outbreak and (b) without the Wishaw Outbreak. In this and all subsequent plots, solid black lines
are the best fine line for the regression, with the dashed black lines the 95% confidence intervals.
Solid and dashed blue lines are the predicted best fit and 95% confidence interval lines, based on
the model for the known data. Years in which enhanced surveillance was in place for some or all
months are indicated in light blue, those prior in darker blue. When known, actual data points for
future years are indicated in green.
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When both a linear and binary year variable with interaction are included in the
model, there is no statistically significant difference in the number of isolates or the
slopes between 1996-1999 and 2000-2004, whether or not the Wishaw Outbreak
cases are included (F<2.2, p>0.199; Fig. 3.5c-d).
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Figure 3.5 c-d: Number of total laboratory isolates, trends before (1996-1999) & after (2000-
2004) the onset of enhanced surveillance
The number of total laboratory isolates with the Wishaw isolates (c) and without the Wishaw
isolates (d) with the best fit and 95% confidence interval lines for trends before and after the onset
of enhanced surveillance. The linear regression models used to fit the lines include the regular year
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3.4.1.2 Number ofE. coli 0157 events in Scotland, by year
The trend in the log-transformed number of total events, defined as the number of
sporadic cases plus the number of outbreaks, can be modelled using a linear model,
and there is a statistically significant decline in trend between 1996 and 2004
(Fij=6.2, p<0.042; Fig. 3.6). There is no statistically significant difference in the
mean numbers of total events or slopes of the trend in total events before and after
the onset of enhanced surveillance (F<0.8, p>0.412).
Figure 3.6: Number of total events, by year
The number of total events per year from 1996 to 2004. The black line is the best fit line for the
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3.4.1.3 Number of sporadic cases
There is a statistically significant decrease in the log transformed number of sporadic
cases between 1996 and 2004 (Fi;7=7.9, p=0.026; Fig. 3.7). However, there is no
statistically significant change in the number of sporadic cases or slope of the trends
after the onset of enhanced surveillance (p>0.637).
Figure 3.7: Number of sporadic cases, 1996-2004
The number of sporadic cases per year from 1996 to 2004. The best fit line, indicated by the solid














3.4.1.4 Number of!:, coli 0157 outbreaks in Scotland, by year
A linear model can be used to analyse the trend in the log transformed number of
outbreaks per year between 1996 and 2004. However, this trend is not statistically
significant (Fi,7=3.1, p=0.124; Fig. 3.8a), and the trend is also not statistically
significant when the Wishaw Outbreak was split into five separate outbreaks
(Fi,7=0.9, p=0.382; Fig. 3.8b). The onset of enhanced surveillance does not have a
statistically significant effect on the mean number of (p=0.938) or slope of the trend
(p=0.856) in outbreaks (Fig. 3.8c). The values predicted by the two models
mentioned above for 2005 are very similar and accurate (less than one outbreak from
the real values).
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Figure 3.8 a-c: Number of E. coli 0157 outbreaks and trends before and after onset of
enhanced surveillance
(a) The number of outbreaks per year between 1996 & 2004, with the best fit line for the linear
model of the log transformed number of outbreaks. Predictions for the best fit line and 95%
confidence interval around that line are shown for the period 2004 to 2005. (b) The number of
outbreaks per year between 1996 & 2004 when the Wishaw Outbreak is split into five different
outbreaks, (c) The number of outbreaks per year between 1996 & 2004 with the solid black lines
indicating separate trends before (1996-99) & after (2000-04) the onset of enhanced surveillance,
a b
3.4.1.5 Number of ill cases from outbreaks, by year
The trends in the number of ill cases from outbreaks are analysed using a
Quasipoisson model. There is a statistically significantly decreasing trend
(Fi,7=14.7, p=0.006) in the number of ill cases from outbreaks between 1996 and
2004 (Fig. 3.9a). The trend becomes non-statistically significant when the Wishaw
Outbreak cases are excluded (Fi 7=0.12, p=0.738; Fig.3.9b).
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Figure 3.9 a-b: Number of ill cases from outbreaks
The number per year of ill cases in outbreaks between 1996 and 2004 with (a) and without (b) the
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In addition, there is a statistically significant interaction between the linear and
binomial time variables (Fig. 2.9c), indicating that a statistically significant
difference exists between in the slopes of the trends in 1996 -1999 and 2000 - 2004.
This difference is barely statistically significant (p=0.044) and is no longer
statistically significant when the Wishaw Outbreak cases are excluded (Fig, 2.9d).
Figure 3.9 c-d: Number of ill cases from outbreaks, trends before & after enhanced
surveillance
The number per year of ill cases in outbreaks between 1996 and 2004 with (c) and without (d) the
Wishaw Outbreak Cases included with the trends before (1996 -1999) and after (2000-2004) plotted
separately.
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3.4.1.6 Number of ill and positive [confirmed] cases from outbreaks
The trends for the number of ill and positive cases from outbreaks are very similar to
those for the number of ill cases in outbreaks. As with the number of ill from
outbreaks, there is a statistically significant downward trend (F1,7=11.7, p=0.011) in
the number of ill and positive cases from outbreaks when the Wishaw Outbreak is
included (Fig. 3.10a), but no statistically significant trend when the Wishaw
Outbreak cases are excluded (F 1,7=0.03, p=0.860; Fig. 3.10b). Also, again there is a
barely significant difference in the slopes of the trends between 1996-1999 and 2000
- 2004 (p=0.041) when the Wishaw Outbreak cases are included.
Figure 3.10 a-h: Number of ill and positive cases from outbreaks
The number per year of ill and positive cases from outbreaks between 1996 and 2004 (a) with and
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3.4.1.7 Number of ill and positive cases per outbreak
When the Wishaw Outbreak is included, the data also cannot be appropriately
modelled (Fig. 3.11a), but when the outbreak is excluded and the data is analysed
using a linear model, there is a statistically significant decreasing trend in the log-
transformed number of ill and positive cases per outbreak (Fij68=8.7, p=0.004)
between 1996 and 2004 (Fig. 3.1 lb). As with the number of ill cases, there is also
statistically significant downward trend (Fi>73=25.2, p<0.001; Fig. 3.11c) when the
Wishaw Outbreak is considered as five separate outbreaks. There is no evidence (in
terms of statistical significance in the analyses used) for any effect of enhanced
surveillance when the Wishaw Outbreak is omitted (p>0.669), but there is a
statistically significant difference in the slopes between 1996-1999 and 2000-2004
when the Wishaw Outbreak is split into five outbreaks (p=0.006).
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Figure 3.11 a-c: Number of ill and positive cases per outbreak
The number of ill and positive cases per outbreak, with each point representing one outbreak. The
plots show the data (a) with the Wishaw Outbreak, (b) without the Wishaw Outbreak and (c) with
the Wishaw Outbreak split into five separate outbreaks. The best fit lines for the quasipoisson
regression of the data are shown in black, with the 95% confidence intervals indicated by dashed
lines.
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3.4.2 Number of outbreaks - by mode of transmission
There is a statistically significant difference between modes of transmission in the
trends in the number of outbreaks (F5 ,42—3.0, p=0.020). Thus the trend for each mode
of transmission will be analysed separately.
3.4.2.1 Number of outbreaks - Food related transmission
Figure 3.12 a-c: Number of outbreaks, per year — foodborne element, foodborne (FB), and
multiple modes including foodborne (MIF)
The number ofE. coli 0157 outbreaks for which the mode of transmission is (a) foodborne element,
(b) foodborne, and (c) multiple modes including foodborne. For foodborne element the outbreaks
are plotted in a log10 scale and the solid line indicates the best fit for the linear regression of the
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The trend in the number of outbreaks with a foodbome element can be modelled
using a linear model, but there is no statistically significant trend in the log10
transformed number of outbreaks with a foodborne element between 1996 and 2004
(Fi,7=4.6, p=0.070; Fig. 3.12a). However, when outbreaks spread mainly by food, as
opposed to those where food is just one of two or more equally important modes of
transmission, are examined separately, there is a statistically significant decreasing
trend in the number of foodbome outbreaks between 1996 -2004 (Fi,7=8.7, p=0.021;
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Fig. 3.12b). When the outbreaks for which food is one of several transmission
modes are examined, there is no statistically significant trend in the number of
outbreaks (Fig. 2.12c) between 1996 and 2004 (Fi>7=1.3, p=0.296).
3.4.2.2 Number of outbreaks - Non-foodborne transmission
Figure 3.13 a-c: Number of outbreaks, per year - Animal/Environmental (A/E), Person to
Person (PTP) and Waterborne (WB)
The number of outbreaks in which the mode of transmission is (a) animal/environmental, (b) person
to person and (c) waterborne. The best fit lines are for the quasipoisson (animal/environmental and
person to person) and Poisson models (waterborne).
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The trend in the number of animal contact or environmental outbreaks between 1996
and 2004 (Fig. 3.13a) cannot be modelled using simple linear models. Using a
quasipoisson model, there is no statistically significant trend in the number of person
to person outbreaks between 1996 and 2004 (Fi,7=0.9, p=0.369; Fig. 3.13b).
However, there is a statistically significant increasing trend between 1996 and 2002
(F 1,5= 14.6, p=0.012), with only a single person to person outbreak reported in 2003
and 2004 combined. There is no statistically significant trend in the number of
waterborne outbreaks between 1996 and 2004 (x2=2.80, p=0.094; Fig. 3.13c).
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3.4.3 Proportion of outbreaks- by mode of transmission
There is a statistically significant difference between modes of transmission in the
temporal trend of the proportions of outbreaks that were spread by each mode of
transmission, so the trend in each mode of transmission will be investigated
individually.
3.4.3.1 Proportion of outbreaks, food related transmission
Figure 3.14 a-c: Proportion of outbreaks, by year — foodborne element, foodborne (FB) and
multiple modes including foodborne (MIF)
Trends between 1996 and 2004 in the proportion of outbreaks in which the mode of transmission
was (a) foodbome element, (b) foodborne and (c) multiple modes including foodborne. In all
instances, the model is quasibinomial with the predicted best fit line and 95% confidence interval
line around the best fit line shown for the period from 2004 to 2005. The inset in 2.16a shows the
trends before (1996 - 1999) and after (2000 - 2004) the onset of enhanced surveillance, with the
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Since 1996, the proportion of outbreaks with food as a main or co-primary mode of
transmission has dropped from 1 to less than 0.20 (Fig. 3.14a), and this decreasing
trend is statistically significant (Fij7=27.3, p=0.001). There are no statistically
significant differences in the slopes of the trends (p>0.324, Fig. 3.14a inset) or the
means before and after the onset of enhanced surveillance, but there is a noticeable
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decrease in the proportion of outbreak that had a foodborne element between 1998
and 2000.
When the outbreaks that are mainly spread by food are examined separately, the
proportion of outbreaks that are primarily foodborne decreases statistically
significantly between 1996 and 2004 (Fig. 3.14b; Fi,7=23.5, p=0.002). When both
linear and binomial year variables are included in the model, there are no statistically
significant differences in the means or slopes of the trends between 1996-1999 and
2000-2004 (Fi!5=0.7, p=0.434). There is also a statistically significant decreasing
trend in the proportion of outbreaks that are spread by multiple modes (Fi ,7= 11.9,
p=0.011; Fig. 3.14c).
3.4.3.2 Proportion of outbreaks - non food related transmission
Figure 3.15 a-c: Proportion of outbreaks, by year - Environmental/Animal (A/E), Person to
Person (PTP) and Waterborne (WB).
Trends between 1996 and 2004 in the proportion of outbreaks in which the mode of transmission is
(a) environmental/animal (b) person to person and (c) waterbome. In (c) the model is quasibinomial
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The trends in the proportions of outbreaks that are spread person to person or by
animal/environmental exposure (Fig. 3.15a, b) cannot be modelled using simple
linear models, but the trend in the proportion of outbreaks that are spread via water
can be modelled using generalised linear models with quasibinomial error structure.
There is no statistically significant trend in the proportion of outbreaks spread by
water (Fi)7=2.7, p=0.143; Fig. 3.15c) transmission between 1996 and 2004.
3.4.4 Number of ill and positive cases from outbreaks - by mode of transmission
As with the trend in the number of ill cases, there is no statistically significant
difference between modes of transmission in the trend of the number of ill and
positive cases when the Wishaw Outbreak cases are excluded (F5>42=2.2, p=0.077),
but there is a statistically significant difference if the Wishaw cases are included
(F5>42=12.7, pcO.OOl). Thus, the trends without the Wishaw cases will be analysed
separately, with the trends including the Wishaw cases shown for the purposes of
comparison.
3.4.4.1 Number of ill and positive cases from outbreaks - food-related
transmission
Figure 3.16 a-b: Number of ill and positive cases in outbreaks with a foodborne element
The number of ill and positive cases in outbreaks with a foodbome element (FE) between 1996 and
2004 with (a) and without (b) the Wishaw Outbreak cases included,
a b
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With a quasipoisson model, there is a statistically significant downward trend
(F],7=49.0; p<0.001) in the number of ill and positive cases from outbreaks with a
foodborne element between 1996 and 2004 (Fig. 3.16a). However, once the
Wishaw Outbreak is excluded, the trends in the number of ill and positive cases are
not statistically significant (Fi,7=3.6, p=0.101; Fig, 3.16b).
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When both the continuous and binomial year variables and an interaction term are
inserted in the model, there are no statistically significant differences in the slopes or
means of the number ill and positive cases before and after the start of enhanced
surveillance (p>0.133).
Figure 3.17 a-b: Number of ill and positive cases from foodborne outbreaks
The number of ill and positive cases in foodbome (FB) outbreaks between 1996 and 2004 with (a)
and without (b) the Wishaw Outbreak cases included. Predicted best fit lines and 95% confidence
intervals for the line are shown for the period between 2004 and 2005.
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Using a quasipoisson model, there is a statistically significant decreasing trend in the
number of ill and positive cases from foodbome outbreaks between 1996 and 2004
(Fi 7=64.5, p<0.001; Fig. 3.17a). The trend becomes non statistically significant
when the Wishaw Outbreak cases are omitted from the data set (Fi j=4.3, p=0.077;
Fig. 3.17b). The trend in the number of ill and positive cases from outbreaks spread
by multiple modes of transmission including food is not statistically significant
(Fi,t=1.1,p=0.323, Fig. 3.18).
Figure 3.18: Number of ill and positive cases from outbreaks spread by multiple modes
including food
The number of ill and positive cases in outbreaks spread by multiple modes of transmission, one of
which is food (MIF).
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3.4.4.2 Number of ill and positive cases from outbreaks - non food related
transmission
Figure 3.19 a-c: Number of ill and positive cases from outbreaks — environmental, person to
person and waterborne transmission
The number of ill and positive cases from outbreaks spread via (a) animal/environmental (A/E), (b)
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The trends in the number of cases from animal/environmental outbreaks cannot be
appropriately modelled using simple linear models (Fig. 3.19a). When quasipoisson
models are used, the trends between 1996 and 2004 in the numbers of ill and positive
cases from outbreaks spread through person to person and waterbome transmission
are increasing, but not statistically significant (FijCO.b, p>0.476; Fig. 3.19b,c).
3.4.5 Proportion of ill and positive cases from outbreaks, by mode of
transmission
There is a statistically significant difference in the trends of the proportion of ill and
positive cases between modes of transmission when the Wishaw Outbreak cases
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were excluded (F5 ,42—4.7, p=0.002). Again, there is no adequate simple linear model
when the Wishaw Outbreak cases are included.
3.4.5.1 Proportion of ill and positive cases from outbreaks, food related
transmission
Figure 3.20 a-d: Proportion of ill and positive cases from outbreaks with a foodborne element
and outbreaks with multiple modes of transmission including foodborne
The proportion of ill and positive cases from outbreaks (a) with a foodborne element (FE) excluding
the Wishaw Outbreak cases (b) spread via multiple modes of transmission, one ofwhich is
foodborne (MIF), (c) spread via food with (d) and without the Wishaw Outbreak cases (FB). 95%
confidence intervals are indicated for the trends which are modelled.
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The trend in the proportion of ill and positive cases from outbreaks spread by a
foodbome element when the Wishaw cases were included could not be modelled
described using GLMs with the error structures specified in section 2.3.4, but when
the Wishaw Cases were excluded, there was a statistically significant decrease in the
proportion of ill and positive cases that were from an outbreak with a foodbome
element (Fi/7=19.5, p=0.003; Fig, 3.20a). In addition, the trend in the proportion of
ill and positive cases that were outbreaks spread by multiple methods including food
(Fig. 3.20b) could not be modelled. The trend in foodbome outbreaks could not be
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modelled if the ill and positive cases from the Wishaw Outbreak were included (Fig.
3.20c). However, if the cases are excluded, there is a statistically significant
decrease in the proportion of ill and positive cases that are from foodborne outbreaks
(F,,7=18.2, p=0.004; Fig. 3.20d).
Where the trends cannot be modelled using GLMs with the specified error structures,
visual inspection indicates that there is an apparent shift in the proportion of ill and
positive from foodborne outbreaks or those with a foodborne element (Fig. 3.20a,c) .
This shift occurs between 1999 and 2000, the juncture at which enhanced
surveillance was started. From 1996 to 1998, the complete years in which there was
no enhanced surveillance, more than 0.79 (95% CI = 0.70, 0.86) and 0.59 (0.49,
0.69) of ill and positive cases in outbreaks are from foodborne element and
foodborne outbreaks, respectively. Since the onset of enhanced surveillance,
outbreaks with a foodborne element have accounted for no more than 0.33 (0.20,
0.48) of ill and positive and outbreaks spread by food, no more than 0.16 (0.06,
0.38).
Even when the Wishaw Outbreak is excluded, the proportion of outbreak ill and
positive cases that were foodborne is still 0.40 (0.12, 0.77), far higher than any
proportion from 2000 onwards and in both instances the decrease in the trend is
statistically significant (p<0.001).
3.4.5.2 Proportion of ill and positive cases from outbreaks, non food related
transmission: environmental/animal, person to person and waterborne
The trends in the proportion of ill and positive cases in outbreaks that are
animal/environmental (Fig. 3.21a) and person to person (Fig. 3.21b) could not be
modelled using GLMs and the error structures specified in Section 2.3.4. If the
Wishaw Outbreak cases are omitted, the trend in waterborne cases can be modelled
using a quasibinomial error structure, but the trend is not statistically significant
(Fi>7=3.5, p=0.104; Fig. 3.21c).
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Figure 3.21 a-c: Proportion of ill and positive cases from environmental/animal, person to
person and waterborne outbreaks
The proportion of ill and positive cases from outbreaks spread via (a) environmental/animal, (b)
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3.4.6 Number of ill and positive cases per outbreak, by mode of transmission
No statistically significant difference in the trends in the number of ill and positive
cases per outbreak exists between modes of transmission (F6,56=0.8, p=0.560).
However, the trends in foodbome element and foodbome outbreaks will be analysed
separately because they are of particular interest in this thesis.
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3.4.6.1 111 and positive cases per foodborne/foodborne element outbreak
Figure 3.22 a-b: 111 and positive cases per foodborne outbreak and per outbreak with a
foodborne element
The number of ill and positive cases per foodborne outbreak (a), per outbreak with a foodborne
element (b), per foodborne outbreak with the Wishaw Outbreak split into five outbreaks (c) and per
outbreak with a foodborne element when the Wishaw Outbreak was split (d). The solid line
indicates the best fit line for the log transformed linear model. There were no foodborne outbreaks
in 2004, so the line should does not represent a model based on the input of the 2004 data,
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As with the analysis of the overall ill and positive per outbreak, the Wishaw
Outbreak appears to be an outlier, and thus the data cannot be appropriately modelled
when the Wishaw data is included. When the Wishaw Outbreak data point is
excluded, there is a non-statistically significant decrease number of ill and positive
per foodborne outbreak (Fi;i3=3.5, p=0.085; Figure 3.22a). If the Wishaw Outbreak
is considered as five separate outbreaks, there is a statistically significant downward
trend in the loglO number of ill and positive cases per outbreak (Fi,i8=14.1, p=0.001;
Fig. 3.22b).
When all outbreaks with a foodborne element are considered without the Wishaw
Outbreak, the trend in the number of ill and positive is still decreasing, but again the
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change is not statistically significant (Fij26=3.2, p=0.087; Fig. 3.22c), but when the
Wishaw Outbreak is split into five outbreaks, the decrease in the trend is statistically
significant (Fi,3i=15.8, p<0.001; Fig. 3.22d).
3.4.7 Trends in phage types: PT 21/28 and PT
3.4.7.1 Number of outbreaks, PT 21/28 and PT 2
Figure 3.23 a-b: Number of outbreaks — phage type 21/28 and phage type 2
The number of outbreaks per year between 1996 and 2004 in which isolates are (a) PT 21/28 and
(b) PT 2.
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When the trends are analysed using a quasipoisson model, the results indicated that
there has not been a statistically significant increase in the number of PT 21/28
outbreaks between 1996 and 2004 (Fi;7=5.3, p=0.055; Fig. 3.23a). There is not a
statistically significant difference between 1996-1999 and 2000-2004 in the means or
slopes of the trends (p>0.496). There is not a statistically significant decline in the
number of PT 2 outbreaks between 1996 and 2004 (Fi,7=1 .9, p=0.215; Fig. 3.23b).
3.4.7.2 Number of ill and positive cases - PT 21/28 and PT 2 outbreaks
There is not a statistically significant increase or decrease in the number of ill and
positive cases from outbreaks with PT 21/28 between 1996 and 2004 (Fi 7=0.03,
p=0.879; Fig. 3.24a). The trend for PT 2 is not statistically significant with or
without Wishaw between 1996 and 2004 (p>0.267; Fig. 3.24b).
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Figure 3.24 a-b: Number of ill and positive cases in outbreaks — PT 21/28 and PT 2
The number of ill and positive cases from outbreaks where isolates were (a) Phage Type 21/28 and
(b) Phage Type 2
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3.4.7.3 Proportion of total outbreaks, PT 21/28 and PT 2
Figure 3.25 a-b: The proportion of total outbreaks, PT 21/28 and PT 2
The proportion of outbreaks of a known phage type in which the isolates are (a) Phage Type 21/28
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The proportion of outbreaks that are PT 2 appears to have increased (Fig. 3.25a),
while in contrast, the proportion of outbreaks that are PT 2 appears to have decreased
(Fig. 3.25b), but the trends cannot be appropriately modelled using GLMs and the
error structures specified in Section 2.3.4.
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3.4.7.4 Proportion of total ill and positive outbreak cases, PT 21/28 and PT 2
The proportion of ill and positive cases from outbreaks with a known phage type for
both PT 21/28 and PT 2 cannot be appropriately modelled GLMs and the error
structures specified in Section 2.3.4 (Fig. 3.26a, b). A visual inspection of the data
suggests, however, that the trends are similar to the trends seen in the proportion of
total outbreaks.
Figure 3.26 a-b: The proportion of ill and positive cases from outbreaks - PT 21/28 and PT 2
The proportion of ill and positive cases with a known phage type from outbreaks that are (a) PT
21/28 and (b) PT 2. 95% confidence intervals are indicated,
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3.4.7.5 111 and positive cases per outbreak, PT 21/28 and PT 2
There are geometric means of 3.98 ill and positive cases (95% CI = 3.23, 4.90) per
PT 21/28 outbreak and 4.15 ill and positive cases (1.98, 8.72) per PT 2 outbreak. No
statistically significant difference exists between the two phage types in the log 10
number of ill and positive cases per outbreak (Wilcoxon Rank Sum p=0.450), even
when the Wishaw Outbreak is excluded (p=0.222) or split into five outbreaks
(p=0.506). When a binomial logistic model is used, outbreaks are statistically
significantly more likely to be PT 21/28 than PT 2 over time with (z=2.44, p=0.015)
or without the Wishaw Outbreak cases (z=2.16, p=0.031).
When a linear model is used, there is a strongly significant decreasing trend in the
log transformed size of outbreaks where most or all of the ill and positive cases were
PT 21/28 (Fij42=13.2, p<0.001; Fig. 3.27a). The data for PT 2 can be modelled
without the Wishaw Outbreak cases, and the trend is not statistically significant
(p>0.323; Fig. 3.27b). However, after breaking down the Wishaw Outbreak into five
outbreaks, there is a statistically significant (p=0.017; Fig. 3.27c) downward trend.
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Figure 3.27 a-c: Number of ill and positive cases per outbreak — PT 21/28 and PT 2
The number of ill and positive cases per outbreak in which the cases are (a) PT 21/28, (b) PT 2
without the Wishaw Outbreak and (c) PT 2 with the Wishaw Outbreak split into five outbreaks.
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3.5 Discussion
As discussed in Section 1.8 temporal trends have been studied in a wide range of
medical conditions including cancer, injury rates and infectious diseases. However,
within the scope ofE. coli 0157 research, studies relating to temporal trends have
been limited to seasonal trends and descriptive statistics, with little if any published
statistical analyses of longer term trends, in Scotland or elsewhere. A statistical
analysis of such trends in infection numbers and characteristics is of relevance and
importance given the increased focus on identifying appropriate and cost effective
prevention and treatment strategies. This chapter was conducted to, where
appropriate, model trends in Scottish E. coli 0157 cases and outbreaks using simple
linear models, and to describe these trends. Equally as important was the
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identification of trends that could not be statistically modelled and the reasons
preventing the creation of appropriate models.
3.5.1 Issues regarding statistical analysis
3.5.1.1 Type ofmodels
For the E. coli 0157 outbreak trends in Scotland, models with Poisson error
structures were most commonly found to be appropriate. Firstly, as discussed in
Chapter 2.3.2, Poisson models have long been used in describing infectious
disease/ecological trends because they are often the most appropriate for the analysis
of data reported in terms of counts (Crawley 2002). Counts, such as the number or
cases or outbreaks, are one the most common type of infectious disease data. One
important quality of these models, as related to count data, is that by use of the log
link function, the model rules out the possibility of obtaining negative fitted values -
negative counts being impossible in disease surveillance.
The Poisson error structure assumes a k, the reverse measure of aggregation, of
infinity (i.e. random distribution), which is not the case in most of the analyses.
Flowever, any over or underdispersion in the sample can be adjusted for by the use of
the dispersion factor in the quasi functions, as described in McCullagh and Nelder
(McCullagh & Nelder 1989). Thus Poisson error structures are a flexible approach
to modelling the trends. Indeed Poisson regression models have been used in many
contexts to examine temporal trends in infectious diseases, infections and cancer
(Agha et al. 2006; Conway et al. 2006; Kamper-Jorgensen et al. 2006; Maule et al.
2006; Tleyjeh et al. 2005). However, for some infectious disease trends, like that of
the number of outbreaks, the increase is log linear — i.e. the rate of increase is not
constant over time and. Thus, linear regression, which has also been used in the
context of infectious disease trends (Menzies et al. 1994; Miller et al. 2004a), is
more appropriate. The binomial error structure was the only appropriate error
structure for the data presented as proportions constructed out of counts (e.g.
proportion of total outbreaks or ill cases that were a particular mode of transmission)
because it allows for data with strict bounds. Additionally, the logit link allows for
fitted values with asymptotes at 0 and 1. Thus, a model can be appropriately and
easily interpreted when analysing proportions (Crawley 2002). Therefore, for the
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purposes of this thesis, generalised linear models with Poisson and binomial error
structures and linear models with log transformation of the data proved to be the
most appropriate and effective methods for modelling some of the E. coli 0157
temporal trends in Scotland.
3.5.1.2 Multiple testing
As discussed in Chapter 2.3.5.1, with the large number of tests of statistical
significance being performed, there is a risk for statistically significance to occur by
chance. With approximately, 65 tests of significance being run on the Scottish data,
one would expect 3 or 4 tests to be statistically significant even if the trend is not
significant. Thus, caution must be taking in making inferences purely on the
statistical results, particularly when dealing with counts of outbreaks where statistical
power to detect a trend may be quite low.
3.5.1.3 Wishaw Outbreak and enhanced surveillance
Additional factors which had to be considered were the Wishaw Outbreak in 1996,
which involved a disproportionately high number of cases compared to any other
outbreaks included in this study (as suggested by its being an outlier in many of the
trend analyses presented in this chapter), as well as the onset of enhanced
surveillance in 1999/2000. The effect of these factors was assessed by analysing
case by case data with and without the Wishaw Outbreak, by splitting the Wishaw
Outbreak into several outbreaks by established cohort and by analysing trends before
and after the onset of enhanced surveillance.
3.5.2 Where models could not be fitted
This study has established that basic linear regression techniques can be used to
analyse some of the yearly temporal trends in Scottish E. coli 0157 cases and
outbreaks. The cases in which trends could not be appropriately modelled could be
divided into a few distinct categories which highlighted some of the above
mentioned difficulties with the data, as well as issues discussed in Chapter 2. For
several situations: the number of environmental outbreaks, the proportion of
outbreaks that were environmental, PT2 and PT 21/28, the number of ill and positive
cases in environmental outbreaks, and the proportion of total cases that were
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environmental, PT2 and PT21/28, the inability of the data to be modelled was
directly linked to a lack of data. With only nine (1996 - 2004) data points and often
a great variability in the number of outbreaks between years, there was not enough
power for meaningful regression analyses. For instance, simulations based on power
size calculations from Dupont and Plummer (Dupont & Plummer 1998) and run
using nQuery Advisor (Elashoff 2005), indicated that analyses would only have 49%
power to detect changes in slope equivalent to one third of the standard deviation of
the residuals around the regression line. Additionally analyses run using the
TRENDS software packaged, and presented in Section 2.3.5.2, indicated that
analyses of trends with low counts and high variation, such as the trend in the
number of foodborne cases would have low power. For instance, such an analysis
would only have about 50% power to detect a 25% decline in the number of
foodborne outbreaks from year to year. The lack of data was also a problem in
assessing the influence of the onset of enhanced surveillance because changes in
trend slopes that looked of importance were almost always not statistically
significant. With no more than five data points on either side of the switch to
enhanced surveillance, the lack of statistical significance may be a result more of
insufficient power rather than an absence of changing trends. A more statistically
powerful technique for measuring the change of trends would be of use in
ascertaining the real influence of enhanced surveillance, such as using monthly or
weekly data points to increase the power of the analysis. However, data was not
available for this thesis at a weekly or monthly level (see Section 2.4.2).
One of the patterns of note in the analyses was the frequent inability to model data
involving case numbers when the Wishaw Outbreak was involved. This
characteristic, as well as those discussed below, suggests that the Wishaw Outbreak
is an outlier, an unusual outbreak that does not fit within the normal pattern in
Scotland and may need to be excluded when fitting models. However, the Wishaw
Outbreak could also just be at the upper end of the normal size distribution for
Scottish outbreaks.
In addition, there is potential evidence that it maybe more appropriate to consider the
Wishaw Outbreak as a series of outbreaks rather than one very large outbreak.
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Firstly, the trends in the number of ill and positive cases per outbreak (overall,
foodborne and foodborne element) could be adequately modelled when the Wishaw
Outbreak was split into five outbreaks based on the cohorts indicated in Cowden et al
(Cowden et al. 2001), but not when it was included as a single outbreak. Also the
trend data was a better fit for the split models than models without the Wishaw cases.
The five cohorts were distinct, "specific groups of people at risk" (Cowden et al.
2001), and were delineated by location where the meat was consumed or purchased:
1) nursing home, 2) pub party, 3) church luncheon, 4) purchased meat from suspect
butcher and 5) purchased meat from a premise supplied by the suspect butcher. The
idea ofWishaw being compromised of smaller incidents is hinted at in Pennington
(Pennington 1998), which says that "the outbreak was comprised of several separate,
but related incidents". Certainly many of the very large outbreaks that have taken
place around the world have had been comprised of distinct cohorts. In the United
States, there have been a number of outbreaks which involved contaminated
ingredients served at multiple restaurants of a single fast food chain. These
outbreaks, including one involving minced meat in 2002 and 2003 (Tuttle et al.
1999) and another involving an unidentified ingredient in November-December 2006
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2006d), had a common source, but the
infections from each restaurant can be considered a separate cohort. Similarly
separate cohorts despite a common source of infection can be identified in the recent
multi-state spinach outbreak in the US (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
2006e), as well as in the largest ever United States E. coli 0157 outbreak, the 1996
Washington County Outbreak (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 1999a)
and the 2005 meat-product outbreak in Welsh schools. (Office of the ChiefMedical
Officer 2005)
There is further precedence for cohorts being considered separate outbreaks. In
Japan, while approximately 10,000 infections in July 1996 - including those in Sakai
City - were all linked back to white radish sprouts grown at a single farm, these cases
were considered to comprise at least five separate outbreaks (Michino et al. 1999;
WHO 1996).
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Overall, the findings in thesis which indicate that, for the purposes of trend
modelling, it may be more appropriate to consider the Wishaw Outbreak as a series
of smaller outbreaks, suggest that the very large outbreaks may in fact have the
epidemiological characteristics of a series of smaller outbreaks. As a result, it may
of interest to reconsider how an outbreak is defined. For the purposes of
investigating and stopping outbreaks, it is important to connect all cases back to their
original source. However, examining trends within individual cohorts may be useful
in assessing outbreak control and prevention strategies, in studying transmission, and
in predicting future outbreak trends.
3.5.3 Modelled trends
3.5.3.1 Overall variables
The results also provided some interesting insights into the ability to model E. coli
0157 trends in Scotland and the trends themselves. Linear regression after log
transformation of data proved to be an appropriate and effective method for
modelling the trends in the number of total isolates, total events, number of sporadic
cases, outbreak and the number of outbreaks. Poisson regression was appropriate for
the number of ill and ill and positive cases from outbreaks and the number of ill and
positive cases per outbreak. The results for these variables seem to suggest that there
has been a real decrease both in the number ofE. coli 0157 cases not involved in
outbreaks, and the size of outbreaks. The decrease in the size of outbreaks might
reflect quicker and/improved outbreak investigations and faster implementation of
exclusion policies, which would both decrease the possibility of person to person
transmission. Additionally, improved attention to food hygiene and hand-washing
might be reducing the rate of person to person spread, and thus the size of outbreaks.
Firstly, the results of the study point strongly towards a true, non-Wishaw dependent
decrease in the number ofE. coli 0157 isolates over the last decade because there
was statistically significant downward trend in the total number of isolates when the
Wishaw isolates were included. Also there was a statistically significant decline in
the number of total isolate between 1996 and 2005 when the Wishaw isolates were
excluded. That the trend without Wishaw was non-statistically significant until 2005
suggests that the Wishaw Outbreak may initially have been an important factor in the
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statistically significant downward trend, but that over time, the statistical significance
became independent of the inclusion of the Wishaw isolates. However the 42%
increase in cases in 2006 once more makes the trend non-statistically significant
when the Wishaw Cases are excluded (F=l, p=0.114).
The case for a significant decrease in E. coli 0157 is strengthened by the fact that the
number of events has also declined statistically significantly between 1996 and 2004.
Given that there was a statistically significant decrease in the number of events, there
should also be a statistically significant decrease in the number of sporadic cases
unless there was a dramatic decrease in the number of outbreaks. Indeed, there was a
statistically significant decrease in the number of sporadic cases. Since the results
suggest against any statistically significant influence by enhanced surveillance, it
appears that there has been a true and statistically significant decrease in the number
of total events and sporadic cases reported in Scotland. This may reflect a decrease
in contact with the bacteria, due either to a true decrease in the amount of bacteria in
the environment and animals, or improvement attention to hygiene. Better hygiene,
in terms ofhand washing, especially after coming into contact with animals or
animal environments, and proper handling of raw vegetables and meat are infection
prevention methods promoted by the Scottish Government, Food Standards Agency -
Scotland and HPS (Food Standards Agency 2007; Scottish Executive 2007b).
Additionally, the reduction in sporadic cases may well reflect a decrease in the
number of household outbreaks.
Intriguingly, though there are statistically significantly decreasing trends in the log
transformed numbers of both total number of events and the number of sporadic
cases, the trend in the number of outbreaks is non- statistically significant. Since
there is only a statistically significant decrease in the total number of ill and ill and
positive cases from outbreaks each year and no statistically significant difference
before and after enhanced surveillance when the Wishaw Outbreak cases are
excluded, it would appear the total numbers of ill and ill and positive cases each year
from outbreaks have remained relatively stable over the last decade. The lack of a
statistically significant decrease in outbreak case numbers could suggest that
prevention programs as mentioned above have not been as effective for reducing
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outbreak cases as for reducing sporadic cases. More specifically, the measures may
be reducing household transmission, but not transmission in public settings such as
nursery schools.
However, some caution should be taken in interpreting these analyses, as the
decrease in the number of total events was just barely significant. Thus it could be a
result by chance due to over-testing. Additionally, of the low counts and high
variance in the analysis of total outbreaks, it is possible that a statistically significant
decrease in the number of outbreaks may not be picked up due to low power.
The trends in the number of ill and positive cases per outbreak, both overall and for
foodbome outbreaks, could only be modelled when the Wishaw Outbreak was
excluded or split into five separate outbreaks, with a statistically significant decline
over time in the size of outbreaks when the Wishaw Outbreak was split. A decrease
in average outbreak sizes may have resulted from a combination of factors such as
increased awareness, and more efficient reporting of outbreaks since the first use of
the new reporting forms and policies in 1996, in addition to factors beyond the scope
of this study, for instance a shift in the dominant age groups of infected persons
(Woolhouse 1998) or a change in factors resulting in decreased infectivity of the
bacteria (Friedrich et al. 2002).
However, while the average size of outbreaks appears to be decreasing, the numbers
of outbreaks are increasing. This suggest, as mentioned above, that while efforts to
prevent infections may be more effective, the methods being used have been better at
eliminating isolated cases and/or single household clusters rather than preventing
outbreaks. The changes in outbreak size and numbers could also be connected to
improvements in the ability of epidemiologists and public health to identify linkages
between cases. When cases can be linked, more outbreaks may be recognised,
especially those with just a few cases. These improvements could be linked to the
onset of the enhanced surveillance program and the work of SERL in typing isolates.
The ability to make any firm conclusions about trends in outbreaks and sporadic
cases is limited by the fact that Health Protection Scotland defines outbreaks as
affecting "members ofmore than one household...". As a result, clusters of cases
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within the same household, which would appear to have all the same characteristics
as an outbreak, are categorised as sporadic cases. Therefore in this study, the
numbers of sporadic cases and events are over-reported whilst the number of
outbreaks and outbreak cases are likely to be under-reported. Thus without being
able to separate out the household clusters from the sporadic cases, it is difficult to
accurately model trends in outbreaks and sporadic cases (defined as cases not
epidemiologically linked to other cases) using the methods in this thesis.
An additional part of this study was to determine the appropriateness and accuracy of
predictions for the values of the succeeding data points. Predictions, even if only in
terms of ranges, for future data points are of interest for two reasons. Firstly, a rough
prediction of future case or outbreak numbers could assist in suggesting what future
prevention and investigation resources might be needed. Additionally,
demonstrating that a model can accurately predict future data points can provide
evidence of the model's validity. Data points for 2005 were only known for the
number of outbreaks and total cases, in all but a few cases, the data point was within
the 95% confidence intervals of the mean prediction. For most of the inaccurate
predictions, the actual data points were zero and thus were out of the possible range
of a Poisson or binomial model. In addition, predictions were almost uniformly
more accurate when the Wishaw Outbreak data was excluded. However, some
caution must be taken because the low number of data points results in very wide
confidence intervals, which in some binomial models encompassed almost the entire
possible range of values. The study seems to suggest that appropriate models, which
can be used with some degree of accuracy to predict future data points, can be
constructed using Poisson, linear and binomial regression techniques.
3.5.3.2 Mode of transmission
Since the decrease in the predominance of food as a mode of outbreak transmission,
as well as the simultaneous increase in outbreaks caused by environmentaPfarm
related contacts has been noted (Locking et al. 2003c), it was also of interest to look
at trends by mode of transmission. In order to assess whether the significance of
food as a mode of transmission was more strongly associated with instances where it
was the dominant mode of transmission or a co-dominant mode of transmission,
trends in three food related variables were created (see 3.2.3.1 and analysed). One
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variable - 'foodborne', involved only outbreaks where food was the dominant mode
of transmission, while 'multiple including foodborne' only included outbreaks where
food was co-dominant. The third variable, 'foodborne element' included all
outbreaks where food was involved.
When looking at the number of outbreaks, the major issues regarding modelling of
trends was insufficient statistical power due both to a low number of data points, and
to large degree of variation between the data point values. As mentioned in Section
2.3.5.2 and above, simulations suggest that the power to detect changes in trend was
not very high in some analyses. Whilst only trends in environmental outbreaks could
not be modelled, all trends had to be assessed with great care. In particular,
information on outbreaks provided in Strachan et al (Strachan et al. 2006) suggests
that there are environmental aspects to outbreaks not categorised as such. Thus,
analyses using the mode of transmission as provided in the data set may not indicate
the true nature of Scottish outbreak trends as far as modes of transmission.
Plots of the data suggest that there has been a decrease in outbreaks and in the
number of ill and positive cases per outbreak involving food (see section 3.4.6) and
an increase where food was not involved, but there was a statistically significant
decrease only in the number of outbreaks where food was the dominant mode of
transmission. There would appear to be a steady decrease in the number of outbreaks
where food was involved at all or where food was dominant, but for these trends
where there were low counts, a lack of power may have contributed to the trends not
being statistically significant. A similar issue with lack of power may also have
influenced the results regarding the number of ill and positive cases. In both cases,
however, the decreases where there were multiple modes of transmission including
food appear to be less marked.
The results discussed above seem to suggest that there may have been a real decrease
in the predominance of food as a sole mode of transmission. However, food still
appears to remain an important factor when it is one of two or more modes of
transmission involved in an outbreak. This continued importance could be explained
by circumstances such as a decrease in the risk of food (e.g. hamburgers, being
contaminated prior to delivery to the consumer) but not in the risk of infection being
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spread from a person through food or of a few foodborne cases causing many more
subsequent infections. This could occur when person who was potentially infected
via food then contaminates swimming water (Breuer et al. 2001; Brewster et al.
1994) or transmits the infection via close contact in a nursery (Spika et al. 1986).
However, since non-foodborne outbreaks were only routinely reported via HPS
forms starting in 1996, it cannot be ruled out that the statistically significant and non
significant changes in predominant outbreak modes of transmission might be a result
of changes in reporting patterns rather than a true change in outbreak epidemiology.
Examining the proportion of outbreaks and the proportion of ill and positive cases in
outbreaks by mode of transmission is potentially problematic given that a decrease in
one mode infers increases in other modes. However, the results from these analyses
can be examined to ascertain whether an increase or decrease in one mode of
transmission was matched by an opposing trend in just one or many other types of
modes of transmission. In Scotland, there were significant decreases in both the
proportion of outbreaks and of ill and positive cases from outbreaks involving food
or a foodborne element. In contrast, no statistically significant increase was seen in
non-foodborne modes of transmission, suggesting that while food may be losing
dominance, no one non-foodborne mode of transmission is becoming predominant.
It would be of interest to determine whether there are common characteristics in the
non-foodborne outbreaks, for instance connections to animals or farms, but detailed
epidemiological information on outbreaks is not available for this thesis.
Visual inspection suggests that enhanced surveillance (see section 3.2.3.3) may have
had an important role in the very apparent downward shift in the proportion of ill and
positive cases from foodborne outbreaks or those with a foodborne element. This
shift, which took place during the years in which the enhanced surveillance program
started (1999, 2000), could possibly indicate that there has been a true shift in the
causes ofE. coli Ol 57 outbreaks in Scotland. However it is unlikely that the
coordination of the start of enhanced surveillance and the shift was a coincidence,
and thus the data would suggest that the data after 1999 reflects the true nature of
outbreaks, while the high proportions prior to 1999 were the result of
epidemiological investigations that focused primarily on food as a source of
transmission. Both the visual and statistical observations, which show a significantly
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decreasing trend regardless of the Wishaw Outbreak, strongly argue for a major
influence of enhanced surveillance and the related increase in awareness of non-
foodborne outbreaks.
It is important to note that the only information available for this thesis on the mode
of transmission for Scottish outbreaks included in this chapter was the designation of
mode of transmission. Thus, it was not possible to determine the strength of
evidence for the choice ofmode of transmission. In fact, some outbreaks where
environmental or animal contact was not designated as the mode of transmission,
may have in fact had an animal/environmental component to infection transmission
(Strachan et al. 2006). Thus the analyses of environmental/animal contact trends
may not represent the full burden of these modes of transmission. Ifmore
information on outbreak modes of transmission is made available, further analyses
would be of interest.
3.5.3.3 Phage Types 2 and 21/28
Finally, the results provide further statistical evidence for the previously noted shift
in dominance - from PT 2 to PT 21/28 - of the two most common outbreak phage
types in Scotland (Locking et al. 2003c). The increase in the number ofPT 21/28
outbreaks between 1996 and 2004 was just barely non-significant (p=0.055). When
the Wishaw Outbreak cases were excluded, there was not a statistically significant
decrease in the number of ill and positive cases per year in PT 2 outbreaks between
1996 and 2004 (p=0.267). However, given the low counts, there may not have been
enough power to detect a statistically significant trend. Ofparticular interest are the
trends in the first three years in which the proportion of outbreaks that were Phage
Type 21/28 went from 0 to 1 and the proportion of those that were Phage Type 2
went from 1 to 0. Though these trends could not be appropriately modelled, they
reveal a dramatic change in the phage type dominance. This would suggest that
while there may have been a real shift in phage type by outbreak, this shift could not
be adequately modelled using simple linear models. Since the common phage types
in cattle and sheep are the same as those in humans (Paiba et al. 2002), the shift in
predominant human phage type may be linked to a shift in the predominant phage
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type in cattle and sheep. The predominance ofPT 21/28 is of concern because it is
associated with severe illness in humans (Halliday et al. 2006).
Intriguingly, there was a significant downward trend in the size of PT 21/28
outbreaks (p<0.001), while the size of PT 2 outbreaks showed no significant change
over time, remaining small (<10 ill and positive cases). It would be of interest to see
whether there is any statistical relationship between PT 21/28 outbreaks and other
populations of outbreaks, for instance those spread by food, which have also
experienced a significant decrease in size. However, given the small numbers of
outbreaks, and given the simulations run to determine power using large n's (see
2.3.5.2) it is unlikely that the analyses would have enough power to reveal any
statistically significant relationships. For instance, in the eight years from 1996 to
2003, there were only three outbreaks that were both PT 2 and foodborne; with just
seven PT 21/28 and foodbome.
3.5.4 Conclusions
This study would suggest that simple regression models are appropriate for statistical
modelling of some of the trends in E. coli 0157 in Scotland. These models indicate
that there has been a statistically significant decrease in non outbreak cases between
1996 and 2004, as well as a statistically significant decrease in cases involving food.
Overall outbreak sizes, as well as sizes of outbreaks involving food and involving PT
21/28 have also statistically significantly decreased. However, there has not been a
statistically significant change in the number of cases involved in outbreaks, nor in
the number of outbreaks. Models could not be constructed for most variables
including cases from the Wishaw Outbreak, suggesting that the Wishaw Outbreak
may be a statistical outlier. Other issues with model construction resulted from the
low number of outbreaks, a factor which reduces the power available in analyses and
warrants careful interpretation of analyses and predictions. The following Chapter,
Chapter 4, will focus on the analysis of trends in the United States.
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Chapter 4 - E. coli 0157 trends in the United States
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4.1 Introduction
E. coli 0157 was first recognized as a human pathogen in the United States after two
outbreaks ofbloody diarrhoea, both eventually linked to consumption of
undercooked beefburgers, in 1982 (Riley et al., 1983; Wells et al., 1983). Notifiable
to the federal government since 1994, E. coli 0157 has been implicated in over 350
outbreaks since 1982 (Rangel et ah 2005), though the vast majority of cases have
been sporadic (O'Brien & Adak 2002). Based on analyses done by Hedberg et al
which suggest that only approximately 1 in 20 cases are reported (Hedberg et ah
1997), it has been estimated that the bacteria may be responsible for over 73,000
illness each year (Mead et ah 1999), with 85% due to foodborne transmission and
approximately one third requiring hospitalization (Mead et ah, 1999).
Infection rates have always been highest in the northern states, including California,
Oregon, Wisconsin, Michigan, Minnesota, New York and Washington (Griffin and
Tauxe, 1991). The most common source of infection is contaminated beefburgers,
which accounted for 50% of outbreaks between 1982 and 1995, but outbreaks have
also been transmitted via water as well as other foods including raw milk, apple cider
and lettuce (Wachsmath et al., 1997). In recent years, contamination of vegetables -
particularly salad greens — has been implicated in several large multi-state outbreaks
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2006d).
E. coli 0157 outbreaks are a continuing problem in the United States, as illustrated
by the series of large outbreaks in the last three years including the multi-state
outbreak due to contaminated food items at Taco Bell restaurants in the Mid-Atlantic
States (at least 69 confirmed cases) (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
2006d) and a national outbreak caused by contaminated fresh spinach, mostly sold in
bags of ready to eat salads (205 confirmed cases, 3 deaths) (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention 2006h)in the last quarter of 2006. However, as in Scotland,
while there have been a number of publications describing outbreak epidemiology
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 1996b; Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention 2004c; Rangel et ah 2005), there has been little statistical analysis of any
temporal outbreak trends. A 2004 FoodNet report by Marcus and colleagues, which
analysed the trends in overall E. coli 0157 case trends in the FoodNet sites, is one of
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the few exceptions (Marcus et al. 2004a). However that analysis involved only
cases reported in the nine FoodNet sites, regions that range from a single city to a
whole state, and no actual statistical values were provided in the results. Thus the
analyses in this chapter have been conducted in order to provide much more
complete and comprehensive data on temporal trends in the whole United States.
4.2 Materials and methods
4.2.1 Data
4.2.1.1 Study data set
The data sets for United States E. coli 0157 outbreaks in 1996 - 2004 were obtained
courtesy of Liz Blanton and Thai An Nguyen at the Enteric Diseases Epidemiology
Branch in the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Data for
foodborne outbreaks in 1996 and 1997 was taken from the data set provided in early
2005. This data did not undergone the same cleaning - updating to incorporate new
data on existing outbreaks, to add new outbreaks and to adjust old case variables so
they are equivalent with currently used variables - by the CDC as the data after
1997. Foodborne outbreak data from 1998 through 2004 and all data on non-
foodborne outbreaks were taken from updated data sets provided by the CDC in early
2007. The original variables from these CDC data sets are referred to in italics.
The figures on total yearly reported cases were taken from the Summary of
Notifiable Diseases — United States 2003 (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention 2005e). Since data from the PHLIS system were not available after 2001,
the NNDSS data were used for the purposes of this study.
4.2.1.2 Time period
Outbreaks which occurred prior to 1996 are not being considered, first because the
time period 1996 - 2004 was selected in order to allow ease of comparison with
Scotland and Canada, where data were not available before 1996. More importantly,
E. coli 0157 infection was only made federally [i.e. state health agency to federal
agency] notifiable in 1994, but 17 states in 1994 and 11 in 1995 still did not require
notification [i.e. local/county agency to state health agency] (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention 1995b; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 1996a),
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so no data was reported to the federal government. Since states which did not report
in 1994, but did report by 1996 represented approximately 15% of 1996 cases, 1994
and 1995 data was not included due to the possibility that any trend might reflect
more the increase in reporting than any underlying epidemiological cause. However
all fifty states did not report individual cases to the CDC (Table 3.1) until 2002, so
the total number of cases prior to 2002 is most probably an underestimate of the
actual number.
Table 4.1: States which did not report data to the NETSS/NNDSS System between 1996 and
2004
States for which data was not reported to the NETSS/NNDSS system between
1996 and 2004
1996 Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, Hawaii, Wisconsin, Arizona








For example, between 1996 and 2002 when the state did not report individual cases
to NNDSS or PHLIS, there were 141 outbreak cases reported from Pennsylvania via
the outbreak reporting system. Also, in 1998 the reporting system for foodborne
outbreaks, through which most E. coli 0157 outbreaks are reported, shifted from a
paper based system to an online system. At that same time "formal confirmation
procedures to finalize reports from each state each year" (Lynch et al. 2006) were
instituted. In addition, a revised reporting form went into use starting in 1999. This
led to "a substantial increase in the number of reports", and what is termed by the
CDC as a "surveillance discontinuity" in 1997-1998 (Lynch et al. 2006). Given the
stated effect of the changes in reporting procedures and forms, it is expected that
there will be an effect on any temporal trends in outbreak variables. Thus, statistical




Below are the definitions used for the analyses of the United States data. These
definitions may vary from those in other countries, in particular Scotland and
Canada, and issues regarding these variations will be discussed in Chapter 6.
4.2.2.1 Definition of a case
In the United States, a case is generally defined as a suspect, probable or confirmed
incidence ofE. coli 0157 infection.
4.2.2.2 Definition of an outbreak
In the United States, for the purposes of these data sets an outbreak is defined as
"two persons becoming ill as the result of a common source" (Lynch et al. 2006).
4.2.2.3 Definitions — Variables
Definition of total ill cases
For the purposes of this chapter, the number of total ill cases is the number of ill
cases from sporadic cases and outbreaks. The values for the variable are taken
directly from the NNDSS data provided in the CDC's Summary ofNotifiable
Diseases (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2007g).
Definition of number of ill cases in outbreaks
In this chapter, the number of ill cases in outbreaks refers to cases that are confirmed
and/or epidemiologically linked to an outbreak. For all non-foodborne outbreaks and
foodborne outbreaks in 1996-1997, data values were taken from the original variable
ill. Values for foodborne outbreaks between 1998 and 2004 were taken from the
original variable estimated ill, the sum of the number of lab confirmed cases,
probable cases and the number of other cases that were considered by the reporting
person or body to be involved.
Definition of number of ill and positive cases in outbreaks
For all non-foodborne outbreaks, and for foodborne outbreaks prior to 1998, the
values for number of ill and positive cases were taken from the original variable
CultureConfirmedCases. From 1998 - 2004, values for foodborne outbreaks were
taken from the original variable Lab Cases Primary, the number of primary culture
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confirmed cases. Since secondary cases are estimated to compromise up to 20% of
confirmed outbreak cases (see Chapter 7), the omission of secondary cases in the
value for number of ill and positive cases may affect analyses of trends in outbreak
size and case numbers in terms of ill and positive cases.
The value for CultureConfirmedCases or Lab Cases Primary was omitted in 30
outbreaks, 22 ofwhich were in 1998, so the variable (as 111 and positive cases) is
limited in use for the purposes of the analyses.
Definition of mode of transmission variable
Values for the variable Transmission were provided for all outbreaks. Outbreaks
were categorised as foodborne, waterborne, person to person, unknown or
environmental/animal contact. Mode of transmission values 'foodborne',
'waterborne' and 'person to person' were taken directly as listed on the original data
sets for. The original values, 'animal contact', 'animal exposure' and
'environmental' were combined to create the new category 'environmental/animal
contact'.
4.2.3 Reporting issues
4.2.3.1 The Washington County Fair and Wisconsin Watermelon outbreaks
Between 1996 and 2003 there were two outbreaks in the United States that were
more than twice as large as any other outbreaks in terms of ill cases, though they
were not larger in terms of ill and positive cases. These two outbreaks, which took
place in 1999 and 2000 respectively, will be termed the Washington County Fair
(WCF) Outbreak and the Layton Avenue Sizzler (LAS) Outbreak.
The Washington County Fair Outbreak took place in August and September of 1999
at the Washington County fairgrounds near Albany, New York. Visitors to the fair
were exposed to E. coli 0157:H7 through consumption of ice or beverages made
with water from a shallow, un-chlorinated well (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention 1999a), one of several sources of potable water at the fairgrounds. There
were 781 confirmed or suspected cases, 126 ofwhich tested positive (New York
State Department of Health 2000)for E. coli 0157:H7 and 45 for Campylobacter. Of
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the 126 confirmed cases, 14 progressed to HUS and two died. The most probably
source of contamination was confirmed by PFGE typing which established that the
PFGE type of the samples from the well was indistinguishable from that of "many"
of the patients (New York State Department of Flealth 2000). All persons were
infected at the same location (the fair) and from the same source, so the cases could
not be broken into cohorts as done with the Wishaw Outbreak (see Section 3.2.3.2).
In July of 2000, 736 people were sickened in the Layton Avenue Sizzler Restaurant
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, resulting in 63 confirmed cases, 4 cases ofHUS and one
death, as well as two additional confirmed secondary cases. The epidemiological
and microbiological investigations revealed that the infections were most likely to be
the result of cross contamination and poor hygienic procedures in the restaurants. It
is thought that watermelon and other prepared fruits in the salad bar were
contaminated by beefbeing minced in close proximity within the kitchen of the
restaurant. Three minced beef samples tested positive for E. coli 0157, as did a
sealed package of sirloin tri-tip from the same lot as delivered to the restaurant.
Isolates from the meat, one of the samples and the infected persons had
indistinguishable PFGE patterns (Proctor 2000a).
For the purposes of this study, these two large outbreaks raise concerns because of
the number of ill cases involved, more than twice as many ill cases as in each of the
other 314 outbreaks in the data set. The presence of the two outbreaks in the middle
of the time period being investigated might lead to a distortion of trends present in
the data or present problems in finding an appropriate model, as seen with the
Wishaw outbreak. In order to determine whether the outbreaks have had any
significant effect on the trends being modelled or have affected the ability to model
the trends, all analyses involving ill case numbers will also be run omitting each
outbreak separately and omitting both outbreaks.
The largest outbreak to date in the United States, in terms of confirmed cases, took
place between November 1992 and March 1993 in four states (Washington,
California, Nevada and Idaho). Caused by improperly cooked minced beef served at
a restaurants that were part of a large fast food chain, the outbreak resulted in four
deaths and over 700 confirmed cases (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
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1993). However because 1992 and 1993 were out with the period of the study, this
outbreak was not part of the data set used in the analyses.
4.2.3.2 Outbreak reporting changes
The other important factor which must be considered in the analysis of trends in E.
coli 0157 outbreaks in the United States is the change in the reporting procedures for
outbreaks. Prior to the changes in the 2004 form 52.13, the foodborne outbreak
reporting form, which do not affect the analysis of the data from 1998 to 2004,
waterborne outbreaks may have been reported using form 52.12, which is
specifically for waterbome outbreaks. Form 52.12, like the pre-1999 form 52.13,
does not ask for the number of confirmed cases, only for the number of exposed and
ill cases (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2003c). This is as opposed to
the current form 52.13 which asks for lab-confirmed, probable and estimated total ill
cases. Thus there may be differences in the way confirmed and ill case totals are
calculated for foodbome and waterborne outbreaks prior to 2004. This is, however,
not anticipated to have a statistically significant effect on the results because data for
all waterborne outbreaks was taken from the data set provided in 2007, which had
undergone extensive data cleaning by CDC researchers (personal communication,
Thai-An Nguyen, 2006). As part of the cleaning process, the data was adjusted to fit
within the new variable definitions.
4.2.4 Statistical analyses
4.2.4.1 Descriptive statistics
The data from 1996 to 2004 was described in terms of the overall number of and
yearly range of total cases, outbreaks and ill and ill and positive cases from
outbreaks. Outbreaks were also described in terms ofmode of transmission.
Average outbreak size was calculated as the geometric mean number of ill cases per
outbreak.
4.2.4.2 Introduction - Models
For this chapter, temporal trends in both count and continuous data from 1998 to
2004 were analysed using GLMs and linear models as specified in Chapter 2.
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4.2.4.3 Analyses specific to the United States data
All data was modelled for both the 1998 - 2003 and 1998 - 2004 data sets excluding
the data prior to 1998 for reasons described in 3.2.1.3. Trends before and after the
onset of the changes to the surveillance system were not modelled as for the Scottish
data because only two time points took place before the changes, an insufficient
amount of data for a regression mode.
All variables regarding or derived from data regarding the number of cases were also
modelled with and without the cases from the Washington County Fair and Layton
Avenue Sizzler Outbreaks. This was done in order to determine whether the
statistical significance of any trend was due solely to the influence of the cases from
these outbreaks. Initial analyses suggested that the Washington County Fair and
Layton Avenue Sizzler Outbreaks might have a large impact on certain trends
because these two outbreaks were involved so many more ill cases than any other
outbreaks during the study time period.
For all variables, ifmore than one model appeared to be appropriate based on
residual plots, models were selected to allow best comparison between data sets with
and without the WCF and LAS ill cases.
4.3 Results - Descriptive
4.3.1 1996-2004 data
Between 1996 and 2004 there were 29,840 probable and confirmed cases ofE. coli
0157 reported via the NNDSS. During this same time period there were 353
outbreaks, with the number of outbreaks per year ranging from 17 to 57 (Figure
4.1a). Within these outbreaks there were 7309 ill cases (range 203 to 1680; Fig.
4. lb). The number of ill and positive cases was available for 323 outbreaks,
totalling 2893 cases. Outbreaks had a geometric mean of 8.57 ill cases (95% CI =
7.62, 9.65).
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Figure 4.1 a-b: (a) Number of outbreaks per year and (b) number of reported cases and
number of ill cases from outbreaks, 1996 - 2004
Plots showing (a) the number of outbreaks and (b) the number of reported cases and ill cases from
outbreaks per year, 1996 - 2004. The number of reported cases is indicated by a black line, the
number of ill cases from outbreaks as a blue-dotted line. The dotted lines between 1998 and 2001
indicate the trends when the cases from the two large outbreaks (Washington County Fair and
Layton Avenue Sizzler) are excluded.
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The highest number of outbreaks - 185 - were spread via foodborne transmission,
whilst 52 were spread person to person (Fig. 4.2). For the 24 waterborne outbreaks,
13 were spread via swimming water, 8 through drinking water; the water source was
not specified in the remaining three. Of the 20 outbreaks categorised as
environmental/animal contact, 17 were transmitted via animal contact or exposure
and three via environmental contamination.
Figure 4.2: Number of outbreaks by mode of transmission (1996 - 2004)









PTP - person to person
AN/EN - animal/environmental
UNK - unknown
Food PTP Water AN/EN UNK
Mode of Transmission
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4.4 Results - Trend Analyses
4.4.1 Overall variables
4.4.1.1 Total reported cases from sporadic and outbreak E. coli 0157 cases in
the United States, by year
The temporal trends in the number of total reported E. coli 0157 cases can be
modelled using a linear model with log 10 transformation of the response variable.
There is not a statistically significant downward trend between 1998 and 2004
(Fi ,5=3.1, p=0.139; Fig. 4.3a ). If the Washington County Fair and Layton Avenue
Sizzler Outbreaks are omitted, the trend between 1998 and 2004 is still statistically
non-significant (Fi,5=2.8, p=0.155; Fig. 4.3b).
Figure 4.3 a-b: Number of total cases reported to NNDSS: 1996 - 2004
The total number ofE. coli 0157 cases reported via the NNDSS reporting system, by year, between
1996 and 2004 (a) with and (b) without the cases from the Washington County Fair (WCF) and
Layton Avenue Sizzler (LAS) Outbreaks. The solid black lines indicate the trends between 1996
and 1998 and between 1999 and 2004, with the dashed lines indicating the 95% confidence
intervals around the regression line for the trend between 1999 and 2004.
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4.4.1.2 Total outbreaks
The trend between 1998 and 2004 can be modelled using a linear model with log 10
transformation of the response variable. However the trend is not statistically
significant (Fi,5=4.4, p=0.090; Fig. 4.4).
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Figure 4.4: Number of outbreaks
The number ofE. coli 0157 outbreaks, per year, between 1996 and 2004. The solid black line
indicates the best fit lines, on a log transformed scale, for the trend between 1998 - 2004, with the
dotted lines indicating the 95% confidence intervals for the trend between 1998 and 2004.
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4.4.1.3 Number of ill in outbreaks
The linear temporal trends in the number of ill cases in outbreaks between 1998 and
2004 can be modelled using a quasipoisson model, with the model a better fit when
the two large outbreaks are omitted. There is no statistically significant trend in the
number of ill cases in outbreaks between 1998 and 2004 (Fi;s=6.0, p=0.059; Fig.
4.5a). However, if the WCF and LAS Outbreaks were excluded, there is a
statistically significant downward trend from 1998 to 2004 (Fi,5=8.9, p=0.031; Fig,
4.5b).
Figure 4.5 a-b: Number of ill cases in outbreaks: with and without the WCF & LAS outbreaks
The number of ill cases from outbreaks between 1996 and 2004, with the best fit line and 95%
confidence intervals around the trend indicated for 1998 - 2004 when the large outbreaks (a) are
included and (b)excluded.
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
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4.4.1.4 Number of ill cases per outbreak
Trends in the number of ill cases per outbreak between 1998 and 2004 (Fig. 4.6),
whether or not the two large outbreaks were included, cannot be modelled using the
simple linear models.
Figure 4.6: Number of III Cases per Outbreak, 1996 - 2004
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4.4.2 Number of outbreaks
Using an ANCOVA analysis, there is no evidence of any statistical difference in
temporal trends of the number of outbreaks between modes of transmission between
1998 and 2004 (F3)2o=1.7, p=0.190). However, the trend for each mode of
transmission will still be modelled separately in order to determine whether any one
trend is statistically significant.
4.4.2.1 Number of outbreaks, per year - foodborne, person to person,
waterborne and animal/environmental
There is not a statistically significant trend between 1998 and 2004 in the number of
foodborne (Fi,5=4.8, p=0.079; Fig. 4.7a), person to person (Fi,5=0. 18, p=0.691; Fig.
3.7b) or animal/environmental outbreaks (Fi,5=0.31, p=0.599; Fig. 4.7c). However,
the number of outbreaks spread by water has decreased statistically significantly
between 1998 and 2004 (Fi;5=14.1, p=0.013; Fig. 4.7d).
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Figure 4.7 a-d: Number of outbreaks, per year - foodborne, person to person, waterborne and
animal contact/ environmental
Trends in the numbers of outbreaks between 1998 and 2004 in which the main mode of
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4.4.3 Proportion of outbreaks - by mode of transmission
There is no evidence for a statistically significant difference between modes of
transmission in the trends between 1998 and 2004 (F3 2o=l -5, p=0.238). However,
the trends for each mode of transmission are of interest and are modelled separately.
4.4.3.1 Proportion of outbreaks, by year - foodborne, person to person,
waterborne and animal contact/environmental
The trends in the proportions of outbreaks with a known mode of transmission which
are foodbome (Fi;5=0.3, p=0.591; Fig. 4.8a), person to person (Fi;5=0.7, p=0.450;
Fig. 4.8b) and animal contact/environmental (Fi^O.78, p=0.417; Fig. 4.8c) can be
modelled, but are not statistically significant. However, there is a statistically
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significant decline in the proportion of outbreaks which are waterborne (Fi;5=8.7,
p=0.032, Fig. 4.8d).
Figure 4.8: Proportion of outbreaks - foodborne, person to person, waterborne and animal
contact/environmental
Trends between 1996 and 2004 in the proportion of outbreaks (out of outbreaks with a known mode
of transmission), in which the mode of transmission was (a) foodborne, (b) person to person, (c)
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4.4.4 Number of ill cases in outbreaks
There is a statistically significant difference between modes of transmission in the
trends in the number of ill cases from outbreaks between 1998 and 2004 when the
two large outbreaks are omitted (F3!2o=l 1-3, p<0.001), but not when the two large
outbreaks are included (F3;2o=1.95, p=0.153). The trends in the number of ill cases
from outbreaks spread person to person, regardless of the inclusion of the WCF
outbreak cases and in those spread by food and water when the WCF Outbreak is
omitted, can be modelled using the techniques discussed in 2.3.4.
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4.4.4.1 Number of ill cases in outbreaks - foodborne
The trend in the number of ill cases from outbreaks spread by food cannot be
modelled (Fig. 4.9a). However, when the LAS outbreak is omitted, the trend could
be modelled using quasipoisson error structure. There is a statistically significant
decreasing trend in the number of ill cases between 1998-2004 (Fi 5=19.6, p=0.0067;
Fig. 4.9b).
Figure 4.9 a-b: Number of ill cases in outbreaks: foodborne 1996 - 2004
Number of ill cases in outbreaks where the mode of transmission was foodbome, (a) with and (b)
without the cases from the Layton Avenue Sizzler Outbreak,
a b
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4.4.4.2 Number of ill cases in outbreaks - person to person
When a quasipoisson model is used, there is no statistically significant trend between
1998 and 2004 in the number of ill cases in outbreaks (Fi;5=0.3, p=0.878; Fig. 4.10).
Figure 4.10: Number of ill cases in outbreaks - person to person
The number of ill cases in outbreaks spread person to person from 1996 - 2004
3 ® -
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4.4.4.3 Number of ill cases in outbreaks - waterborne
To examine the number of ill cases per year in outbreaks spread by water,
quasibinomial models are used. The trend between 1998 and 2004 can only be
modelled when the cases from the Washington County Fair Outbreak were excluded.
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When the WCF Outbreak is omitted, there is a statistically significant decreasing
trend between 1998 and 2004 (Fi>5=39.1, p=0.002; Fig. 4.11).
Figure 4.11: Number of ill cases in outbreaks, waterborne - 1996 - 2004
The number of ill cases in outbreaks spread person to person from 1996 - 2004 without the cases
from the Washington County Fair Outbreak.
n i i i r
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Year
4.4.4.4 Number of ill cases in outbreaks - animal contact and environmental
The trend between 1998 and 2004 in the number of ill cases from outbreaks where
the infection was spread via animal or environmental means cannot be modelled
(Fig. 4.12) because there were very few outbreaks involved (less than six per year)
and the number of outbreaks differed substantially between years given the number
of outbreaks involved (range of 1 to 6 outbreaks).
Figure 4.12: Number of ill cases in outbreak — animal contact/exposure and environmental
The number of ill cases in outbreaks spread via animal contact/exposure or environmental means
from 1996 - 2004. Within each bar, the each segment represents the cases within one outbreak.
The dotted line connects the data points for each year.
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4.4.5 Proportion of ill cases in outbreaks, by mode of transmission
There is a statistically significant difference between modes of transmission in the
trends in the proportions of total ill cases from outbreaks with a known mode
between 1998 and 2004 when the two large outbreaks are included (F3j2o=1 1.3,
p<0.001), and when the two large outbreaks are excluded (F3>2o=5.2, p=0.008). The
trends in the number of ill cases from outbreaks spread person to person (Section
4.4.4.2), regardless of the inclusion of the WCF and LAS outbreak cases, and those
spread by food (Section 4.4.4.1) and water (Section 4.4.4.3) - only when the WCF or
LAS outbreak is omitted - can be modelled using the techniques discussed in 2.3.4.
4.4.5.1 Proportion of ill cases in outbreaks - foodborne
The trends in the proportion of ill cases from outbreaks with known modes of
transmission that were spread by food between 1998 and 2004 cannot be
appropriately modelled using the binomial error distribution when the cases from the
WCF and LAS Outbreaks were included (Fig. 4.13a). When the cases from these
two large outbreaks are excluded, the trend can be modelled (Fig. 4.13b), but is not
statistically significant (Fj>5=1 .2, p=0.322).
Figure 4.13 a-b: Proportion of ill cases from outbreaks - foodborne
The proportion of ill cases from outbreaks of known mode of transmission between 1996 and 2004
that were spread via food, (a) with and (b) without the cases from the Washington County Fair and
Layton Avenue Sizzler Outbreaks,
a b
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4.4.5.2 Proportion of ill cases in outbreaks - person to person
The trends in the proportion of ill cases from outbreaks with known modes of
transmission that were spread person to person between 1998 and 2004 can be
appropriately modelled using the binomial error distribution whether or not the cases
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from the Washington County Fair and Layton Avenue Sizzler Outbreaks are
included (Fig. 4.14a-b). However neither the trend including the large outbreaks
(Fi>5=2.7, p=0.160) nor the trend excluding the two large outbreaks (F] 5= 1.8,
p=0.233) are statistically significant.
Figure 4.14 a-b: Proportion of ill cases from outbreaks - person to person
The proportion of ill cases from outbreaks of known mode of transmission between 1996 and 2004
that were spread person to person (a) with and (b) without the cases from the Washington County
Fair and Layton Avenue Sizzler Outbreaks,
a b
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4.4.5.3 Proportion of ill cases in outbreaks - waterborne
An appropriate model cannot be found for the trend in the proportion of ill cases that
come from outbreaks with waterborne transmission when the Washington County
Fair and Layton Avenue Sizzler outbreak cases are included (Fig, 4.15a). When
these cases are excluded, there is a statistically significant decreasing between 1998
and 2004 (F1i5=45.6, p=0.001; Fig. 4.15b).
Figure 4.15 a-b: Proportion of ill cases from outbreaks - waterborne
The proportion of ill cases from outbreaks of known mode of transmission between 1996 and 2004
that were spread via water (a) with and (b) without the cases from the Washington County Fair and
Layton Avenue Sizzler Outbreaks.
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4.4.5.4 Proportion of ill cases in outbreaks - animal contact or environmental
The trends between 1996 and 2004 in the proportion of ill cases in outbreaks where
the infection was spread via animal contact/exposure or environmental means cannot
be modelled using the binomial error structure (Fig. 4.16a,b).
Figure 4.16 a-b: Proportion of ill cases from outbreaks, animal contact or environmental
The proportion of ill cases from outbreaks of known mode of transmission between 1996 and 2004
that were spread via animal contact/exposure or environmental means (a) with and (b) without the
two large outbreaks.
4.5 Discussion
As in Scotland, there has been little statistical analysis of temporal trends in E. coli
0157 cases or outbreaks in the United States. Rangel and colleagues published a
report on the epidemiology of all outbreaks between 1992 and 2002, however it
contains only brief, general comments on trends, with no formal statistical analysis
of temporal trends (Rangel et al. 2005). An unpublished report from the FoodNet
surveillance program (Marcus et al. 2004a), using a Poisson model to look at
changes in sporadic and overall case incidence between 1996 and 2002 represents
one of the few statistical analyses of temporal trends. The report, however, involves
only data from the nine states or regions covered by the FoodNet surveillance
program and no actual values for the measure of statistical significance are provided.
Given the prominence ofE. coli 0157 infections in the United States in recent years,
as illustrated by the two multi-state outbreaks caused by contaminated produce in
late 2006, a better understanding of outbreak and case epidemiology, including
temporal trends is important. Improved knowledge on temporal trends may help to
provide insight into the success or failure of preventative measures and suggest as to
which modes of transmission or case types may be of greater importance in terms of
prevention and research. It is thus surprising that there has been little published
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research on long term trends. Therefore the study in the current chapter was
conducted to determine whether it was possible to model temporal trends in U.S. E.
coli 0157 case and outbreak numbers using generalised linear models, and if so,
whether any of the modelled trends were statistically significant.
The methods and models used in the analyses were identical to that used for the
analyses of the Scottish data, but there were unique challenges associated with the
United States data. E. coli 0157 cases have been reportable (to the federal
government) in the United States since 1994 (Rangel et al. 2005), however only by
2002 was reporting of individual cases mandatory within all 50 states, with all 50
states reporting case totals to the NNDSS for the first time in 2002. As a result case
numbers during the earlier portion of the study time period may not represent the true
prevalence. However, a lack of a mandate to report individual cases within a state
does not mean that outbreak cases were not reported to the CDC. Thus the number
of total cases reported to the NNDSS may not include outbreak cases which were
included in CDC outbreak data sets. The NNDDS data set may also vary from the
outbreak data set due to the differences in the way dates are assigned to cases
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2005e). The difference between data
sets, though, is expected to have been minimal as only five states did not report case
data to the CDC during the time period of the study and only two states did not report
data after 1999, with all states reporting by 2002. These five states do not represent a
major proportion of total cases, and in many cases, still reported outbreaks.
More significant were the major significant changes to the surveillance systems in
1998 and 1999 (see Section 4.2.3.2), as well as the composition of the study data set
from two separate data sets as detailed in 3.2.1.2. Firstly, the start of the enhanced
surveillance program and the switch to new reporting forms resulted in a substantial
increase in the number of foodborne E. coli 0157 outbreaks reported to the CDC
beginning in 1998 (Lynch et al. 2006). Since outbreaks where the suspected mode of
transmission was non-foodborne were reported to the CDC using state forms until
2006, and the resultant data kept in a separate database (personal communication
Thai An Nguyen, CDC), the above changes are less likely to have affected the
reporting of non-foodborne outbreaks. However, because there was no standardised
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reporting form, the data collected on non-foodborne outbreaks may be less consistent
both in terms of definitions and in the strength of evidence associated with the
putative mode of transmission.
Additionally, data for all non-foodborne outbreaks and foodborne outbreaks reported
between 1999 and 2004 was obtained from an updated data set provided by the CDC
(Thai An Nguyen, CDC), while the data for foodborne outbreaks prior to 1998 was
obtained from an earlier dataset (Liz Blanton, CDC). This earlier data set had not
undergone 'data cleaning', a process which amends the data to reflect the most
recent information on case numbers and/or transmission mode, adjusts the entries so
that the data corresponds with the most recent variable definitions, and corrects any
errors in prior data entry. In particular, for foodborne outbreaks prior to 1998, the
number of laboratory confirmed cases was recorded as the number of confirmed
cases. Starting in 1998 though, the number of ill and positive cases recorded on
CDC form 52.13 only included primary cases. Thus the possibility that any decrease
in the number of ill and positive outbreak cases could be due to the exclusion of
secondary cases after 1997 must be considered.
Given the major changes to data collection and the subsequent affect on the data, as
illustrated by the substantial increase in the number of reported outbreaks, it was
determined that it was not appropriate to analyse the temporal trends from 1996 to
2004. For the purposes of this study, therefore, only the data between 1998 and
2004 was included in the temporal trend statistical analyses, though the 1996 - 1997
data points were illustrated and considered in discussion of the analyses where
appropriate.
4.5.1 Trend analyses
While it was not possible to model the temporal trends in E. coli 0157 outbreaks for
the entire period between 1996 and 2004 due to the significant changes in the
surveillance system, many trends between 1998 and 2004 could be modelled using
simple linear or generalised linear models with quasipoisson, Poisson or
quasibinomial error structures or log transformation of the data.
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4.5.1.1 Where trends could not be modelled
Where appropriate models could not be constructed, there appeared to be two
predominant reasons. For trends in the number ill, and the proportion of total
outbreak cases each year that were ill, the inclusion of the cases from the two large
outbreaks -Washington County Fair and Layton Avenue Sizzler - appeared to be the
primary reason for the inability to model the data. While these outbreaks occurred
during the middle of the study time-period and thus did not have such a significant
potential to affect trends as with the Wishaw Outbreak in Scotland, their disruptive
effect on the ability to model the trends suggest that they might be statistical outliers,
though not to the degree ofWishaw.
The Washington County Fair Outbreak may have been an outlier in our study
because the number of reported number of ill was likely inflated by cases that were
actually due to Campylobacter - there were 45 persons positive for Campylobacter
(New York State Department ofHealth 2000) in the outbreak. Though one of the
most common gastrointestinal illnesses in the United States (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention 2005a), Campylobacter has only been implicated in 12
waterborne outbreaks between 1998 and 2004 (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention 2004c). Waterborne Campylobacter outbreaks between 1998 and 2004
were substantially larger than those caused by E. coli 0157, whether or not outbreaks
with multiple implicated organisms were included (calculations from unpublished
data, CDC). Therefore it may be that a quarter or more of the ill cases associated
with the Washington County Outbreak were infected with Campylobacter rather than
E. coli 0157. Since not all persons were tested for infection, it is clearly impossible
to determine which symptoms were a result ofwhich bacterial infections(s), but if it
were possible to omit the Campylobacter cases from the totals, the reduction in the
number of ill cases may mean that the outbreak no longer appears to be an outlier.
The other reason for the inability to fit appropriate models was a low number of
outbreaks, which affected primarily the attempts to model the number and proportion
of ill cases from outbreaks spread by animal/environmental contact or exposure.
With a maximum of just five outbreaks per year and three years where no more than
two outbreaks were reported, the amount of data available over the seven-year time
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period for analysis may have been too insufficient and too variable for the
construction of a regression model with enough power to detect changes in trends
(see Section 2.3.5.2). It would appear from a visual inspection of the data however,
that while the number of outbreaks spread via animal contact peaked in 2001, there
has been an increase in the number of cases in these outbreaks.
Another factor in the inability to model the data from animal/environmental
outbreaks was the disproportionate number of ill cases from outbreak cases in 2001,
which may be linked to the first appearance of environmentally transmitted outbreaks
in that year. Prior to 2001, no outbreaks were considered to be the result of
environmental spread, but in 2001 there were two environmental outbreaks with a
combined 145 ill cases between them. It is not known whether the category
'environmental' was used prior to 2001, whether no previous outbreaks of this
transmission method had been recorded or whether there was increased awareness by
public health officials in investigating the causes of outbreaks in agricultural areas.
The large numbers of ill cases, as opposed to cases confirmed by laboratory tests, in
animal/environmental outbreaks may also reflect the location of the environmental
outbreaks, which both involved infections that resulted from airborne or surface
contact with bacteria in barns where infected animals were or had been present (Croft
et al. 2002; Varma et al. 2003). Since in both outbreaks, food was consumed by all
or many of the persons in the contaminated areas, there were many pathways for
infection.
4.5.1.2 Modelled trends
Though the incidence ofE. coli 0157 infection has substantially decreased between
1996 and 2003/2004 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2005d) and
increased in 2005 and 2006, based on data from 10 states as part of the FoodNet
Surveillance (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2007f), and there was an
increase in the number of reports to NNDSS between 1996 and 2000 (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention 2003a), between 1998 and 2004 there was no
statistically significant trend in the number ofE. coli 0157 cases in the United
States. However the presence of a statistically significant decrease in overall case
numbers between 1999 and 2004, regardless of the inclusion of the two large
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outbreaks in 1999 and 2000 (p<0.047), and the noticeable increase in number of
cases between both 1997 and 1998 and 1998 and 1999, suggest that the impact of
enhanced surveillance and substantial reporting forms updates may have extended
into 1999. One reason for the effect of enhanced surveillance being spread out over
more than one or years might have been that the revised reporting form for
foodborne outbreaks was not released until August 1999 (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention 2004a), though the number of outbreaks decreased in 1999
as compared to 1998. After a significant increase in the number of outbreaks
between 1997and 1998, resulting from the onset of enhanced surveillance (Lynch et
al. 2006), the number of outbreaks remained relatively stable with no statistically
significant trend between 1998 and 2004. However, when the two large outbreaks -
Layton Avenue Sizzler and Washington County Fair - are excluded, there is a
statistically significant decrease in the number of ill cases from outbreaks.
There appears to be a decrease in the role ofwater as a mode of transmission, as
there are statistically significant decreases in the number ofwaterbome outbreaks
and ill cases from waterborne outbreaks as well as the proportion of outbreaks and
outbreaks cases that were waterbome. However, given the issues regarding reporting
of waterbome outbreaks (see section 4.2.3.2), this apparent decrease may reflect a
change in reporting rather than a tme increase. Additionally, there appears to be a
decrease in the dominance of food as a mode of transmission, with a statistically
significant decrease in the number of ill cases from foodbome outbreaks. No
statistically significant trend was seen in the number of foodbome outbreaks, but the
plot appears to suggest a decreasing trend. Since the power calculations in Chapter
2.3.5.2 specifically indicate that there would be less than 50% power to detect a 25%
decrease from year to year, it is very possible that the analysis was not powerful
enough to pick up a statistically significant trend.
4.5.2 Conclusion
The results from the analyses in this chapter indicate that some trends in E. coli 0157
outbreaks and cases in the United States between 1998 and 2004 can be modelled
using simple linear models. These models suggest that like the Wishaw Outbreak,
the large Washington County Fair and Layton Avenue Sizzler outbreaks do have a
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statistically significant effect in some trends, and could possibly be considered as
outliers. In addition, whilst there has not been a statistically significant change in the
numbers of total confirmed cases (outbreak and sporadic) or outbreaks during the
study period, there has been a statistically significant decrease in the number of ill
cases from outbreaks. In particular, there have been statistically significant decreases
in the number of ill cases from outbreaks spread primarily by food and water. Thus,
as in Scotland, food and the occurrence of one or more disproportionately large
outbreaks appear to have played significant roles in E. coli 0157 trends. These
factors will also be examined in the next chapter, Chapter 5, when trends in Canada
are analysed.
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Chapter 5 — An analysis ofE. coli 0157 temporal trends in
Canada: 1996 - 2003
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5.1 Introduction - E. coli 0157 in Canada: 1996 - 2003
The first cases ofE. coli 0157 in Canada were recognized in 1982 (Woodward et al.
2002), when 18 residents of a home for the aged in Ottawa were infected in the third
ever reported E. coli 0157 outbreak (Lior 1983). Notification became mandatory at
a national level in 1990 (Wilson et al. 1997); E. coli 0157 infections are counted
together with all verotoxin producing E. coli (VTEC) serotypes. Since 1990,
reported rates have stayed above 3 cases annually per 100, 000 population (Public
Health Agency of Canada 2006) and there have been over 20,000 reported cases of
VTEC E. coli infection (Public Health Agency of Canada 2006). Between 1994 and
2003, approximately 95% of these cases were 0157 (Sockett et al. 2006). Research
in the province of Ontario and on data from the National Notifiable Disease Registry
suggests that surveillance data is very incomplete and that cases may be
underreported at a rate as high as 98% (Michel et al. 1998; Michel et al. 1999;
Thomas et al. 2006). A multi-provincial database of outbreaks occurring between
1996 and 2003 was assembled in 2006 and indicated that upwards of 100 outbreaks
were reported to provincial health authorities during this period (Sockett et al. 2006).
Ontario has generally had the highest number of cases per year, followed closely by
Quebec, and then Alberta and British Columbia (Public Health Agency of Canada
2006).The highest rates of infection have tended to be in Manitoba, Quebec and
Alberta (Public Health Agency of Canada 2006). Caution must be taken when
looking at the rates in some of the more sparsely populated provinces because a
small number of cases can result in a very high rate. For instance, the Northern
Territories had only 6 cases in 2000, but because the population is only around
42,000, the rate was 14.82 per 100,000.
As in the U.S., many outbreak-related cases have been reported as being linked to
consumption of improperly cooked minced beef or other beef products (Todd 2000).
Research has shown that higher livestock density, especially cattle, may be linked to
increased occurrence of human STEC infection (Michel et al. 1999; Valcour et al.
2002). Outbreaks have also been traced to raw milk (Mclntyre et al. 2002), lettuce
(Woodward et al. 2002), apple cider (Health Canada 1999) and salami (MacDonald
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et al. 2004). Direct animal contact has been implicated, as has contaminated water
such as in a 2001 outbreak linked to a beach in Montreal (Bruneau et al. 2004).
The largest reported outbreak in Canadian history was the large Walkerton Outbreak
(O'Connor 2002), which involved more than 1000 ill cases. It remains the largest
outbreak in North America, and the second largest ever, second only to the 1996
Sakai City Outbreak in Japan, which sickened over 6300 people (Michino et al.
1999). (See Section 2.4.1.3 for more detail).
Though overall rates of reported infection have generally been declining since 2000
(Sockett et al. 2006), E. coli 0157 outbreaks continue to occur in Canada, as a
number of outbreaks in 2006, including the minced-beef linked outbreak in Manitoba
(Winnipeg Regional Health Authority 2007), one linked to beef donairs in Alberta
(Honish et al. 2007) and outbreaks in Ontario (ProMED-mail 2007) indicate. Yet, as
in Scotland and the United States, the literature on outbreaks has been mainly limited
to descriptive analyses of specific outbreaks (Honish et al. 2007; Michel et al. 1998),
with comprehensive studies limited, in large part, by the lack of a systematically
collected and validated, long-term multi-provincial database of outbreaks. The
recent compilation of a historical national enteric disease outbreak data set, which
includes E. coli 0157 outbreaks, has provided an opportunity for an analysis of long
term outbreak trends in Canada. This chapter has been conducted to analyse E. coli
0157 outbreaks in Canada between 1996 and 2003.
5.2 Materials and methods
5.2.1 Study data sets
5.2.1.1 Outbreak data set
Data set
The data set for Canadian E. coli 0157 outbreaks in 1996 - 2003 has been obtained
from Kathryn Dore at the PHAC. The standard definition of an outbreak in Canada
is "an incident in which two or more persons experiences similar illness after a
common source exposure. An outbreak is identified through laboratory surveillance
or an increase in illness that is unusual in terms of time and/or place. An outbreak is
confirmed through laboratory and/or epidemiological evidence." (Foodborne Illness
Outbreak Protocol). However, outbreaks with fewer than two cases were reported to
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the PHAC data set, which suggests that provincial records were incomplete and/or
there may have been alternate outbreak definitions used by some provinces/territories
for at least part of the study time period.
The extent of the variation in outbreak definitions between provinces cannot be fully
quantified because only a few of the definition(s) used in the data provided by the
various provinces in and territories for the report were available in the information
provided by PHAC and included in published reports. However, outbreaks with
fewer than two cases have been excluded prior to analyses in this study, and thus all
outbreaks in this data set are assumed to meet the PHAC definition of an outbreak:
an outbreak involving "two or more clinically or laboratory confirmed cases..
(Tinga et al. 2006) and for the purposes of this chapter an outbreak is defined as
involving two or more ill cases. In this chapter, an ill outbreak case is defined as an
incidence of infection that is clinically confirmed, but not necessarily laboratory
confirmed. An ill and positive outbreak case is defined as a laboratory confirmed
case.
Data manipulations
For the purposes of this chapter, changes were made to the original data set provided
by PHAC, which contained 110 confirmed or suspected E. coli 0157 outbreaks
between 1996 and 2003, as explained below.
Detailed notes on the data and data variables provided by each province/territory to
PHAC and the re-coding by the PHAC researchers were made available, and
information from these notes and from correspondence with staff at PHAC has been
used to adjust and recode the data. In particular, the notes were used in the process
of establishing definitions for number of ill and number of ill and positive cases that
can best accommodate provincial/territorial data and which are most compatible with
the data collected from the United States and Scotland.
Firstly, after discussion with researchers at PHAC, the ten outbreaks for which no
information was provided on case numbers - either laboratory, clinical or total - were
excluded from the data set. One outbreak was confirmed by further conversation
with PHAC to be a duplicate of another outbreak in the data and so was also deleted.
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Another outbreak, which had only one confirmed case listed and no data for ill or
total cases, was omitted because it did not meet the outbreak definition for this thesis.
Data on six outbreaks not included in the data set but reported in detail in the
literature, and confirmed as reliable by PHAC, were added to the data set (David et
al. 2004; MacDonald et al. 2000; MacDonald et al. 2004; Mclntyre et al. 2002;
Williams et al. 2000).
Further changes were made to correct inconsistencies in the data and to make
variables compatible with those used for the Scottish and United States data, as listed
below (Table 5.1).
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Table 5.1: Changes made to variables in the Canadian E. coli 0157 outbreak data set
The changes by outbreak made to the data set received from PHAC prior to analyses.





Corrections as per Galanis et al
3769 Num_cases 11 12 Corrections as per Health Canada,
1999
894 Clin_cases ... 0 Added value as per Honish et al 2005
4930 Clin_cases 69 39 Corrected as lab cases + Clin_cases
should equal Num cases. Information
on data cleaning and comparison
between data set and papers on
Walkerton Outbreak suggest that in
Ontario Clin cases include Lab cascs.







Corrected to reflect the fact that there
were 44 lab_cascs, so at least 44
Numcases
1477 Num_cases 5 13 Changed to reflect the fact that there
were 13 lab_cases, so must have been
at least 13 num cases
1643 Clin_cases 2 0 Corrected so lab cascs + Clin cases =
Num_cases.
1164 Clincases 4 0 See above





Removed improbable values of zero
because Num cases was 3
5543 Labcases 273 174 Removed Campylobacter cases as per
Health Canada, 2000
4968,2238, 3 904,4117,
5330, 2398, 2452, 3054,
3540, 3728, 4363, 5800,
5886,6115, 1961,2703,
2863,3752,3061
Clin_cases Changed Clin cascs so that it equals

















Environmental Changed to be compatible with
Scottish datasct








Changed to be compatible with
Scottish datasct
7536,779,867,7506 Mode Transmission Other Unknown
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The variable LabCases, defined as the number of "Primary and secondary cases for
which there are positive lab results", has been re-named III andPositive Cases and
the variable "ClinicalCases", defined as the "sum of lab-confirmed and clinical
cases", was renamed III Cases. Clinical cases, in this instance, are defined as the
number of "Primary and secondary cases for whom there are no lab results, but who
have clinical presentation consistent with case definition and who can be linked
epidemiologically (by place or time) to the outbreak".
Outbreaks have been assigned to the same categories for the mode of transmission
variable as used for the Scottish data, based on the information for putative mode of
transmission provided in the original variables modetransmission and
mode text other. If the value for mode transmission in an outbreak was recorded as
foodborne, waterborne, unknown or person-to-person, the value was directly copied
to the new putative mode of transmission variable. Outbreaks for which
mode transmission was Agriculture were coded as Environmental/Animal Contact.
Where no value or the value Other was provided for mode transmission, the new
mode of transmission value was unknown. Again, it is important to note that all
modes of transmission designations are putative as the data is based on information
recorded by provincial or regional public authorities and may not have been
systematically collected or validated. Thus while not explicitly indicated in the
results section, all analyses involving mode of transmission should be considered to
involve putative, not confirmed mode of transmission.
The final data set for this thesis has 104 Canadian outbreaks, with variables for
number of ill cases, number of ill and positive cases and mode of transmission
(foodborne, waterborne, person to person, animal/environmental or unknown).
5.2.1.2 Total cases data set
Data set
Data on the reported confirmed cases (outbreaks and sporadic cases) for 1996 to
2003 has been obtained from the Disease Surveillance On-Line section of the Public
Health Agency of Canada website (www.phac.aspc.gc.ca/dsol-smed/index.html). A
confirmed case in this data set is, for the purposes of this chapter, considered to be
equivalent to an ill and positive case.
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Data manipulation
The data reported in 2000 included all the epidemiologically related cases from the
Walkerton Outbreak, not just the ill and positive cases (Sockett et al. 2006). Thus
the non-confirmed cases are omitted from the data prior to any analyses. The number
of non-confirmed - e.g. ill, but not laboratory positive - cases has been calculated by
subtracting the number of ill and positive cases as listed in the outbreak data set from
the number of ill as listed in the outbreak data set.
5.2.1.3 Study time period
Only data between 1996 and 2003 were included in this thesis in order to allow
comparison with the data from Scotland, and also because compiled data on
outbreaks in Canada prior to 1996 was not provided in the PHAC data set.
5.2.1.4 Reporting issues -Walkerton Outbreak
With 1346 ill cases, the Walkerton Outbreak is nearly ten-fold greater in size than the
next largest outbreak in Canadian history. When only the 147 ill and positive cases,
are considered, it is still larger as compared to other reported Canadian outbreaks
between 1996 and 2003. Given this relatively large number of ill cases and the
results presented in this chapter which suggest that the Walkerton Outbreak may be
an outlier, the analyses of the Canadian data will be conducted both including and
excluding the Walkerton Outbreak. Since the Walkerton Outbreak occurred in the
middle of the time period being analysed and thus does not dramatically increase the
first or last data point, it is not expected that it will have the same degree of influence
on trends as did the Wishaw Outbreak which occurred in the first year of the study
time period (see Section 2.4.1.1), but it is important to ensure that any
disproportionate influence is recognised and considered in interpretation of analysis
results. Another issue regarding the Walkerton Outbreak is the large number of ill
cases attributed to infections with other pathogens - 97 with Campylobacterjejuni
and 20 with other organisms (O'Connor 2002). In the data set for this thesis, these
117 cases have been excluded from the number of ill cases; it is still possible that
even more of the ill cases were the result of these other organisms.
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While the Wishaw Outbreak in Scotland could also be analysed as a series of
outbreaks (see section 3.2.3.2), a similar analysis will not be performed for the
Canadian data because no such identifiable cohorts exist in the Walkerton Outbreak.
All but 39 of the 1346 ill persons were infected from direct consumption ofwater
from the common municipal water supply, and the 39 secondary cases can all be
traced to contact with a person infected from the water supply.
5.2.2 Variables selected for the analyses
Table 5.2: Variables used in analyses
The variables used in analyses of case and outbreak trends in Canada, 1996 - 2003
Variable Definition
Total reported cases Number of laboratory confirmed verotoxin-producing E. coli cases
Number of Outbreaks Number of outbreaks
Number of ill cases from outbreaks Total number of cases from outbreaks, including those clinically
confirmed, but not laboratory confirmed
Number of ill cases per outbreak - overall
and foodborne
Total number of cases per outbreak (all outbreaks, and those spread
via food)




d) Person to person (PTP)
Number of outbreaks in which the putative mode of transmission, as





Number of ill cases from outbreaks spread
by a, b, cord
Number of total cases from outbreaks where the putative mode of
transmission, as categorised per thesis definitions, was a, b, c or d
Proportion of outbreaks spread via a, b, c
ord
Proportion of outbreaks with known mode, as per the thesis definition,
in which the mode of transmission was: a, b, c or d
Proportion of ill cases from outbreaks
spread via a, b, c ord
Proportion of cases from outbreaks in which the mode was a, b, c or d
The variables for the analysis of the Canadian data were selected to allow analyses of
basic trends in Canadian E. coli 0157 cases and outbreaks, as well as comparison
between trends in Canada, Scotland and the United States. Firstly the trends in the
number of reported VTEC cases will be modelled (Table 5.2), then trends in the
number of ill cases in outbreaks (Table 5.2) and finally trends in the number of ill
cases per outbreak (Table 5.2).
Also to be modelled are trends in the putative modes of transmission, in terms of
both the numbers and proportions of total outbreaks and ill cases each year. In
particular, the number of outbreaks and ill cases from each putative mode of
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transmission will be modelled, as will the proportion of outbreaks and ill cases
associated with each mode of transmission. The final variable to be modelled will be
the number of ill cases per outbreak spread via food. Since the mode of transmission
for approximately one third of outbreaks is listed as 'unknown' in the thesis data set,
the above proportions will be calculated excluding those outbreaks where mode of
transmission is listed as 'unknown'. All variables including or derived from numbers
of ill cases will be analysed with and without the Walkerton Outbreak cases, to check
for any influence on trends by the outbreak as discussed in section 5.2.1.4.
5.2.3 Analyses
5.2.3.1 Descriptive analyses
The data from 1996 to 2003 will be described in terms of the variables mentioned in
Table 5.2: the annual numbers of total reported cases, ill outbreak cases and
outbreaks will be described, as will be the breakdown of outbreaks by mode of
transmission.
5.2.3.2 Statistical analyses
For this chapter, temporal trends between 1996 and 2003 are analysed using GLMs
and linear models as specified in Chapter 2. All variables involving case numbers
including waterborne cases were analysed with and without the cases from the
Walkerton outbreak included (see Section 2.4.1.3).
5.3 Results - Descriptive
Between 1996 and 2003, there were 12,042 cases of verotoxigenic E. coli reported to
Health Canada (Public Health Agency of Canada 2006), the majority ofwhich were
serotype 0157 (Sockett et al. 2006). This total includes cases from 104 outbreaks,
with the annual number of outbreaks ranging from 2 to 24 (Fig. 5.1a). Within these
outbreaks there were 2485 ill outbreak cases reported to PHAC (yearly range 41 to
1429) (Fig. 5.1b). The number of ill and positive cases was only available for 92
outbreaks, for which there were 865 total cases between 1996 and 2003. Outbreaks
had a median of 5 ill cases (range 2 to 1346) and 3 ill and positive cases (range 0 to
174).
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Figure 5.1a-b: (a) Number of outbreaks per year & (b) Number of reported cases and
outbreak ill & positive cases
In (a), the number E. coli 0157 outbreaks per year and in (b) reported VTEC cases and E. coli 0157
ill cases from outbreaks per year. The number of reported cases is indicated by a thick black line
and the number of ill cases in outbreaks by a thick blue line. The narrow lines between 1999 and
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Of the 104 outbreaks, 69 (66.3%) had a putative mode of transmission recorded.
Within the 104 total outbreaks, those categorised as foodbome were most common
(44.7%), followed by unknown (34.3%), with person to person,
animal/environmental and waterbome transmission each implicated in more than 2%
of outbreaks (Figure 5.2).
Figure 5.2: Number of outbreaks by mode of transmission








PTP - person to person
A/E - animal/environmental
UNK - unknown
Food PTP Water A/E
Mode of Transmission
UNK
5.4 Results - Statistical analyses
5.4.1 Total case and outbreak variables
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5.4.1.1 Total reported VTEC cases
Temporal trends in the number of total reported VTEC cases, regardless of whether
the cases from the Walkerton Outbreak are included, can be modelled using linear
models with log 10 transformation of the data. There are no significant trends in the
number ofVTEC cases reported to PHAC when the Walkerton Outbreak is included
(Fi^O.3, p=0.62; Fig. 5.3a) or excluded (Fi,6=0.5, p=0.53; Fig. 5.3b).
Figure 5.3 a-b: The number of VTEC cases reported to PHAC (a) with and (b) without the
Walkerton Outbreak
The number ofVTEC cases reported to Health Canada, by year, (a) with the confirmed Walkerton

















1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Year
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Year
5.4.1.2 Number ofE. coli 0157 outbreaks, by year
A linear model is used to analyse the trend in the log transformed number of
outbreaks per year between 1996 and 2003. The analysis reveals that this trend is
statistically significant and increasing (Fi;6=14.5, p=0.01, Fig. 5.4).
Figure 5.4: Number ofE. coli 0157 outbreaks
The number ofE. coli Ol 57 outbreaks per year, with the best fit line for the model.
~i i i i r
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5.4.1.3 Number of ill cases in outbreaks, by year
The temporal trend in the number of ill cases in outbreaks cannot be appropriately
modelled when the Walkerton Outbreak cases are included (Fig. 5.5a). When the
1346 Walkerton Outbreak cases are excluded, and a GLM with a quasipoisson error
structure is used, the trend in the number of ill cases in outbreaks per year between
1996 and 2003 is not statistically significant (Fi,6=4.3, p=0.08; Fig. 5.5b).
Figure 5.5 a-b: Number of ill cases in outbreaks, with and without the Walkerton Outbreak
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5.4.1.4 Number of ill cases per outbreak
The temporal trends in the number of ill cases per outbreak cannot be appropriately
modelled when the Walkerton Outbreak is included (Fig. 5.6a). After the Walkerton
Outbreak cases are excluded, the trend can be modelled using a GLM with
quasipoisson errors, but it is not statistically significant (Fi,6=1.1, p=0.29; Fig. 5.6b).
Figure 5.6 a-b: Number of ill cases per outbreak
The number of ill cases per outbreak (a) with and (b) without the Walkerton Outbreak. The lines


























5.4.2 Number of outbreaks, by mode of transmission - overall differences
Over time, there is a statistically significant increase in the number of outbreaks per
year (see section 5.4.1.2), but there is no evidence of any statistically significant
difference between modes of transmission in the temporal trends of the number of
outbreaks (F3;24=2.4, p=0.09). However, the individual trends will still be fitted
because the trends for each mode of transmission are of interest.
5.4.2.1 Number of foodborne, person to person and waterborne outbreaks
The trends in the number of outbreaks by mode of transmission can be modelled
using a GLM with quasipoisson or Poisson errors. No statistically significant trend
exists in the number of foodbome outbreaks each year (Fis6=3.8, p=0.10; Fig. 5.7a),
but there are statistically significant increasing trends in the number of person to
person (Fi 6=9.7, p=0.02; Fig. 5.7b) and waterborne outbreaks (z=2.2, p=0.03; Fig.
5.7c). It should be noted that no waterborne outbreaks were recorded until 2000.
Figure 5.7 a-c: Number of outbreaks: foodborne (FB), person to person(PTP) &
waterborne(WB)
Trends between 1996 and 2003 in the number of outbreaks in which the mode of transmission was
(a) foodborne, (b) person to person and (c) waterbome. With the exception ofwaterborne for which













"i 1 1 1 1 1 1 r








~i i i i i i i r











1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Year
188
5.4.3 Proportion of outbreaks, by mode of transmission - overall differences
There is a statistically significant difference between modes of transmission in the
temporal trends of the proportion of outbreaks (F3,24=15.1, p<0.001). Therefore, the
individual trends will be fitted below.
5.4.3.1 Proportion of outbreaks: foodborne, person to person and waterborne
When GLMs with quasibinomial error structures are used, there is a statistically
significant decreasing trend between 1996 and 2003 in the proportion (out of
outbreaks of known mode of transmission) of outbreaks that are foodborne
(Fi>6=37.1, p<0.001; Fig. 5.8a). The trends in the proportions of outbreaks that were
person to person (Fi)6=4.4, p=0.08; Fig. 5.8b) and waterborne (Fi)6=5.5, p=0.06; Fig.
5.8c) transmission are not statistically significant.
Figure 5.8 a-c: Proportion of outbreaks: foodbornc (FB), person to person (PTP) and
waterborne (WB)
Trends in the proportion of outbreaks (out of outbreaks with a known mode of transmission), in
which the mode of transmission was (a) foodborne, (b) person to person and (c) waterbome.
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5.4.4 Number of ill outbreak cases
The differences in trends of the number of ill cases in outbreaks between modes of
transmission when the Walkerton Outbreak cases were included will not be modelled
because an adequate simple linear model cannot be found for the overall number of
ill cases (see section 5.4.1.3). However, when the Walkerton Outbreak cases are
excluded, there is a significant difference between modes of transmission in temporal
trends (F3i24=3.2, p=0.04). Thus the trends will be individually modelled.
5.4.4.1 Number of ill outbreak cases: foodborne, person to person & waterborne
The trend in the number of ill cases in foodborne and person to person outbreaks can
be adequately modelled using GLMs with quasipoisson error structures. However,
while the trends in the number of ill cases from foodborne (F| 6=0.5, p=0.50; Fig.
5.9a) and waterborne outbreaks (without Walkerton) (Fi,6=4.5, p=0.08; Fig. 5.9c) are
not statistically significant, the trend in the number of ill cases in person to person
outbreaks increases statistically significantly (Fi 14.7, p=0.01; Fig 5.9b). The
trend in the number of ill cases in waterborne outbreaks with the Walkerton outbreak
cannot be adequately modelled using simple linear models (Fig. 5.9c).
Figure 5.9 a-c: Number of ill cases in outbreaks: foodborne, person to person and waterborne
The number of ill cases in outbreaks where the mode of transmission is (a) foodborne, (b) person to
person and (c) waterborne. In plot c, the bright red dot and line indicate the plot if the Wishaw
Outbreak cases are included
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5.4.5 Proportion of ill cases in outbreaks, by modes of transmission
When the cases from the Walkerton Outbreak are excluded, there is a statistically
significant difference between modes of transmission in the trends in the proportion
of outbreaks (with known modes of transmission) (F3 24=17.9, p<0.001). Therefore
the individual trends are modelled separately.
5.4.5.1 Proportion of ill outbreak cases: foodborne, person to person &
waterborne
When the cases from the Walkerton Outbreak are excluded, the trends for the
proportion of ill cases from both foodborne (Fi;6=32.0, p=0.001; Fig. 5.10a) and
person to person (Fi;6=~9.9, p=0.02; Fig. 5.10b) outbreaks are statistically significant.
However, the trend in the proportion of ill cases that are waterborne is not significant
(Fi;6=1.5, p=0.27, Fig. 5.10c).
Figure 5.10 a-c: Proportion of ill outbreak cases: foodborne, person to person & waterborne
The proportion of ill cases from outbreaks of known mode of transmission where the mode of
transmission was (a) food, (b) person to person and (c) waterborne. The light red dots and lines
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In Canada, analysis of temporal trends in E. coli 0157 outbreaks, either descriptively
or statistically, has been limited. Woodward and colleagues provide a listing of
major outbreaks between 1985 and 2000 in their overview ofE. coli 0157 in Canada
(Woodward et al. 2002), however any in depth analysis of outbreaks has been
hampered by a lack of a nationally representative, systematically collected and
validated outbreak data set. Summary tables and listings of outbreaks in 1994 and
1995 were published in 2000 by Health Canada and a report on outbreaks in 1997
and 1998 was issued in 1999, but the latter did not provide a line listing of outbreaks
(Tinga et al. 2006). The National Microbiology Laboratory has issued yearly reports
on confirmed cases of enteric diseases, available online since 1999 (National
Laboratory for Enteric Pathogens 2002; National Laboratory for Enteric Pathogens
2006). These reports include outbreak listings, however the reports state that the lists
are not complete, in some years may include case clusters which are not
epidemiologically linked and the listings do not include data on the number of ill
cases or specifically indicate the mode of transmission (National Laboratory for
Enteric Pathogens 2002; National Laboratory for Enteric Pathogens 2006). In
addition, only a descriptive summary of the data is provided. The new national
outbreak data set has been collated and summarised in an internal report by Tinga
and colleagues in 2006 (Tinga et al. 2006), but the report provides only outbreak
counts for individual pathogens and analyses of putative modes of transmission and
outbreak summaries are broken down by overall pathogen type and not by pathogen.
Though national case rates have decreased in recent years, rates have remained over
3 per 100,000 and over 5 per 100,000 in some provinces (Public Health Agency of
Canada 2006) and outbreaks, at least two in the past year relating to meat products
(Honish et al. 2007; Winnipeg Regional Health Authority 2007), are still reported.
Given the continuing role ofE. coli Ol 57 as a clinically significant enteric pathogen,
research into temporal trends is of importance to:
• determine whether trends in overall case numbers are reflected in
outbreak trends
• indicate whether current preventative measures may be having an effect
on case and outbreak trends and
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• suggest which future directions in prevention and research might be most
appropriate.
The new availability from PHAC of a pan-Canadian database is a first step towards
making such analyses possible. The purpose of the chapter is therefore to determine
whether temporal trends in Canadian E. coli 0157 cases and outbreaks can be
modelled using simple generalised linear models and if so, which of the trends are
statistically significant.
Despite using the same methods and materials as with Scotland (Chapter 3) and the
United States (Chapter 4), the Canadian data involved the greatest challenges with
regards to analysis because of the nature of the recently compiled PHAC data set.
The data set is acknowledged to be incomplete (Tinga et al. 2006), with only four
provinces providing data for the entire period (1996 - 2003). Additionally, some
outbreaks that are summarised in peer-reviewed journals are not included in the data
set. Also neither a consistently used outbreak definition, nor a standard outbreak
reporting form existed at the time of data collection. Thus, the exact data collected -
in terms of variables and variable definitions - varied between and within provinces,
and so required extensive work by PHAC researchers, and further work in this thesis
to classify the data using post-hoc standard definitions. As detailed in section
5.2.2.1, the data set has been adjusted/recoded to best conform to definitions that are
compatible with the data collected from the United States and Scotland and to
include outbreaks detailed in the peer-reviewed literature, but not included in the
original data set. Information from the National Laboratory for Enteric Pathogens
reports was not included because data was only provided on laboratory confirmed
cases.
Since it was known for which years each province provided data (Tinga et al. 2006),
it was possible to determine whether these omissions might have had a significant
impact on the results of the analyses. Much of the missing data was from provinces
or territories where very small numbers of total VTEC cases were reported to PHAC
through the NND database. Thus, the only missing data that was likely to have
statistically significant effects on analyses was that of three provinces from which
large numbers of cases were reported, and from which three or more years of data
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were missing. The potential effect of this missing data was examined by running
additional analyses of some variables with the data from each of the three provinces
omitted in turn and then with the data from all three provinces omitted (not shown).
The lack of a standardised reporting form also may have impacted the determination
of mode of transmission because the selection of mode by public health official could
have been influenced by the options provided. Also, no information was given about
the strength of evidence linking the putative mode of transmissions to outbreaks. For
instance, in one provincial database there was no option for either waterborne or
foodborne when entering mode of transmission (Tinga et al. 2005). Recoding of
data by PHAC attempted to address this issue by basing the determination of mode
of transmission on all available data. However in situations where mode was
ambiguous or not given, the mode of transmission had to be coded as 'unknown',
which may have, in part, accounted for nearly a third of the outbreaks having mode
of transmission listed as unknown. Again, where mode of transmission was provided,
its validity was rarely substantiated and the investigator's level of certainty was not
known.
While the notifiable disease data on total VTEC cases has been collected since 1990
in a standardised fashion, it still presented challenges because data are not subdivided
by VTEC serotype in the Notifiable Diseases Online system (Public Health Agency
of Canada 2006). Also the outbreak cases reported to this system likely varied from
the outbreak cases captured in the outbreak database, as suggested by the differences
in the outbreaks listed in the dataset provided for this thesis (Tinga et al. 2006) and
the yearly summaries by the National Laboratory for Enteric Pathogens (National
Laboratory for Enteric Pathogens 2002). Thus it is not considered appropriate to use
the data to determine the number of sporadic cases or the proportion of cases that
came from outbreaks. However, the data is still considered to be sufficient as an
approximation of the total number ofE. coli 0157 cases because non-0157 serotype
cases comprise less than 5% of the total (Woodward et al. 2002).
5.5.1 Discussion of statistical analyses
For all analyses involving the number or proportion of ill cases, overall or by mode
of transmission, the Walkerton Outbreak may have been an outlier as appropriate
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simple linear models could not be constructed when the cases were included. With
174 laboratory confirmed cases, the Walkerton Outbreak was larger than all but one
other outbreak in the data sets analysed in Chapters 2 - 5; the outbreak is only
disproportionately large in terms of ill cases. However, the large number of ill cases
is attributable, in part, to large number of infections from other organisms during the
Walkerton Outbreak, including 97 confirmed Campylobacter cases (O'Connor 2002),
and 20 confirmed cases from other pathogens. The presence of these confirmed
cases of infection by other organisms suggests that there are likely to be non-
confirmed, non- E. coli 0157 cases amongst the number of ill cases. Thus, the
outbreak's true influence could be much better ascertained in analyses based on the
number of ill and positive cases. However, such analyses were not possible because
data on the number of ill and positive cases was missing for 12 of the 104 outbreaks
in the data set. In particular, since nine of these outbreaks took place between 1997
and 1999 inclusive, analyses of trends in the number of ill and positive cases may not
be accurate prior to 2000, the year when the Walkerton Outbreak occurred.
Alternatively, a more accurate value for the number of ill cases might be ascertained
based on knowledge about the average size of waterborne outbreaks for both E. coli
0157 and Campylobacter and/or the average ratio of ill to ill and positive cases in E.
coli 0157 outbreaks. As there have been no other large waterborne outbreaks
reported in Canada, the best comparisons are with outbreaks in the United States.
The outbreak in Cabool, Missouri (Swerdlow et al. 1992), also the result of
contaminated municipal water supply, and the Washington County Outbreak in New
York (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 1999a), in which a fairground
water supply became contaminated, both involved large numbers of ill cases where
only a portion of cases were ever tested for infection. The latter outbreak also
involved a number of Campylobacter cases. In Cabool, where no other pathogen
was isolated, E. coli 0157 was isolated from approximately 60% ofpatients tested -
19 of 25 with bloody diarrhoea and 2 of 7 with non-bloody diarrhoea. These figures
could potentially be used to estimate the number of ill cases with E. coli 0157
infection in Walkerton based on the known number of cases tested, the percentage
positive and the distribution of symptoms ifmore information was available about
the symptoms of the ill persons associated with the Walkerton Outbreak.
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The total number of reported E. coli 0157 cases per year in Canada appears to have
peaked in 1989 (Woodward et al. 2002), with the number reported to have decreased
in recent years (Sockett et al. 2006). The results from this study, however, do not
reveal a statistically significant trend away from no change in the number of total
VTEC cases. Yet, while trends in the number of ill cases from outbreaks and the
number of ill cases per outbreak were not statistically significant, there was a
significant increase in the number ofE. coli 0157 outbreaks reported between 1996
and 2003. Caution must be taken in interpreting the analysis of the number of
outbreaks because, though excluding any one of the three provinces discussed above
as having potentially important missing data does not make a significant difference,
excluding all three provinces results in the trend in the number of outbreaks being
non statistically significant. This suggests that the increasing trend may, in part, be
caused by the greater amount ofmissing data in the earlier part of the time period
covered in the data set. Additionally, there appears to be an increase in the number
of ill cases (excluding Walkerton), but the simulations in Chapter 2.3.5.2 suggest that
that there may not have been enough power to detect a statistically significant trend.
There is no overall statistically significant difference in the trend in number of
outbreaks between modes of transmission, though there are statistically significant
increases over time in the numbers of outbreaks spread person to person and by
water. The trends in the proportion of outbreaks did vary statistically significantly
between outbreaks, with there being a statistically significant decline in the
proportion of outbreaks that were foodborne. However, the statistical and
epidemiological significance of these trends should be interpreted with caution
because the trends may be statistically significantly affected by the data that is
known to be missing, particularly from the earlier section of the data set time period.
Though a statistically significant trend does not exist in the number of ill cases from
outbreaks (without Walkerton), there is a statistically significant difference in trends
in the number of ill cases between modes of transmission. While trends in the
number of foodborne and waterborne outbreaks show no statistical significance,
there has been a statistically significant increase over time in the number of ill cases
from outbreaks where the predominant mode of transmission was person to person
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contact. There is also a shift in the proportions of outbreak ill cases, with an increase
in the proportion of ill cases coming from person to person outbreaks and a decrease
in the proportion from foodborne outbreaks, both statistically significant.
If these changes in predominant outbreak mode of transmission reflect actual case
numbers and not reporting artefacts (e.g. incomplete reporting), it could reflect a true
shift in outbreak epidemiology from outbreaks being primarily spread via food to
outbreaks being predominantly spread via water and person to person contact, and/or
an increasing thoroughness in outbreak investigations. In Scotland the importance of
non-foodborne modes of transmission has been recognized, with a listing of
outbreaks between 1994 and 2003 appearing to show a shift away from food being a
predominant factor in outbreaks (Strachan et al. 2006). In Canada, the data seem to
suggest that such a shift may also have taken place, since as per the data set, only one
person to person outbreak was reported prior to 2000, the first waterborne outbreak
was reported in 2000 and the first outbreak involving animal or environmental
contact was not reported until 2001. Studies have also established a positive
association between cattle density and human infection in parts of Canada (Michel et
al. 1999; Valcour et al. 2002), with routes of infection related to cattle including well
water contamination (O'Connor 2002) and direct contact, with the potential for
further person to person spread (Wilson et al. 1997).
However, the lack of outbreaks attributed to person to person, waterborne and
animal/environmental spread prior to 2000 (with the one exception) and the resulting
statistically significant trends, may be linked to biases within data collecting. Firstly,
E. coli 0157 outbreaks in Canada have been long associated with minced beef
(Todd 2000), but only more recently linked to animal contact and other food items
(Woodward et al. 2002). Thus earlier outbreak investigations may have been more
likely to have focused on foodbome modes of transmission. The trends may also be
linked to the Targe proportion' ofmissing data or missing values in the data set
(Tinga et al. 2006). With approximately a third of outbreaks having an unknown
mode of transmission, real trends may be masked by the lack, or ambiguity, of
information which resulted from surveillance systems which used variables that did
not effectively capture data about mode of transmission in outbreaks involving
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pathogens like E. coli 0157. In one province, the possible values for mode of
transmission included neither food nor water. Instead, options such as
'animal/person', 'faecal-oral', 'indirect' and 'droplet' (Tinga et al. 2005) were used.
These options do not provide enough information to properly classify transmission in
terms generally used in regards to gastrointestinal outbreaks, such as foodborne,
person to person and waterborne. Since outbreaks where the information on mode of
transmission was not clear have to be recoded as unknown, the number of unknown
outbreaks is likely to have been overestimated. Such an example illustrates why it is
vital to have surveillance systems and/or database variables that are suited to the
infection or illness involved, and which use variables and values that can adequately
capture information for future reference, and where data collection methods are
explicit, rigorous, systematic and where the resultant information can be validated.
In addition, the reported modes of transmission may also reflect the trends in the
particular provinces/territories which provided data rather than the entire country,
over the time period of the study. For instance, since there was more missing data in
the first half of the study period, in particular from provinces with high rates of
infection as per the data on the reported confirmed cases from the Notifiable
Diseases Online database, the trends seen in this chapter may reflect best the trends
in province/territories with lower rates of infection and/or provinces/territories that
provided more complete information.
5.5.2 Conclusions
Overall the analyses suggest that in Canada there may have been an increase in the
number ofE. coli 0157 outbreaks, accompanied by the emergence of non-foodborne
outbreaks (i.e. waterborne, person to person), as reflected in both case and outbreak
numbers and proportions. If these results are true, this may suggest that current
prevention efforts (personal communication, Carole Tinga, 2007) may not be
effectively targeting outbreaks spread by non-foodborne means. However, given that
only five provinces provided data for every year in the study period, and outbreak
listings in other sources (National Laboratory for Enteric Pathogens 2002) suggest
that even this data is not complete, these results need to be interpreted with caution.
It is hoped that the publication by PHAC of a national enteric disease outbreak
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summary, assembled using data from the current data set and other sources, the
introduction of a web-based outbreak summary data (which will provide a consistent
format in which to record outcomes of outbreak investigations), as well the results of
this study, will encourage both a renewed effort to build a standardised,
comprehensive prospective national enteric outbreak summary system as outlined by
Tinga et al. (Tinga et al. 2006).
Having now analysed the individual trends in E. coli 0157 cases and outbreaks for
Scotland, United States and Canada, the next chapter will go on to compare data and
trends across countries in order to determine whether statistically significant
differences in trends occur between countries.
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Chapter 6 — Comparison of Temporal Trends in E. coli
0157: Scotland, United States and Canada
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6.1 Introduction
Having now analysed the temporal trends in E. coli 0157 within each of the three
countries included in this section of the thesis (Scotland, Canada and the United
States), the focus will now shift back to the concept of comparison between
countries. As introduced in the Prospectus and in Chapter 2, the goal of the first
section of this thesis is to determine whether or not there are significant differences
in temporal trends between countries. The presence or absence of statistically
significant differences in trends could suggest as to the underlying factors that
influence E. coli 0157 epidemiology. For instance, a lack ofmany statistically
significant differences might suggest that E. coli 0157 epidemiology is primarily
influenced by factors that are similar across countries.
Though there have a been a few between-country statistical comparisons of temporal
trends in diseases such as cancer (Venzon & Moolgavkar 1984), gonorrhoea (Van
der Heyden et al. 2000) and childhood diabetes (EURODIAB ACE Study Group
2000), no such statistical analysis has ever been done involving E. coli 0157. To
date, the only comparisons ofE. coli 0157 across countries have been purely
descriptive. In 1994, Waters and colleagues published a broad overview ofE. coli
0157 in Scotland and Alberta from 1987 to 1991 (Waters et al. 1994). In the paper,
comparisons were made on a purely descriptive basis with the authors highlighting a
number of similarities between the two countries. Reports from the EnterNet
Salmonella and E. coli Ol 57 surveillance network have included tables of data from
member countries, but as of yet, no statistical comparisons have been published
(European Commission 2006; European Commission 2007).
As discussed in Chapter 2, the lack of comparisons between countries is likely to
caution in regards to comparing data collected via different surveillance systems.
However, with the onset of improved and/or enhanced surveillance programs across
Scotland, Canada and United States in the last decade, it seems appropriate for a
comparison to now be attempted. Thus, in this chapter, the temporal trends in
variables for which appropriate models could be found for Scotland (Chapter 3),
United States (Chapter 4) and Canada (Chapter 5) will be now be statistically
compared. The results of these analyses will be presented, along with a discussion of
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the issues involved in comparing data from different countries and how these issues
affect the interpretation of the results.
6.2 Materials and methods
6.2.1 Data sets
The final total case and outbreak data sets used in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 will be
compared, with data from 1996 to 2004 used for Scotland, 1998 to 2004 for United
States and 1996 to 2003 for Canada. 1996 and 1997 data from the United States was
omitted due to a major change in reporting procedures, as detailed in section 4.2.1.2.
See sections 3.2.1, 4.2.1 and 5.2.1 for detailed descriptions of the data sets.
6.2.2 Variables
Variables for the analyses are selected based on the appropriateness of comparison
between Scotland, the United States and Canada. As listed in fable 6.1, the
variables which will be compared are:
• number of total confirmed cases
• number of ill cases per outbreak
• number of outbreaks
• number of ill cases.
The number of ill cases and outbreaks will be examined both overall and by mode of
transmission (again, as with the individual analyses, mode of transmission was based
on the data provided. The strength of the evidence linking the putative mode of
transmission to the outbreak is not always known). Also compared were the
proportions of outbreaks and ill cases from outbreaks with a known mode of
transmission which are foodborne, waterborne and person to person.
For the total number of confirmed cases (outbreak and sporadic)(Table 5.1), data is
taken from the HPS data set (Scotland), NNDSS data set (United States) and the
PHAC data set (Canada). For Canada, the non-confirmed cases from the Walkerton
Outbreak are omitted prior to any analysis. The Scottish and United States data sets
include only confirmed 0157 cases, while the Canadian data set is known to contain
a small percentage (~3%) of non-0157 VTEC cases (Health Canada 2000b; Sockett
et al. 2006; Woodward et al. 2002).
202
Data for the total numbers of outbreaks (Table 6.1) are taken from the respective
outbreak data sets provided by each country and detailed in sections 3.2.1, 4.2.1 and
5.2.1. Outbreak case number data - yearly case totals and cases per outbreak - are
analysed only in terms of the number of ill cases because of the large number of
missing values for the number of ill and positive case variable in both the United
States (29 out of 310) and Canadian data sets (12 out of 104).
In analyses involving (putative) mode of transmission (Table 6.1), comparisons are
carried out between the three main modes of transmission as categorised in Chapters
2, 3, 4 and 5: foodborne, waterborne and person to person. Outbreaks spread by
animal or environmental means were not compared due to the low number of
outbreaks spread by animal/environmental means in Canada (3 out of 104) and the
lack of appropriate models for the trends in Scotland.
In contrast to Scotland where outbreaks can be categorised as 'multiple modes
including (or excluding) foodborne', in the United States and Canada, there is no
separate category for outbreaks with co-dominant modes of transmission. However
since descriptions of outbreaks categorised as 'foodborne' do occasionally refer to
other modes of transmission (and the strength of evidence for mode of transmission
designation is not known), the mode of transmission category 'foodborne' would
appear to be less specific in the United States and Canada than in Scotland. In order
to account for this difference in categorisation, Scottish outbreaks designated as
either foodborne or multiple including foodborne are combined into one category,
referred to previously in Chapter 3 as 'foodborne element' and referred to in this
chapter as simply 'foodborne'.
Outbreaks in the Scottish data set, which are categorised as 'multiple modes
excluding foodborne', indicating that transmission has taken place through two or
more co-dominant non-foodborne modes, are omitted from the mode of transmission
analyses. These outbreaks are excluded because the category 'multiple excluding
foodborne' does not exist in the American or Canadian data sets, and not enough
information on non-foodborne outbreaks in the U.S. and Canada is included in the
data sets to determine which, if any, would have met the criteria for 'multiple modes,
not including foodborne'.
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All analyses involving case numbers are carried out excluding the cases from the
large outbreaks (Wishaw Outbreak in Scotland, Washington County and Layton
Avenue Sizzler Outbreaks in the United States and the Walkerton Outbreak in
Canada) because the analyses in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 suggest that these outbreaks
may be outliers in terms of case numbers, and thus the data may be best analysed
with these outbreaks omitted.
For each country, the geometric mean number of ill cases per outbreak and the
geometric mean number of total confirmed cases (without the large outbreaks) and
outbreaks per year are calculated using R (R Development Core Team 2007). 95%
confidence intervals for the geometric means are calculated using a function written
for R. ANOVA analyses are used to test for overall statistically significant
differences between countries in the log-transformed data. Where the overall
difference is statistically significant, pair-wise comparisons between countries are
performed using contrasts. The mean numbers per year of ill cases from outbreaks
(overall, foodborne, waterborne and person to person) are calculated for each
country. Also calculated are the mean proportions of both ill cases and outbreaks
(from outbreaks with a known mode of transmission) that are foodborne, waterborne
and person to person. Calculations are done using the GENMOD procedure in SAS
v9.1 (SAS Institute Inc. 2003). The GENMOD procedure is also used to compare
the means between countries using a GLM with a log link and Poisson or Binomial
error structure.
For each of the above variables, the geometric mean or means are calculated for the
rate per 100,000 persons per year, rates being calculated by dividing the variable by
the 2003 population (see Table 2.1) rounded to the closest 10,000. The geometric
means or means are compared between countries as specified above.
Additionally, the data is presented by country in terms of the overall proportions of
both total cases and total outbreaks spread by each mode of transmission during the
entire study period. For each mode of transmission, the proportion of total outbreaks
and cases are compared overall between countries by using the R function prop.test
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(The R Project 2007) which, in this instance, uses a Chi-squared test with a 2 by 3
contingency table to test the null hypothesis that the probabilities of success in two or
more groups are the same (Armitage et al. 2002). Where there is overall statistical
significance (p<0.05), the prop.test function is used to compare proportions between
countries.
6.2.3.2 Correlation
For each country in the study (Scotland, United States and Canada), the number of ill
cases and ill and positive cases for each outbreak are plotted against each other.
Outbreaks for which the number of ill and positive cases is not known are excluded
from the analyses. The correlation between the two variables is compared using a
correlation test with Kendall's tau. Kendall's tau was selected because a non-
parametric test that was distribution free (Armitage et al. 2002) was required due to
non-normal distributions of the number of ill cases and the number of ill and positive
cases. Stats Direct (StatsDirect Ltd. 2007) was used for calculations of Kendall's tau
and the corresponding 95% confidence intervals.
6.2.3.3 Trends
Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) analyses, which combines regression and
analysis of variance (Crawley 2005), are used to test for statistically significant
differences between countries in the temporal trends in the variables mentioned in
section 6.2.2. If there is a statistically significant interaction between the time and
country explanatory variables in the ANCOVA, a statistically significant difference
in temporal trends between countries is considered to exist. In addition, differences
between countries and modes of transmission in the trends are tested for by including
a mode of transmission variable and looking for three way interaction between time,
country and mode of transmission. However, tests with three way interactions were
only used for trends in the proportion of outbreaks or ill cases from outbreaks. Three
way tests were not used in the analyses of trends in the number of outbreaks or ill
cases from outbreaks because not all modes of transmission were considered in these
analyses due to low counts. Thus it would not be appropriate to compare trends
between all modes of transmission.
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Two separate data sets are used for the ANCOVA models. The first, which is used
for comparing the number of ill cases per outbreak, contains an entry for each
outbreak with variables for country, mode of transmission, year and number ill. The
second data set is used for comparison of trends involving the numbers or
proportions of total confirmed cases, ill cases and outbreaks. It includes a separate
entry for the number or proportion of outbreaks or ill cases for each country for each
of four modes of transmission (food, water, person to person and
animal/environmental) for each year. Years in which data was not available or
omitted from previous analyses - 1996 and 1997 for the United States and 2004 for
Canada - are not included in the data set for the analyses.
For the ANCOVA, year and country - and mode of transmission when appropriate -
were entered as explanatory variables along with the interaction between the two
variables, using the following log-linear model (number of outbreaks used as
example):
Number of Outbreaks = exp(a;+bj * Year) where i is different for each country
Rcode: Model <- glm(Outbreaks~ Year + Country + Year*Country, family=quasipoisson,
data=....), where * indicates interaction between the two variables
If the p value for F was less than 0.05, contrasts were used to look for significant
difference in temporal trends between countries.
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6.3 Results
6.3.1 Descriptive analyses - overall
The geometric mean number of ill cases per outbreak is 4.90 (95% CI = 4.02, 5.97)
in Scotland, 8.5 (95% CI =7.48, 9.54) in the United States [1998 - 2004], and 5.71
(95% CI=4.69, 6.95) in Canada (Fig. 6.1). There is a statistically significant
difference between countries in the geometric mean number of ill cases per outbreak
(F2,482=8.5, pcO.OOl). While there is not a statistically significant difference in the
geometric mean number of ill cases per outbreak between Scotland and Canada
(t=0.82, p=0.416), outbreaks in the United States have a statistically significantly
higher geometric mean number of ill cases per outbreak than those in Scotland
(t=3.46, p<0.001) and Canada (t=2.91, p=0.004).
Figure 6.1: Geometric mean ill cases per outbreak, by country
The geometric mean number of ill cases per outbreak (Ob) for each country. The vertical bars




















When the outbreaks for which the mode of transmission is not known are excluded,
Scotland has a statistically significantly lower proportion of outbreaks during the
time period being studied that are foodbome than either the United States or Canada
(p<0.004; Fig. 6.2), but there are no overall statistically significant differences
between the countries in the proportions of outbreaks that are waterbome or person
to person (p>0.05; Fig. 6.2)
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Figure 6.2: Proportion of total outbreaks by mode of transmission and country
The proportion of total outbreaks (with a known mode of transmission) spread by foodborne,
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Mode of Transmission - Country
There is a statistically significant difference in the proportions of ill cases in all
modes of transmission (p<0.001; Fig. 6.3) between the three countries.
Figure 6.3: Proportion of total ill cases by mode of transmission and country
The proportion of total ill cases (with a known mode of transmission) spread by foodborne,
waterborne and person to person (PTP) transmission by country with the large outbreaks from each

























Mode of Transmission - Country
Compared to Canada and the United States, Scotland has a statistically significantly
lower proportion of ill cases from outbreaks that are foodbome (p<0.001; Fig. 6.3),
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but a statistically significantly higher proportion that are waterborne and person to
person (p<0.003; Fig. 6.3). Similarly, in comparison to the other two countries,
Canada has a statistically significantly higher proportion of ill cases from outbreaks
that are foodborne (p<0.001; Fig. 6.3), and a statistically significantly lower
proportion of ill cases outbreaks that are waterborne and person to person (except the
United States) (p<0.004; Fig. 6.3).
6.3.2 Descriptive analyses - by year
If the large outbreaks are excluded, Scotland has the lowest geometric mean total
confirmed cases per year and the United States, the highest, with the differences
between countries in the geometric means all statistically significant (p<0.001; Fig.
6.4a). However, the United States has a statistically significantly lower geometric
mean rate per 100,000 people of total confirmed cases (1.1, 95% CI =0.96, 1.3) than
either Scotland (4.6, 3.7 to 5.7) or Canada (4.1, 3.6 to 4.7) (p<0.001).
Figure 6.4 a-b: Geometric mean number of (a)total confirmed cases and (b) outbreaks
The geometric mean number of (a) Total confirmed cases excluding the large outbreaks and (b)
Outbreaks. Black bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals,
a b
Scotland United States Canada Scotland United States Canada
Country Country
The United States has a statistically significantly higher geometric mean number of
outbreaks than either Scotland or Canada (p<0.001; Fig. 6.4b). Scotland though, has
a statistically significantly higher mean rate of outbreaks (0.14, 0.10 to 0.21) than
either Canada (0.03, 0.02 to 0.06) or the United States (0.02, 0.01 to 0.02)(see Table
6.2). The geometric mean number of outbreaks per year in Canada is likely to be
higher than shown here because data was missing from at least one province
and/territory for each year of the time period.
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There are statistically significant differences in the mean numbers of foodbome
outbreaks (see Table 6.2) between all three countries (p<0.007; Fig. 6.5a). For
person to person outbreaks, a statistically significantly difference in the means exists
between the United States and both Scotland and Canada (p<0.0001; Fig. 6.5b).
Similarly, a statistically significantly difference between mean numbers of
waterborne outbreaks (see Table 6.2) exists only between the United States and both
Canada and Scotland (p<0.018; Fig. 6.5c). Scotland has the highest mean rate of
outbreaks for all three modes of transmission, followed by Canada and then the
United States, but none of the differences are statistically significant (p>0.05).
Figure 6.5 a-c: Mean numbers of foodborne (FB), person to person (PTP) and waterborne
(WB) outbreaks per year in Scotland, United States and Canada
The mean numbers of (a) foodborne, (b) person to person and (c) waterborne outbreaks per year in
Scotland, the United States and Canada
Scotland
When only outbreaks with a known mode of transmission are considered, the mean
proportion of Scottish outbreaks that are foodborne (see Table 6.2) is statistically
significantly lower than that in the United States or Canada (p<0.003: Fig. 6.6a). For
the proportion of outbreaks that are person to person and waterbome, no statistically
significant differences in mean proportions exist between countries (Fig. 6.6b, c).
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Figure 6.6 a-b: Mean proportion of yearly outbreaks that are foodborne and waterborne
The mean yearly proportion of outbreaks with a known mode of transmission that are (a) foodborne








There are statistically significant differences in the mean number of ill cases per year
between all three countries (p<0.001; Fig. 6.7a), but no statistically significant
difference in the mean rate of ill cases (p=0.053). The mean number of ill cases per
year from foodbome outbreaks was also statistically significantly different between
the countries (p<0.001; Fig. 6.7b). For ill cases from person to person and
waterborne outbreaks, the mean number in the United States is statistically
significantly different from the means in both Canada and Scotland (p<0.001; Fig.
6.7c,d). When the mean rate of ill cases per year is considered for foodborne,
waterborne and person to person outbreaks, there are no statistically significant
differences between countries (p>0.05).
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Figure 6.7 a-d: The mean number of ill cases from outbreaks - overall, foodborne (FB),
person to person (PTP) and waterborne (WB)
The mean number of ill cases from (a) all outbreaks, (b) foodbome outbreaks, (c) person to person
outbreaks and (d) waterborne outbreaks, all with the large outbreak cases excluded. The black lines










The mean proportions of ill cases from foodbome outbreaks are all statistically
significantly different from each other (p<0.001; Fig.6.8a), while the mean
proportions of ill cases from person to person and waterbome outbreaks in Scotland
are significantly higher than that in Canada or the United States (p<0.004: Fig.
6.8b,c).
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Figure 6.8 a-c: Mean proportion per year of ill cases from outbreaks — foodborne, person to
person and waterborne
The mean proportion of ill cases from (a) foodborne, (b) person to person and (c) waterborne





































































































































































































































































































































































When the correlation between the number of ill and ill and positive cases per
outbreak was calculated using Kendall's Tau Test, for Scotland tau=0.756, for
United States tau= 0.661 and for Canada tau=0.667(Table 6.3; Fig. 6.9).
Table 6.3: Coefficients (Kendall's Tau) for the correlation between the number of ill and ill and
positive cases per outbreak
Kendall's Tau for the correlation between the number of ill cases and ill and positive cases per
outbreak. 95% confidence intervals are indicated in brackets. Only outbreaks for which both the
Country Kendall's Tau
Scotland 0.756 (0.657, 0.855) (n=70)
United States 0.661 (0.607, 0.716) (n=279)
Canada 0.658 (0.546, 0.770) (n=91)
Figure 6.9 a-c: Plots of the number of ill cases against the number of ill and positive cases per
outbreak
Plots of the number of ill cases per outbreak against the number of ill and positive cases per outbreak
for (a) Scotland 1996 - 2004, (b) United States 1998-2004 and (c) Canada 1996-2003. The large
outbreaks are omitted, and the dotted line indicates y=x.
a
0 20 40 60 80 0 20 40 60 80 0 50 100 150
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6.3.4 Trend analyses
6.3.4.1 Total confirmed cases
When the trends in the log transformed number of total confirmed cases from 1996
to 2004 in Scotland, 1998 to 2004 in the United States and 1996 to 2003 in Canada
are compared, there is not a statistically significant difference between the countries
in the slopes (F2,is=0.6, p=0.560; Fig. 6.10) .
Figure 6.10: The number of total confirmed cases by country
The number of total confirmed cases by country. Scotland is indicated by blue squares, United
States by green triangles and Canada by red circles. The Canadian data is for all VTEC, the rest for
E. coli 0157 only.
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6.3.4.2 Number of total outbreaks
Overall
In contrast, there is a statistically significant difference between the three countries in
the trends of the log transformed number of outbreaks (F2,i8=5.5, p=0.014; Fig. 6.11),
with only the trends in Canada and the United States differing statistically
significantly (p=0.004). The Canadian trend increases statistically significantly,
while the trends in the United States and Scotland do not.
Figure 6.11 a-b: The number of total outbreaks by country
The number of outbreaks by country. Scotland is indicated by blue squares, United States by green
triangles and Canada by red circles. The Canadian data is for VTEC, the rest for only E. coli 0157.
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By mode of transmission
If the outbreaks are analysed by mode of transmission, there is a statistically
significant difference between countries in the slopes of the trends in the number of
foodbome outbreaks (F2,ig=5.8, p=0.011; Fig. 6.12a), with Canada having a
statistically significant different trend slopes from the United States and Scotland
(p<0.013). Though none of the slopes are individually statistically significant, the
Canadian trend would appear to be increasing, whilst the American and Scottish
trends appear to be decreasing. When trends in person to person outbreaks are
examined, there is not a statistically significant difference between countries in the
trend slopes (F2,i8=1.2, p=0.337; Fig. 6.12b). The slopes for the trends in the number
of waterborne outbreaks do vary statistically significantly between countries
(F2,18=8.4, p=0.003; Fig. 6.12c). It is not unexpected that both Canada and the
United States have statistically significantly different slopes from Scotland (p<0.012)
because while the Scottish trend is not statistically significant, the American trend is
significantly increasing and the Canadian trend significantly decreasing.
Figure 6.12 a-c: The number of total outbreaks by country and mode of transmission
The number of (a) foodbome, (b) person to person and (c) waterbome outbreaks in Scotland, the
United States and Canada. Scotland is indicated by blue squares, United States by green triangles
and Canada by red circles.
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6.3.4.3 Proportions of outbreaks - by mode of transmission
When outbreaks of a known mode of transmission are considered, there is a
statistically significant difference overall between countries in the slopes of the
trends of the proportion of outbreaks that are different modes of transmission
(F6,72=4.1, p=0.001).
Figure 6.13 a-c: The number of total outbreaks by country and mode of transmission
The proportion of outbreaks with a known mode of transmission that are (a) foodborne, (b) person
to person and (c) waterborne in Scotland, the United States and Canada. Scotland is indicated by
blue squares, United States by green triangles and Canada by red circles.
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The slopes of the trends in the proportion of outbreaks that were foodborne and
waterborne differ statistically significantly between countries (p<0.006; Fig. 6.13 a,c)
and in both instances, the slope of the trend in the United States is statistically
significantly different from the slopes in the other two countries (p<0.015). Scotland
and Canada both have significantly decreasing trends in the proportion of outbreaks
that are foodborne. However the trend in the trend in the United States is not
statistically significant. The opposite is true for waterborne outbreaks: there has been
a statistically significant decline in the proportion of outbreaks that are waterbome in
the United States, with no significant trend in the other two countries. The trends in
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the proportion of outbreaks that were person to person were not compared because
no appropriate simple linear model was found for Scotland (Fig. 6.13b).
6.3.4.4 Number of ill cases
Overall
When the cases from the large outbreaks are excluded, the overall difference in the
trend slopes is statistically significant (F2,i8-5.4, p=0.015; Fig. 6.14), with a
statistically significant difference between the United States and Canada (p=0.005).
As illustrated in Figure 6.14, there is a statistically significant decline the number of
ill cases in the United States, while the trends in Canada and Scotland do not change
statistically significantly between 1996 and 2003/2004.
Figure 6.14: The number of ill cases from outbreaks by country
The number of ill cases from outbreaks by country without the cases from the large outbreaks.
























By mode of transmission
For the trends in ill cases from foodbome and person to person outbreaks, the slopes
do not vary statistically significantly between counties (F2,i8>2.5, p>0.080; Fig.
6.15a,c). For ill cases from waterborne outbreaks, there is a statistically significant
difference between countries in trend slopes (F2,i8=13.2, p<0.001; Fig. 6.15b). The
slope of the United States trend is statistically significantly different from that in the
other two countries, as it decreases statistically significantly in contrast to the non¬
significant (flat) trends in Canada and Scotland.
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Figure 6.15 a-c: The number of ill cases from outbreaks by country and mode of transmission
The number of ill cases from outbreaks by country where the mode of transmission is (a) foodborne,
(b) waterbome and (c) person to person.
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6.3.4.5 Proportion of ill cases - by mode of transmission
No statistically significant difference exist in the slopes of the trends in the
proportion of outbreak ill cases that are spread via food (p>0.099; 6.16a), but there is
a statistically significant difference in the slopes of the trends in the proportions of ill
cases that were waterborne (F2,i8=12.5, p<0.001; 6.16b ). Again, the slope of the
American trend, which decreased statistically significantly, was statistically
significantly different from the non-significant trends in the other two countries
(p<0.013). The trends in the proportion of ill cases from person to person outbreaks
can not be compared because no adequate simple linear model could be constructed
for the Scottish data.
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Figure 6.16 a-b: The proportion of ill cases from outbreaks by country and mode of
transmission
The proportion of ill cases from outbreaks with a known mode of transmission by country where the
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6.3.4.6 Number of ill cases per outbreak
There is not a statistically significant difference between countries in the slopes of
the trends in the number of ill cases per outbreak (p=0.488; Fig. 6.17a). The same
result is seen when the trends in the number of ill cases per foodborne outbreak are
examined: there is not an overall statistically significant difference between countries
in the slopes (p=0.517; Fig. 6.17b).
Figure 6.17 a-b: The number of ill cases per outbreak by country, overall and foodborne
The number of ill cases per outbreak by country, (a) all cases and (b) foodbome cases. For ease of
viewing, outbreaks with more than 350 cases (the large outbreaks) are not shown.
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6.4 Discussion
In the previous three chapters of this thesis, the trends in E. coli 0157 cases and
outbreaks in three countries - Scotland, United States and Canada - have been
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analysed. Now the trends between countries can be compared, which is the focus of
the temporal trend analyses. Though there have been some descriptive analyses of
outbreaks in these individual countries (Cowden 1997b; Rangel et al. 2005; Tinga et
al. 2006; Woodward et al. 2002), no statistical comparisons of outbreak or case
temporal trends between any countries, including Scotland, the United States and
Canada have been published. The most comprehensive published comparison on E.
coli 0157 between countries has been a descriptive study of infection epidemiology
between 1987 and 1991 in Scotland and Alberta, Canada (Waters et al. 1994), the
regions with the then highest rates ofE. coli 0157 infection in the United Kingdom
and North America, respectively. The lack ofpublished comparisons in E. coli 0157
epidemiology between countries may reflect the perceived difficulties in comparing
data collected in countries with differing surveillance systems, a concern mentioned
by Waters et al. Another factor may be the predominance of single outbreak studies
in the published literature on outbreaks: of the 334 papers listed in a search of
Medline using the key words "0157 and outbreak", 186 are reports on or research
relating to either a single outbreak or a small number of outbreaks. While the
establishment of EnterNet, a multinational reporting network, which "allows for
trends in infections to be tracked and new and emerging health threats to be
recognised in a multi-national setting" (European Commission 2007) (see Section
1.7.1), suggests that there is an increasing focus on examining E. coli 0157 on an
multinational level, the reports have to-date only listed reported numbers of cases
and outbreaks without assessing trends statistically or offering any discussion or
analysis of similarities between countries.
Comparison of trends between countries, however, has the potential to be a way of
finding out more about E. coli 0157 epidemiology. Evidence from descriptive
studies suggests that geographically and demographically similar countries may have
very different epidemiological trends regarding E. coli 0157, and similarities may be
found in countries with few such commonalities. For instance, Scotland and England
& Wales share an extensive land border across which there is a continual flow of
people, animals and goods, but these countries have not had the same rate ofE. coli
0157 infection. In 2004, the rate of infection in Scotland was more than three times
that in England & Wales (European Commission 2006). Additionally, the countries
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differ in the epidemiology ofE. coli 0157 characteristics such as the predominant
phage types, proportions of isolates with both vtxi and vtX2 detected (European
Commission 2006; Locking et al. 2006a) and the common type of location for
outbreaks between 1995 and 1998 (Cowden 1997b; Willshaw et al. 2001). Other
countries which share borders and/or geographical similarities, but have had diverged
epidemiologically with regards to E. coli 0157 include Ireland and Northern Ireland,
and Sweden and Denmark (Cheasty et al. 2000). Conversely, Waters and colleagues'
report on Alberta, Canada and Scotland in the early 1990s (Waters et al. 1994)
indicated that Alberta and Scotland had high rates of infection and similarities in the
age distribution amongst infected persons despite Alberta having less than three-
fourths the population of and approximately seven times the land mass of Scotland
(Scottish Executive 2007a; Statistics Canada 2006).
Since the data above suggests that there is no one geographical or demographic
factor which dictates E. coli 0157 trends, a comparison of trends between countries
may, in part, help to elucidate which, if any, factors do influence trends. In this
chapter, for the first time, E. coli 0157 trends over time in Scotland, the United
States and Canada have been statistically compared, as it was possible to get
outbreak data sets from these countries.
In keeping with the aims of this thesis, which are to analyse trends in E. coli Ol 57
outbreaks and cases using simple linear models, the comparison has been conducted,
where possible, using the same models and error structures as in the analyses of the
individual countries. In order to compare the trends between countries, analysis of
covariance was used, with country as the comparison variable. Use of the ANCOVA
technique permitted comparison of the trends between countries for which data was
available for different time periods, since 2004 data was not available for Canada.
Additionally, as discussed in Chapter 4, for the United States, trends could only be
analysed from 1998 to 2004. Omission of this data has the potential to reduce the
power of the comparative analyses, but due to the reasons detailed in Chapters 4, a
reduction in time period was epidemiologically preferable to inclusion of data that
was not comparable.
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6.4.1 Issues regarding the analyses
There are a number of issues that must be considered when comparing data between
countries. These issues will be discussed with reference to the analyses of specific
trends. The most prominent and potentially problematic issue is that of the
differences between the three countries in the surveillance systems through which the
data used in the analyses was reported. Data is collected on both the case (sporadic
and outbreak) and outbreak level in each country (Scotland, United States and
Canada). Individual cases - both sporadic and outbreak - have been reported on a
national level in all three countries since at least 1994 with surveillance definitions
clearly delineated and data published at least yearly and available online (see Section
1.7.1). Thus, while is none of the surveillance systems are expected to have detected
all E. coli 0157 cases and all have evolved since their inception. Thus, reporting is
established and the potential short-comings and idiosyncrasies of each system are
known. In each country, surveillance definitions for individual cases reporting are
clearly delineated, with data published at least yearly and available online.
For outbreaks, the situation regarding surveillance is more complicated because of
the differences between countries in the longevity of reporting systems, the amount
and type of information collected and the reporting hierarchies. Scotland, with a
population of approximately 5 million, is relatively small country, while in contrast
Canada and the United States are very large countries, having populations of
approximately 32 million and 291 million persons respectively. Scotland has a
surveillance network that is run by part of the national health care system (Health
Protection Scotland), and as a result, outbreak information transmission to HPS is
either direct or via one of just 14 Health Board regions. In addition, the current
outbreak reporting system has been operational since 1996 (Smith-Palmer & Cowden
2004), during which time outbreak data has been collected with a high degree of
consistency in the way data is reported.
Responsibility for reporting of infectious diseases involves a multi-tiered
surveillance hierarchy from the local, county and city levels up to the provincial/state
and national levels, which can involve differing policies and definitions. In the
United States, a national foodborne illness reporting form (52.13) has been available
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in a number of print (and online) versions, but it was not clear from the information
available for this thesis how non-foodborne outbreaks were reported prior to a
specific section for that purpose being added to the form in 2004. A separate form
(52.12) exists for waterborne outbreaks. However it appears that there are two
parallel systems for reporting waterborne outbreaks because the outbreak listings in
the annual waterborne outbreak reports (for example (Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention 2006g)) do not always correspond with those listed in the E. coli
0157 data set provided by the CDC. Finally, in Canada, reporting of outbreaks
reporting is primarily carried out at the provincial or lower level; only confirmed
outbreak (and sporadic) cases are recorded by the National Laboratory for Enteric
Pathogens (National Laboratory for Enteric Pathogens 2006). National outbreak
reports for 1994-1995 and 1997-1998 were compiled, however the data set made
available for this thesis is the most complete pan-Canadian E. coli Ol 57 outbreak
data set available for this time period. Given the devolved nature of the Canadian
outbreak surveillance system, there are a number of issues regarding this current data
set, including "missing data, unknown values and sparse laboratory confirmation", as
well as "different reporting standards, data and variables between provinces and
territories." (Tinga et al. 2006). The most important factors, in terms of the degree of
impact on the data set, are missing data and the lack of common variables.
Information regarding the nature ofmissing data, specifically the years for which
each province/territory provided data, and the completeness of the data was provided
(see Chapter 5). Though the exact nature of the missing data could not be
ascertained, the relative statistical significance of the data omissions to the results of
the analyses in this chapter was assessed based on the results of deletion analyses.
Of the provinces where outbreak data was missing, only three provinces contributed
substantially to the overall number of cases. Analyses were run omitting the data
from one or all three of these provinces (see Section 5.5.1). These analyses showed
that in some instance, the omission of one or all provinces resulted in a statistically
significant change in the temporal trend in certain instances. Such effects were
discussed in Chapter 5, and will be discussed in this section where relevant. Lack of
common variables across provinces is also a serious issue because the absence of a
common reporting form or effective consensus on what information should be
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recorded for outbreaks means that data from provinces might not be comparable.
This issue is discussed in Chapter 5, with the detailed information from by PHAC on
the data variables provided by each province or territory used to make the data
relatively comparable.
The issues mentioned above - different time periods, surveillance systems and
missing data - were addressed, either by adjusting the data sets or interpreting the
results with respect to known issues. The variations across surveillance systems in
the variable definitions, in particular, were minimised by establishing definitions,
either from the existing surveillance definitions or created to accommodate the
information available, for the variables within each country in this thesis. Exact
details for each variable, both in terms of definition and the effect of other issues,
will be discussed in Section 6.4.2.
6.4.2 Discussion of results
Since the analyses in Chapter 3-5 could not be performed when the large outbreak
cases (Wishaw, Washington County Fair, Layton Avenue Sizzler and Walkerton)
were included, and the data suggest that these outbreaks may be outliers, all
comparison analyses involving case numbers are conducted excluding the large
outbreaks.
6.4.2.1 Total cases and outbreaks
When the geometric mean numbers of the overall number of outbreak and sporadic
cases combined are compared, statistically significant differences exist between
countries for the geometric mean number and rates of cases per year, but not in the
slopes of the temporal trends. The statistically significant differences in the
geometric mean number of cases per year, with the United States having a higher
mean than either Scotland or Canada, are not unexpected because the United States
population is approximately 58 times that of Scotland and nine times that of Canada.
Thus even if the United States or Canada had a lower rate of infection, the raw
numbers of cases would still be higher. In addition, whilst the figure for the total
number of confirmed cases in Scotland includes only confirmed E. coli 0157 cases,
the figure for Canada also includes non-0157 VTEC cases. The American number
includes both confirmed and probable cases: the definition of a probable case extends
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to include cases which are "epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or probable
case" or where there is an elevated serum titre or identification of a shiga toxin in a
clinically compatible case (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2006a;
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2006b). Studies that indicate that less
than 5% of reported cases in Canada were of serotypes other than 0157 (Sockett et
al. 2006; Woodward et al. 2002) suggest that the inclusion of the non-0157 cases is
not likely to significantly affect the magnitude of the trends.
In contrast, the reporting ofboth probable and confirmed cases in the United States
may result in a final figure that is a considerable overestimate of the number of
confirmed cases. The degree of overestimation may be from one third to 10 times, as
suggested by data from outbreak report forms during the study period. These data
indicate that in the two outbreaks where specific information was available, there
were 65 confirmed cases, but an additional 601 cases that were probable (Proctor
2000a; Proctor 2000b). Also, in the 310 outbreaks between 1998 and 2004 analysed
in this thesis, the total number of ill cases was more than twice the total number of
confirmed cases. In addition, totals for confirmed cases only were available via the
PHLIS system until the end of 2001. While 15,487 confirmed and probable cases
were reported between 1998-2001 via the NNDSS, just 11,186 confirmed cases were
reported via PHLIS during the same time period (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention 1998; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2001b; Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention 2002b; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
2003b), a decrease ofmore than 25%. Yet, while this overestimate clearly affects the
analyses of the mean number of confirmed cases per year, if the magnitude of
overestimation is consistent from year to year, the slope of the trend may not be
statistically significantly affected. It is intriguing, however, that even though the
number of cases in the United States is likely to be over-estimated, the rate of total
confirmed cases per year is statistically significantly lower in the United States than
in the other two countries. The reason for the lower rate of confirmed cases in the
United States is not known, but it may be related to percentage of ill persons that are
tested (while still shedding) for the bacteria. The percentage of ill persons that are
tested depends upon the practices ofphysicians and laboratories. For instance, if
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only people with bloody diarrhoea are tested, fewer infections will be detected than if
all persons with diarrhoea are tested.
A significant difference exists between countries in the geometric mean number and
rates of outbreaks per year and in the slopes of the trends in the log transformed
number of outbreaks. It is not unexpected that Scotland would have a significantly
higher rate of outbreaks because, for the reasons discussed in 5.4.1, outbreak
reporting in Canada and the United States is probably much less comprehensive than
that in Scotland. In Canada, particularly, outbreak data from up to half the
provinces/territories is missing each year (see Chapter 5). The slopes of the
American and Canadian trends differ statistically significantly with the trend in
Canada decreasing while the American trend does not change statistically
significantly. The United States has a significantly higher geometric mean number
of outbreaks than either Scotland or Canada.
However, these results should be viewed with caution because the Canadian trend
may be statistically significantly affected by missing data. Specifically, data from
three provinces which reported more than 100 overall cases per year was missing or
incomplete in the first half of the time period being analysed (see 5.2.1.1). If, when
the Canadian trend was analysed individually, the data from all three of these
provinces were omitted from the analyses, the trend was no longer statistically
significant. If the significance was in fact an artefact due to missing data, there may
not be a statistically significant difference between countries because the Canadian
trend was the only statistically significant trend. The difference in the geometric
mean number of cases per year may also have been overestimated, because the
numbers of outbreaks - according to the definition used in this thesis - may have
been undercounted, particularly in Canada and Scotland. In Scotland, unlike in the
other two countries, outbreaks must involve two or more cases out with the same
household (Locking et al. 2004), so the number of Scottish outbreaks may be
undercounted as per the American and Canadian definitions in which outbreaks are
not restricted to being multi-household (Tinga et al. 2006)(Personal communication,
Thai An Nguyen, CDC). The data on single-household clusters, was however, not
available for this thesis. As previously mentioned, three or more years worth of data
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from a number of provinces/territories was missing from the Canadian data set, thus
the results presented here may not be applicable to the provinces for which no or
only a few years data is available.
6.4.2.2 Analyses by mode of transmission - issues
A more detailed view of the trends is revealed when the outbreaks are broken down
by the primary mode of transmission. In order to compare trends between countries
by mode of transmission, the categories in the mode of transmission variable must be
comparable across the three countries. Standardising the variable definitions requires
both adjustments to category definitions and an understanding of the issues involved.
Only in Scotland are outbreaks publicly reported using a specific set of categories for
modes of transmission: foodborne, waterborne, animal contact, environmental,
multiple including foodborne, multiple excluding foodborne and unknown (see for
example (Smith-Palmer & Cowden 2004)). Since these categories have been used
consistently and little other background information relating to the modes of
transmission with which to reassign outbreaks to alternative categories was provided
in the Scottish data set, the Scottish categories are used as the basis for defining the
categories used in the comparison analyses. Standardised categories have not been
used in either the Canadian or American data sets, but the updated 52.13 reporting
form introduced in the United States in 2004 (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention 2004a) does provide a clear list of options for mode of transmission. It is
also possible that a set of categories does exist in the computerized reporting system
which is now used to report outbreaks to the CDC. Neither the updated form nor the
computer system was in use during the majority of the time period analysed in this
study.
However, for both the United States and Canada, more extensive information was
provided in relation to the nature of the transmission, for example listings of food
items or comments about suspected means of contamination in a farm setting. This
information was then used to split the outbreaks into the categories used in Scotland
with a few exceptions described below. Firstly, there are no definitive criteria in
Scotland for categorising an outbreak as being transmitted by multiple modes
including foodborne or multiple modes excluding foodborne, and additional data on
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mode of transmission is not available for all outbreaks in the Canadian and United
States data. Thus there is no accurate way of applying these categories to additional
data. Several outbreaks in the United States are listed foodbome, with mention of an
additional mode of transmission; however without information on how many cases
were ascribed to the second mode of transmission, it was not possible to determine
whether the foodborne transmission was dominant or co-dominant. Thus for the
purposes of the comparisons in this chapter, the foodborne category has been
broadened. For Scotland the category includes all outbreaks classified as foodborne
or multiple including foodborne, and for Canada and the United States it includes all
outbreaks where the main mode of transmission was listed as foodborne. As only
three outbreaks in Scotland were categorised as multiple excluding foodborne, and a
clear definition which could be applied to non-Scottish outbreaks is not available,
these outbreaks were omitted in mode of transmission analyses. All outbreaks which
related to animal or environmental contact were categorised as
animal/environmental, while person to person, waterborne and unknown mode of
transmission outbreaks were indicated as such in all three data sets. However, it is
not known whether the definitions for waterborne, unknown and person to person are
equivalent in (or even within) the three countries, so these categories may include
outbreaks that are spread by multiple modes of transmission. However, there should
be less bias in the categorisation of the waterborne and person to person outbreaks
since the categorisations were made directly from the notations in the data sets.
Another major issue regarding the comparison of these modes of transmission
categories between countries was the variability in data recording. Firstly, the nature
of the persons making the determination of mode of transmission for each outbreak
could vary widely. Depending on circumstance and country, the person making the
choice might be made by a public health consultant or trained epidemiologist
involved in the outbreak investigation, a staff member paid to input data into a
database or an epidemiologist collating data from a number of disparate sources.
Secondly, there was no standard between or within countries regarding the way in
which the data was recorded - i.e. whether a checklist of options was provided for
mode of transmission, a space for an answer, or some combination of the two
methods. Such variations in the forms can strongly influence the choice of mode of
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transmission. For instance, the set of categories used to record mode of transmission
information in one Canadian province included neither foodbome or waterborne as
an option. As a result outbreaks which were spread by food or water might be listed
as 'other' or fit into an existing category (e.g. faecal-oral if food was contaminated
by someone who didn't wash their hands properly), thus obscuring the true
transmission nature of the outbreak. These issues are most applicable to Canada and
the United States where outbreaks are apparently often recorded - at least below the
national level - on various non-0157 specific forms, and a much greater number of
reporting bodies are involved (state/provincial, city, county etc. public health
agencies) in surveillance. While the experiences and biases of individual public
health consultants can influence how outbreaks are reported in Scotland, their
selection is guided by a list of defined modes of transmission. It would be
anticipated that above discussed issues will result in a number of inbuilt biases in the
comparison data set, and these biases will be discussed as relevant in the next
section.
6.4.2.3 Analyses by mode of transmission - outbreaks
For all three modes of transmission which are compared - foodbome, person to
person and waterbome, statistically significant differences exist in the mean numbers
of outbreaks per year, with the United States having a higher mean number of
outbreaks than either Canada or Scotland, and Canada a higher number than
Scotland. The rates of outbreaks are not statistically significantly different, but the
lack of apparent differences may be a result of the large 95% confidence intervals
which resulted from having a low number of outbreaks per year, but high variation (0
to 12 in one instance) between years. The rates may also be different. There is a
statistically significant difference between Canada and both the United States and
Scotland countries in the slopes of the trends in the number of foodbome outbreaks,
the slope in Canada being significantly different from the slope in either Scotland or
the United States though none of the slopes were individually statistically significant.
It would appear though, that the slope of the Canadian data is decreasing, whilst the
American and Scottish slopes are increasing. Flowever, these results should be
interpreted with caution because the slope of the Canadian trend may be significantly
skewed by the large quantity of missing data in the first few years of the data set. In
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addition, particularly in Canada, there may be an overestimation of the number of
foodborne outbreaks earlier in the data set. Firstly, since the initial E. coli 0157
outbreaks in the United States (Riley et al. 1983; Wells et al. 1983) and Canada
(Lior 1983) were associated with hamburger meat, and a large number of outbreaks
in Canada have been associated with food (Todd 2000), outbreak investigations in
the earlier years of the data sets may have placed a greater emphasis on food-related
sources of infection (personal communication, Carol Tinga, PHAC). In Canada there
were no outbreaks categorised as any mode other than food or unknown until 1998,
and then no waterborne or animal/environmental outbreaks until 2000. Additionally,
prevention and interventions programs aimed at foodbome transmission such as
recalls, improvement in the processing practices in food plants and consumer
education campaigns (Sockett et al. 2006) could potentially have contributed to a
decrease in foodborne outbreaks in Canada.
There is not a statistically significant difference between countries in the slopes of
the trends of the number of person to person outbreaks. The United States does have
a statistically significantly higher mean number of person to person outbreaks per
year, but a possible explanation for this difference is the much larger population of
the United States. Canada has a statistically significantly different slope in the trend
in the number ofwaterborne outbreaks when compared to either the United States or
Scotland. However, the statistically significant increase in the number ofwaterborne
outbreaks in Canada is likely to be an artefact of the under-reporting of outbreaks in
the first half of the Canadian data set, as no waterborne outbreaks were listed on the
data set until 2000.
Surveillance disparities such as missing mode of transmission values are likely to
have had an impact on the results discussed above. In Canadian outbreaks, data is
likely to have been lost in the process of trying to enter and compile data into/from
databases with different mode of transmission categories. In the United States,
particularly in the earlier years of the time period, values may not have been recorded
accurately because of a reporting system in which E. coli 0157 outbreaks were
reported on forms designed for foodborne outbreaks. Additionally, the pre-
computerised system depended on information reported from 50 state public health
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departments and countless county and city health departments. However, these
results could also reflect a true difference in the dominance over time of foodborne
and waterborne outbreaks, suggesting that in the United States there is a shift away
from water as a method of spread, while food is becoming less dominant in Scotland
and Canada.
After outbreaks with an unknown mode of transmission were excluded, only the
mean proportion of outbreaks that were foodborne per year and over the entire study
period varied statistically significantly between countries. In both instances,
Scotland had a statistically significantly lower mean proportion of foodborne
outbreaks per year. When the temporal trends were compared, statistically
significant differences existed between countries in the slopes of the trends in the
proportions of known outbreaks that were foodborne and waterborne. For foodborne
outbreaks, the slope of the American trend is statistically significantly different from
that in the other two countries, which would be expected because the trend in the
United States was non-significant, whilst there was a statistically significant decline
in both Canada and Scotland. It has been suggested that the decline in Scotland may
be in part due to an increasing awareness of non-foodborne modes of transmission,
as highlighted by Strachan and colleagues paper on recent outbreaks linked to
environmental contamination and animal contact (Strachan et al. 2006). Likewise
the slope of the trend in the proportion of outbreaks that were waterborne was
statistically significantly different in the United States as compared to the other
countries, which is not unexpected because the American trend is the only one of the
three to be statistically significant. Person to person outbreaks were not compared
because no appropriate simple model could be found for the Canadian data
6.4.2.4 - 111 cases from outbreaks - analyses
Though there are statistically significant differences between all three countries in
the mean number of ill cases from outbreaks per year, there are no statistically
significant differences between mean rates. Additionally, the slopes of the temporal
trends vary statistically significantly only between the United States and Canada: the
trend in the United States was statistically significantly decreasing, while in Canada
there was no statistically significant trend.
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When ill cases from outbreaks are analysed by mode of transmission, no statistically
significant differences are found between countries in the mean rates per year. As
discussed with reference to rates for the number of outbreaks, however, the lack of
statistically significant differences is likely due to a lack ofpower due to small case
numbers and large variations in the number of cases from year to year. If foodborne
outbreaks are analysed separately, the differences between the mean numbers of ill
cases are still statistically significant, but the slopes are not. There is a statistically
significant difference in the mean numbers of and slopes of the trends in the number
of ill cases from waterborne outbreaks, with the United States having a statistically
significantly decreasing slope as opposed to the non-significant slopes in the other
two countries and the highest mean number of ill cases. No difference in trend
slopes or intercepts exists between countries in the number of ill cases from person to
person outbreaks. These last two results should be interpreted with caution due to
the fact that the American trend is based only on data from 1998 onwards and there
were no waterborne outbreaks reported in Canada until 2000. More complete
outbreak data is needed to confirm the findings on trends in waterborne and person to
person outbreaks.
When the mean proportions of ill cases were examined, both overall and by year,
there were significant overall differences between countries in the proportion of ill
cases from foodborne, waterborne and person to person outbreaks. Scotland has a
significantly higher overall and yearly mean proportion of ill cases from person to
person and waterborne outbreaks, and a lower mean proportion from foodborne
cases. This disparity could reflect a true difference in outbreak transmission
epidemiology. However, it is more likely that the higher proportion of non-
foodborne outbreaks in Scotland is due to an under-reporting of non-foodborne
outbreaks in the United States and Canada (personal communication, Carole Tinga,
PHAC) and a greater awareness of such outbreaks in Scotland, at least in recent years
(Strachan et al. 2006).
6.4.2.5 Number of ill cases per outbreaks - analyses
The average size of an outbreak - in ill cases - was statistically significantly larger in
the United States than in either Scotland or Canada, but there were no statistically
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significant differences in the slopes of the trends in size of outbreaks. There were
also no statistically significant differences in the trend slopes when only foodborne
outbreaks were considered. It is possible that outbreaks in the United States were
significantly larger because a bias in the size of outbreaks reported to the CDC or
that outbreak investigators in the United States use broader case definitions when
reporting data to the CDC. The fact that the slopes did not differ significantly
between countries suggest however that the large the size of outbreaks was the result
of an epidemiological factor unique to the United States.
6.4.2.6 Correlation analyses
The correlation between the number of ill and ill and positive cases per outbreak
varies very little between countries regardless of the inclusion of the large outbreaks,
as evidenced by a large overlap in the 95% confidence intervals. The number of
cases associated (ill) with an outbreak depends on the established definition of an ill
case as well as the thoroughness of the outbreak investigation. For instance, if an
person who is epidemiologically linked to an outbreak, but not laboratory confirmed,
must have bloody diarrhoea to be counted as an ill case, fewer people are likely to be
reported as ill cases than if a person only had to have diarrhoea. The number of
cases confirmed (ill and positive) depends on factors such as the practices regarding
taking of faecal samples and testing of samples (Deneen et al. 1998a), all of which
vary within and between countries. As a result, it was anticipated that correlation
would be quite different between countries. The similarity of the correlation between
ill and ill and positive sizes is a finding of note because it suggests that the
relationship between the number of ill and ill and positive cases may be closely
linked to underlying microbiological epidemiological factors that are independent of
the country in which the outbreak takes place. These factors could include the
average dose of bacteria an infected person is likely to receive, the relationship
between the dose and both the distribution of ages of infected persons and severity of
symptoms (Haas et al. 2000; Strachan et al. 2005). Other factors include the
relationship between verotoxin type and symptoms and patient age (Friedrich et al.
2002), and the likelihood of having symptoms severe enough to require medical
intervention, faecal sampling and testing for E. coli 0157 (Hedberg et al. 1997;
Imhoff et al. 2004; Michel et al. 2000).
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While Canada, the United States and Scotland are dramatically different in terms of
demographic qualities which have been suggested to have an effect on infectious
disease epidemiology like population, population density, land use and cattle
population (see Table 2.1), the analyses in this chapter provide the first statistical
evidence that there are relatively few statistically significant differences between the
countries in case or outbreak temporal trends from 1996 to 2004.
Intriguingly, the data suggest that there may have been a decrease in the importance
ofwater as a transmission source in the United States, as the United States alone had
statistically significant trends - all decreasing - in the number and proportion of ill
cases that were waterbome and the proportion of outbreaks that were waterbome.
Further clarification about how waterborne outbreaks are reported in the United
States could help in confirming or refuting these results as not all waterbome
outbreaks included in yearly reports on waterbome outbreaks are also in the E. coli
0157 outbreak data set. Thus it could be that progress has been made in reducing
contamination ofwater supplies and bathing areas in the United States. However,
another possibility is that there appears to be a decrease in waterbome outbreaks
because the reports of some waterbome outbreaks are not being included in the E.
coli 0157 outbreak data set. Differences in geometric mean or mean numbers did
exist, as expected, given the large variation in population sizes. The vast majority of
the differences in trends could, in part, be explained by missing data and inter-
country variation in reporting and surveillance. Therefore, the analyses suggest that
Scotland, Canada and United States are quite similar in terms of temporal trends in
E. coli 0157 outbreaks and cases. This would suggest that the factors which are
influential in causing changes in the trends in number of cases and outbreaks do not
vary significantly between countries. It would be of great interested to follow up on
these findings in future years as more data become available, both in terms of new
data and more complete data from past years.
This chapter concludes the analysis of temporal trends. In Chapter 7, the focus will
shift specifically to cases within outbreaks, with data taken from published reports
rather than national data sets. Secondary and primary cases in outbreaks detailed in
the published literature will be described and the overall proportion of secondary
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cases calculated. In addition, analyses will be run to determine which factors are
statistically significantly associated with higher rates of secondary cases.
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Chapter 7 — An analysis of primary and secondary cases in
E. coli 0157 outbreaks
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7.1 Introduction
E. coli 0157 infection can be acquired directly from the initial or point source of the
bacteria, whether it be an infected animal, animal faeces, contaminated food or water
(Coia 1999). However, secondary transmission from an infected person, directly or
indirectly [e.g. through water] to another person is known to also occur (Armstrong
et al. 1996; Coia 1998a) with between 10% and 20% of outbreak cases thought to
have been acquired by secondary transmission (Armstrong et al. 1996; Locking et al.
2003a; Locking et al. 2004; Parry & Palmer 2005). These rates of secondary
infection may reflect both the low infectious dose (Parry & Salmon 1998) and the
potential for further spread from contact with asymptomatic carriers (Armstrong et
al. 1996). These asymptomatic carriers present a special risk, as they may be
unaware of their infective status (Armstrong et al. 1996).
The potential for secondary cases, alone, highlights the benefit of research into
secondary spread. However, the potential for severe outcomes in the age-groups
which are at the highest risk for infection is also of concern. Transmission between
members of a household is a type of secondary spread, and age appears to be an
important factor in determining individuals likely to be infected (Parry & Salmon
1998). Young children are the most likely to transmit infection to, and be infected
by, other household members (Parry & Salmon 1998). This association between
children and infection is reflected in other locations where outbreaks are likely to
involve many secondary cases, including nurseries (Al-Jader et al. 1999; Belongia et
al. 1993; Galanis et al. 2003; Spika et al. 1986; Sugiyama et al. 2005; Swerdlow &
Griffin 1997), petting zoos (Blackmore & Ginzl 2005; Gage et al. 2001; Heuvelink et
al. 2002) and swimming areas (Brewster et al. 1994; Friedman et al. 1999; Keene et
al. 1994; Paunio et al. 1999). The apparent association of secondary cases with such
locations, as well as with institutional settings such as hospitals and care homes,
where individuals may have weakened immune systems and problems maintaining
hygiene (Bolduc 2004; Coia 1998b; Pavia et al. 1990; Reiss et al. 2006), is of great
importance because of the age-related morbidity and mortality (Coia 1998a).
Furthermore, people who were infected via secondary transmission appear to have a
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similar risk of severe outcomes such as HUS as people who most likely acquired
infection by direct exposure (Locking et al. 2006a).
Though there are differences between the countries as far as potentially
epidemiologically relevant characteristics like population density and land use are
concerned, the fact that secondary case rates of 10 - 20% overall (Locking et al.
2003a; Locking et al. 2004; Locking et al. 2006a) and over 50% for individual
outbreaks (Galanis et al. 2003; Public Health Laboratory Service 1998a) have been
reported in multiple countries, seems to indicate that regardless of country, secondary
cases are potentially important in terms of numbers and populations affected. This
suggests that an examination of the relationship between primary and secondary
cases, in particular any differences between modes of primary and secondary
transmission and countries, is of interest. However, while some countries do report
population based figures for secondary spread (Locking et al. 2006a) there has been
little systematic quantification or characterisation of secondary outbreak cases.
Generally descriptive information with no statistical analyses of the data has been
presented (Armstrong et al. 1996; Belongia et al. 1993; Coia 1998b). Definitions of
primary mode of transmission for surveillance purposes have generally been based
upon the predominant transmission mode rather than the mode of transmission to the
initial case or cases (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2004a; Health
Protection Scotland 2004). Also, while nursery school-based outbreaks have been
mentioned as a unique group with high rates of secondary infection (Armstrong et al.
1996), there have been otherwise almost no comparisons between primary or
secondary modes of transmission or countries. Perhaps the only exception to this is
the study of secondary household transmission in sporadic cases in Wales (Parry &
Salmon 1998). However, this study was limited to a single country and because all
secondary cases were the result of household contact, there was no comparison
between modes of transmission. More comprehensive data and analyses on
secondary cases, especially relating to any differences or similarities between
countries, modes of transmission, and ages of secondary cases, would help greatly to
better understand the observed heterogeneity in the size and severity ofE. coli 0157
outbreaks.
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Therefore, this chapter will describe and characterise primary and secondary cases in
E. coli 0157 outbreaks and estimate the proportion of E. coli 0157 outbreak cases
that are the result of secondary transmission. It will analyse the relationships
between primary and secondary cases in general E. coli 0157 outbreaks by mode of
transmission, country and age of cases.
7.2 Materials and methods
7.2.1 Literature search
A search was performed of online reference databases and the online archives of
publications issued by national public health organizations for reports ofE. coli
0157 outbreaks occurring between January 1, 1982 and December 31, 2006 in
Scotland, England and Wales, the United States, Canada, Japan, Ireland and
Scandinavian nations (Sweden, Denmark and Finland). Medline and the Web of
Knowledge were searched using one or more of the terms "0157", "outbreak",
"STEC" and "VTEC". National and international organizational publications that
were searched were Mortality and Morbidity Weekly (USA), Canadian
Communicable Disease Report, (Canada), Communicable Disease Review Weekly
and Communicable Disease and Public Health (England & Wales), SCIEH Reports
(Scotland), Infectious Agents Surveillance Reports English version (Japan), Epi-
Insight (Ireland), EpiNews (Denmark) and Eurosurveillance (European Union).
References from papers or reports found in the above searches were also checked for
relevant materials. While outbreak data sets from the United States and Canada were
obtained for the studies in Chapters 2 -6 of this thesis, these data sets did not contain
information on the number of secondary cases. As a result, the data sets could not be
used for this chapter.
7.2.2 Definitions and inclusion criteria
7.2.2.1 Time period
This is selected to include outbreaks from 1982, the year in which the first E. coli
0157 outbreak was reported, to mid 2006, 2005 being the last complete year for




For the purposes of this chapter, a case is defined as a person-infection-episode ofE.
coli 0157 infection that is serum or culture confirmed.
7.2.2.2b Outbreak definition and inclusion criteria
For all countries, outbreaks are defined as events with two or more epidemiologically
related E. coli 0157 cases. For an outbreak to be included in the data set used in this
chapter, enough information had to be provided in the report to determine the total
number of confirmed cases and the number of confirmed secondary cases (see
7.2.2.2d for definition).
7.2.2.2c Modes of infection transmission
Based on the information provided in the articles or reports, transmission of an
infection to a person in the outbreaks was classified by the following routes:
1. exposure to a contaminated food, subdivided for this chapter into dairy
products (dairy product) and non-dairy food items (food). Dairy products are
defined here as milk, cheese, cheese curds, yogurt, cream and ice cream.
2. exposure to water from a contaminated water supply or recreational/outdoor
activities water contaminated by a non-human source (water)
3. direct animal contact or exposure to infected animals (animal contact)
4. exposure to contaminated animal faeces or environments, but where direct
animal contact has not been identified (environmental)
5. person to person transmission in a specific setting (person to person...)
o institution - residential facility in which meals are generally prepared
in a common kitchen or kitchens. For example: hospitals, prisons and
nursing homes.
o nursery - a nursery or day-care facility where attendance is generally
limited to pupils of age five years or younger
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o home - private home. Also includes any cases where the location of
transmission is not specified as taking place in a commercial or public
location.
o other - includes all other public or commercial locations including
restaurants, camps and non-residential schools where contact took
place outside residential settings
6. contact with recreational water contaminated by another human {water)
7. unknown pathways (unknown) - where no suspected mode of transmission
was reported or the suspected mode of transmission was not from the above
options
Primary and secondary cases
The definitions of secondary and primary cases were not consistent between outbreak
reports. For instance in the 1993 minced-beef outbreak in Washington, people were
defined as having secondary infection if they "became ill within 10 days of a
household or other close contact with another patient and had not eaten at chain A
during that time" (Bell et al. 1994). However, in an outbreak that same year in
London (Hildebrand et al. 1996) linked to paddling pools, a secondary case was
defined as person with "any gastrointestinal symptoms and/or HUS with onset date
in 1993 between mid-June and end of July, who lived in south west London and in
whom there was microbiological evidence of is. coli 0157 infection... [and] who, in
addition, had had household or close personal contact with a case in the previous two
weeks" (Hildebrand et al. 1996). The second definition is more restrictive in terms
of geographical region, but unlike the first definition, does not clearly rule out
patients who had contact with both the initial source of infection (pool) and another
infection person, and thus could have been infected either way. Also, in many papers
secondary case definitions were not included (e.g. (Gammie et al. 1996; Hilborn et
al. 1999; Marsh et al. 1992)). Thus, standard case definitions for primary and
secondary cases have been established for this study.
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A primary case is defined as a case in which the infected person was determined,
(based on the information provided in the article or report) as having direct contact
with the suspected initial or point source of E. coli 0157 through transmission routes
1 - 4,7 as detailed above.
A case is considered to be secondary if there was no reported exposure to the
suspected initial or point source of contamination, and the infection resulted from
confirmed or suspected transmission from a primary case. Secondary transmission
of an infection to a person can occur by transmission routes 5, 6 and 7. Where no
secondary spread was reported in an outbreak, secondary mode of transmission was
categorised as not applicable (n/a) and not included in any analyses of secondary
mode of transmission. In outbreaks where cases were suspected to have had more
than one mode of secondary transmission, mode of secondary transmission category
was selected based on the transmission route of the majority of secondary cases.
7.2.3 Statistical analysis
All analyses have been performed using R (Version 2.4.0, R Foundation, 2006), with
the exception of the Generalised Linear Model (GLM) analyses, which were
performed using SAS'R Version 9.1 (SAS Institute Inc. 2003). For the first section of
the chapter, data from the outbreaks which met the above inclusion criteria are
described in terms ofmedian (due to non-normal distributions) number and range of
ill, confirmed, primary and secondary cases, as well as by primary and secondary
mode of transmission, country, year of outbreak, and age. The overall mean
proportion of outbreak cases that are secondary and the overall rate of secondary
cases per primary case have been calculated, as well as the mean proportion of cases
secondary for each age category. Mean proportions are calculated out of the total
number of confirmed cases with known transmission route (primary or secondary).
In all further analyses, mode of transmission and/or country categories with unknown
values or containing fewer than five outbreaks are combined or omitted. For analyses
involving mode of primary transmission, the categories 'animal contact' (n=7) and
'environmental' (n=2) are combined. Similarly for analyses involving mode of
secondary transmission, the levels 'n/a' (n=21) and 'unknown' (n=2) are omitted and
'p-p institution' (n=4) and 'p-p other' (n=3) are combined. For analyses involving
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country, categories Sweden (n=2), Ireland (n=l) and Finland (n=l) are omitted, and
levels 'Wales' (n=l) and 'England' (n=23) are combined.
A categorical variable with four levels has been created for all analyses involving
median age. The levels were: less than 6 years old (nursery-aged infants and
toddlers), between 6 and 16 years old (school-aged children), greater than 16 years
old to 59 years old (adults) and 60 or more years old (senior citizens). These median
age groups are used to split the median ages into those including nursery-aged infants
and toddlers, school-aged children, adults, and senior citizens.
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) analyses are used to check for statistically
significant differences in the log-transformed number of ill, confirmed and primary
cases between modes of transmission, countries and age categories. When the
ANOVA indicates a statistically significant overall difference, as discussed in
Chapter 6 (see Section 6.2.3.1), contrasts are used to examine the differences
between the individual variable categories. Log-transformation is applied to
normalize the residuals. Fisher's Exact Tests are used to check for statistically
significant differences in age categories between modes of transmission and
countries. As there were many zero values in the secondary case variable, log
transformation is not possible and so non-parametric analyses are used to compare
numbers of secondary cases between modes of transmission and countries. Kruskal-
Wallis Tests are performed to check for overall statistically significant differences,
and Mann-Whitney Tests are used to test for differences between pairs of variable
levels. The ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis Tests are repeated excluding nursery
outbreaks (see results). In all cases, values of p < 0.05 are considered to be
statistically significant and subscripts are used to indicate degrees of freedom for F
tests.
The relationships between the rate of secondary cases as compared to primary cases
by mode of transmission, country and median age are explored using univariate
GLMs with Poisson errors and the log link function.
In the models, mode of transmission, country or median age (categorical variable) is
inserted as the explanatory variable, the number of secondary cases as the response
variable and the number of primary cases, log transformed, as the offset variable.
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This is because the expected number of secondary cases from the Poisson model will
depend not just on the variables included in the model, but also directly on the
number of primary cases in an outbreak. The offset variable (Crawley 2002) is
included so that the chance of a given number of secondary cases occurring will
reflect this relationship between the number of secondary and primary cases. The
use of the offset variable thereby allows for the size of the population who could
spread the infection (i.e. primary cases) in the analysis of the rate of secondary cases
per primary case. The error distributions are not strictly Poisson and there is
overdispersion, which is when an excess of unexplained variation (residual deviance)
occurs, as compared to the number of data points or levels (degrees of freedom).
Thus statistical significance is overestimated, and so to adjust for this, a scale
parameter, estimated by the square root of deviance/degrees of freedom, is factored
into the ANOVA calculations. This scale parameter in SAS® has a similar function
as the quasi-function in R, used in early chapters (see2.3.4.2). F-values are used to
assess the overall statistical significance between modes of transmission, countries
and age categories (Crawley 2002), and where statistical significance is indicated
(p<0.05), the statistically significant differences between different modes of
transmission, countries and age categories are quantified by examining the
differences of least square means.
Multivariate analyses including the above explanatory variables are run using the
same basic GLM model as above to look for potential confounders and interactions
between explanatory variables. F-values are used to assess overall statistical
significance of explanatory variables. Model simplification is achieved by omitting
model terms which are not statistically significant in three way interactions and
running model with all three variables without interaction. Models are then run with
two variables, and if there is no statistically significant interaction between the terms,
the two variables are retained in the model, but without an interaction term.
7.3 Results
7.3.1 Descriptive summary - overall, country and age
There were 176 outbreaks, covering the time period 1982 to 2006, for which
outbreak reports were available (Table 7.1). Of these outbreaks, 90 matched the
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inclusion criteria for the study and were included in the descriptive portion of the
study.
Table 7.1: Selection of outbreaks for the study
Table of the outbreaks included in the stages of the studies, and reasons for exclusion. The other
rows show the data sets used in the univariate and multivariate analyses, when various omissions
were made, including omission of nursery cases and omission of cases without a value for
categorical median age. Outbreaks for which there were no secondary cases are classified as 'n/a'
for the purposes of secondary transmission and person to person is abbreviated as 'p-p'.
Selection of Outbreaks for the Studies
Outbreaks
+ descriptive report(s) were found in the published literature N = 176
- those outbreaks where the number confirmed could not be ascertained
- those outbreaks where the number of secondary confirmed cases






* met the case definition (sufficient information to determine
the number of confirmed primary and secondary cases) N = 90 (51%)
Outbreaks
* after omission or combination of categories with < 5 outbreaks
Combined: England & Wales, Omitted: Finland, Sweden, Ireland
Combined: Animal & Environmental





* after omission of outbreaks without stated median age
With all modes of transmission and countries
With Sweden, Finland and Ireland omitted
With Animal & Environmental combined






The 90 outbreaks in the descriptive study occurred between 1982 and 2006, with the
majority of outbreaks occurring between 1994 and 2000 (Figure 7.1, Table 7.2).
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Table 7.2: References for outbreaks used in study (n=90), by country
References for the 90 outbreaks used in the study. Some references involve more than one outbreak
and for some outbreaks, there are more than one reference
Canada (Abbas et al. 2005; Bruneau et al. 2004; CDC 1983; Clark et al. 1997;
Galanis et al. 2003; Health Canada 1999; Honish et al. 2005; Honish
et al. 2007; lebin et al. 2003; Lior 1983; MacDonald et al. 2000;
MacDonald et al. 2004; Mclntyre et al. 2002; Sutcliffe et al. 2004;
Warshawsky et al. 2002)
England (Allaby & Mayon-White 1995; Clark et al. 1997; Crampin et al. 1999;
Gammie et al. 1996; Goh et al. 2002; Harrison & Kinra 2004; Health
Protection Agency 1999; Health Protection Agency 2006a; Hildebrand
et al. 1996; McDonnell et al. 1997; Morgan et al. 1988; Public Health
Laboratory Service 1995; Public Health Laboratory Service 1997;
Public Health Laboratory Service 1998a; Public Health Laboratory
Service 1998b; Public Health Laboratory Service 1999a; Public Health
Laboratory Service 1999b; Public Health Laboratory Service 1999c;
Public Health Laboratory Service 1999d; Public Health Laboratory
Service 2000a; Public Health Laboratory Service 2000b; Public Health
Laboratory Service 2000c; Public Health Laboratory Service 2002;
Public Health Laboratory Service 2006; Shukla et al. 1995; Verma et
al. 2007)
Finland (Paunio et al. 1999)
Ireland (O'Donnell et al. 2002)
Japan (Maruzumi et al. 2005; Michino et al. 1999; Michino et al. 1998;
Sugiyama et al. 2005; Terajima et al. 1999; Yamamoto et al. 2001)
Scotland (Brewster et al. 1994; Coia et al. 1996; Cowden et al. 2001; Davis &
Brogan 1995; Howie et al. 2003; Jones & Roworth 1996; Kohli et al.
1994; Licence et al. 2001; Marsh et al. 1992; O'Brien et al. 2001c;
SCIEH 1998a; SCIEH 1999; SCIEH 2001a; Upton & Coia 1994)
Sweden (Wahl & Andersson 2004; Welinder-Olsson et al. 2004)
United States (Ackman et al. 1997; Banatvala et al. 1996; Bell et al. 1994; Belongia
et al. 1991; Belongia et al. 1993; Bhat et al. 2007; Breuer et al. 2001;
Bruce et al. 2003; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 1994;
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 1995a; Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention 2005c; Cody et al. 1999; Crump et al.
2003; Feldman et al. 2002; Ferguson et al. 2005; Friedman et al.
1999; Gage et al. 2001; Gouveia et al. 1998; Hilborn et al. 1999;
Keene et al. 1994; Keene et al. 1997; Ostroff et al. 1990; Palumbo et
al. 2004; Payne et al. 2003; Proctor 2000a; Proctor 2000b; Reiss et al.
2006; Samadpour et al. 2002a; San Mateo County Health Services
Agency 2004; Spika etal. 1986;Tuttle etal. 1999)
Wales (Payne et al. 2003; Public Health Laboratory Service 1999e)
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Figure 7.1: Number of outbreaks in the study, by year and mode of primary transmission
The outbreaks included in the descriptive study (n=90) split by year. For outbreaks where cases
were reported in more than one year, the year noted in the outbreak report was considered to be the
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These outbreaks took place in nine countries, with 30% of the outbreaks occurring in
the United States (Table 7.3). One outbreak involved cases both in the United States
and Canada, and since 86% of the cases took place in the United States was
categorized as being in the United States for the purposes of the study.
Table 7.3: Outbreaks included in the study, by country
The outbreaks included in the descriptive study (n=90), split by country. Percentages shown are out
of the total outbreaks in the descriptive study.
Outbreaks (%)










In the 75 outbreaks with values for the categorical age variable, 20 (26%) outbreaks
had cases with a median age less than 6 years, 27 (36%) a median age from 6 to 16
years, 23 (31%) a median age from 17 to 59 years and 5 (7%) a median age of 60
years or older.
The mean proportion of outbreak cases that were secondary was 0.195 (range 0 to
0.97) and the overall rate of secondary cases per primary case was 0.24. The highest
mean proportion of secondary cases were found in outbreaks with a median age of
cases that was less than six years (0.65: 95% CI=0.60-0.70), followed by outbreaks
with a median age of sixty or more years (0.17: 0.10-0.24), outbreaks with a median
age between 6 and 16 (0.12: 0.10-0.14 and those with a median age between 17 and
59 (0.09: 0.07-0.11).
Figure 7.2: Histogram of the number of ill, confirmed, primary and secondary cases per
outbreak
The histograms of the number of (a )ill, (b) confirmed, (c) primary and (d) secondary cases per
outbreak in the descriptive study (n=90). The vertical dotted line indicates the median.
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The frequency distributions of ill, confirmed, primary and secondary cases are all
strongly positively skewed (Figure 7.2 a - d). The median outbreak size for the study
is 17 ill (range 2 to 738) cases and 13.5 confirmed (range 2 to 501) cases. The
outbreaks have a median of 7 primary cases (range 1 to 398) and a median of two
secondary cases (range 0 to 48).
When the numbers of primary cases in each outbreak were plotted against the
number of secondary cases (Figure 7.3), there was no linear relationship. The
resulting pattern suggests that the majority of outbreaks (81%) have fewer than 50
primary cases and 15 secondary cases, and that the largest numbers of secondary
cases (generally more than 10) are seen in outbreaks with 2 or fewer primary cases or
those with more than 100 primary cases.
Figure 7.3: The numbers of secondary cases plotted against the number of primary cases
The numbers of secondary cases plotted against the number of primary cases on a log (1+x) scale,
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After variable categories were combined or omitted, as described above, to avoid
categories with fewer than five outbreaks 86 outbreaks remained in the data set used
for statistical analyses involving country and 75 for median age (Table 7.1).
Between countries, there is a statistically significant difference in the log-
transformed mean numbers of ill cases (F4)gi=2.8, p=0.033; Table 7.4a).
Table 7.4 a-b: Geometric mean number of ill, confirmed and primary cases and median
number of secondary cases.
The geometric mean number of ill, confirmed and primary cases and median number of secondary
cases by country and median age category are shown. For the geometric means, 95% confidence
intervals are shown and for the medians, range is shown. The last row gives the F or yj and p-
values for the overall difference in the geometric means or medians,
a) by Country (n=86)
III Cases Confirmed Cases Primary Cases SecondaryCases
United States 25.2 (14.7,43.1) 14.5(8.6, 24.6) 6.2 (3.2, 12.2) 2 (2,6)
England & Wales 11.9 (7.9, 17.9) 10.8 (7.5, 15.6) 4.7 (2.8, 7.8) 3(1,7)
Scotland 14.5 (7.5, 31.7) 14.4 (7.5, 27.6) 9.3 (3.9, 21.8) 2 (0,5)
Canada 13.4 (7.2, 24.9) 9.4 (4.8, 18.7) 5.5 (2.3, 13.4) 2(1,5)
Japan 52.9(17.2, 163.3) 43.3 (14.8, 126.4) 23.8 (3.4, 164.2) 3 (0,22)
F4,81=2.8, p=0.033 F4,81=2.1, p=0.082 F4,8i=1.6, p=0.183 X2=1.3,
p=0.859
b) by Median Age Category (n=75)
III Cases Confirmed Cases Primary Cases SecondaryCases
< 6 years 13.9 (9.0, 21.5) 10.4 (6.5, 16.7) 2.0 (1.2, 3.4) 6(3,13)
6-16 years 18.9 (10.2, 35.0) 14.5 (8.5, 25.0) 8.3(4.2, 16.4) 2 (2,4)
17-59 years 20.2 (11.4, 35.7) 13.2 (7.5, 23.1) 10.2 (5.5, 19.0) 2 (0,2)
60+ years 29.5 (9.9, 88.4) 20.7 (11.1, 38.5) 10.9 (1.8, 65.1) 4(0,10)
F3,71=0.6, p—0.639 Faji^O.S, p=0.665 F3,71=5.4, p=0.002 X2=8.4,
p=0.038
Japanese outbreaks have statistically significantly higher log-transformed mean
numbers of ill cases than outbreaks in Canada, England & Wales and Scotland (t<-
2.16, p<0.034; Table 7.4a) and outbreaks in the United States have statistically
significantly higher log-transformed mean numbers of ill cases than those in England
& Wales (1=2.25, p=0.027; Table 7.4a).
In addition, the mean number of primary cases and median number of secondary
cases differ statistically significantly between age categories (F3)7i=5.4, p=0.002;
254
X =8.4, p=0.038; Table 7.4b). Outbreaks with a median age of less than 6 years have
a statistically significantly lower mean number of log transformed primary cases than
outbreaks with a median age between 6 -16, 17-59 or 60+ (t<-2.2, p<0.025; Table
7.4b) and a statistically significantly higher median number of secondary cases than
outbreaks with a median age of 17-59 (p=0.007; Table 7.4c). There is no statistically
significant difference between countries in the proportion of total outbreaks in each
median age category (Fisher's Exact p=0.737; Table 7.5).
Table 7.5: Number of outbreaks, by country and age (n=71)
The number of outbreaks by country (excluding category = other) and age.
Canada England & Japan Scotland United
Wales States
< 6 years 4 6 1 2 6
6-16 years 4 5 1 6 10
17-59 years 4 6 0 3 8
60+ years 1 0 1 2 1
7.3.2 Descriptive summary - mode of primary transmission
Food was the most often reported mode ofprimary transmission (as per the
definitions in 7.2.2.2) (42%), with dairy products (12%) and animal contact (7%) the
next most common modes ofprimary transmission (Table 7.6).
Table 7.6: Outbreaks included in the study, by mode of primary transmission
The outbreaks included in the descriptive study (n=90), split by country. Percentages shown are out
of the total outbreaks in the descriptive study.
Outbreaks (%)
Food 38 (42.2)
Dairy Product 11 (12.2)




Other identified primary modes of transmission were water (6%) and environmental
contact (2%). In approximately 29% of outbreaks, the primary mode of transmission
could not be determined from the information provided in the paper, and thus was
classified as unknown.
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The log-transformed mean numbers of ill (F4 85=6.3, p<0.0001), confirmed
(F4,85=3.1, p=0.021) and primary cases (F4;g5=19.2, p<0.0001) and the median
number of secondary cases (K-W y2=28.2, p<0.0001) differ statistically significantly
between modes ofprimary transmission (Table 7.7).
Table 7.7: Geometric mean number of ill, confirmed and primary cases and median number
of secondary cases.
The geometric mean number of ill, confirmed and primary cases and median number of secondary
cases by mode ofprimary transmission are shown. For the geometric means, 95% confidence
intervals are shown and for the medians, range is shown (n=90). The last row gives the F or y2 and
p-values for the overall difference in the geometric means or medians.
III Cases
Confirmed Cases Primary Cases SecondaryCases
Animal/Environmental 6.7(3.6, 12.7) 6.6(3.5, 12.5) 5.1 (2.4, 10.7) 1 (0,3)
Dairy products 12.0 (5.6, 25.7) 10.4 (4.9, 22.1) 8.1 (3.5, 18.8) 1 (0,5)
Food 33.8 (21.6, 52.8) 20.9(13.4, 32.4) 18.1(11.5, 28.4) 2(1,2)
Water 8.5(4.5, 16.1) 8.3 (4.2, 16.1) 6.3(3.5, 11.5) 1.5(1,6)
Unknown 14.2 (10.5, 19.1) 11.3 (8.2, 15.5) 1.4 (1.0, 2.0) 11 (5,17)
F4,85=6.3, p<0.001 F4,85=3.1, p<0.021 F4j85— 19.2, p<0.001 X2=28.2,
p<0.001
Outbreaks where the primary mode of transmission was food have statistically
significantly higher log-transformed mean numbers of ill and primary cases than
those outbreaks with any other known or unknown primary mode (t>2.03, p<0.045;
Table 7.7), and statistically significantly higher log-transformed mean numbers of
confirmed cases than outbreaks with animal/environmental or unknown modes (t>
2.20, p<0.031; Table 7.7). Additionally, outbreaks where the primary mode is
unknown have statistically significantly lower log-transformed mean numbers of
primary cases (t<-l .28, p<0.005; Table 7.7) and statistically significantly higher
median numbers of secondary cases (p<0.01) than those spread by all other (known)
primary modes.
There are also statistically significant differences in age categories between modes of
primary transmission when the outbreaks with an unknown mode of transmission are
included (Fisher's Exact p=0.004). Outbreaks where food is the mode of primary
transmission are statistically significantly different in terms of age categories from
outbreaks where the primary mode of transmission is water or unknown (p=0.041,
0.001; Table 7.8). There is statistically significant difference in age groups between
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waterborne outbreaks and those with an unknown mode of primary transmission
(p=0.001, Table 7.8).
Table 7.8: Number of outbreaks, by mode of primary transmission and median age group






< 6 years 1 3 2 2 12
6-16 years 6 2 11 3 5
17-59 years 1 3 15 0 4
60+ years 0 0 3 0 2
7.3,3 Descriptive summary -mode of secondary transmission
For descriptive purposes, all 90 outbreaks were considered when considering mode
of secondary transmission. The most common mode of secondary transmission is
person to person within a home (46%), with transmission also commonly occurring
person to person in nurseries (11%) and via water (10%) (Table 7.9). Approximately
one quarter of outbreaks do not have secondary cases (23%).
Table 7.9: Outbreaks included in the study, by mode of secondary transmission (n=90)
The outbreaks included in the descriptive study, split by mode of secondary transmission.
Percentages shown are out of the total outbreaks.
Outbreaks (%)
Person to Person - home 41 (45.6)
Person to Person - nursery 10 (11.1)
Water 9 (10.0)
Person to Person - Institution 4 (4.5)
Person to Person - Other 3(3.3)
Unknown 2 (2.2)
No secondary cases 21 (23.3)
For the statistical analyses of mode of transmission, only the 67 outbreaks with
known mode of secondary transmission were included in the data set. The log-
transformed mean numbers of ill and confirmed cases do not vary statistically
significantly between modes of secondary transmission (F3 63—1.1, p=0.353 and
F3,63=1-3, p=0.285; Table 7.10).
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Table 7.10: Geometric mean number of ill, confirmed and primary cases and median number
of secondary cases
The geometric mean number of ill, confirmed and primary cases and median number of secondary
cases by mode of secondary transmission are shown. For the geometric means, 95% confidence
intervals are shown and for the medians, range is shown (n=67). The last row gives the F or yj and
p-values for the overall difference in the geometric means or medians.
III Cases Confirmed Cases Primary Cases SecondaryCases
P-P home 23.8 (15.7, 36.2) 19.8 (13.4, 29.1) 11.9 (7.2, 19.6) 2 (2,5)
P-P nursery 25.8 (18.0, 37.1) 15.7 (10.2, 24.3) 1.4 (0.8, 2.6) 15.5(9,22)
P-P other 15.5 (5.7, 41.9) 11.2 (5.3, 23.9) 6.0 (1.9, 19.0) 3 (1,10)
Water 11.9 (5.6, 25.5) 9.9 (4.3, 23.0) 1.6 (0.5,4.9) 5 (3,17)
F3,63=1.1, p=0.353 F3,63=1.3, p=0.285 F3.63—8.9, p<0.001 z2=13.9,
p<0.003
However there are statistically significant differences in the log-transformed mean
numbers of primary (F3;63=8.9, p<0.001) and the median numbers of secondary
(p=0.003) cases. Outbreaks where the mode of secondary transmission was person
to person spread in a nursery have statistically significantly lower log-transformed
mean numbers ofprimary cases (t<-2.00, p<0.046), and higher median numbers of
secondary cases (p<0.016) than all other outbreaks with person to person secondary
modes of transmission. In addition, outbreaks with waterborne secondary
transmission have statistically significantly lower log-transformed mean numbers of
primary cases (t=-3.75, p<0.001) and higher median numbers of secondary cases
(p=0.043) than those where secondary transmission was person to person in a home.
There are also statistically significant differences in age categories between modes of
secondary transmission whether or not the outbreaks with an unknown mode of
transmission are included (Fisher's Exact p<0.001; Table 7.11).
Table 7.11: Number of outbreaks, by mode of secondary transmission and median age group
The number of outbreaks by mode of secondary transmission and median age group (n=75). PTP =
person to person
PTP home PTP nursery PTP other Water Unknown
< 6 years 7 8 1 2 0
6-16 years 17 1 1 4 0
17-59 years 10 0 1 2 2
60+ years 0 0 3 0 0
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Outbreaks in which the secondary mode of transmission was person to person in a
nursery had statistically significant differences in median age categories as compared
to outbreaks spread by all other secondary modes of transmission (p<0.030).
Additionally, outbreaks in which the secondary mode of transmission was person to
person in a home had statistically significantly different counts in median age
categories than outbreaks where the secondary mode was person to person other
(p=0.003).
7.3.4 Rate of secondary cases in relation to primary cases.
7.3.4.1 Country and age -univariate models
Country
There is no statistically significant overall difference between countries in the rate of
secondary cases to primary cases (F4,8i=1.4, p=0.232; Figure 7.4).
Figure 7.4: Rate of secondary outbreak cases per primary case, by country
The rate of secondary outbreak cases per primary case, by country, shown on the log (1+x) scale.
The means and 95% confidence intervals - indicated by the bars - are calculated from the univariate
GLM model using back transformation of the parameter and standard errors. For Canada n=13,

































A statistically significant overall difference in the rate of secondary cases to primary
cases exists between age categories (F3;7i=8.9, p<0.001), with outbreaks of a median
case age of less than six years having a significantly higher rate of secondary cases to
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primary cases than outbreaks with a median case age of 6-16 years (x =25.2,
p<0.001) and 17-59 years (x2=18.8, p<0.001; Figure 7.5).
Figure 7.5: Rate of secondary outbreak cases per primary case, by median age category
The rate of secondary outbreak cases per primary case, by median age category, shown on the log
(1+x) scale. The means and 95% confidence intervals - indicated by the bars - are calculated from
the univariate GLM model using back transformation of the parameter and standard errors. For <6
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7.3.4.2 Mode of primary transmission -univariate models
Mode of primary transmission
There is a statistically significant difference between modes ofprimary transmission
in the rate of secondary cases to primary cases (F4,85= 37.9, p<0.001; Figure 7.6).
Outbreaks in which the mode ofprimary transmission is unknown have statistically
significantly higher rates of secondary cases than outbreaks with all other modes (x
> 2.6, p<0.002). When the outbreaks with unknown modes of primary transmission
are omitted, there is still a statistically significant difference in secondary case rates
(F3,60= 6.7, p=0.030) with waterborne outbreaks having statistically significantly
higher rates of secondary cases than foodborne outbreaks (x2=8.6, p=0.003).
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Figure 7.6: Rate of secondary outbreak cases per primary case, by mode of primary
transmission
The rate of secondary outbreak cases per primary case, by mode ofprimary transmission shown on
the log (1+x) scale. The means and 95% confidence intervals - indicated by the bars - are calculated
from the univariate GLM model using back transformation of the parameter and standard errors.
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7.3.4.3 Mode of primary transmission - multivariate models
No analysis was possible for the model with the three way interaction between Mode
ofPrimary Transmission, Country and Median Age because there was a lack of
counts for some mode-country-median age categories. When the variables Mode of
Primary Transmission, Country and Median Age Category are all included in the
model without an interaction term (Table 7.12), there are statistically significant
differences in the rate of secondary cases between modes of primary
transmission(p<0.001) and between median age categories (p<0.001; Table 7.12).
However, if the outbreaks for which the mode ofprimary transmission is unknown
are excluded, the differences are no longer statistically significant (p>0.165; Table
7.12).
There are no statistically significant interactions between pairs of the variables (e.g.
Primary Mode & Country, Primary Mode & Median Age and Country & Median
Age) (p>0.120; Table 7.12), whether or not the outbreaks with an unknown mode of
primary transmission are included. However, in the two analyses with two way
interactions including Mode of Primary Transmission (Primary Mode & Country and
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Primary Mode & Median Age), the overall differences in rates of secondary to
primary cases between modes of primary transmission are statistically significant
(p<0.001; Table 7.12).
Table 7.12: P-values for multivariate analyses including Mode of Primary Transmission
P-values for the multivariate analyses including Mode ofPrimary Transmission (ModeP). The
column for 'With Unknown' includes outbreaks for which the mode of primary transmission was
unknown N indicates the number of outbreaks included in the analyses, listed for analyses including
and excluding outbreaks with an unknown mode ofprimary transmission. *** indicates an analysis
that could not be performed because of a lack of particular interaction categories, and — indicates
analyses that were not applicable. A indicates interaction between terms, a "+" indicates terms
in the model without any interaction.
N With Unknown Without
Unknown
ModeP * County * Median Age — *** ***
















Country * Median Age 71
***








Country + Median Age 71 Country p=0.479
Age p<0.001
In both analyses, when the interaction terms are removed, all the terms were
statistically significant (p<0.012; Table 7.12). When Mode of Primary Transmission
and Median Age only are included in the analysis, outbreaks in which the median age
was less than 6 had statistically significantly higher rates than those of any other age
(p<0.040) and those with a median age from 6 to 16 have a statistically significantly
higher rate than those where the median age was 17 to 59 (p<0.026). When Mode of
Primary Transmission and Median Age or Mode of Transmission and Country were
included in the analysis, outbreaks where the mode of primary transmission was
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unknown have a statistically significantly higher rate of secondary to primary cases
than outbreaks with all other modes of primary transmission (all p<0.001). When the
outbreaks for which the mode of primary transmission is unknown were excluded,
none of the terms are statistically significant (p>0.131; Table 7.12).
In addition, when only Country and Median Age are included the model, there are
statistically significant differences in the ratio of secondary to primary cases between
median age categories: the rate of secondary cases in outbreaks with a median age <
6 is statistically significantly higher than in those outbreaks with median case ages
from 6 to 16 and from 17 to 59 (p<0.01). However, there is no overall statistically
significant difference in the rate of secondary to primary cases between countries
(p=0.479).
7.3.4.4 Mode of secondary transmission - univariate models
There is a statistically significant difference between modes of secondary
transmission in the rate of secondary cases to primary cases (F3!63= 13.0, p<0.001;
Figure 7.7).
Figure 7.7: Rate of secondary outbreak cases per primary case, by mode of secondary
transmission
The rate of secondary outbreak cases per primary case, by mode of secondary transmission, shown
on the log (1+x) scale. The means and 95% confidence intervals - indicated by the bars - are
calculated from the univariate GLM model using back transformation of the parameter and standard
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Outbreaks where the mode of secondary transmission is person to person spread in a
nursery setting have statistically significantly higher rates of secondary cases to
primary cases than those where secondary transmission was by person to person
spread in a home or other setting, or by water (p<0.007). Outbreaks where the mode
of secondary transmission is water have a statistically significantly higher rate of
secondary cases than those where secondary transmission is via person to person
spread in a home (p=0.002).
7.3.4.5 Mode of secondary transmission - multivariate models
Again, the analysis could not be conducted when all three variables (Mode of
Secondary Transmission, Country and Median Age) are included in the model with
interaction terms. If the interaction terms are removed, there are statistically
significant differences in the rate of secondary cases between modes of secondary
transmission (p<0.001; Table 7.13) and between median age categories (p<0.001;
Table 7.13).
Table 7.13: P-values for multivariate analyses including Mode of Secondary Transmission
P-values for the multivariate analyses including Mode of Secondary Transmission (ModeS). The
column for 'With Unknown' includes outbreaks for which the mode of primary transmission was
unknown N indicates th e number of outbreaks included in the analyses, listed for analyses including
and excluding outbreaks with an unknown mode of primary transmission. *** indicates an analysis
that could not be performed because of a lack of particular interaction categories, and — indicates
analyses that were not applicable. A indicates interaction between terms, a "+" indicates terms
in the model without any interaction.
N With Unknown
ModeS * County * Median Age — ***
ModeS + County + Median Age 57 ModeS p<0.001
Country p<0.001
Age p=0.756
ModeS * Country 64 Interaction p=0.720
ModeS p=0.004
Country p=0.695
ModeS * Median Age 57 Interaction p=0.158
ModeS p=0.114
Age p=0.210
ModeS + Country 64 ModeS p<0.001
Country p=0.468
ModeS + Median Age 57 ModeS p<0.001
Age p<0.001
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When Mode of Secondary Transmission and Country are included in the model,
there is no statistically significant interaction (p=0.711; Table 7.13), but whether or
not the interaction terms is kept in the model, there is a statistically significant
differences in secondary case between modes of secondary transmission (p<0.001;
Table 7.13). As compared to outbreaks where secondary transmission was through
person to person spread in nurseries or through water, outbreaks where secondary
transmission was due to person to person spread in the home have statistically
significantly lower secondary case ratios(p<0.002).
When Mode of Secondary Transmission and Median Age are included in the model
with an interaction term, none of the terms were statistically significant (p>0.114),
but if the interaction term is removed, there are statistically significant differences in
the rate of secondary to primary cases between both modes of secondary
transmission and median age categories (p<0.001). There is a statistically
significantly higher secondary case ratio in outbreaks with a median age of less than
6 as compared to those with median ages of 6-16 and 17- 59 (p<0.001). In addition,
outbreaks where the mode of secondary transmission was person to person in a home
had statistically significantly lower rates of secondary to primary cases than
outbreaks where secondary transmission was person to person in a nursery or
through water (p<0.001).
7.4 Discussion
The results presented here provide what is believed to be the first large-scale
systematic descriptive and statistical analysis of primary and particularly secondary
cases in E. coli 0157 outbreaks detailed in the published literature. These analyses
suggest that there is a statistically significant relationship between the rate of
secondary cases and modes of primary transmission, modes of secondary
transmission and median age. However, there appears to be no such relationship
between the rate of secondary cases and country. The results suggest that mode of
secondary transmission and median age are the most important predictors of
secondary case numbers and ratio of secondary to primary cases.
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7.4.1 Issues with the data
However, some caution must be taken in interpreting these results. Firstly data
availability was limited; for example, out ofmore than 350 outbreaks in the United
States between 1982 and 2006 (Rangel et al. 2005)(official United States outbreak
data set, Elizabeth Blanton, CDC), fewer than thirty are included in our analyses. As
a result, the distribution of the outbreaks in our study between countries and modes
of transmission may not be the same as the distributions in the population which
includes all outbreaks reported to national surveillance organizations of countries
included in this study. The actual number of outbreaks that have been reported to
national surveillance organizations since 1982 varies considerably between countries,
from fewer than five in Sweden (Soderstrom et al. 2005; Wahl & Andersson 2004;
Welinder-Olsson et al. 2004; Ziese et al. 1996), to more than 90 in Scotland (Cowden
1997b; Locking et al. 2003c; Locking et al. 2004; Locking et al. 2006a) and more
than 350 in the United States (Rangel et al. 2005). Thus while 40% of Swedish
outbreaks are included in the study, fewer than 10% ofUnited States outbreaks and
less than 20% of Scottish outbreaks are included. Further, the study population
(n=90) is biased towards outbreaks from the United States and England & Wales and
towards outbreaks that are detailed in the literature published in English. Thus it is
known that many Japanese outbreaks are not included. Additionally, the study
population was limited to outbreaks in countries with developed surveillance
programs. However, the distribution of outbreaks by mode of transmission in this
study is similar to the proportion in reported outbreaks in the United States, Scotland
and England & Wales. For instance, food was the mode of transmission in
approximately 42% of outbreaks reported in Scotland from 1990-2004, 47% in the
United States from 1982-2002, 38% in England & Wales from 1996-2005 (out of
those with a known mode of transmission) and 45% in this study (Cowden 1997b;
Rangel et al. 2005; SCIEH 1997a; SCIEH 1998b; SC1EH 2000b; SCIEH 2001b;
SCIEH 2002d; SCIEH 2003c; Smith-Palmer et al. 2005; Smith-Palmer & Cowden
2004; Willshaw et al. 2006). Thus, except for the geometric mean ill results
discussed below, the differences between the outbreak dataset for this study and the
population of all reported outbreaks appear to be minimal. Therefore the data set is
considered appropriate for the study. However the results from the study should only
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be extrapolated to the population of reported outbreaks since the complete population
of all outbreaks may be very different from that of those reported.
However, other factors should be considered in discussion of the results. Firstly
because the decision whether to classify a case as primary or secondary was made
based upon the information provided in each publication or report, the definition of a
secondary case in this thesis may differ from that reported in some outbreak
investigations (Cowden et al. 2001; Friedman et al. 1999). In many of these
investigations, secondary cases were generally defined as being close and/or family
contacts ofprimary cases (Bell et al. 1994; Friedman et al. 1999). In this chapter, all
nursery and waterbome cases other than the index case(s) whom introduced the case
into the nursery or contaminated the swimming water are considered secondary
cases. Thus, the proportion of secondary cases in these outbreaks may be much
higher than the proportion calculated when other definitions are used.
The 90 outbreaks included in the descriptive and statistical sections of our study,
with a geometric mean of 13.5 (95% CI = 10.6, 17.1) confirmed cases, were on
average, statistically significantly larger than the populations of reported outbreaks in
the included countries, such as Scotland (4.1: 3.3-5.1) (1996-2003, Health
Protection Scotland official outbreak data set) and United States (5.5: 4.9-6.2) (1996-
2003, CDC official outbreak data set). This difference was anticipated because
larger outbreaks are more likely to be reported in the literature. Large outbreaks
have an increased likelihood of being reported because they are likely to be more
thoroughly investigated. In addition, outbreaks with large numbers of cases are
suited to case-control studies, which are carried out in many investigations detailed
in published papers on E. coli 0157 outbreaks (Allaby & Mayon-White 1995;
Ostroff et al. 1990). Due to the bias, the results of this study are more likely to be
representative of larger outbreaks. However, it is not known how the inclusion of
smaller outbreaks would influence the rate of secondary cases. If smaller outbreaks
are more likely to have secondary cases, the analyses would likely underestimate the
rate of secondary cases because when the number of secondary cases is constant, the
smaller the outbreak, the higher rate of secondary cases to primary cases. For the
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same reason, if smaller outbreaks are less likely to have secondary cases, the
analyses would overestimate the rate of secondary cases.
Since all of the outbreak reports on Japanese outbreaks mention asymptomatic cases,
while many reports from other countries included in this chapter do not, it would
appear that investigations that included broad-based screening of potential case
patients and their contacts, such as those in Japan, are more likely to pick up
asymptomatic cases. Studies have indicated that as many as 40% of secondary cases
may be asymptomatic (Parry & Salmon 1998), and that secondary cases are, in
general, less likely to have severe symptoms (Bell et al. 1994). As a result, the
number of secondary cases reported may depend greatly on the level of testing and
epidemiological study. Thus investigation into the rates and characteristics of
asymptomatic cases in outbreaks would help in better understanding the true
numbers and rates ofprimary and secondary cases.
Additionally, since many statistical tests have been performed in this chapter, the
issue ofmultiple-testing must be considered. As discussed in Section 2.3.5.1, when a
large number of tests of significance are performed, there is an increased risk of false
positives. For this chapter, many of the same techniques to adjust and account for
multiple testing presented in Section 2.3.5.1 were used. These include the use of F-
tests for more conservative estimates of statistical significance, testing for overall
statistical significance between categorical variables before examining contrasts and
the presentation of actual significance values.
7.4.2 Exploration of the results
One of the most interesting findings in this chapter is the lack of statistically
significant differences between countries in variables such as secondary case rate.
Despite the fact that the countries in this study vary widely in factors which may
affect infection transmission and frequency, such as population, population density
and size, there were no overall statistically significant differences between countries
in the mean number of confirmed, secondary and primary cases, in the median case
age or in the rate of secondary cases. The statistically significantly higher mean
number of ill cases in Japanese outbreaks could result from the investigative
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practices in Japan (Sakuma et al. 2006). Japanese outbreak investigations can
involve interviews and testing of all work, school and/or family contacts of known
cases, thus increasing the number of ill cases recorded as part of the outbreak
(Akashi et al. 1994; Sugiyama et al. 2005). This lack of statistically significant
differences between countries suggest that outbreak size and rate of secondary cases
are likely to be determined by more epidemiological factors or risks that are
relatively independent of country, such as age and mode of transmission.
Indeed, the results of our analyses indicate that both mode of secondary transmission
and median age are a statistically significant determinant in the rate of secondary
cases. In particular, outbreaks where the mode of secondary transmission was person
to person spread in nurseries are unique from those spread by other means in having
statistically significantly higher median numbers of secondary cases and statistically
significantly higher rates of secondary cases. The association between outbreaks in
nurseries and secondary cases has been noted (Armstrong et al. 1996; Coia 1998b;
Coia 1999), but this study is the first to statistically test and quantify this association,
and to note statistical differences in secondary case rates between other modes of
secondary transmission.
These findings can be explained, in part, by the ease of transmission between infants
and toddlers in nursery settings, where close contact of persons with poor personal
hygiene skills, and a higher likelihood of shedding the bacteria for extended periods
of time (Swerdlow & Griffin 1997) provides many opportunities for direct or
indirect transmission of contaminated faecal materials (Coia 1998b). Further
transmission then occurs through contact with the nursery pupils by teachers, parents
and siblings, though the majority of cases in nursery outbreaks are the nursery pupils
themselves (Al-Jader et al. 1999; Allaby & Mayon-White 1995; Cheasty et al. 1998;
Incident Control Team NHS Fife 2007; Public Health Laboratory Service 2000a;
Sugiyama et al. 2005).
While secondary cases have been noted in outbreaks linked to primary and secondary
schools (Belongia et al. 1991; Michino et al. 1998; SCIEH 1999), secondary
transmission in these outbreaks seems limited to family members (Belongia et al.
1991; Michino et al. 1998; SCIEH 1999). This suggests that that older pupils may
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have good enough hygiene skills (Eves et al. 2006) to prevent transmission outside
settings of close family contact (i.e. primary school pupils are highly likely not to be
wearing diapers, to be toilet trained, to be able to reach sinks and soap dispensers
etc.). Also, all of the primary or secondary school outbreaks included in this study
were thought to be the result of contaminated food consumed by students at the
school (Belongia et al. 1991; Michino et al. 1998; SCIEH 1999). In contrast, all the
nursery outbreaks in this study were suspected to have been triggered by the presence
of one or more pupils infected outside the nursery (Allaby & Mayon-White 1995;
Belongia et al. 1991; Belongia et al. 1993; Galanis et al. 2003). Residential facilities
such as nursing and care homes are also are common locations for outbreaks
involving secondary transmission (Coia 1998b; Griffin & Tauxe 1991). However,
as with the primary/secondary school outbreaks, the majority of cases in the care
home outbreaks in this study resulted from ingestion of contaminated food with
subsequent secondary transmission (Lior 1983; Reiss et al. 2006).
The analyses in this study suggest that the mechanism(s) behind these differences in
secondary case rates between secondary modes of transmission is likely to be linked
to the age of infected persons. The results in this chapter provide evidence for the
link to age. For instance, ifmedian age is added to the model containing mode of
secondary transmission, outbreaks where the mode of secondary transmission was
person to person in a nursery no longer have statistically significantly higher rates of
secondary case than outbreaks where secondary transmission was via water.
However, outbreaks with secondary transmission through person to person contact in
the home still have statistically significantly lower secondary case ratios that those
outbreaks spread by water or person to person contact in the nursery. In addition,
lower median age was associated with a higher rate of secondary cases, with
outbreaks with a median age of less than 6 years having statistically significantly
higher rates of secondary cases that those outbreaks where median age was 6-16 and
17 - 59. Association between young age and high rates of secondary transmission
has been noted in a study where index cases under the age of 15 were mostly likely
to transmit infection to a household contact, with household contacts between 1 and
4 years old the most likely to become infected (Parry & Salmon 1998).
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Initially, the mode ofprimary transmission appeared to have a statistically significant
role in determining the rate of secondary transmission. However, comparison of
results from analyses including and excluding outbreaks where the primary mode of
transmission was unknown revealed that all the statistically significant differences in
secondary case rates were between the unknown outbreaks and outbreaks in one of
the known mode categories. The statistically significantly higher ratio of secondary
to primary cases in outbreaks with unknown modes of primary transmission is most
likely caused by the secondary transmission related characteristics of these
outbreaks. More than two-thirds of outbreaks where the primary mode of
transmission was not known involved secondary spread through nursery person to
person contact or recreational water ( (Ackman et al. 1997; Allaby & Mayon-White
1995; Friedman et al. 1999; Paunio et al. 1999; Sugiyama et al. 2005)), the two
modes of secondary transmission categories with the highest rates of secondary
cases. Therefore it is not unexpected there would be a high rate of secondary cases
amongst outbreaks of unknown primary mode of transmission
When the unknowns were excluded, outbreaks where water was the mode of primary
transmission had a statistically significantly higher rate of secondary cases than those
spread by food. The fact that all of the outbreaks in which water was the primary
mode of transmission had a median age of 16 or under, suggests that the difference in
secondary rates between waterborne and foodborne outbreaks is related to the age of
the infected persons. Thus, it would appear that age is likely to be one of the
predominant factors in determining the rate of secondary transmission.
7.4.3 Implications for public health practice
The results of the study in this chapter indicate that the median age of infected
persons and the mode of secondary transmission are statistically significant factors in
determining the rate of secondary case transmission. Statistically significantly higher
rates of secondary transmission were associated with person to person spread within
nurseries and via water, as well with outbreaks where the median age was less than 6
years. It should be noted that the outbreaks included in the study appeared to be
statistically significantly larger than those in the total population of reported
outbreaks, thus the results may not encompass all outbreaks. In particular, the
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secondary spread within outbreaks solely within private homes, which by nature tend
to be small and not published in the literature due to privacy concerns, may not be
properly represented in these analyses. Nonetheless, the results as summarised
above, suggest that prevention measures aimed at reducing person to person
transmission in nurseries and swimming areas (natural or pool) as well as other
locations where young children are likely to be involved would help to reduce the
size of outbreaks and reduce the overall number of infections.
Such measures, as suggested by the recommendations of the 2001 Task Force on E.
coli 0157 (Task Force on E.coli 0157 2001), include promoting good personal
hygiene, especially hand-washing in settings such as nurseries and playgroups. This
has been done in Scotland through the Food Standard Agency's "Food Hygiene"
campaign (Food Standards Agency 2007) with similar programs in other countries
such as Canada and the United States. Additionally, with a specific focus on
nurseries, recommendations which have been put into action are the exclusion of all
infected or probably infected children as well as contact siblings under age 5 from
nurseries. Prompt recognition of symptoms and exclusion of suspected cases is vital,
which requires education of both nursery staff and parents. Given the risks to such
young children, firm regulation of nurseries in terms of hygiene standards and
education ofparents as to the risk involved with non-licensed nurseries, would seem
advisable.
Whilst transmission via animal contact was not specifically addressed in this study
due to a lack of reports on such outbreaks that met the conditions for inclusion, the
results suggest that the measures to reduce animal to human transmission, such as the
"Shedding Light on E. colE program (Scottish Executive 2007b) and those set out in
the United States (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2007b) should be
continued and promoted. The support for such measures comes from the findings
that outbreaks in which the median age is less than 5, young children frequently
being part of trips to open farms and other locations where animal contact is
prevalent and less likely to be able to maintain good hygiene, have a statistically
significantly higher rate of secondary transmission. Another important measure, as
recommended by the task force, is educating parents who work with animals to
272
remove work clothes prior to contact with children and keep such garments where
they cannot be accessed by children.
Finally, the demonstration of higher rates of secondary transmission via water in this
study also suggests that measures to promote proper hygiene in pools and natural
swimming areas (beaches, lakes and rivers) should continue to be promoted. Again
outbreaks in such facilities are likely to involve children, and it is important to reduce
the risk of human faecal material from entering the water. Strict measures should be
in place to prevent un-toilet trained babies and toddlers from entering pools and
public bathing facilities, including signage and withdrawal of usage privileges from
patrons who abuse the regulations. Since it is not feasible or desirable to prevent
families with young children to visit swimming facilities, alternatives should be
provided for young children such as specific toddler pools which are carefully
monitored and cleaned regularly and/or staffed creches for babies. Additionally, and
vitally, parents and pool staffmust be educated as to the risk faecal contamination
presents in swimming facilities. This includes for the staff and managers the need
for chlorine levels to be carefully monitored, for both parents and staff, the need for
contamination promptly reported to staff and the need to (and reasons why) children
with current of very recent bouts of diarrhoea should be excluded from public
bathing facilities. Many of these measures are included in current programs like the
CDC's "Healthy Swimming" (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2007c),
and should be continued and enhanced as appropriate for the needs and existing
regulations of each region or country.
7.4.4 Conclusion
This chapter provides the first multi-country quantitative description and analysis of
secondary cases in E. coli 0157 outbreaks in Scotland, England & Wales, Canada,
the United States, Japan and Scandinavia during the last two decades. The results of
this study indicate that approximately 19% of outbreak cases are secondary,
supporting earlier reports that "secondary transmission after point-source outbreaks
ofE. coli 0157:H7 is common" (Armstrong et al. 1996), but suggests that modes of
secondary transmission and median age, rather than country are important in
determining the secondary case characteristics ofE. coli 0157 outbreaks.
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Statistically significant differences in rates of secondary cases were found between
modes of secondary transmission, specifically between outbreaks spread through
person to person contact in nurseries and all other modes, as well as between
outbreaks where the median age was less than 6 and those with a median age of 6 -
16 or 17 - 59. The statistically significantly higher rates of secondary transmission in
outbreaks with low median ages and secondary transmission through person to
person spread in nurseries confirms the importance of simple, but effective strategies
to prevent person to person spread amongst children (Al-Jader et al. 1999; Scottish
Executive 2007b). The reasons behind these differences, however, are likely to be
complex, and further research using more comprehensive outbreak reports, and
including other variables such as location would help further elucidate the reasons
for the differences that have been described.
In the next chapter, Chapter 8, the issue of under-reporting ofE. coli infections will
be discussed and a framework for estimating the true prevalence of infections will be
presented and tested using data from Scotland.
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Chapter 8 — A framework for estimating the true
prevalence ofli. coli 0157 in Scotland
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8.1 Introduction
Data from a number of studies, detailed in Section 1.9.1, suggests that the majority of
cases of infectious intestinal disease are not reported (Cumberland et al. 2003;
Wheeler et al. 1999). In particular, E. coli 0157 cases in countries such as the
United States, Canada and England & Wales are under-reported to surveillance
agencies at rates of up to 98% (Adak et al. 2002; Bender et al. 2004; Mead et al.
1999; Michel et al. 2000). In order for a case ofE. coli 0157 to be reported via
active or passive surveillance, it must pass through a number of steps which can be
illustrated in 'reporting triangles'. Examples of triangles for general infectious
intestinal illness were discussed in Section 1.9.2, but the steps for E. coli 0157 in
particular are illustrated in Figure 7.1.
Figure 8.1: Reporting triangle for E. coli 0157
Generally reporting triangle for E. coli 0157 showing the seven stages from infection to reporting
A person infected with E. coli 0157 first has to have a symptomatic infection, and
the symptoms must be serious enough to cause the person to be seen by a GP or other
medical professional. Once an infected person seeks medical care, the medical
practitioner has to take a sample (usually faecal), and the laboratory must test the
sample for E. coli Ol 57, and the test be sensitive enough to pick up the presence of
the bacteria, toxin or antigen (see 1.4.5). Then to be reported, the test must be
positive for E. coli 0157 and the national surveillance agency notified by the
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laboratory or other related medical personnel (Angulo et al. 1998; MacDougall et al.
2007).
Estimates for the actual prevalence ofE. coli 0157 cases have been calculated in
national and regional studies, introduced in Section 1.9.1 (Michel et al. 2000;
Thomas et al. 2006; Wheeler et al. 1999). These studies used physician, laboratory
and population surveys combined with other data to calculate the approximate
number of cases that are lost to the surveillance system at each step of the triangle
(Michel et al. 2000). The IID study (see Section 1.9.1) indicated that 50% ofE. coli
0157 cases in England & Wales were picked up by surveillance. In the United
States, sporadic E. coli 0157 infection rates in FoodNet surveillance sites were
estimated through the use of series of patient, physician and laboratory surveys, and
results suggested that 2-9% of cases were detected via FoodNet active surveillance
(Bender et al. 2004; Hedberg et al. 1997). This calculation was later used to estimate
that there are approximately 73,480 E. coli 0157 cases per year in the United States
(Mead et al. 1999). Another study of the FoodNet network indicated that stool
samples were only collected for about one third of outbreaks where the etiology was
not known, and just over half the time these samples were tested for E. coli 0157
(Jones et al. 2004). Based up these studies and data from other papers (Angulo et
al. 1998; Belongia et al. 1993; Deneen et al. 1998b; Imhoff et al. 2004; Michel et al.
2000; Voetsch et al. 2004a), a reporting triangle was constructed (as part of this
chapter) for the United States (Fig. 7.2).
Figure 8.2: Reporting triangle for E. coli 0157 in the Untied States












Using two models - one based upon adjusting for under-reporting at each level of the
reporting triangle and the other based upon hospitalization data - Canadian
researchers posited that for each case reported in Ontario, 4-8 cases were not
reported (12-22% are reported)(Fig. 7.3) (Michel et al. 2000).
Figure 8.3: Reporting triangles for Canada
Reporting triangles for Canada based upon (a) all data from Michel et al 2000 and (b) data on
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A later study based on results from the National Studies ofAcute Gastrointestinal
Illness (NSAGI)(see Section 1.9.1), in which data was recorded from two provinces
for the population study and nationwide for the laboratory study, resulted in higher
estimates ofunder-reporting (Thomas et al. 2006). The estimates, ranging from 2%
to 9%, are similar to those found in the above mentioned United States FoodNet
study. No study estimating prevalence in Scotland has been published, thus it is not
known whether the high reported rates (Locking et al. 2003b) are true or merely a
reflection of a high rate of infection detection.
Flowever, the above methods of calculating E. coli 0157 prevalence provide only
rough estimates of true prevalence and the techniques have a number of
inadequacies. For instance, estimation of occurrence based upon stepwise
calculation of the proportion of cases lost to the surveillance system is dependant on
the level of uncertainty in the accuracy of the data and/formulas used (Michel et al.
2000). As an example, some formulas and entire estimates were based either on
sporadic (Bender et al. 2004) or outbreak (Michel et al. 2000) cases (see Section
1.6.6 for information on outbreak and sporadic cases). Thus, the results may not be
applicable to actual populations in which cases are distributed between outbreaks and
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sporadic cases. Further, the IID calculations were based on just one case of E. coli
0157 infection detected in the course of the study. Since the total study population
was not more than 459,975, and the rate ofE. coli 0157 infection in England &
Wales has been above 1 case per 100,000 since 1996 (Locking et al. 2003b), the
study appears to have undercounted even the number of reported cases. It is thus
unlikely to have provided an accurate representation of the true prevalence of
confirmed cases in England & Wales. In addition, in terms of identifying the patient
population which has the potential to seek medical care, there is no set definition as
to what constitutes an E. coli 0157 illness. In some studies, symptoms were defined
as bloody diarrhoea (Bender et al. 2004; Hedberg et al. 1997), whilst some formulas
took both bloody and non-bloody diarrhoea into account (Michel et al. 2000), and
others involved all persons with any symptoms of infectious intestinal disease
(Cumberland et al. 2003). Finally, all of the studies involved only a limited
geopolitical region - Ontario in Canada, and the FoodNet regions in Oregon,
California, Connecticut, Georgia and Minnesota in the United States - and thus the
estimates based on data from these regions may not be applicable to regions where
surveillance, diagnostic, medical practices or even underlying infection rates differ.
The development of a more accurate technique for estimating E. coli 0157
prevalence is of considerable importance to public health epidemiologists and
economists because incomplete knowledge about the true prevalence makes it
difficult to allocate resources for prevention, treatment and research, and to gauge the
effectiveness of and biases in surveillance efforts (Silk & Berkelman 2005; Thomas
et al. 2006). More informed allocation of resources is particularly important in
countries where there has been a historically high rate ofE. coli 0157 infection, and
a significant financial impact from outbreaks (Roberts et al. 2000). As a result,
estimating the true prevalence in Scotland, which has had some of the highest rates
of infection in the world (Locking et al. 2003b; O'Brien et al. 2001b), and for which
no studies estimating the degree of under-reporting have been published, would be of
particular interest. Data from Scotland is particularly suited for prevalence
estimation because outbreak and sporadic case data has been collected via a
centralised, consistent and comprehensive surveillance program since 1996. As a
result, the data on Scottish outbreaks and cases is less likely than that in Canada or
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the United States to be affected by biases created by both changes in surveillance
systems and variations in surveillance within a country. In analyses of temporal
trends such as those in Chapters 2-6, these biases can be corrected for, or the effects
of the biases considered in the interpretation of results. However in this chapter, the
data is considered as a single distribution of outbreak sizes, and thus to correct for
biases is more difficult. Additionally, single case data - the source of sporadic case
counts - in the United States and Canada is captured by systems very distinct from
outbreak data (CDC 2007), as compared to Scotland, where all E. coli 0157 data is
collected by closely linked systems. In this chapter, a new framework for estimating
prevalence will be explored. The framework will be tested in order to determine
whether it has potential for use with Scottish data, and thus to be further developed
into a proper model. If the approach proves appropriate, it may lead to a model that
can overcome many of the uncertainties involved with estimations based on
sequential and hospital data and thus provide further insight into the extent ofE. coli
0157 detection in Scotland and in other countries where outbreak and sporadic data
is available. In addition the framework may have applications in estimating
prevalence for other infectious diseases including Salmonella and Campylobacter,
for which as explained in Chapter 1, case numbers are underreported. Finally, the
results of the framework exploration will be discussed with relation to the known
issues regarding the Scottish data, and the biological distributions that underlie the
best fits for the framework.
8.2 Materials and methods
The framework for estimating prevalence ofE. coli 0157 in Scotland that is
presented in this thesis is based on the fact that each E. coli 0157 event (an incident
of is. coli 0157 infection, whether a single case or a group of epidemiologically
linked cases) is either detected or not detected, but not every case is necessarily
detected. Therefore, a proportion of events are only partially detected - i.e. not all
cases in the event are detected, and thus each event has a detected size and an actual
size, which may not be the same. The framework uses a matrix, shown in Figure 8.4,
which allows the proportion of total cases comprised of each combination of actual
size (x) and detected size (y, where y<x) to be calculated.
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The equation for each actual and detected size combination within the matrix is
constructed through several steps. Firstly, the matrix is split into rows by the
probability of actual event occurrence (p(x)), which is presented as a distribution,
and into columns by the detected event size (y). The conditional probability for each
detected event size is represented through an expansion of the binomial distribution
since the probability of detection is binomial - an event is either detected or not
detected at a certain size. These conditional probabilities multiplied by p(x) give the
probabilities of particular observed numbers of cases from each event size. Within
the binomial equations, the probability of detection of a case (X) is also expressed as
a function of the event size. The selection of distributions/functions will be discussed
later in Methods and Materials (Section 8.3.1). These proportions (out of all detected
events, e.g. detected size >1) for each detected event size (i.e. column) are then
summed to produce a summary table and bar plot of the distribution of the
proportions of sizes of detected events. In the bar plot, each bar is split to indicate
for each detected event size, the proportion for each actual event size. This plot can
then be compared to the plot of the proportion of event sizes in Scotland from 1996 -
2004 (Fig. 8.5).
Figure 8.5: Plot of the proportions of events, by size: Scotland 1996 - 2004
A plot showing the proportions ofE. coli 0157 events, by size, in Scotland from 1996 to 2004.































Additionally, in the summary table, the proportions are multiplied by the number of
observed events (1996 - 2004) to create tables of counts by event size (see Table 8.1)
which can be compared with the real event counts for the same time period.
Distributions or functions (for both the probability of actual event size and event
detection) and values for parameters in these distributions which are suggested both
by actual biological mechanisms and by data from Scotland are used. The aim in
using such distributions/functions is to see whether it is possible to create a detected
size probability distribution for events that matches closely to the proportions
observed in Scotland. Since the observed distribution in Scotland only shows events
that are detected (size>0), the distribution created in the framework is adjusted so
that the proportions are only out of those events that are at least detected size one
(i.e. detected events). If a distribution constructed using the framework that matches
the observed distribution, then the actual prevalence of events can be estimated. The
actual number of events is estimated from the proportion of events that are detected
as size zero (i.e. not detected) in the unadjusted data and the number of events that
took place during the study period. Actual case prevalence is calculated by then
multiplying the number of events that are not detected by the proportions of those
events that are of each actual event size. For instance, if 100 events went undetected,
and 50 of those were of actual size 1, and 50 were of actual size 2, there would be
50x1 + 50x2 or 150 cases that went undetected, so the true number of cases would be
the number of detected cases plus 150.
8.2.1 Data sets
All data on confirmed (ill and positive) cases ofE. coli 0157 in Scotland for 1996 to
2004 was taken from reports issued by HPS, with outbreak data from the yearly
Surveillance of Outbreaks of Infectious Intestinal Disease reports (SCIEH 1997a;
SCIEH 2000b) and data on sporadic cases from the HPS website. Sporadic cases are
those cases which are not epidemiologically linked to any cases other than those




An event is considered to be a single incident ofE. coli 0157 infection, either a
sporadic case or an outbreak.
Detected case/event
A detected case is defined as a laboratory confirmed case ofE. coli 0157 that is
reported to Health Protection Scotland, and a detected event as an event involving at
least one laboratory confirmed case of E. coli 0157.
Actual Case/Event
An actual case or event is defined as an incidence ofE. coli 0157 infection - either a
single case or outbreak - that could be detected by normal laboratory techniques, but
does not necessarily end up being detected and/or reported to Health Protection
Scotland. Thus the population of actual events includes both detected events and
undetected events.
Observed case/event
A laboratory confirmed and reported case ofE. coli 0157 or an event involving at
least one laboratory confirmed case of E. coli 0157, as per HPS definitions and
occurring during the time period from 1996 to 2004.
8.2.3 Framework construction
The process of creating a viable framework includes three steps:
• Distribution selection. First, potentially appropriate distribution(s) and/or
functions for the distribution of the probability of actual event size occurrence
and the probability of event detection must be selected for further
consideration. For the probability of actual event occurrence, several discrete
distributions, which are associated with biological mechanisms, are examined
in detail. These distributions include Poisson, Logarithmic and Negative
Binomial. The Logistic Growth Law function is considered for the probability
of event detection because of the flexibility of the function shape which
allows for a sigmoidal curve (see Section 8.3.1.2).
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• Exploration of the distribution for the probability of actual event
occurrence. Secondly, the parameter(s) for each of the selected probability of
actual event occurrence distributions must be explored in terms of how the
parameter values relate to the shape of the distribution and thus which, if any,
distributions and parameter values or ranges are appropriate for the
framework. The process includes relating the distributions and parameter
values to biological mechanisms associated with infectious disease
epidemiology. For instance, Lloyd-Smith (2007) indicates that the range of
negative binomial parameter k is 0.032 to 5.2 in uncontrolled outbreak data
sets, so when the negative binomial distribution is used, values of k within
this range will be tried first.
• Case detection function exploration. Thirdly, the parameters for the
function for the probability of event detection are examined in the same
manner as discussed above
• The complete framework. Finally, the framework is completed by the
addition of the probability of event detection function. The complete
framework can then be used to calculate the distribution of the proportions of
detected events. The fitting of the values to the framework will be an iterative
process, with series of values for each parameter tried in order to find the
values which produce the most appropriate distribution(s) of the proportions
of detected event sizes. The process of finding or approaching an appropriate
combination of distributions/functions is of importance, so examples will be
used to illustrate why particular distributions and/or parameters are not
appropriate. The exact construction of the matrix and how it is used to create
the proportion of detected event size distribution will be detailed in Section
8.2.4.
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8.2.4 Matrix construction and usage
The framework for the distribution of the proportions of detected event sizes is
derived from the matrix in Figure 8.4. The construction of the matrix is based on
two assumptions: (a) that an event is either detected or not detected but (b) that not
all cases in each event are necessarily detected and so an event of size x may be
detected as an event of a size y, where y is less than or equal to x. Therefore, each
event has a detected size y and actual size x, and the equation for each actual and
detected size combination (x,y) can be constructed through a series of steps:
(1) The rows in the matrix represent the probability of occurrence of an event of
actual size x (p(x)), where x is an integer from 1 to 130. 130 has been chosen
as the upper limit because the largest event size (when the Wishaw Outbreak
is split into separate cohorts - see 3.2.3.2) is 118. This probability, which
varies depending on the value of x, is expressed in terms of a distribution, the
selection of which is discussed below in 8.3.1.1.
probability of an event of size x = p(x), where x= 1,2,3... 130
(2) The columns represent the detected size of the event (y). The distribution of
y is conditional because it is dependent on actual size (x). Thus there is a
conditional probability (h) for each detected size dependent on actual size
(h(y|x)) (e.g. there is a probability for each combination of actual and
detected event size) and the conditional distribution is the binomial
distribution where y is an integer > 0 and x is an integer > 1:
h(y|x) = x!/ y!(x-y)! * V * (1- X)x'y x = 1,2,3... 130 andy = 0,1,2... 130
Yjh(y\x) = \
y=1
(3) Within the binomial distribution, A. is the probability of an individual case
being detected. The probability of a case being detected would appear to be
likely to vary depending on the size of the event - a case in a large event is
more likely to be detected than a single case, since an outbreak where a
number of people are ill is less likely to go undetected and more likely to be
intensively investigated than a single case. Therefore, while lambda may be a
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single value, it is probably a function of event size X(x). The selection of
lambda will be discussed in 8.3.1.2.
(4) Therefore, the final equation for the probability of each x and y combination
is the binomial equation, which represents the conditional probability of
detected event size, multiplied by p(x), the probability of actual event
occurrence:
P(x, y) = p(x) * h(y|x) Yj E P(y>x) = l
X y
When parameter values are inserted and the framework is tested, a value for the
probability (i.e. proportion out of the total) of each detected-actual event combination
is produced. The distribution of the proportions of detected event sizes >1 is then
obtained by calculating the sum of the probabilities for each y (detected event size),
and dividing each sum by the overall proportion of events where y>0. The
proportions for each detected event size are then illustrated in a bar plot within which
each bar is split into bands indicating the proportions of actual event sizes for each
detected event size.
Figure 8.6: Distributions of event size proportions
Distribution of detected event size proportions, with the coloured bands indicating proportions of
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This is illustrated in Figure 8.6, where red bands indicate actual outbreak size of 1,
orange bands actual outbreak size of 2 etc. In this example, approximately 70% of
detected events are detected as events of size 1, in other words, as sporadic cases, but
only one third of the events are actually size 1 (red band). The remaining two thirds
(orange band etc.) of the events are in fact size 2 or larger, but not all of the cases
have been detected. This plot is compared visually with the plot of the observed
distribution of the proportions of event sizes in Scotland, based on the data from
1996 to 2004. In addition, the proportions for each detected event size are multiplied
by the number of total events between 1996 and 2004 (the study time period), to
produce a summary table of event size counts (see Table 8.1). These counts are
compared to the actual counts between 1996 and 2004, providing a numeric
comparison between the model distribution and the observed distribution. If an
accurate fit is found based on the plot shape and summary counts, the actual
prevalence of events can be estimated from the proportion of events that are not
detected (detected size=0). If, for instance, 90% of events are not detected, the actual
event prevalence is ten times the number of events observed/reported. Case
prevalence can then be calculated by multiplying the number of events of each size
by the event size.




In order to come up with non-arbitrary values for the distribution of the probabilities
of actual event occurrence, p(x), and function for the probability of event detection,
L(x), are assumed to be in the form of distributions or functions. Since the data for
actual events is in the form of counts, the distribution is assumed to be discrete, and
the related distributions Poisson, Logarithmic and Negative Binomial are all
considered because they are frequently used to describe biological populations
involving discrete data (Bliss & Fisher 1953; Cassie 1962; Johnson et al. 1992;
Sampford 1955).
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8.3.1.1 Probability of actual event occurrence
Regardless of the distribution selected, since an actual event must have at least one
case (size = 1), the distribution of (the probability of) actual event occurrence (by
size) must be truncated at 1.
Continuous distributions such as the gamma, exponential and Weibull were
discounted because they are appropriate for continuous data and outbreak data by
nature, since there cannot be a fraction of an outbreak, is in the form of non-zero
integers. Neyman's A Distribution is also not considered because references to use
in biological instances are with a non-truncated form (Beall & Rescia 1953; Evans
1953; Johnson et al. 1992; Martin & Katti 1965; Neyman 1939).
Truncated Poisson distribution
The first distribution considered is the Poisson distribution (Poisson 1837), which
has been used earlier in this thesis in the context of an error structure for GLMs
(2.2.6.2) and describes a situation where events occur independently and at random
(Kirkwood & Sterne 2003). The Poisson distribution is frequently used in describing
biological processes (Elliott 1971b; van Rest & Parkin 1933) because it is a discrete
distribution in that it used in instances where there is integer data, such as counts
(Crawley 2007). In infectious disease statistics, count data is very common (e.g.
outbreaks, cases, number ofbacteria), and, for example, the distribution of E. coli
0157 in food items implicated in a Japanese outbreak has been assumed to have a
Poisson distribution (Tennis et al. 2004).
The distribution has one parameter, lambda (A) which is equivalent to the mean, and
the mean is equal to the variance (p= a2) and (Crawley 2007; Johnson et al. 1992;
Poisson 1837) the probability of a count of x is:
ezAx
p(x) = where ! indicates factorial and e is the exponential constant = 2.718
x!
When the Poisson distribution is left truncated, in that the equation is adjusted to
restrict values to a set minimum, it is referred to as the positive or conditional
Poisson (Johnson et al. 1992). A positive or zero truncated Poisson distribution has
been used to describe the distribution of counts of lymphatic filariasis microfdariae
in human blood samples (Grenfell et al. 1990) and gall fly egg frequencies (Finney &
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Varley 1955). For the positive Poisson (Johnson et al. 1992), the probability of a
count is expressed as:
However, due to a number of issues, the truncated Poisson distribution is not
considered to be a likely choice for the distribution of the probability of event
occurrence. Firstly, the variance to mean ratio of the observed Scottish E. coli 0157
data is approximately 37 to 1. Though the actual variance to mean ratio undoubtedly
varies from the observed ratio, the actual range in event size should most likely be
similar or larger to the observed range because events with small numbers of cases
are the most likely to have gone undetected. Thus, there would be little difference
between the actual and observed ranges, so the variance would still be larger than the
mean. Since the mean to variance ratio for a Poisson distribution must be
approximately one, and the difference between variance and mean still not large
when the distribution is truncated, it would not appear to be appropriate for
describing the E. coli 0157 data. Also, one of the more rigid assumptions of the
Poisson distribution is that the events occur at random - i.e. with equal probability of
occurrence (Elliott 1971a). However, it has been shown that there are "significant
clusters of sporadic E. coli 0157 infections" in Scotland, with a suggested link to
cattle to human population ratios or other rural factors (Innocent et al. 2006), and E.
coli 0157 cases are known to cluster temporally with infections occurring more often
in the summer or early autumnal months (Douglas & Kurien 1997). Thus it is
unlikely that E. coli 0157 event occurrence is truly random, and so the use of a
Poisson distribution is probably not appropriate.
Truncated negative binomial distribution
The second distribution considered for the distribution of the probability of actual
event occurrence is the truncated negative binomial distribution. This distribution,
which is used to describe aggregated populations where the variance is greater than
the mean (Bliss & Fisher 1953; Elliott 1971b), is an increasingly widely used
distribution, especially in biological contexts, because the assumptions are not as
rigid as compared with the Poisson distribution, e.g. mean equal to the variance
x!
where X is the mean count per unit and is >0
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(Elliott 1971b). Uses of the negative binomial distribution in biological contexts
include describing the distribution ofbenthic invertebrates in bottom samples (Elliott
1971b), parasitic helminths in human hosts (Grafen & Woolhouse 1993), parasites in
48 parasite-host systems (Shaw et al. 1998), parasites in shrimp (Crofton 1971), ticks
in mice and tapeworm in bream (Anderson & May 1978), mites on apple leaves
(Bliss & Fisher 1953), plankton in water samples (Cassie 1962), number of lymph
nodes involved in various cancers (Kendal 2007), parasites in dogs (Azlaf et al.
2007), green leafhoppers on bean plants (Moura et al. 2007) and nematodes in Spain
(Campos-Herrera et al. 2007). It is a two parameter distribution - X is the mean and
k is the inverse measure of aggregation. Aggregation refers to the clumping or
clustering of counts (insects, bacteria, humans etc.) in space or over time - e.g.
outbreaks over time (seasonal trends) or bacterial counts in humans (most having low
counts, with a few having high counts). High values of k indicate low aggregation -
when k approaches infinity, the distribution becomes the Poisson distribution (see
Fig. 8.7) - and low values of k indicate high aggregation - the distribution tends
towards the logarithmic distribution when k approaches zero.
Figure 8.7: Relationship between the binomial family distributions
The relationships between the distributions in the Binomial Family, from Elliot (Elliott 1971b). The
inverse measure of aggregation is k, p = p/k and q = 1 — p, where p is the arithmetic mean of the
population. The variance is indicated as s2 and x is the population mean.
Binomial family
Positive binomial ri2 < .v)
(<7 +P)k
Negative binomial (j2 > 3c)
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Truncated negative binomial models have been used to describe family size (Hamdan
1975), the fish caught by recreational anglers (O'Neill & Faddy 2003) and
microfilarial parasite loads in humans (Das et al. 1990).
There are several reasons underlying the selection of the tmncated negative binomial
distribution as one possible distribution for the probability of actual event
occurrence. Firstly, it is known that the observed event occurrence distribution in
Scotland is strongly aggregated: there are few large events/outbreaks and many
events of size one or two (official data set, HPS). Thus the probability of actual
event occurrence distribution is also likely to be aggregated, and so a distribution that
allows for a high degree of aggregation is needed. Relatedly, with event sizes as least
as high as 118, but as many as 87% of events of size 1, the variance is likely to be
much larger than the mean - for reported outbreaks in Scotland from 1994 to 1999
the ratio was 120.4 to 1 (Woolhouse et al. 2001) and the approximate ratio for all
detected cases between 1996 and 2004 was 37 to 1. In addition, the negative
binomial, whether or not it is truncated, has been used to describe many biological
distributions (see above), and the data does not have to adhere rigidly to the criteria
of independent probability of occurrence for each event (Elliott 1971b). The
relaxation of this criteria is important because HPS considers cases within household
outbreaks to be sporadic cases (Locking et al. 2003a), whilst for this chapter
household outbreaks are defined as events. Thus, since the data for this study comes
from HPS, there are undoubtedly a number of household outbreaks within the events
of size one. As a result, not all of the events in the distribution are independent in
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terms of occurrence, nor is it truly accurate that the occurrence of cases and
outbreaks of an infection such as E. coli 0157 are truly independent. Studies have
posited that factors such as the ratio of cattle to human population (Innocent et al.
2006) and contact with animals or animal faeces (Locking et al. 2001), and that there
are geographic clusters of sporadic cases in Scotland (Innocent et al. 2006), thus
unrelated outbreaks or sporadic cases may have increased probabilities of occurrence
due sharing a risk factor such as geographic region.
Logarithmic distribution
The logarithmic distribution is the limiting case of the negative binomial distribution
when k approaches zero (Fig. 8.7), and thus more highly aggregated than the
negative binomial distribution is another potential choice for the distribution of
actual event occurrence. In this distribution, the probability equation is:
/x -[ln(l — A)]-1 Tx , . ,
p(x) =— where x= 1,2,3... and In is the natural logarithm
x
The distribution does not have to be truncated to be applicable to the study data, for
which all values are greater than 0, because x must be a minimum of one (it is not
possible to divide a number by zero) and x also must be an integer. The distribution
was derived by Fisher as the limit from the truncated negative binomial distribution
when k —>0 (Johnson et al. 1992), and like the negative binomial does not require
strict assumptions ofmean equivalence to variance or independence of observations.
In addition, Chatfield and colleagues have indicated that the logarithmic distribution
"is likely to be a useful approximation to the negative binomial distribution" when
the aggregation parameter (k) is less than 0.01 (Chatfield et al. 1966). The
logarithmic distribution has been used to describe a number of biological patterns
including head lice on hosts, numbers of individuals in British nesting birds (Johnson
et al. 1992), as well as being commonly used to describe growth patterns. Truncated
logarithmic distributions were used to describe the patterns ofSalmonella serotypes
in pigs (Izsak & Hunter 1992).
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8.3.1.2 Probability of case detection
Little information is available about the probability of a case being detected,
dependant on the size of the event. It seems intuitive that the probability of detection
is a function of event size - e.g. the larger an event a case in part of, the more likely a
case within that event is to be detected - the chance of a case in an outbreak the size
ofWishaw Outbreak (see 2.4.1.1 for details) going undetected would seem to be
much less than that for a single sporadic case. Since it seems unlikely that any single
case would have a 100% chance ofbeing detected (even if every infected person had
a stool or serum sample tested, the tests do not have 100% sensitivity) or a 100%
chance of not being detected, the most appropriate shape for the function would be
one that is asymptotic near zero and one.
Since a sigmoidal function is necessary, the Logistic Growth Law function, which
has been used to describe growth in populations such as the human population of the
United States (Snedecor & Cochran 1971), fish (Chaudhuri 1988) and fungal




where A defines the upper asymptote and B and p are shape parameters
8.3.2 Exploration of the distribution of actual event occurrence
The parameter values for each actual event occurrence distribution must be explored
to determine how the values affect distribution shapes, and which value(s) may be
appropriate for the framework.
8.3.2.1 Truncated negative binomial distribution
With the truncated negative binomial distribution, there are two parameters which
shape the curve, mu (p) which is the arithmetic mean and k, which is the inverse
measure of aggregation. When p is held constant, low values of k produce a curve
which is highly dispersed (Fig. 8.8a), meaning that there is a very long right tail. As
the value for k increases, the curve becomes steeper, with an increasing p(x) at event
size=l.
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Figure 8.8 a-f: Truncated negative binomial distributions - varying k
A series of plots showing the effect of variation in the parameter k on the truncated negative
binomial distribution for the probability of event occurrence. The value of p is constrained at 0.5,
with k increasing from a to f: 0.01, 0.1, 0.5, 1, 5 and 10. The table shows the counts for event sizes
up to size 20 when the probabilities in the distribution are multiplied by 1927, the number of events
in Scotland between 1996 and 2004.
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P(x) Size of Event
M =0.5, k 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11-20
a k=0.1 474 235 154 114 89 73 61 53 46 41 249
b k=0.01 818 375 219 141 97 68 50 37 28 21 66
c k=0.5 1163 436 182 80 36 16 8 4 2 <1 <1
d k=1 1285 428 143 48 16 5 2 <1 <1 <1 <1
e k=5 1435 391 83 15 2 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1
f k=10 1459 382 73 11 1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1
If k is held constant, skewness increases as the value of p decreases. This can be
observed in Figure 8.9 a-f, where k = 1, and the values of p increase from 0.01 to 10.
When fx=0.01, the probability of actual event occurrence is nearly 1 for events of size
one, but is close to zero for events of two or more cases. However, at p =10, the
probability for events of size one is approximately 0.1, and the curve declines at a
very slow rate.
295
Figure 8.9 a-f: Truncated negative binomial distribution - varying p
Bar plots of a series of truncated negative binomial distributions demonstrating the effect of
variations in the parameter p. K is fixed at 1, with p increasing from a to f (0.01, 0.1, 0.5, 1, 5, 10).
The table shows the counts for event sizes up to size 20 when the probabilities in the distribution are
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k=1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11-20
a p =0.01 1908 19 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1
b p =0.1 1752 159 14 1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1
c p =0.5 1285 428 143 48 16 5 2 <1 <1 <1 <1
d M =1 964 482 241 120 60 30 15 8 4 2 <1
e M =5 321 268 223 186 155 129 108 90 75 62 260
f p =10 175 159 145 132 120 109 99 90 82 74 457
Since there have been events as large as 118 cases reported in Scotland, the
assumption is that the probability of actual event occurrence would need to have a
long right tail in order to allow for the occurrence of larger actual event sizes. Low
values of p and/or high values of k result in distributions which produce high enough
counts (counts being used instead of probabilities in order to permit easier
comparison to the data in Scotland from 1996 to 2004) for events of size 1, but these
distributions underestimate event counts for large event sizes, particularly over size
10. For instance, when p =0.1 and k=l, the framework predicts 1752 events of size
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one, but then predicts almost no events larger than size 4 (Table 8.1 Line 1, Fig.
8.10a). In contrast, when there are high values of p and/or low values of k, the tail of
the distribution is sufficiently long, but the counts for events of size 1 are
considerably underestimated and the counts for events for larger events are
overestimated. When, for example, p=5 and k=l, the framework results in only 321
events of size one, but more than 200 events of greater than size 1 l(Fig. 8.10b, Table
8.1 Line 3). If p=1.2, which is the approximate mean event size in the observed
population, values of k less than 0.2 are required to produce a long enough tail
Figure 8.10 a-b: Comparison of truncated negative binomial distributions for the probability
of event occurrence
Bar plots showing the truncated negative binomial distributions for the probability of event
occurrence when k=l and (a)mu=0.1 and (b) mu=5. The plots are limited at event size=50.
a b
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These findings suggest that a negative binomial distribution is not likely to be an
appropriate distribution for the distribution of actual event occurrence, but it is still
possible that the addition of the function of event detection to the framework may
sufficiently adjust the counts to permit a long tail with a high count for events of size
one.
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In the logarithmic distribution, there is single parameter, c (also referred to as 0 in
some texts), which is limited to values between zero and one (Johnson et al. 1992).
In order to explore how variation in c affects the distribution of the probability of
event occurrence (p(x), frameworks were created for distributions with values of c
ranging from 0.01 to 0.99 (Fig. 8.11). As shown in Figure 8.1 la-g, when there is
perfect event detection, as c increases from 0.01 to 0.99, the distribution of event size
proportions shifts to the right, with dispersion increasing and a greater proportion of
events of larger sizes.
An estimate for c can be obtained from the population mean (p), using the equation
below (Johnson et al. 1992).
p = (-1 / In (1-c) * c) / 1 - c , where c is the shape parameter and 0<c<l
The mean for observed Scottish E. coli 0157 events has been estimated as
approximately 1.2. Since a value of 0.3 for c gives a mean of 1.202, this would
suggest a value of 0.3 as an approximate initial value for c.
Figure 8.11 continued (see next page for rest of figure and figure legend)
P(x) Size of Event
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11-20
a c=0.01 1917 -9 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1
b c=0.1 1829 91 6 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1
c c=0.25 1675 209 35 6 1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1
d c=0.5 1390 348 116 43 17 7 3 1 <1 <1 <1
e c=0.75 1043 391 195 110 66 41 27 17 12 8 -16
f c=0.9 753 339 203 137 99 74 57 45 36 29 -121
e c=0.99 427 211 139 103 82 68 57 50 44 39 -249
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However, as the logarithmic distribution is the limiting form of the negative binomial
distribution when k approaches zero, similar issues are encountered as with the
truncated negative binomial distribution when trying to approximate the distribution
of actual event occurrence. When the value of c is small (less than 0.5, and so
including 0.3; Table 8.1 Line 7), the distribution is highly skewed towards small
event sizes. Thus, whilst the proportion/count for events of size=l is close(r) to the
observed proportion, for value of c up to 0.5, the count for size=2 is overestimated
and the counts for events with more than 2 cases are all underestimated (Figure 8.12a
vs. b).
Figure 8.12 a-b: Event size histogram: Scotland 1996 - 2004 and logarithmic distribution
(a) A histogram of the sizes ofE. coli 0157 events in Scotland from 1996 to 2004 and (b)




























Values of c equal to or above 0.9 (Table 8.1 Line 9 and Fig. 8.1 lg) predict high
enough counts for events over size 10, but as with the truncated negative binomial
distribution, models which predict sufficient counts for events with more than 20
cases underestimate the count for single case events and overestimate the counts for
events between 2 and 20 cases. However, when models that predict sufficient counts
for events > size 20 are considered, the counts predicted when the logarithmic
distribution is used are closer (by values of one or two) to the observed counts than
with the truncated negative binomial.
Thus it would appear both that the logarithmic distribution is probably a better fit for
the framework than the truncated negative binomial distribution and that high value
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of c is most likely to be appropriate for the framework. The next step will be to
determine the appropriateness of the distributions in the full framework.
8.3.3 Exploration of a function for the probability of case detection
8.3.3.1 Logistic Growth Law
For the logistic growth law, the parameter A indicates the value of the upper
asymptote. B and Rho (p) are shape parameters, with B influencing the shape of the
first part of the curve and p, the second part of the curve.
Figure 8.13: Logistic Growth Law functions for the probability of case detection- varying Rho
A series of Logistic Growth Law distributions for the probability of case detection demonstrating
the effect of variation in the p parameter. For all curves, A is 0.95 and B=50. The values for p are 1
(red), 1.1 (dark orange), 1.2 (light orange), 1.3 (yellow), 1.4 (light green), 1.5 (green), 1.6 (light
blue), 1.8 (blue), 2 (dark blue), 4 (purple) and 6 (pink).
Event Size
When p= 1, the distribution is a straight line, with all values for event detection
equivalent to 1/B. When p is less than one, the curve is decreasing and when Rho is
greater the one, the curve is increasing. As the value of p increases above one, the
curve becomes steeper (Fig. 8.13) and the values of y (probability of case detection)
for each x (event size) increase. Thus, the higher the value of p, the lower the value
of x at which the curve approaches the upper asymptote (at A), which in terms of this
model means that the higher the value of p, the smaller the event size at which the
maximum probability of case detection is reached. This trend can be visualised in
Figure 8.13 where increasing values of p are represented as the colours proceed from
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red, orange, yellow... through to pink. Whilst the red curve is flat (p =1), the pink
curve is almost vertical and the asymptote is reached at a very low detected event
size (approximately event size = 7, as compared to event size = 60, for the dark
orange curve for p=l. 1).
In contrast, as the value for parameter B increases, the value ofy at each x decreases
until the curve approaches the upper asymptote. For this framework, it means that as
B increases, the probability of case detection for each event size decreases until the
curve approaches the asymptote. Thus, the higher the value ofB, the closer the
probability of detection for events of size one is to zero. At very high values of B
(>1000), the probabilities for small event sizes are similar, flattening out the curve as
it approaches the lower asymptote. The influence of parameter B can be seen in
Figure 8.14, where the values for the probability of case detection for events of size 1
do not begin to approach zero until B is 100 (first green curve).
Figure 8.14: Logistic Growth Law distributions for the probability of case detection- varying
B
Distributions for the probability of case detection demonstrating the effect of variation in the B
parameter. For all curves, A=0.95 and Rho=2.0. B is 0.01 (red), 0.1 (dark orange), 1 (orange), 10
(yellow), 100 (light green), 1000 (green), 5000 (light blue), 10,000 (blue), 15,000 (dark blue),
20,000 (purple) and 25,000 (pink).
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
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Estimates for E. coli 0157 case detection have been calculated and discussed in a
number of papers (Brewster et al. 1994; Feldman et al. 2002; Locking et al. 2004;
Marsh et al. 1992; Michel et al. 2000; Sharp et al. 1994b), with reporting triangles
frequently used to show why and where cases are not being detected. The use of
reporting triangles and the published studies on prevalence estimation have been
discussed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 8.1. Studies from Canada, the United Kingdom
and the United States suggest that between 0.5% and 10% of cases are detected by
current surveillance systems. However, no study on under-reporting has been
published for data in Scotland. In order to estimate a possible overall p(detection)
for Scotland, data from the above papers was used to construct a reporting triangle
for Scotland (Figure 8.15), which suggests that the overall probability of detection
might be around 10%.
Figure 8.15: Reporting triangle for E. coli 0157 in Scotland











100% - Infected with 0157
However, neither this reporting triangle, nor any other study has addressed case
detection as a function of event size. Therefore possible curve shapes for the
function of the probability of case detection will be hypothesized based on what is
know about methods of detection and rates of detection.
The parameter A indicates the upper limit of the distribution, and for initial models,
A will be fixed at 0.98, a high value, but short of 1, which would indicate perfect
detection. It is assumed that perfect detection would never be achieved due to a
number of factors including the presence of asymptomatic cases (Griffin & Tauxe
1991), imperfect sensitivity of laboratory tests for infection (De Boer & Heuvelink
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2000; Noel & Boedeker 1997) and the decreasing effectiveness of faecal testing of
patients with increasing time after onset of symptoms (Tarr et al. 1990). Equally it is
assumed that every case has at least a small probability of detection - for instance
sporadic cases can be picked up as part of large outbreak investigations (Cowden et
al. 2001) - and thus the curve for the case detection distribution should not ever
reach zero.
Less, however, can be assumed about the behaviour of the curve between the
minimal and maximal values. One possibility is that the probability of detection for
sporadic cases or cases in very small events (size 2 - 3) is very low, but increases
quickly after reaching events of size four of five cases, and then levels off at the
upper asymptote. This scenario might occur if clusters with more than three cases
are more likely to come to the attention of public health investigators because, for
instance, the follow up of each confirmed case as a part of the Scottish enhanced
surveillance program in Scotland (Locking et al. 2003a)) increases the chance that
previously unrecognized or unlinked cases will be connected to events. However
eventually, when events are large enough, the increase in detection probability with
each additional case becomes negligible. However, there could be a much gentler
curve, in which cases in very small events have a low probability of detection, and
the probability of detection increases steadily as the event size increases. Both types
of curves will be explored in the framework by using sigmoidal Logistic Growth
Law functions for the probability of case detection.
8.3.4 The complete framework
8.3.4.1 Truncated negative binomial distribution and Logistic Growth Law
When the Logistic Growth Law function for the distribution of case detection -
irrespective of the parameters- is added to the framework, it is still not possible to
find parameters for the framework for both the extremely large proportion of single
case events and the much smaller, slowly decreasing proportions of events larger
than size 1. When the right tail of the event occurrence distribution is very short as
in Fig. 8.16a, events of large sizes (usually >10) cannot occur. Thus even if the
distribution of case detection increases sharply (Fig. 8.16b) and is near perfect for
larger event sizes, the proportions of large events are underestimated in the final
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framework(Fig. 8.16c; Table 8.1 Line 2) (Counts for all frameworks are shown in
Table 8.1).
Figure 8.16 a-c: Components of a framework that underestimates large event sizes
The (a) truncated negative binomial distribution of event occurrence, (b) logistic growth law
distribution of case detection and (c) final framework of the distribution of detected case size
proportions where mu=0.1, k=l, A=0.98, B=10 and p= 1.7. The distribution of case detection
decreases too sharply, and thus in the final framework, the proportions of event sizes greater than
six are, in general, underestimated.
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In contrast, if distribution of event occurrence is skewed (Fig. 8.17a) and thus the
right tail is very long, even with a more gradual increase in detection probabilities
(Fig. 8.17b), the proportions for events between approximately size 2 and 20 are
overestimated (Figure 8.17c; Table 8.1 Line 4).
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Figure 8.17 a-c: Components of a framework that overestimates small event sizes
The (a) truncated negative binomial distribution of event occurrence, (b) logistic growth law
distribution of case detection and (c) final framework of the distribution of detected case size
proportions where mu=5, k=l, A=0.98, B=10 and p=1.05. The distribution of case detection
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The above frameworks using the framework either underestimate the proportions of
large event sizes or overestimate the proportions of small event sizes. If it is
accepted that for this reason the events of size one cannot be properly estimated by
the framework, and so only the proportions for the events of size or 2 or larger are
examined, an appropriate framework still cannot be found. The creation of a
framework which reflects the very low proportions for events greater than size 1 is
only possible by using a value for the case detection function parameter B which is
so large that small events would have an extremely low probability of case detection
(<0.001). Even the most extreme estimates of underreporting are only around 0.02,
so the framework is highly unlikely to be appropriate. In addition, extreme values of
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B produce peaks and valleys in the detected event size proportion distribution, in
addition to low proportion values for events of small sizes (Fig. 8.18, Table 8.1 Line
5).
Figure 8.18: Inappropriate distribution of detected event size proportions
A distribution of detected event size proportion when mu=5, k=l, A=0.98, B= 10,000 and p=10,
demonstrating the inappropriateness of frameworks where extremely high values ofB are used in an
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Neither the peaks and valleys or small proportions values are consistent with the
observed distribution (Fig. 8.5). Given the difficulties, as shown above, in
constructing a framework that predicts the correct proportions of events for small
event sizes and the issue regarding household outbreaks, the final approach is to
construct a framework which allows for the fact that the detected distribution
underestimates the proportion of events at size=l and overestimates the proportions
of events of size 2 to 5. The best fit is then found after mu is fixed at 1.2, which is
the approximate mean of the observed event population, and the values for the other
parameters are varied. When k=0.3 (a moderately overdispersed distribution for
event occurrence), and A=0.98, B=500 and p=1.15, (a very gradual distribution for
case detection), the proportions of detected events that are size 1 and size 3 to 20 are
fairly accurately estimated by the framework (Fig. 8.19a, Table 8.1 Line 6).
However, the framework highly overestimates the proportion of events that are size
2, and underestimates proportions of events greater than size 20. These
over/underestimates may be plausible because a number of events of size 2 or greater
are actually counted as sporadic cases. Therefore, the observed counts most likely
overestimate the number of events of size one and underestimate the number of small
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multi-case events. The underestimation of the number of very large outbreak (>20
cases) may reflect the fact that the large events are outliers or clusters of smaller
events.
Figure 8.19: Distribution of detected event size proportions and predicted counts
(a) The distribution of detected event size proportions (event size >1) when mu=l .2, k=0.3, A=0.98,
B=500 and Rho=1.15. (b) The complete distribution of detected event size proportions showing
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The framework suggest that 1.7% of events are detected (Figure 7.19b), which means
than more than 98% of events are not detected. Since there were 1927 events in
Scotland between 1996 and 2004, an underreporting rate of 98% suggests that there
were approximately 107,000 events. Further calculation based on the proportions of
the undetected events (size=0) indicated to be actual events of size 1 or greater,
indicates that there were over 330,800 cases in Scotland. Thus the overall case
detection rate was -0.7%. The next step is to determine whether the logarithmic
distribution for the probability of actual event occurrence produces a more accurate
framework.
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8.3.4.2 Logarithmic distribution and Logistic Growth Law
Similar issues as with the truncated negative binomial distribution arise when the
Logistic Growth Law function for the probability of case detection is added to the
framework. Where the value of c is low and thus the proportions of detected events
are reasonably accurate for events of size one or two, the distribution of actual event
occurrence declines too steeply and thus there is a very small probability of events
over size three occurring. Even if the Logistic Growth Law function parameters are
adjusted so that there is a very steep increase in the rate of case detection, the
proportions of large events are still greatly underestimated. For instance, if the rate
of case detection is initially assumed to be 100%, when c=0.1, there are 1829 events
of size one and 91 of size two, but less than one event each for sizes greater than
three (Table 8.1 Line 7, Fig. 8.20c). If a very steep function for the probability of
case detection is added to the framework (Fig. 8.20b, Table 8.1 Line 8), there are
1887 events of size 1 and 38 of size two, but even smaller probabilities for events >
size 2.
Figure 8.20: Components of a framework that underestimate large event sizes
The (a) logarithmic distribution of event occurrence, (b) logistic growth law distribution of case
detection and (c) final framework of the distribution of detected case size proportions where c=0.1,
A=0.98, B=10 and p=l .7. The distribution of case detection decreases too sharply, and thus in the
final framework, the proportions of event sizes greater than three are, in general, underestimated.
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In contrast, where the value for c is high and perfect detection is assumed,
sufficiently high counts/proportions for large event sizes can be estimated using the
framework, but the counts for events size 2-49 are overestimated and the count for
single case events is considerably underestimated (Table 8.1 Line 9). If a very
gradual Logistic Growth Law Function is added to the framework to counterbalance
the overdispersion, the underestimation of single cases events and overestimate of
larger outbreaks remain. As an example, when c=0.9, the distribution of actual event
occurrence is right skewed (Fig. 8.21a), but even with a very gradual function for the
probability of case detection (Fig. 8.21b), the final framework still predicts too few
size 1 events and too many events of size 2 or larger (Fig. 8.21c, Table 8.1 Line 10).
Figure 8.21a-c: Components of a framework that overestimates small event sizes
The (a) logarithmic distribution of event occurrence, (b) logistic growth law distribution of case
detection and (c) final framework of the distribution of detected case size proportions where c=0.9,
A=0.98, B=10 and p=1.05. The distribution of case detection decreases too gradually, and thus in
the final framework, the proportions of event sizes greater than one are overestimated.
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Again, considering the issue of household outbreaks, the most appropriate and final
approach will be to construct a framework which has fewer single case events and
more small (size 2 to 5) events than the observed distribution. The most accurate
framework results from a high value of c(0.82) (Fig. 8.22a) and a steeply increasing
logistic growth law function for case detection (Fig. 8.22b).
Figure 8.22 a-d: Distribution of detected event size proportions - best complete framework
The distributions of (a) actual event occurrence, (b) case detection and (c) detected event size
proportions (event size >1) when mu=c=0.82, A=0.98, B=500 and Rho=1.15. Also, (d) the
complete distribution of detected event size proportions showing that 98.6% of events are detected
at size zero - in other words, they are not detected,
a b
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This framework underestimates the number or proportion of single case events, and
overestimates the number of events with two to four cases (Fig. 8.22c, Table 7.1 Line
11), but this is expected because some of the events of size =1 in the observed
distribution are likely to actually be events of size 2 to 5, given that most households
do not have more than 5 persons). The framework indicates that less than 2% of
events are detected (Fig. 8.22d). This framework appears to be an adequate fit, and
thus may be a potential framework for the distribution of detected event size
proportions. This is the final potential framework that will be presented, and the
issues which must be considered in assessing the appropriateness of this framework
will be addressed in the next section (Section 8.4).
8.4 Discussion
8.4.1 Introduction to the framework
A number of studies have shown that the prevalence ofE. coli 0157 infection is
significantly underestimated by both active and passive surveillance systems
(Handysides 1999; Hedberg et al. 1997; Thomas et al. 2006). Studies in Canada
(Michel et al. 2000; Thomas et al. 2006), the United States (Hedberg et al. 1997;
Mead et al. 1999) and England & Wales (Adak et al. 2002), based on surveys of
patient, physician and laboratory practices (Bender et al. 2004; Hedberg et al. 1997;
Thomas et al. 2006), data from previous studies and/or hospital records (Michel et al.
2000), have suggested that the degree of under-reporting may range from 50% to
around 98%. However, these studies are limited by a number of factors including
study areas which are not necessarily epidemiologically or demographically
representative of the whole country (e.g. (Michel et al. 2000)), and lack of data
about patient and physician practices. Furthermore, no study has been published on
the magnitude of underreporting within Scotland. Accurate estimations ofE. coli
0157 prevalence in Scotland and other countries are of importance because they
would set accurate benchmarks for the improvements needed to national or regional
surveillance systems. They would also provide a measure of the magnitude of
scientific efforts needed to lower infection rates. An accurate estimate of prevalence
could also indicate whether the high reported rates of infection in Scotland are due to
high prevalence of infection or high proportion of cases being reported.
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Thus, in this chapter the aim has been to construct and test a different type of
framework that, if functional, could be developed into a model to more accurately
estimate prevalence. The framework depends only upon observed prevalence data
both for sporadic cases and outbreaks. The framework is based upon the
assumptions that all cases are part of an event - whether it is a single case event or
large outbreak - and that each event is either detected or it is not detected. However,
whilst an event is detected, not all of the cases in that event may be detected,
resulting in the event being observed as smaller than true. As such, there is a
distribution of the proportion of detected event sizes which includes events of size
zero - events that are not detected. The concept of this framework is that this
distribution is a function of the distribution of actual event sizes and the probability
of event detection. Thus if the distribution of the proportion of detected event sizes,
for which the distribution of events greater than size zero matches that of the
observed distribution, the actual prevalence can be calculated from the proportion of
cases that are 'detected' as size zero and the number of events seen
8.4.2 Advantages of the framework
The primary advantage of this approach is that it is not based on data from a series of
population, laboratory and/or physician studies. Previous prevalence studies have
had error attached to them because they have mainly been structured around
calculations of how many cases are detected (or not detected) at each step of the
reporting process. For instance in one Canadian study (Michel et al. 2000), there
were five different variables - each based on a step between infection and detection -
in one of the formulas used to estimate under-reporting. Whilst this type ofmodel is
epidemiologically and mathematically sound, the studies from which the data is
drawn are often prone to bias (Michel et al. 2000; Thomas et al. 2006). This bias
results from a number of different factors. For example, some studies or data sources
involve only a specific province (Michel et al. 2000) or region (Adak et al. 2002), or
only areas with high rates of infection (Hedberg et al. 1997), whilst other studies
cover only symptomatic cases (Michel et al. 2000), and the definitions of clinical
illness vary from study to study. The degree of inaccuracy that results is by no
means small: in two studies the estimates ranged for percent of cases reported ranged
from approximately 2% to 9% (Hedberg et al. 1997; Thomas et al. 2006). For
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Scotland, where there about 200 cases per year, this is a not insignificant range
because a reporting rate of 9% would suggest that there are about 2,000 cases per
year, a 2% rate, 10,000 cases.
By using a framework which does not involve data from a plethora of sources, the
approach in this chapter bypasses many of the biases in the step-wise estimations
used in the above mentioned studies. Eliminating the steps in the framework also
reduces the chance that any error in the calculation will be compounded as the rate of
reporting is recalculated at each step. In addition, an appropriate framework (if
found) could lead to the development of a model that can not only be used to
estimate prevalence, but also be to estimate the relative rates of large and small
outbreaks. Such a model, developed from the framework, can also provide insight
into the relationship between outbreak size and detection. The latter information
could be very helpful in that in can inform surveillance agencies as to the
effectiveness of surveillance programs as a function of event/outbreak size. For
instance, a probability of case detection curve that has a dramatic increase starting at
events of size 5 might indicate that increased effort needs to be put into investigating
sporadic cases and small outbreaks.
8.4.3 Issues with the framework
8.4.3.1 Uncertainty
However, the approach does involve a degree of uncertainty, and the sources of this
uncertainty must be considered. Firstly, there appears to be no published literature
about case detection as a function of event size or on event size distributions (with
both sporadic cases and outbreaks considered as events). The parameters - and thus
curve shapes - for these distributions, as a result, must be selected based on
assumptions and what is known about current surveillance systems and
investigational techniques. This introduces uncertainty into the framework, as the
parameter values must be selected partially based on assumption. The paucity of
information about the potential shape of a curve for case detection and actual cases
size probability also means that it may be possible to construct a model for which the
distribution of event size proportions matches the observed distribution, but for
which the contributing distribution and function are not correct. This is a situation
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which, much simplified, could be compared to finding the 'correct' pair of values
that add up to four, but not having a firm understanding ofwhat makes a value
'correct'. There are three possibilities: two and two, three and one and zero and four,
but if being 'correct' means the values must be less than three, only one of the pairs
would be correct.
The validity of the distributions/functions must then be assessed, in large part, by
examining the composition of each detected size bar in terms of the proportion of
events of each actual event size. Such an examination would reveal the magnitude of
under-reporting, for example whether a high proportion of large events are being
detected as very small events or the majority of under-reporting is in terms of only a
one or two cases. There is data from previous studies in other countries about the
proportions of cases being lost to detection at various stages (Adak et al. 2002;
Bender et al. 2004; Hedberg et al. 1997; Majowicz et al. 2005; Michel et al. 2000;
Thomas et al. 2006). Therefore, it is possible to determine whether the magnitude of
under-reporting as indicated by a model is within the range reported in countries with
similar surveillance programs (the final models presented in this chapter suggest a
case detection rate of 0.5%, which is lower than the ranges (2%-9%) suggested in the
studies mentioned above.
Additionally, one strength of the multi-step approach towards prevalence estimation
is the insight into specific biases in the surveillance data (Michel et al. 2000). The
approach in this chapter does not permit under-reporting to be apportioned by cause.
However, data from the framework presented in this chapter - a more accurate
estimate for total prevalence and information about the probability of detection by
event size - could be used together with the data from previous studies to create a
more accurate reporting triangle. The final issue, which will be discussed in greater
depth in the following section, is that of differing event definitions. In Scotland, only
clusters of cases outwith a single residence are considered to be general outbreaks
(Locking et al. 2003a), while cases from single household clusters are reported as
unrelated (e.g. sporadic). However, for this framework, every epidemiological
cluster must be considered as a separate event, and since data on single case events
for the study is based on counts of sporadic cases from the HPS website (overall
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count - number of outbreak cases), study data for events of size one is likely to
include cases from household clusters. It is therefore assumed that the distribution of
event size proportions for the observed data - which the model is being matched to -
will overestimate the number of single case events and underestimate the number of
small events. As the average household in Scotland is around 2.3 persons (General
Register Office for Scotland 2006), it is presumed that it is the estimates of events of
1 to 3 cases or less that will be most affected, with effects potentially extending up to
events with approximately 5 cases. As shown by the counts of the frameworks
(Table 8.1), the difficulties with fitting the frameworks were most acute in the
smaller event sizes.
8.4.3.2 Uncertainty - methods of addressing the issue
When trying to estimate the prevalence (or degree of underreporting) of a disease or
condition, one important issue is sources ofuncertainty, including incomplete or non-
representative coverage and recall bias in surveys of a population or medical
practitioners, imperfect sensitivity of a diagnostic tests and variation in calculations
for factors. These sources of uncertainty must be recognised and the model or
framework adjusted to account for them.
The methods of accounting for uncertainty vary depending upon the way in which
prevalence or under-reporting is being estimated. In studies where prevalence is
being estimated by sequential adjustment at each level of the reporting triangle,
uncertainty is often introduced in surveys or surveillance. For example, since is
rarely feasible to include the entire population of interest in a study,
survey/surveillance participants, whether they are patients, person who seek GP
treatment or physicians, may not be representative of the complete population (of
patients etc.). Published data may also suggest a range of figures for particular
factors such as the percent of patients with E. coli 0157 infection who have bloody
diarrhoea (Hedberg et al. 1997; Michel et al. 2000) and a degree of uncertainty is
often known to be involved in mortality and hospitalisation rates due to
misclassification (Mead et al. 1999).
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Such uncertainty may be accounted for by simple methods, such as multiplying
surveillance data by a factor to account for cases or deaths not picked up (Mead et al.
1999), or where estimates of a factor vary, using high and low estimates to calculate
a range of results (Hedberg et al. 1997; Thomas et al. 2006). Also, confidence or
credibility intervals are given both for figures from prior studies and for estimations
(Flint et al. 2005; Prattley et al. 2007; Weller & Stanberry 2007; Wheeler et al.
1999). Uncertainty is also reduced by including data from as many sources as
possible, which both increases the number of persons involved and provides are more
accurate representation of the range (Michel et al. 2000). The use of high and low
estimates, is not however, feasible when the data - as for the framework - is in terms
of a distribution, and there was only one source of data available. In addition, the
framework was developed in order than methods such as these, which produce
imprecise estimates, do not have to be used.
When a formal statistical model is developed (both in sequential studies and those
simply from surveillance data), techniques with increased statistical complexity can
be used. On such technique is that of inputting each coefficient, which accounts for
one level of the reporting triangle, as a distribution (Flint et al. 2005; MacDougall et
al. 2007; Prattley et al. 2007). Additionally, the final estimation is often presented as
a distribution. By using a distribution instead of a single figure or high and low
figures, the model allows for uncertainty within each calculation and in the final
result. Distributions that are used include the triangular distribution (Michel et al.
2000; Voetsch et al. 2004b), the normal distribution (Michel et al. 2000) and the
uniform distribution (Michel et al. 2000). Parameters in a model equation may also
be represented as probabilities, accounting for uncertainty within the estimation of
the parameter (de Vlas & Gryseels 1992). To further adjust for uncertainty, a model
may be run using a Monte Carlo simulation (Bradshaw et al. 2007; Groenewald et al.
2007; Joubert et al. 2007; MacDougall et al. 2007; Michel et al. 2000; Norman et al.
2007; Schneider et al. 2007a; Schneider et al. 2007b). As many as 10,000 or more
iterations may be done, with the large number ofmodel runs providing a more
detailed distribution. Such methods, however, are not feasible for a framework, such
as the one presented in this chapter, because a formal model is required to run a
simulation. As will be discussed in the next section, the ability to develop this
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framework into a formal model is currently limited by the known issue with the data
regarding the inclusion of household outbreaks as sporadic cases and the more
complex statistical techniques required.
Finally, using capture-recapture studies with confidence intervals may help reduce
uncertainty. The method involves using multiple data sets from the same population,
with prevalence being calculated based on the number of person listed on all data
sets and the number of persons listed on one or some of the data sets. By using
independent (or partially independent) data sets, the method allows for greater power
in the statistical analyses of prevalence (Rota et al. 2007). This method was not
feasible for the framework because data was only available from one source for
Scotland.
8.4.3.3 Uncertainty - methods used in the framework
The major limitation of the approach presented here is that it is a framework, rather
than a model. As a framework, approximate parameter values have been estimated
by inserting values suggested by models of the functions and distributions that are
included. Additional 'y, the final frameworks presented are not fully accurate
descriptions of the Scottish data, with further analyses and more information
regarding the data set, needed to come up with a final framework. Thus, unlike a
formal statistical model for which a specific equation has been determined and
hundreds or thousands (10,000 were done in above mentioned studies) of simulation
tests have been run to come up with parameter values in the form a distribution, there
is no formal or appropriate way to estimate uncertainty bounds. The next step would
be to develop the framework into a formal model so that a technique such as Monte
Carlo simulation could be used to run large numbers of model simulations.
However, for two reasons, it was decided not to further develop the framework at
this time. First, was the inability to properly use the framework without further
knowledge about the number and size ofhousehold events included within the
sporadic cases. Additionally, the framework needs to be expanded to account for the
variations of the probability of cases detection within an event, a step which requires
a significant increase in the complexity of the statistical analyses. As such, while the
sources of uncertainty have been discussed, a formal estimate of uncertainty bounds
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is not appropriate until the framework is developed into a model, at which point a
method such as Monte Carlo simulation can be used to estimate uncertainty bounds
for the parameters.
8.4.4 Exploration of the results from the framework
Exploration of the various potential distributions and functions and parameter values
revealed that there is no straightforward model for the distribution of event size
proportions in Scotland.
With no apparent published data on infectious disease event detection as a function
of event size, the Logistic Growth Law function was selected to describe the function
of the probability of case detection for two reasons. Firstly, a curve that was
asymptotic at both ends [e.g. sigmoidal] was considered to be necessary because the
probability of detection for any particular case, regardless of event size, is highly
unlikely ever to be zero or one. The fact that asymptomatic cases, which have the
highest potential to go unreported, are nevertheless reported (Locking et al. 2003a;
Locking et al. 2004; Locking et al. 2006a) suggests that every case has a non-zero
probability of detection. At the opposite end, it is extremely unlikely that any one
case would have certain probability ofbeing detected. Even in an instance where
symptoms are severe, testing sensitivity is often less than 100% (Michel et al. 2000).
Additionally, as evidenced by Figures 8.13 and 8.14, the Logistic Growth Law has a
great deal of flexibility in the shape of the curve, an important factor since the exact
shape of the detection curve is not known.
A range of distributions were considered for the distribution of the probability of
actual event occurrence. Since the actual distribution is clearly not known, some
assumptions must be based on the observed distribution. The observed distribution is
highly overdispersed and the actual distribution is likely to be overdispersed because
the events which are not being detected are likely to be smaller events, so the range is
not likely to vary much from that of the observed distributions and the proportion of
events that have one case is unlikely to decrease significantly. Due to this
overdispersion, the truncated negative binomial and logarithmic distributions were
considered to be the most appropriate distributions. The logarithmic distribution is
the limiting form of the negative binomial distribution when k approaches zero (and
320
thus overdispersion is highest) (Elliott 1971b), so can be used if the truncated
negative binomial distribution, even at low values of k (when over distribution is
highest) is not over-distributed enough for the purposes of the framework.
The first step in the frameworks was to look at the distribution of the probability of
actual event occurrence alone, the equivalent of a framework with a perfect
probability of detection for all event sizes. Selecting an appropriate distribution for
the actual event occurrence was vital because regardless of the probability of
detection, events will not be detected if the probability of occurrence is too low. Yet,
it is clear that modification of the distribution by the function of event detection is
necessary. When the household clusters are accounted for, the proportion of events
that are size one far exceeds that of any other event size. Since the function of case
detection increases with event size and the magnitude of the difference in proportions
between outbreaks of size one and size 2 is great, it would appear unlikely that this
difference would be only a function of the probability of case detection. Resultingly,
the distribution of the probability of actual event occurrence is most probably a major
influence in the difference between the proportions of events of size one and events
of size two or larger.
When complete frameworks were constructed, regardless of the distribution of event
occurrence selected, very similar issues arose. First, distribution parameter(s) were
selected to reflect the steep drop in proportions of detected events between events of
size one and two of -97% to -1%. Yet, even with a very steeply increasing function
of event detection, the predictions for counts/proportions of large outbreaks in the
final framework were not large enough. Contrastingly, a much more gradual
distribution shape was selected for event occurrence in order to ensure the
occurrence of large event. However, even with a very gradual, increasing function of
event detection, there was not a large enough difference between the proportions of
events of size one and larger events. The logarithmic distribution performed slightly




The results in Section 8.3.4 suggest that the distribution of the proportions of
detected event sizes cannot be completely accurately constructed using the
distributions and function explored in this chapter. However, the reasonable fit of
the final frameworks in 8.3.4 indicates that the approach and framework have
potential and provide clues about the reasons that for the difficulties in constructing
an appropriate framework. When the best fitting frameworks are examined, the
distribution of actual event occurrence can be described equally as well by a
truncated negative binomial or logarithmic distribution, though the logarithmic
framework will be discussed here. In either case the distribution has a relatively
gradual curve, with the probability of events of size one approximately twice that of
events of size two. The function of case detection is also not extreme, with a gentle
increase in case detection until about event size =20 followed by a steep increase
until maximum detection probability is effectively reached around event size=60.
The resulting framework predicts the proportions/counts for all events other than
those of size 2 fairly accurately (statistical measures of the framework fits using Chi-
square techniques were not possible because of the low counts). The only major
discrepancy between the framework and the observed distribution is in the
count/proportion for events of size 2. The number of single case events is under¬
estimated, and the number of events size 3 and 4 are moderately overestimated,
however these observed discrepancies are what could be expected given the issues
with the household events/outbreaks discussed below.
The issues with household events arise because HPS classifies household outbreak
cases as sporadic cases (SCIEH 2000b). For the purposes of this framework, each
epidemiologically linked cluster - sporadic case or outbreak - must be considered to
be a separate event because one of the assumptions of the function of event detection
is that the size of an event affects the probability that a case will be detected.
Household transmission is a well documented phenomenon (Belongia et al. 1993;
Marsh et al. 1992; Parry & Salmon 1998) and testing of household contacts is often
carried out in cases ofE. coli 0157 infection where transmission through an item or
person within the household is suspected (Parry & Salmon 1998). Therefore it
would be expected that a case that is part of a household outbreak would have a
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much greater chance of being detected than a true sporadic case with no other
epidemiologic linkage.
With an average household size of 2.7 in Scotland (General Register Office for
Scotland 2006), the decision to count household outbreak cases as separate events
would be expected to manifest itself in an observed distribution where there is an
over-reporting of single case events and an under-reporting of events from size two
up to ~ size five. Where each cluster is counted as a separate event, the expectation
is that fewer single case events would be reported and there would be an over-
reporting of events from size two to five. In the framework with the best fit to the
data, the predicted distribution matches the latter situation, which is what would be
expected from the actual, rather than observed data. This suggests that, despite the
issues discussed, the frameworks may be one possible fit for the data
When the data from the best fit framework is then used to estimate the overall
prevalence of events, the framework predicts that only 1.4% of events are detected,
with 98.6% of events going completely undetected (e.g. detected size zero). Based
on this detection estimate, the framework predicts that there were actually -138,000
events and approximately 361,600 cases from outbreaks with <20 cases between
1996 and 2004. These figures suggest that about 0.7% of cases are reported, which
is near the 2% lower estimate of the Canadian and American studies (Hedberg et al.
1997; Thomas et al. 2006). This estimate for the case detection rate seems low since
Scotland has a comprehensive enhanced surveillance program which attempts a
follow up of every reported case (Locking et al. 2003a). Such a program would be
anticipated to result in a higher detection rate as compared to larger countries such at
the United States, where the greater magnitude of case numbers (-200 per year in
Scotland as compared to -2000 in the United States) (Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention 2005e; Health Protection Scotland 2007b), the size of the covered
population and the number of levels of bureaucracy involved (local, county/parish,
state, federal etc.) make it difficult to follow up on all cases.
However, it is the predictions the framework makes about the magnitude of under¬
reporting in terms of event size that would appear to be less supported by existing
data. The best fitting framework suggests that fewer than 10% of the events which
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are detected as size one are actually size one, and that events larger than 20 cases are
being detected as size one. Also, of the outbreaks which have gone completely
undetected, fewer than half are predicted to be size one, with around ten percent of
the undetected events actually involving at least five cases. With the detailed follow-
up of the enhanced surveillance program (Locking et al. 2003b; Locking et al. 2003a)
and the PFGE typing of every isolate submitted to the Scottish E. coli 0157
reference laboratory (Locking et al. 2003b), it would at first seem highly unlikely
that 19 of 20 cases in an event would be missed. However, the explanation for lower
observed rates of infection may lie in low rates of health care uptake and low test
sensitivity (Michel et al. 2000). These prevent cases from ever coming to the
attention of the enhanced surveillance system. In addition, more than half of the
study period occurred prior to the implementation of enhanced surveillance.
However, if the final framework (see Figure 8.20) was applied to data before (1035
events) and after (892 events) the onset of enhanced surveillance, both detected event
size distributions were highly skewed (Table 8.2, lines a and c).
Table 8.2: Counts of detected event sizes, frameworks before and after the onset of enhanced
surveillance
The counts of event sizes when counts are calculated from the framework with c=0.82, A=0.98,
B=500 and Rho=1.15 using event size data (line a, b) before and (line c,d) after the onset of
enhanced surveillance (ES). Actual counts are in lines a and c, the counts based on the framework
proportions in lines b and d.
Size of Event
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11-20
a Before ES 1006 5 4 3 3 2 1 1 1 0 3
b framework 928 67 18 8 4 2 2 1 1 <1 2
c After ES 846 16 15 4 6 2 0 1 0 0 2
d framework 800 58 15 7 4 2 1 1 1 <1 2
Thus the framework fits were similar to that of the complete data set, with the
framework distribution overestimating the number of events with two cases and
underestimating the number of events with one case. The fit for the data after
enhanced surveillance was slightly better for events larger than size 2 (Table 8.2). A
slightly better fit (not shown) for the distribution prior to enhanced surveillance by
increasing the value for parameter B and lowering the value for parameter Rho in the
Log Growth Law function for case detection (see Section 8.3.3). As discussed in
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Section 8.3.3 the effect both of lowering Rho and raising B is to lower the rate of
case detection in events, which could suggest that case detection has improved with
the onset of enhanced surveillance.
The rate of patients seeking medical treatment for E. coli 0157 infections generally
depends upon the severity of symptoms, with a higher rate for patients with bloody
diarrhoea (Thomas et al. 2006). Studies suggest that approximately 45% (18 to 91%)
of cases involve bloody diarrhoea (Hedberg et al. 1997; Michel et al. 2000), and that
the rate of patients seeking care with bloody diarrhoea varies from 33% to 73% and
non bloody diarrhoea froml6% to 22%. Furthermore, rates of sample submission
and test sensitivity (especially when a longer period of time has elapsed between
onset of symptoms and the taking of a faecal sample) are as low at 18% (Michel et
al. 2000). Therefore, it is not impossible that many events are completely or largely
missed. The highest reported rates of infection tend to be amongst young children
and the elderly (Coia 1999). Evidence of infection has been found amongst farm
families with no history of diagnosed infection (Silvestro et al. 2004). Though these
results cannot be directly extrapolated to the whole population, they could suggest
that a large number oi infections in healthy adults do not cause any or severe
symptoms, and thus are never detected by surveillance systems. It is possible, then,
that larger events may only surface when the susceptible population contains a large
enough proportion of young children or elderly to result in an increase in physician
visits.
The best fit for the framework is still only one possible explanation for the
distribution of detected event sizes and there are other factors which may affect the
ability to find an adequate fit for the framework. First of all, the framework is not
designed to function in the situation where a larger outbreak may be detected
(completely or incompletely) as two or more smaller outbreaks. This is, of course,
the situation with household outbreaks, but may also occur in instances where the
'outbreak fragments' are events of two or more cases. If indeed, some events are
being detected as two or more separate events, the true distribution of detected events
sizes would be expected to be much more gradual, and thus more easily fitted using
the framework. Alternatively, it is possible that some larger outbreaks would be
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better split into a number of smaller events. In fact, the Wishaw Outbreak, for the
purposes of this chapter and other chapters (3 and 6), was considered to be five
smaller outbreaks. If this is true, the actual distribution of detected events
proportions would also be more gradual, but with a shorter right tail.
Also, in addressing the relationship between the probability of case detection and the
size of an event, it is assumed that every case in an event would have the same
probability of detection. In reality, this is probably not true because once a single
case has been detected, it would seem that the chance of second or further case being
detected is likely to increase. The probability of detection would increase because
the confirmation of infection in one family member, classmate or other contact
would seem to increase the chance that a person, especially one with symptoms
would come to the attention of public health professionals or individually seek
attention. The effect would be especially pronounced in event locations such as a
nurseries or care facilities, where screening is more likely to be done on contacts in
order to exclude infected persons until they are no longer shedding the bacteria (Al-
Jader et al. 1999; Belongia et al. 1993; Cheasty et al. 1998; Pickering et al. 1986). If
the above is true, the probability of the first case being detected would be linked to
their symptoms, and chance of seeking treatment, but the probability of subsequent
cases being detected is linked not only to the above factors, but to their connection to
the first case.
An attempt was made to find more adequately fitting frameworks by splitting the
detected event size distribution, allowing for different distributions of actual event
occurrence depending on event size. In split frameworks, the assumption is that
while there is only one function for the probability of case detection, there are two
event occurrence distributions. For instance, when c=0.66 and A=0.98, B=10 and
Rho=1.7, the framework predicted counts of 1906 and 20 for events of size one and
2, respectively (Table 8.1, Line 12, Fig. 8.23). If the value for c was adjusted to find
the most accurate counts for events of greater than size 2, the most appropriate was
c=0.8 (Table 8.1, Line 13). Whilst this split framework is still not a perfect fit for the
observed data, the possible fit of the data it suggests that the distribution of actual
event size may be best described by a mixture of distributions.
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Figure 8.23: Split frameworks for the distribution of the proportions of detected events
Two frameworks which are combined to create one framework for the distribution of the proportion
of detected events. Framework A, with c =0.66 is appropriate for events of size one and two, whilst
Framework B with c=0.8 is appropriate for events of size three or greater. For both frameworks the
parameters for the Logistic Growth Law are A=0.98, B=500, Rho=1.15.
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Like the final single framework, both separate
frameworks in this technique suggest at very high rates of under-reporting and many
cases in large events going undetected. However, the greater accuracy of this
framework, in particular the very accurate prediction for outbreaks of size two,
should be considered with caution given the issues discussed above about the
household outbreaks. If indeed the observed data overestimates the number of single
case events and underestimates the number of small events (2-5 cases) due to the
inclusion of household outbreak cases as sporadic cases, then an accurate prediction
of the proportions of smaller detected events would not be expected. This approach
does, however, suggest that the true distribution of actual event sizes may not as
simple as a single distribution, but in fact a mixed distribution. Mixed distributions
have been proposed as a method of describing biological patterns (Magurran &
Henderson 2003). In this instance, the authors are describing areas where a few
species are very common and most species are rare. They suggest that the common
species are log normally distributed while rare species "follow a log series
distribution". When these distributions are combined, the result is a skewed
distribution like the one for the distribution of detected event sizes proportions in E.
coli 0157 in Scotland. Exploration of mixed distributions is beyond the scope of this
thesis, but is a potential route of future exploration of the framework.
Finally, while seemingly adequate fits have been found for the distribution of the
proportions (or counts) of detected event sizes using the presented framework, the
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possibility that the framework is simply not appropriate must be considered. Since
prior studies suggest that only a small fraction of cases are detected (Michel et al.
2000; Thomas et al. 2006), it may be that the population of detected events is too
different from the actual population of events to extrapolate back from the detected
distribution. In particular, since many factors such as geographic region, age,
exposure to animals or animal faeces have been shown to affect the risk or chance of
infection (Bryant et al. 1989; Coia et al. 1998; Locking et al. 2001; Mead et al. 1997;
O'Brien et al. 2001a; Parry et al. 1998; Voetsch et al. 2006; Werber et al. 2007), there
may be too many contributing factors to be able to describe case detection in terms of
a simple function of event size.
It may also be that case detection is less strongly linked to event size, and more
closely related to other factors. Firstly, mode of transmission could be a factor if, for
instance, it was easier to track other potential cases through a link to a store or
restaurant where a foodbome outbreak occurred, rather than a link to an infected
animal or faeces (linked to an environmental outbreak). Another factor could be
time period, e.g. whether the case occurred when there was great publicity due to a
large ongoing event(s) - such as the Wishaw Outbreak (Cowden et al. 2001),
Walkerton Outbreak (O'Connor 2002) or the Spinach Outbreak (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention 2006h) during which there was more awareness ofE. coli
0157 and thus potentially a higher rate of patients seeking medical care and being
tested). A final factor could be location, for example if an event took place in
location where more samples were tested for E. coli 0157. If such factors are
predominant in determining the probability of case detection, then a framework like
the one explored here, which assumes case detection to be a function of event size
and/or detection order of the case, would be unlikely to be able to appropriately
framework case detection. In this instance, the best method of estimating prevalence
would likely be the existing method of step wise estimation using data from
population, physician and laboratory studies. However the estimate would have to be
adjusted based on the factor or factors shown to be of influence. For instance, if
cases were more likely to be detected in a certain region, then the estimation data
would need to be waited to account for the disparity in detection. Additionally, the
framework may not be appropriate because of the necessity to delineate cases by
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event, a task that is complicated by the lack of an unequivocal way of identifying an
event. For this chapter, all outbreaks except one (Wishaw Outbreak) were assumed
to be individual events, but it is possible that some or many of the other 4 outbreaks
of 5 or more cases, according to the definition in the chapter, are actually several
events. However, since case by case information on outbreaks was not available due
to reasons ofmaintaining patient anonymity, it is not possible at this time to
determine which outbreaks might be composites of several events. If data on
household outbreaks could be made available, the framework could be applied with
more precision. Otherwise the degree of error - i.e. the number of sporadic cases
that are in fact part of larger events — must be roughly estimated if the framework is
to be used. An estimate of the error could be made if either a histogram of household
outbreak sizes or the number of household outbreaks was available. Fitting the
model to data from other countries where all the outbreak definition includes
household clusters would help to validate the model. However, the model could not
be fitted to the Canadian data because single case data was only available for all
VTEC cases, rather than just E. coli 0157, and also could not be fitted to the United
States data because ofmissing data on confirmed outbreak size, particularly in 1998
and 1999 (see 4.2.1.2), the lack of single case data on only laboratory confirmed
cases ofE. coli 0157 (see 4.2.1.1) after 2001 and the significant changes in outbreak
numbers in 1998 due to a change in reporting practices (see Section 4.2.3.2 for
further details).
8.4.6 Further use of the framework - discussion of issues
As discussed earlier, due to lack of data on sporadic cases, it was not practical to test
the framework with data from Canada or the United States or to develop the
framework into a formal model. However, if data were to be obtained from either of
these countries or another country, when considering the applicability of the
framework, there are a number of issues which must be considered. The primary
consideration is that the mechanisms behind the distribution/functions of actual event
sizes and detected event sizes may differ between countries.
The size distribution of events detected (and then listed in data sets) in each country
could potentially depend on the type(s) of surveillance and detection methods being
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used, the definition of an outbreak used in surveillance and the underlying
distribution of actual event sizes. Firstly, in countries such as Scotland where there
is extensive enhanced surveillance which includes an attempted follow-up of all
persons with confirmed infection (Locking et al. 2003a), there may be a higher
chance of linking together cases in an outbreak. Increased linkage of cases has the
potential to result in more large events being reported and fewer single case events.
Furthermore, depending on whether or not the definition of an outbreak includes
events within a single household outbreak, the resulting distribution may be more or
less skewed. The time period being considered when constructing a distribution of
detected event sizes (which would vary depending on the data available from a
country) might also affect outbreak sizes. For instance, one or a few large and/or
well publicised outbreaks in a short-term data set could influence a distribution if the
publicity and/or investigation surrounding an outbreak resulted in more sporadic
cases being detected. For instance, the investigations surrounding the Wishaw
Outbreak resulted in the detection of 7 outbreak cases for which no link to the source
of contamination could be found (Cowden et al. 2001). This, however, is not likely
to be a significant issue when using data sets that span 8 or 9 years, such as one from
Scotland.
It may also be the case that the underlying distributions of actual event sizes differ
between countries. Variation between distributions in actual event sizes could lead
to differences in the sizes of events being detected. Hypothetical reasons for
differing underlying distributions could include variations in control measures and in
the predominant modes of transmission. For example, control measures which
improve the speed of infection recognition and/or reduce the possibilities for
secondary infection could result in a reduction in the average event size.
Additionally, the size of events could be affected by the primary or secondary mode
of transmission in an outbreak. As shown in the last chapter, it appears that
outbreaks with particular primary or secondary modes of transmission have
statistically significantly higher rates of secondary cases. Thus the predominant
mode(s) ofprimary or secondary transmission in a country could potentially have an
affect on the size of events. The frequency ofmodes of primary or secondary
transmission could be affected by other factors including the age distribution of the
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population and the urban/rural split of the population. For instance, a population
where the majority of the population lives in very urban areas may be more likely to
have outbreaks which are spread by food rather than by environmental contact.
Additionally, the applicability of the framework to countries other than Scotland
could be influenced by the factors which affect case detection. These factors include
the guidelines regarding the taking of faecal samples, and the accuracy of testing. A
country where all samples from all patients with diarrhoea are cultured for the
bacteria would likely have a higher detection rate than one where samples are only
taken for culture from patients with bloody diarrhoea. Equally, where more accurate
testing techniques are used, the likelihood of additional cases in an event being
detected increases.
The level of public awareness about symptoms and the availability of affordable
medical treatment could also affect the rate of detection by influencing the number of
persons who seek medical treatment when they or a family member have symptoms.
Investigational techniques also have the potential to influence the detection rate of
infections. For instance, in a country such as Japan where widespread screening of
case contacts is sometimes performed as part of an outbreak investigation (Akashi et
al. 1994), the probability of subsequent cases being detected is much higher than in
countries where such screening is not done for practical or economic reasons.
Finally, the setting of an event could also play a role in the probability of case
detection. For example, cases which are part of an outbreak at a nursery might have
a higher chance of detection because young children are more likely to have severe
symptoms. If the predominant settings for outbreaks vary between countries than the
probability of event detection may be different.
If the framework presented in this chapter is to be developed into a model that can be
used for other countries besides Scotland the factors discussed must be taken into
account. The differences between countries might be adjusted for simply by
changing the parameter values in the lunction or distributions involved or by using
another function/distribution. However, if the influences regarding event detection
are too complicated in a particular country to be explained by a single or mixture of
functions/distributions, the framework would not be used. It may also be possible
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that the combination of factors makes it impossible to find an appropriate distribution
to adequately describe the distribution of actual event sizes.
8.4.7 Further development of the framework - validation
Another step that can be taken if the framework is developed into a proper model is
for the model to be validated. At present, the lack of complete data about household
outbreaks makes validation impractical as a final model cannot yet be determined. If
a model(s) can be constructed for one or more countries, validation of the approach
could potentially be accomplished through a number ofmethods. The only
completely accurate method of validation would be to do a study of the entire
population included in the model. Since the framework has been developed in order
to provide an estimate because it is impossible to survey an entire country, this
approach is clearly not practical.
However, there are two methods in which surveys could possibly be used to validate
a model or models. Firstly, if accurate surveillance data can be acquired from two or
three countries, the approach could be validated by seeing whether the same model
(or models with different distributions according to the epidemiological factors in the
individual countries) could be used in the countries. Since it may not be feasible to
properly validate the approach if different models are required for each country, a
more accurate method would likely be to focus on a specific region within a country.
For instance, more detail about infection and outbreaks are available from the states
and cities in the United States which are part of the Food-Net (active) surveillance
network. If the data from one or more of the involved states/regions was modelled,
and the modelling results could be compared to the estimates of prevalence based on
the active surveillance studies that have been done. A similar method of validation
could potentially be developed using the Canadian provinces involved in the NSAGI
study, however the approach is not likely to be feasible in Scotland given the low
outbreak and case counts overall.
However, a potential problem with validating a future model using data from past
surveys or active surveillance is the difference in case definitions. For the
framework, a case is considered to be an E. coli 0157 infection that would be picked
up by current detection methods. However, surveys such as NSAGI and IID,
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primarily detect infections which are severe enough to cause symptoms of note to the
patient. Even where surveys of the general community are done, they are usually by
phone and thus based on general symptoms with no follow-up to determine the actual
pathogen (if any) involved (Imhoff et al. 2004).
One other possible validation method is to the split the data set randomly and fit the
framework to half the data. If the model is valid, then the parameters from this fit
should be a good fit for the remainder of the data. This process could be repeated
with multiple times using a computer program to randomly select a different halfof
the data each time.
8.4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, a new framework for estimating the prevalence ofE. coli 0157 has
been introduced, explored and discussed. Designed to avoid the inaccuracies in other
estimation methods which rely on assessing the number of cases lost to surveillance
at various stages between infection and reporting, the new method involves
modelling the distribution of the proportions of detected events sizes. When the
modelling was carried out, the logarithmic distribution appeared to be most accurate
for the probabilities of event size occurrence and the Logistic Growth Law was used
for the function of case detection. The ability to find an adequate model was
hampered by differences in the way household events (or outbreaks) are defined by
HPS and in this approach. The best fitting model using this distribution suggests that
there is a very high (>99%) degree of under-reporting with a high magnitude of
under-detection of cases within events, and an actual event size distribution which is
much more gradual and less skewed towards smaller events than the observed
distribution.
A number of concerns arise with this framework, including the issue with regards to
household outbreaks and the assumption made that the probability of detection is
identical for each case within a single event. However, the aim of this chapter was
not necessarily to find a perfect fit for the Scottish data, but to determine whether a
distribution based modelling approach might be suitable for estimation of case/event
prevalence in Scotland. The construction of a model that is a reasonable fit to the
data when the issues of household outbreaks were taken into account, suggests that
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the approach is valid, though the possibility must always be considered that this
framework is not appropriate even though a possibly adequate model was found.
Furthermore, the work done in constructing and testing the model has highlighted a
number of directions in which the framework can be taken in order to find a better fit
for the Scottish data. These directions include the use of other distributions or
functions, especially mixed distributions for the probabilities of actual event
occurrence, and adjusting the function of case detection to allow for differing case
detection probabilities within a single event.
Further exploration of this framework with these new directions could potentially
lead to a more accurate estimation of the prevalence ofE. coli 0157 in Scotland. It
is anticipated that a more accurate model, particular with regards to the household
outbreak cases would predict a slightly higher rate of event detection with fewer
large events going completely or mostly undetected. If this further exploration leads
to a model that is a better fit and can be validated, the framework may be used to for
estimation of prevalence in other countries, in particular to see whether the estimates
agree with those calculated in prior studies using step-wise methods (Adak et al.
2002; Bender et al. 2004; Hedberg et al. 1997; Majowicz et al. 2005; Michel et al.
2000; Thomas et al. 2006). It is hoped that an accurate estimation based on models
using the approach outlined in this chapter can compliment and improve estimations
of case loss between infection and detection, with the end goal of providing
epidemiologists and CsPHMs with a clearer picture of the magnitude ofE. coli 0157
infection in Scotland.
In summary, the study in this chapter has shown that true case prevalence can
potentially be estimated using a framework based on the function of case detection
and the distribution of actual event sizes. The models constructed using the
framework suggest that the level of under-reporting in Scotland is higher than levels
estimated for England & Wales, Canada and Scotland. However more exploration is
needed to validate the approach, and to determine whether the framework is truly
appropriate. Future pathways of exploration include the use ofmixed distributions
and an adjustment of the framework to make case detection of a function of event
size and the order in which a case is detected within an outbreak.
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In the following and final chapter, the conclusions of the studies in each chapter will
be summarised, with a discussion of future research directions suggested by the study
results.
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Chapter 9 — Conclusions and future directions
E. coli 0157 has become a significant contributor to infectious intestinal illness in
the developed world, and increasingly in the developing world (Nataro & Kaper
1998). Major outbreaks with more than 250 associated illnesses in Scotland, Canada
and the United States, as well as hundreds or thousands of sporadic cases, have
resulted in high costs (Frenzen et al. 2005; O'Connor 2002; Roberts & Upton 2000).
These costs are both economic and in terms ofmortality and morbidity - particularly
of young children. As a result, the bacterium has been the subject of a substantial
amount of research, focusing on microbiological (Friedrich et al. 2002), clinical (Tarr
et al. 1990) and epidemiological (Rangel et al. 2005; Renter & Sargeant 2002)
factors. However there have been several facets ofE. coli 0157 epidemiology that
have not been addressed in the published literature. The research presented in this
thesis has thus been conducted to fill in some of these gaps. The major focus of this
thesis has been on statistical analysis of outbreaks and prevalence, with the three
main foci of the research being temporal trends, secondary and primary cases in
outbreaks and estimation of infection prevalence. Chapter 1 presented a brief
literature review ofE. coli 0157 as well the issues of under-reporting and
surveillance. The following five chapters, 2-6, provided statistical analyses of
temporal trends in outbreak and cases in the three individual countries covered in this
thesis: Scotland, the United States and Canada. These analyses were done in order to
provide context for the comparison of temporal trends between these countries in
Chapter 6, whilst Chapter 7 examined the characteristics ofprimary and secondary
cases in E. coli 0157 outbreaks detailed in the published literature. The chapter also
included a statistical analysis of the relationship between secondary case rates and
modes of primary and secondary transmission, median age and country. Chapter 8
was an exploration of a framework for estimating true case prevalence using Scottish
data from 1996 to 2004. In this final chapter, the conclusions of these chapters will
be briefly summarised, and the future directions suggested by these results will be
discussed.
9.1 Temporal trends
The results in Chapters 3 (Scotland), 4 (United States) and 5 (Canada) indicated that
the approach of using simple linear regression models to describe temporal trends in
both outbreaks and cases was statistically appropriate in some, but not all cases.
337
Regardless of the country being analysed, two major factors were responsible for the
inability to model certain trends. The first factor was low case or outbreak counts,
due to a relatively short time period being analysed and/or a low number of
outbreaks overall. The United States data set, in particular, had a shorter time period.
This was because changes in the reporting practices, which resulted in a noticeable
increase in the number of reported outbreaks (Lynch et al. 2006), meant that data
could only be analysed for the period since 1998. Thus where counts for each year
were highly variable (e.g. ranging from 2 to 252 ill cases in animal/environmental
outbreaks per year) or very low (e.g. no more than 5 waterborne outbreaks per year),
generalised linear models were not always able to accurately describe the trends.
Low counts were also a problem, particular in Scotland where there were as few as
three outbreaks in 1996 and 1998. Also, mode of transmission categories that tended
to have low counts such as animal/environmental and waterborne were difficult to
model. The second factor was large outbreaks which acted as potential outliers and
thus reduced the ability of the trends involving case numbers to be adequately
modelled using simple linear models. In each of the three countries, there were one
or two outbreaks which involved more than 400 ill cases - the Wishaw Outbreak in
Scotland, the Washington County Fair and Layton Avenue Sizzler Outbreaks in the
United States and the Walkerton Outbreak in Canada (Cowden et al. 2001; New
York State Department of Health 2000; O'Connor 2002; Proctor 2000a). In
particular with the Scottish data, trends involving case numbers could not be
appropriately modelled until these large outbreaks were removed from the data set.
In order to allow the Scottish data to be modelled without completely excluding the
Wishaw Outbreak cases, the trends were also modelled with the Wishaw Outbreak
split into five outbreaks, the largest including 118 cases (as in the cohorts suggested
by Cowden et. al, see Section 3.2.3.2). Clusters that shared an infection source, but
were geographically distinct have been considered as separate outbreaks in other
countries (Michino et al. 1999).
However, despite these difficulties with some of the variables, for the rest of the
variables, simple linear models did fit the data. In Scotland the results suggested that
there has been a decrease in sporadic cases and events, but not in the number of
outbreaks or outbreak cases. However, outbreaks do appear to be involving fewer
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cases, as there were statistically significant decreases in the number of ill and
positive cases per outbreak and per foodborne outbreak. There were also statistically
significant decreasing temporal trends in foodborne cases, which would appear to
confirm that food is becoming a less significant factor in infection transmission (or
non-foodborne outbreaks are becoming more significant factors). Finally, analysis of
the Scottish data would appear to support statements regarding a shift in dominant
outbreak phage types (Locking et al. 2003c), as outbreaks were statistically
significantly less likely to be PT2 and more likely to be PT21/28 over the course of
the time period. Additionally, the results suggest that the Wishaw Outbreak could be
acting as a statistical outlier, and could possibly be considered as five (or more)
separate outbreaks for the purposes of trend modelling. Contrastingly in the United
States, analysed in Chapter 4, there was a statistically significant decline in the
number of ill cases in outbreaks, both overall and for waterborne and foodborne
outbreaks. Finally, the study of the Canadian trends in Chapter 5 suggested that
outbreaks are increasing in size, both overall and for non-foodborne modes of
transmission such as water and person to person contact.
The analyses of the three separate countries were brought together in Chapter 6,
which is the first statistical comparison of temporal trends in the published literature.
This comparison indicated that there were almost no statistically significant
differences in temporal trends between countries. Though the statistical power of the
comparison was limited by the short time period being compared (only 1998 to 2003
for all three countries), the few statistically significant differences in temporal trends
could potentially be explained by the missing data from some provinces in the
Canadian data set. The effect of this missing data was briefly explored by analysing
data with and without the provinces/territories for which the largest amount of data
was missing. While these analyses provided some perspective on how the missing
data may have affected the results, this is one aspect of the study which could be
further investigation. Such future explorations will be discussed in the next section.
9.2 Future directions for analyses of temporal trends
The analyses in Chapters 2-6 have established that some trends in E. coli 0157
outbreak and cases can be modelled using simple linear regression models.
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Furthermore there are some statistically significant trends in E. coli 0157 outbreak
and cases, but few statistically significant differences in these trends between
countries. These findings are of interest because they provide the first evidence that
some temporal trends can be statistically analysed using simple linear models and
that the majority of these trends do not vary statistically significantly between
countries. Yet they are only a first step towards investigation of these trends, and
there are a number of future directions to build upon them. One of the major
concerns regarding the study was the data because the time period was less than ten
years and both in the United States and in Canada, the data sets were acknowledged
to be incomplete. With two or three more years having elapsed since the receipt of
the data sets, a new analysis including the data from 2004 (Canada) or 2005 through
2006 (or soon 2007) would permit a full ten years of data to be analysed. Allowing
for delays in data release due to the need for the respective agencies to check arid
clean the data prior to allowing it to be accessed by researchers, such data should be
available. Adding this data would provide more statistical power for detecting trends
and suggest whether any of the detected trends in Chapters 2-6 are no longer
statistically significant. In particular, the numbers ofE. coli 0157 infections in
Scotland have increased in 2006, and are thus far, higher again in 2007 as compared
to the same period in 2006. This increase may have resulted in a less (or non)
statistically significantly decreasing trend in sporadic cases than noted in Chapter 3.
Additionally, as the Canadian data set was recently collated, more complete
information might be available. However, the official data sets made available for
this thesis did not include data for years beyond 2004, so analyses of longer time
periods could not be conducted. Also, it would be of interest to obtain more precise
data from the United States and Canada on total and sporadic cases, as the current
data was taken from web-based sources and the definitions for case inclusion not
identical to that for the outbreak data sets. Official data for sporadic cases was not
available for this thesis. If this data could be obtained for future studies, it would
allow a more accurate analysis of trends in outbreaks in Scotland, and sporadic cases
in all three countries.
There are issues concerning data protection with regards to sporadic case data, but
only the aggregated month by month data is needed for analysis. Thus, if the data
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could be stripped of patient identifiers and the data released only in terms of cases
per month, it appears that the research needs and patient confidentiality needs could
both be met. Even for months with only a handful of cases, the lack of any other
information besides case numbers and the lack of press attention to single cases make
it highly unlikely that data aggregated by month could ever be linked to a specific
person.
Another point of future research is the large outbreaks -Wishaw, Walkerton,
Washington County Fair and Layton Avenue Sizzler. As shown in Chapter 3,
subdividing the Wishaw Outbreak into five smaller outbreaks (suggested by cohorts
listed in a published report (Cowden et al. 2001)) allowed trends to be modelled
without completely excluding the outbreak. It did not appear that the Walkerton
Outbreak could be subdivided by cohorts, but there was not enough information on
the latter two outbreaks (in the United States) to determine whether subdivisions
would be possible. Additionally, more than 30 cases in the Wishaw Outbreak could
not be assigned to a cohort based on the available information (Cowden et al. 2001).
Thus it would be of great interest to get more detailed case information on the above
mentioned large outbreaks as well as a number of large outbreaks which have
occurred in 2005 and 2006 such as the spinach outbreak in the United States (Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention 2006h). This would make it possible to examine
in greater depth whether such outbreaks might be considered as clusters of smaller
outbreaks when looking at long term trends or whether they are truly large outbreaks.
Finally, since some trends could not be described by simple linear regression models,
future studies could explore techniques that might be able to describe these trends. In
particular, ifmore specific time information - e.g. day by day or month by month -
could be obtained for all of the data sets, the additional data points might enable
other trends to be modelled. Using data subdivided by time periods less than a year
would require additional analysis to remove the effects of seasonal trends. However,
techniques -such as including year and month (or day) as variables, have been
successfully used to model temporal trends (Guerin et al. 2005b). Additionally, as
mentioned above, it would seem that monthly data on sporadic cases could be
released with compromising patient confidentiality. Whilst there might be more
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issues regarding month by month data for outbreaks in Scotland, outbreak data is
already publicly released on a quarterly basis in the HPS Weekly Report and the
month of outbreaks is not infrequently made known via published reports, news
stories and peer reviewed articles. Also, it would be of interest to compare trends in
other countries for which data was not available for this thesis with the trends in
Scotland, Canada and the United States. Ofparticular would a comparison with
England & Wales because despite the fact that the countries share a land border
(between England & Scotland), rates of infection in England & Wales have
consistently been lower than those in Scotland (Coia 1999). In addition, the
surveillance systems in Scotland and England & Wales use the same outbreak
definitions (Wall et al. 1996), so a comparison between these two countries could be
made without the need for detailed sporadic case data. A final direction for future
exploration would be to see if these simple linear regression models are adequate for
describing trends in other infectious pathogens such as Salmonella and
Campylobacter. As Salmonella, in particular, has been under surveillance for a
longer than E. coli 0157 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2005e), data
should be available for a longer time period, potentially enhancing the statistical
power of the models.
9.3 Primary and secondary cases in outbreaks
In Chapter 7, the analyses of data from published reports on outbreaks in nine
different countries, suggested that approximately 19% of cases in outbreaks are due
to secondary transmission (as based on the definition used in this thesis).
Additionally, the results indicated - that as with temporal trends - statistically
significant differences in the numbers of primary and secondary cases and rates of
secondary infection did not exist between countries. There were statistically
significant differences in the geometric mean number of ill and positive cases
outbreaks between countries, but this was not unexpected, given that the analyses in
Chapter 6 indicated that there were statistically significant differences between the
three countries analysed in Chapters 2-6 in the mean number of cases per outbreak.
However, the results indicate that median age and secondary mode of transmission,
but not primary mode of transmission, were statistically significant factors in
determining the rate of secondary cases. In particular, outbreaks where the median
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age was less than 6 and outbreaks where the mode of secondary transmission was
person to person spread in a nursery school setting.
9.4 Future directions for analyses of primary and secondary cases in outbreaks
One of the primary limitations of this study on secondary cases was the biases
inherent in taking data only from published studies. The analyses indicated that the
outbreaks included from several countries were statistically significantly larger than
the general population of reported outbreaks in countries where outbreak data sets
were available. In addition, the data set for the study was, for example, biased
towards outbreaks from the United States and England & Wales since these were the
countries with the largest number of published papers in English on outbreak. In
addition, it was clear that the lack of reports in English limited the number of
Japanese outbreaks included, and may have affected the inclusion of outbreaks from
Scandinavia. (The analysis was limited to countries with established E. coli 0157
outbreak reporting systems). Furthermore, because published reports were used for
the data, secondary cases were not always explicitly defined (e.g. (Gammie et al.
1996; Hilbom et al. 1999; Marsh et al. 1992)) and when they were defined, these
definitions varied between outbreaks (Bell et al. 1994; Ostroff et al. 1990)). Thus the
designation of secondary cases had to be made based only on the information
provided in the paper. This information was not always complete and may have
reflected the biases of the organisations and researchers involved (personal
communication, Mary Locking, HPS).
However, the results obtained appear to suggest risk factors for higher incidences of
secondary cases - e.g. secondary transmission in a nursery and young age, and so
confirming the findings using more comprehensive data should be the first step in
any future studies. In particular, a primary focus of any future explorations would be
to obtain more complete outbreak information directly from national data sets rather
than using data from published papers. (The data sets provided for Chapters 2-6 did
not include information on secondary cases). This would not only permit a larger
number of outbreaks to be analysed, but would also allow secondary cases to
identified and defined with more precision. Equally as important, detailed
information of outbreaks might help to clarify the primary mode of transmission,
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which was missing for some of outbreaks (-29% of the 90 in the study) where the
published report concentrated on the secondary mode of transmission. Additionally,
data sets would likely provide information on more recent outbreaks (2003 and
onwards) which are less likely to have so-far been detailed in published papers.
Including these recent outbreaks would help because non-foodborne modes of
transmission have been more commonly reported in recent years in some countries,
including Scotland (Strachan et al. 2006), in recent years. Thus a more inclusive
analysis would help to further clarify the role ofmode of primary and secondary
transmission in secondary case rates.
Also, since age had statistically significant role in determining the rate of secondary
cases, an analysis of the role of age using exact age data should be a focus in any
future investigations. Median age data is of use for looking at broad patterns, but
especially for small outbreaks or outbreaks with widely varying groups of patient
ages, the median may not be an accurate measure of the ages within an outbreak. For
instance, if an outbreak has two person of age 2 and three persons of age 98, the
median age would be 98, despite 40% of patients being only two years old. Thus
using the average age instead ofmedian age or even also looking at factors such as
the percentage of persons in an outbreak below (or above) a certain age might
provide a more accurate picture ofhow age affects the number of secondary cases.
However, patient by patient data on ages or even enough data to determine average
age was not available from enough of the published reports to permit such in depth
analysis. Another factor which was not included in the Chapter 7 analyses due to
lack of information in the papers was the male to female ratio of cases, both primary
and secondary cases. It has been noted that women generally make up a greater
percentage of cases, with the exception usually being young children (Locking et al.
2003b; Locking et al. 2003a; Michel et al. 1998; Parry & Palmer 2005). Thus the
extension of this study to look at the sex ratio of outbreak cases, specifically primary
cases versus secondary cases, might help to further elucidate the factors driving
secondary case rates, especially if infection rates are linked to both patient sex and
age.
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These are all possibilities for future research, but the results in the study do suggest
actions that can be taken or reinforced without any further studies. Given that the
results indicated that young age and person to person contact in nurseries were
statistically significantly associated with higher rates of secondary cases, the study
reaffirms the need to promote proper hygiene practices amongst pupils and staff in
nursery schools, and amongst young persons in general (Al-Jader et al. 1999).
Prevention measures, advocated already in many countries (Chin 2000; Hawker et al.
2001; Keene et al. 1994; O'Brien et al. 2001b), such as hand-washing and careful
monitoring or exclusion of non toilet trained children from the water in pools and
other swimming areas not only could aid in preventing infections in nursery schools,
but also in places like petting zoos and water parks.
9.5 Exploration of a framework for estimating the prevalence of E. coli 0157
infections
The final study of this thesis suggested that a framework based on the distribution of
detected event sizes has potential as a method for more accurately estimating the true
prevalence ofE. coli 0157 infection. Though the framework was only explored
using Scottish data because of limitations with the United States and Canadian data
sets, it was possible to construct models that predicted distributions of actual event
sizes which were similar to the distribution of detected event sizes in Scotland. Even
though these models may not be completely accurate, it was of interest to note that
the models suggested that if under-reporting rates in Scotland and other countries are
similar, the estimates ofunder-reporting from existing studies may be too low. The
model in the study suggested that fewer than 0.5% of outbreak cases were reported,
as compared 2% (low end of the range) in studies in Canada and the United States
(Bender et al. 2004; Michel et al. 2000). More specifically, the model indicated that
even in reported outbreaks, many cases may be going undetected, and thus efforts
should be continued to enhance and improve surveillance to detect cases that are not
being reported. Whether or not these findings are representative of all countries is
unknown, and a number of issues were discussed which should be further explored to
affirm or question the proposed framework as a new method for estimating E. coli
0157 prevalence.
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9.6 Future directions in estimating the true prevalence of E. coli 0157
The framework presented has potential promise as a different and potentially more
accurate and more descriptive method for estimating case prevalence. Yet, the study
presented should only be a first step, as there are a number of future pathways to
expand and enhanced the current findings. These pathways could not be included in
the current study because they either required data that was not available or
significantly more complicated statistical analyses. Firstly, the use of a framework
based on a distribution of events was hampered by differences in the definition of
outbreaks. Specifically, in Scotland, cases that were part of outbreaks within a single
household were considered to be sporadic cases (Locking ct al. 2003a), and since
information on these cases was not available for this thesis, it was not possible to
create an entirely accurate plot of the distribution of event sizes. Specifically,
models underestimated the number of single case events and overestimated the
number of small (<5) case events. The explorations of the framework suggested that
appropriately fitting models could possibly be constructed for distributions with
fewer single case events and more events of 2 - 5 cases - the case if single household
outbreaks were classified as single events. Thus, it would be of great benefit ifmore
information on the single household outbreaks - ideally the number and size - could
be obtained. Additionally, if data on sporadic case data for E. coli 0157 cases alone
could be obtained from Canada and Scotland (currently the number of sporadic cases
is estimated from the number of total cases and the number of outbreak cases and
only the total number ofVTEC cases is available for Canada), the framework could
be applied to these event distributions in these countries. The ability to explore the
framework with several different data sets could provide more evidence as to
whether the framework is appropriate, and if so, whether it is "appropriate for
countries other than Scotland. Most importantly, the low number of events in
Scotland has made statistically validating the fit of the framework to the data not
possible. However there are sufficient numbers of events in the United States to
allow for the fit to be statistically validated.
Another future direction would be to adjust the framework equations in order to take
into account the fact that the probability of case detection may not only be influenced
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by the size of an event, but by the order in which is a case is detected. For instance,
the probability of the first case in an event being detected may be less than the
probability of a subsequent case being detected. This is likely to be a point of serious
consideration in large outbreaks where some cases may be detected due to testing or
surveys initiated after the discovery of an initial cluster of cases. However, this
adjustment would have required a much more complex statistic analysis, which was
not feasible as part of this thesis. Additional factors could influence case detection
probabilities, for instance if outbreak investigators are more likely to screen contacts
of existing cases if an outbreak is in a certain location or spread by a certain method.
For instance, an outbreak in a restaurant or food store might result in the staff being
tested (McDonnell et al. 1997), whilst the staffwould not be tested if the outbreak
were in a pool or a petting zoo (Gage et al. 2001; Verma et al. 2007).
As discussed in Chapter 8, it would be of interest to explore further the possibility
that the distribution of actual event sizes may not be a single distribution, but rather a
mixture of distributions. Magurran and Henderson present a mixture distribution for
describing the distribution of species in an environment, which was developed to
explain distributions with a greater abundance of rare (or in outbreak terms, small)
species (Magurran & Henderson 2003). This mixture distribution, which includes a
log series distribution and a log normal distribution could considered rather than a
single distribution for actual event sizes. However, caution has to be taken to avoid
over-parameterisation, as one of the issues with the current framework is that low
count numbers with the Scottish data and large numbers ofparameters make it
impossible to statistically asses the model fits.
The last future direction for the framework would be to apply the model to infectious
diseases other than E. coli 0157 which occur singly and in outbreaks. Two strong
possibilities are Campylobacter and Salmonella, the numbers ofwhich are thought to
be underreported at even greater rates than E. coli 0157 (Thomas et al. 2006;
Voetsch et al. 2004b). Not only would better estimates of cases numbers for these
pathogens be helpful in assessing prevention programs, but there are several
advantages to using such data for testing the framework. First of all, these pathogens
have been under surveillance for many more years in some countries, so data is
347
available in greater depth and for a longer period of time. Additionally, the reported
rates of these two pathogens are much higher than for E. coli 0157 (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention 2005e), thus the counts per year and/or month are
much higher (the yearly reported counts ofSalmonella in Scotland ranging from
approximately 1000 to 3300, and the counts of Campylobacter from approximately
4300 to 6400) (Health Protection Scotland 2007a; Health Protection Scotland 2007e).
A larger quantity of data not only makes it easier to test the fit ofmodels, but allows
the construction of a distribution of detected event sizes that better represents the
reported population of a pathogen.
9.7 Overall conclusion
In this thesis, studies have been presented which advance and enhance the current
knowledge ofE. coli 0157 trends, outbreak case characteristics and prevalence
estimation techniques. Of the more important findings are the fact that it appears that
country is not an important factor in outbreak and case trends or in the rates of
secondary cases in outbreaks. Additionally, the thesis indicated that many outbreak
and case trends can be described adequately by simple linear regression models, and
that mode of secondary transmission and median age are significant factors in
determining the rate of secondary cases in outbreaks. Also, a framework based on
event size distributions has the potential for more accurately estimating the true
prevalence ofE. coli 0157 cases. These findings not only statistically confirm
existing statements about E. coli 0157 epidemiology and prevention methods, but
also suggest new ways of examining epidemiological factors, in particular looking at
outbreaks as whole, rather than outbreak by outbreak. Most importantly, it is hoped
that the results from studies in this thesis will also be considered as the impetus for
future research to build and expand on the epidemiological research into E. coli
Ol 57 as well as infectious intestinal diseases in general.
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